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“In the name of Allah, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II 
 
  
“Indeed, we offered the Trust to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, and they declined to bear it and 
feared it; but man [undertook to] bear it. Indeed, he was unjust and ignorant” (Quran, 33:72) 
 
“And fear a Day when you will be returned to Allah. Then every soul will be compensated for what it earned, and 
they will not be treated unjustly” (Quran, 2:281) 
 
 “O you, who have believed, fear Allah and give up what remains [due to you] of interest, if you should be 
believers” (Quran, 2:278) 
 
“And O my people, give full measure and weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their due and do not 
commit abuse on the earth, spreading corruption” (Quran, 11:85) 
 
 
“Say, indeed, my prayer, my rites of sacrifice, my living and my dying are for Allah, Lord of the worlds” (Quran, 
6:162) 
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Abstract  
    This study explores the concept of accountability in Islamic Banks (IB), which may achieve 
through disclosure. It aims to measuring the bank’s disclosure levels which contains Sharia, Social 
and Financial (SSF) as well as determinants and consequences of this disclosure. It moreover 
aims to identify the gap between Islamic banks’ board and stakeholders concerned with the 
accountabilities priorities of IBs. To achieve these objectives the researcher conducted six 
empirical studies. The first three empirical studies uses content analysis to measuring compliance 
level with Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) 
standards as well as measuring the and sharia, social and financial disclosure (SSFD). It 
furthermore adopts Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to identify the determinants of SSF reporting 
related to firm characteristics and corporate governance of Board of Directors (BOD) and Sharia 
Supervisory Board (SSB). The fourth empirical study uses the same method (manual content 
analysis) and OLS to measuring the economic consequences of SSFD on the firm value through 
testing the impacts of disclosure on market capitalization and return on assets. The fifth 
empirical study adopts questionnaire as well as Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) to 
measures the non-economic consequences of SSFD though surveying the perceptions of 
stakeholders who deal with IBs about the increasing SSFD on loyalty; trust and satisfaction. 
Finally, the sixth empirical study uses questionnaire to explore the consequences of SSF practices 
on the perceptions 600 stakeholders who deal with IBs and non-customers who do not deal with 
IBs. Highlighting the distinctions between economic and non-economic consequences of 
disclosure in the study enables the researcher to obtain greater insights into the implications of 
SSF reporting. Moreover, exploring accountability practices from different viewpoints 
(management, stakeholders and non-customers) and based on different methods (content 
analysis and questionnaire) allows the researcher to obtain greater insights into IBs 
accountabilities’ practices.  
This study provides several interesting findings. With regard to the disclosure and compliance 
levels, the study finds a variation between IBs in the number of SSFs disclosed, with a notably 
low level of non-financial reporting (Sharia and social). It also finds high compliance level with 
AAOIFI standards related to financial and Sharia reporting and low compliance levels with social 
reporting requirements. Concerning with the determinants of disclosure; the analysis shows 
positive significant association of disclosure levels with existing Sharia auditing department; 
auditor; size and profitability. It also finds that corporate governance mechanisms play an 
important role in improving SSF reporting. The analysis indicates that corporate governance 
mechanism of board of directors (BOD) as well as Sharia supervisory board (SSB) are the main 
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determinants behind the disclosure levels for IBs such as SSB size, SSB reputation; BOD 
independence, duality in position and ownership structure.    
Concerned with the economic consequences of disclosure, the study finds that Sharia, social 
and overall disclosures have a positive impact on Firm Value (FV) based on the accounting-
based measure (ROA). It moreover finds that Sharia and overall disclosure has a positive 
significant impact on the FV based on market-based measure (Market Capitalization). It argues 
that the association between disclosure and FV is sensitive to the category of disclosure and the 
proxy employed for FV. Consequently, the study provides evidence that the SSF disclosures not 
derived from the same factors, and both have a different impact on firm value. With regard to 
the non-economic consequences of disclosure, the results indicate that there is a significant 
association between disclosure and stakeholders’ trust, satisfaction, and loyalty. The results 
furthermore indicate that there is a partial mediating of trust and satisfaction in the relationship 
between disclosure and loyalty.  
    A pyramid of IBs’ accountabilities from stakeholders’ perspectives shows the importance of 
Sharia, then financial and social accountability for both stakeholders and non-customers. It 
moreover shows that the main criterion of stakeholder’s selection of IBs was Sharia, financial 
then social factors. Stakeholders who deal with IBs are satisfied about the practices of these 
banks. Both of groups believe that IBs may guide by Sharia, financial then social objectives.  
    The results identifies gap between the orientation of IBs’ board based on the disclosure and 
orientation of stakeholders and non-customers based on their perceptions towards SSF 
accountability. The main originality for this study is measuring SSFD for most of Islamic banks 
around the world from different perspectives and methods as well as identifies the main 
determinants and consequences of this disclosure. These results have several implications for 
regulators, policy makers, managers, IBs, investors, FASB and AAOIFI. For instance, the 
present study has revealed that disclosure of SSFs - especially non-financial ones - was limited in 
many annual reports as well as websites. Therefore, regulatory bodies may identify a minimum 
level of SSFs to publish by each IB.   The study has crucial implications to how IBs may improve 
its Sharia compliance disclosures to create a competitive advantage. The present study is one of 
the first to investigate the determinants and consequences for SSF disclosure for IBs based on a 
holistic model. Moreover, the current study is one of the first to investigate the non-economic 
consequences for corporate disclosure. The current study has some limitations, in either sample 
or data; disclosure indices; approach; or in its research methodology, which have to consider as 
potential avenues for future research. 
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Chapter one: Introduction  
1.1 Overview 
          Islamic banks as Muslims entities (according to Islamic approach) are accountable towards 
Allah (God) as he said “And fear a Day when you will be returned to Allah. Then every soul will be 
compensated for what it earned, and they will not be treated unjustly” (Quran “The Islamic holy book”, 2:281). 
IBs are also accountable towards stakeholders and society in general. This accountability as 
Islamic banks involves compliance with Sharia1 (Sharia accountability); servicing society (social 
accountability) and achieving high financial performance with high quality services (financial 
accountability). These accountabilities can be proven through disclosure and full transparency as 
Allah orders us “And O my people, give full measure and weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their 
due and do not commit abuse on the earth, spreading corruption“ (Quran, 11:85). Disclosure is a crucial 
aspect of the accountability function of IBs to its stakeholders. Therefore, it is required that IBs 
disclose as much information in a succinct, truthful and comprehensible method to its 
stakeholders. 
  In recent years, a sizeable body of literature indicates a major increase in interest in disclosure 
(e.g. Moumen et al., 2015; Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2006). This interest contains studies focused on disclosure level, as well as the 
determinants and consequences of increased disclosure levels (Elzahar et al., 2015; Farag et al., 
2014; Farook et al., 2011; Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010; Maali et al., 2006). These studies show 
that disclosure reporting plays an important role in improving communication with stakeholders. 
It also shows that disclosure have a positive impact on the reputation, image, and financial 
performance as well as Firm Value (FV) of banks (Uyar and Kilic, 2012; Anam et al., 2011; Wang 
1 Sharia is Islamic law, which embodies all aspects of Islamic faith including believes and practice. 
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et al., 2008; Schwaiger, 2004). These studies explain financial performance while providing a 
broader analysis of a firm operating activities and strategies. 
    SSFs aspects are crucial measures of performance that are disclosed by IBs directors in order 
to help the stakeholders analyse the firm’s performance as well as to see to what extent their 
banks are achieving their accountabilities particularly related to compliance with Sharia. SSF 
factors are the main disclosures that could be useful to the users of annual reports. By analysing 
SSF information, different users could evaluate the financial performance of the firm and assess 
the current competitive position. Moreover, it assists all interested parties to approve the 
fundamental basis of these banks, which is compliance with Sharia through Sharia Supervisory 
Board Report (SSBR), and prove the role of Islamic banks towards society through Corporate 
Social Responsibility Report (CSRR). Even the financial aspect supports the previous two 
aspects through presenting Zakat2 statement and Qard Hassan 3 statement, which considered 
Sharia and social accountabilities. AAOIFI provides guidance for achieving best practice in terms 
of SSF disclosure (AAOIFI, 2010). It issues accounting as well as governance standards to 
support all IFIs as well as IBs in their SSF practices.  
In general, most research studies to date have examined the determinants and economic 
consequences of either overall disclosure or particular types of disclosure. Numerous studies 
examined the factors that affecting disclosure suggesting that corporate governance (CG) 
attributes as well as firm characteristics are the key drivers for corporate disclosure, either as a 
whole (e.g., Samaha et al., 2015; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Elshandidy et al., 
2011; Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009) or for different types of disclosure such as risk reporting (e.g. 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Abraham and Cox, 2007); online reporting (e.g. Abdelsalam and Street, 
2007); and intellectual capital disclosure (Li et al., 2008). The other stream of research has shown 
the usefulness of corporate disclosure on stock market participants’ decisions. For instance, 
2 Zakat is An Islamic tax imposed on the rich or having wealth above the prescribed minimum and given back 
mainly to the poor and needy and It is calculated by 2.5% 
3 Qard Hassan is Loan fixed for a definite period of time without interest or Charitable loan with no interest 
2 
 
                                               
several studies tested the effect of corporate disclosure on the cost of capital (e.g., Beyer et al., 
2010; Kothari et al., 2009); firm value (e.g. Hassan et al., 2009; Servaes and Tamayo, 2013); share 
price anticipation of earnings (e.g. Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Hussainey and Walker, 2009) and 
analysts’ forecast accuracy (e.g. Yu, 2010). Notably, the majority of previous studies have just 
focused on one category of disclosure (Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSRD) or 
risk disclosure) and used data for non-Islamic banks. However, these studies have not provided 
evidence on the factors determining disclosure regardless of SSF for Islamic banks. The majority 
of the previous studies that measuring disclosure levels and determinants in context of IBs have 
not measuring Sharia compliance disclosure separately from CSRD and have not adopted 
AAOIFI as a benchmark particularly after issuing a newer version in 2010 followed by another 
one in 2014. Similarly, there is a lack of evidence on the influence of each of the SSF factors on 
FV exclusively for IBs. Finally, none of the previous studies explore the impacts of SSF 
disclosure on the stakeholders’ loyalty as well as trust and satisfaction.    
  Despite the importance of SSF information, it appears that there are a limited number of 
studies, which have looked at SSF reporting and for most of IBs around the world (e.g. Khan et 
al., 2013; Bukhari et al., 2013). Moreover, there are limited studies that measured compliance 
with AAOIFI (Ahmed and Khatun, 2013) or adopt AAOIFI as a benchmark for SSF reporting 
(Vinnicombe, 2010; Hafij, 2013). Despite the impacts of SSF information whether economic or 
non-economic, it appears that there are a rare number of studies which have looked at the 
economic consequences of SSF disclosure on the firm value generally and on Islamic banks 
particularly (e.g. Elzahar et al., 2015; Dong et al., 2015; Hassan et al., 2009). It is appears also that 
there are no previous studies measuring the non-economic consequences of disclosure.  
   To the best of the author’s knowledge, there has been no study to have explored the three 
category of disclosure (Sharia, social and financial reporting), or to have shown variations among 
Islamic banks in practice around the world. There is limited study that adopts AAOIFI as a best 
practice for SSF reporting for IBs based on the latest versions (2010 and 2014). Moreover, 
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previous studies have not examined how SSF reporting could influence a firm’s value for Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, previous studies have not measured the non-economic consequences of 
disclosure through exploring the impacts of increased SSF disclosure on the stakeholders’ loyalty. 
AAOIFI offers an interesting benchmark by which to conduct this study. Overall, this research 
will contribute to the existing disclosure literature and could have policy implications for IBs. 
Thus, this study seeks to explore the accountabilities for most of IBs around the world based 
on a holistic index that contain three dimensions (SSF). The current study aims to measure these 
accountabilities from different perspectives to build a holistic image about IBs’ accountabilities. 
First, this study explores this topic through measuring these accountabilities from the viewpoint 
of IBs, based on disclosure levels in their annual report and websites, to see how IBs’ disclosure 
levels reflect these dimensions. Second, the study measures main factors behind SSF disclosure 
related to firm characteristics and CG concerned with BOD and SSB. Third, this study explores 
the market reaction by testing the impacts of increased disclosure about SSF accountabilities on 
the FV as well as financial performance or profitability. Fourth, the current study explores this 
issue from the viewpoint of stakeholders who deal with IBs by assessing the impacts of SSF 
disclosure on the loyalty as well as trust and satisfaction of external stakeholders. Fifth, the study 
measures this matter from stakeholders’ standpoint (investor; customers; non-customers) by 
surveying their perceptions and expectations of IBs’ practices of SSF accountabilities.  
   The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 1.2 outlines the definition of Islamic 
Sharia as a basis for this study. Section 1.3 shows the main basis for Islamic banks. Section 1.4 
reflects the importance of this study though show the growing in Muslim as well as number of 
IBs. Section 1.5 outlines the nature of the study. Section 1.6 highlights the main research gaps 
and the main reasons that motivate the current study to investigate SSF reporting of IBs. Section 
1.7 introduces the research objectives, research questions and research hypotheses. Section 1.8 
provides details about the research methodology, which includes the sample selection and 
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variables measurements concerned with each question. Originality and contributions of the study 
presented in Section 1.9. The structure of the current study discussed in Section 1.10 
1.2 Islamic sharia  
   Literally, the word ‘Sharia’ is a derivative of the Arabic three-lettered word ‘Sha’ra’aa’ which 
means to make a way, Another derivative ‘Sha’rei’ means the way or the road. In Islamic 
terminology, the word ‘Sha’ra’aa’ means to make a law and the derivative ‘Sharia’ stands for the 
divine law made by Allah the Almighty. According to Aghnides (1916) Sharia is defined by the 
scholars as “that which would not be known had there not been a divine revelation” (p.23). 
Sharia, Sardar (2003) defined as “a system of ethics and values covering all aspects of life (e.g., 
personal, social, political, economic, and intellectual) with its unchanging bearings as well as its 
major means of adjusting to change” (p.17). In other words, it reflects the holistic view of Islam, 
which is a complete and integrated code of life encompassing all aspects of life, be they 
individual or social, both in this world and the Hereafter. According to Imam al-Ghazzali, the 
objective of the Sharia is to promote the well-being of all mankind, which lies in safeguarding 
their faith (din), their human self (nafs), their intellect (`aql), their posterity (nasl) and their wealth 
(mal). Whatever ensures the safeguard of these five serves public interest and is desirable. Al-
Shatibi approves of al-Ghazzali’s list and sequence, thereby indicating that they are the most 
preferable in terms of their harmony with the Sharia’s essence (Chapra, 2000). Technically and 
broadly speaking Sharia has a wider concept of a divine law which is not confined only to 
Muslims and their book but all the people of scripture including Jews and Christians and their 
books like the Torah and Bible also have their shared common values and recognition in this 
divine law. In other words it is the law of those people of the book who follow a divine faith or 
any monotheistic religion. 
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1.3 Islamic Banks  
     Islamic banking and finance has is a result of Islamic injunctions in relations to everyday 
dealing with economy, business and finance. The term of Islamic banking means that conduct of 
banking operations is in line with the guidance of Sharia law. Sharia law which governs the 
operations of IBs comes from four sources, namely the Quran, hadith, Ijma’ and Qiyas. While 
the Quran and hadith are the primary source of Sharia, both ijma’ and qiyas are considered 
secondary and only applied when no solution on the matter in question neither found in the 
Quran nor hadith. There are many verses in Quran indicating the principles used as guidance for 
IBs in their operational affairs (Haron and Shanmugam, 1997). The crucial prohibition in Islamic 
banking is payment and receipt of riba (interest/usury) at a fixed or predetermined rate, maysir 
(gambling), gharar (speculation), fraud, exploitation and extortion (Damak et al., 2009; Usmani, 
2009). Hence, the restriction of certain sources of earnings is particularly a distinctive plank that 
distinguished the Islamic economic system from the conventional financial system (Asutay, 2009). 
    The prohibition of usury in the Islamic banking system is only one part of the Islamic 
economic principles. As an Islamic business institution, all Islamic banks not only have to run 
their business to achieve their goal of making profit, but at the same time, they are expected to 
adhere to the rules and laws of Sharia. The Quranic position, hence, is that it is compulsory for 
Muslims and they are strongly advised not to deal in riba. Islamic moral economy has 
implications for the nature of business and financial transactions, as certain sectors and 
economic activities are not considered lawful; such as companies producing tobacco, alcohol, 
drugs, weapon, or engaged in the business of gambling, casinos, nightclubs and prostitution are 
also not allowed. These transactions are considered haram (unlawful) because they can affect 
human health and instigate moral problems. Beside of the prohibition of riba, the Islamic 
financial system encourages risk sharing, equity based transaction, and stake-taking economic 
system (Asutay, 2009). Muslim jurists have recommended various principles to be adopted by 
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IBs in delivering their product and services. These principles are broadly divided into four 
categories namely, profit-loss sharing, fees or charges based, free service and ancillary principles.  
1.4 Growing of Muslims population and Islamic funds  
      The importance of this research comes from growing the Islamic banking and estimations for 
its investments around the world as well as growing the number of Muslims around the world. 
The world’s Muslim population4 is expected to increase by about 35% in the next 20 years as 
presented in figure 1, rising from 1.6 billion in 2010 to 2.2 billion by 2030, according to new 
population projections by the Pew Research Centre’s Forum on Religion & Public Life. If 
current trends continue, Muslims will make up 26.4% of the world’s total projected population 
of 8.3 billion in 2030, up from 23.4% of the estimated 2010 world population of 6.9 billion. This 
growing has a reflection on increasing demand for IBs’ services which supporting them to find a 
way for investing their money that comply with Sharia.    
Figure 1: Growing Muslims  
 
             Pew Research centre (2015) 
4  In a religious sense, the Islamic Ummah refers to those who adhere to the teachings of Islam, referred to 
as Muslims. As of 2012, over 1.6 billion or about 23.4% of the world population are Muslims. By the percentage of 
the total population in a region considering themselves Muslim, 24.8% in Asia-Oceania do, 91.2% in the Middle 
East-North Africa, 29.6% in Sub-Saharan Africa, around 6.0% in Europe, and 0.6% in the Americas (Pew Research, 
2015).  
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    Commonly synonymous with ‘interest-free’ banking, Islamic Banking has become a growing 
force in global financial circles over the past three decades, with IBs found in over 70 countries 
worldwide (Warde, 2000). The Islamic finance industry has expanded rapidly over the past 
decade, growing at 10-12% annually (World Bank, 2015). Today, Sharia-compliant financial 
assets are estimated the size of the Islamic Finance market in terms of assets at $2.1 Trillion as of 
the end of 2014, with growth at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 17.3% between 
2009 and 2014 covering bank and non-bank financial institutions, capital markets, money 
markets and insurance (Takaful) (Islamic finance, 2015). In many majority Muslim countries, 
Islamic banking assets have been growing faster than conventional banking assets. There has also 
been a surge of interest in Islamic finance from non-Muslim countries such as the UK, 
Luxembourg, South Africa, and Hong Kong (World Bank, 2015). Ernst & Young estimates that 
Islamic banking assets grew at an annual rate of 17.6% between 2009 and 2014, and will grow by 
an average of 19.7% a year to 2018 (Economist, 2015).  
Figure 2: Growing Islamic funds around the world  
 
    Islamic finance, 2015 
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1.5 The nature of the study 
      Islamic banks requested to disclose all information that reflects its identity on the concept of 
accountability. Accountability from an Islamic approach is wider than the Western context as it 
contains accountability to Allah then (similar with Western approach) accountability towards 
stakeholders. Accountability can be measuring for Islamic banks through reporting which shows 
to what extent the performance and practices of these banks reflects its accountability towards 
Allah and its stakeholders. Maali et al., (2006), categorizes three broad objectives that used as the 
basis for accountability disclosures by IBs; to show compliance with Sharia, to show how the 
operations of the business have affected the wellbeing of the Islamic community, and to help 
Muslims perform their religious duties. Islamic banks as will other financial institutions guide by 
achieving high returns for its shareholders and provide high quality services for its customers 
(financial accountability). IBs, similar to other financial firms, expected to provide good financial 
and governance performance (Belal et al., 2014). 
    Secondly, IBs represented part of Islamic society and it may consider its accountability 
towards this society through charity, Qard Hassan and finance developed and social projects 
(social accountability). CSR reporting based on Gray et al (1995) in this sense “... extends the 
accountability of organisations, beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account to 
owners of capital, in particular shareholders” (p.3). IFIs promote a social and ethical identity and 
the promotion of social welfare and justice are significant to IBs as part of their CSR (Haniffa 
and Hudaib, 2007). Finally, in the context of Islam, the key aim of IFIs’ reporting is to show that 
their activities in compliance with Sharia principles (Baydoun and Willet, 2000). Hasan and Siti-
Nabiha (2010) argue that issues regarding accountability in IBs need further research. Hameed 
(2001) claims that disclosure about Sharia compliance is one of the essential Islamic accounting 
purposes. IBs may consider the three accountabilities by equal weight and different priorities.      
In attempting to distinguish between SSF disclosures, this study will add to the existing 
disclosure literature. SSF information may be of a high quality if this information is to be useful 
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for the users of annual reports. Therefore, the starting point of this study has been to assess SSF 
reporting. Researchers have attempted to measure disclosure level for Islamic banks mainly 
through using self-constructed indices (e.g. Volkov and Smith, 2015; Moumen et al., 2015). 
However, most of the previous attempts have been criticised due to focusing on one dimension, 
which is CSRD (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006), which lead to increased need for 
research that accounts for the three accountabilities. 
The study uses the resultant SSF reporting scores to explore the variation among IBs’ SSF 
disclosure practices. Then, these scores used to examine the determinants and consequences of 
SSF reporting. Most published studies on the determinants of disclosure have not distinguished 
between Sharia and social accountabilities (e.g. Abdul Rahman et al., 2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012). 
Instead, accounting research usually measuring the impacts of disclosure on the cost of capital, 
analysts’ forecasts, financial performance and share price anticipation of earnings (e.g., Wang et 
al., 2013; Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Kothari et al., 2009). Moreover, most or all previous 
studies on the consequences of disclosure have just focused on the economic impacts rather 
than analysing how non-economic factors impact on the stakeholders’ behaviour (e.g., Volkov 
and Smith, 2015; Moumen et al., 2015; Elzahar et al., 2015). Finally, no previous studies 
exploring SSF accountabilities effects on the perceptions of non-customers regarding IBs. 
   The distinction between each category of disclosure as well as distinction between economic 
and non-economic consequences of disclosure allows the present study to participate actively in 
the development of empirical disclosure studies in general and particularly for Islamic banks. 
More specifically, it enables the researcher to investigate the factors affecting each dimension. In 
turn, the study tests the influence of SSF reporting on firm value. The study also measures the 
impacts of aggregate SSF disclosure on the stakeholders’ trust, satisfaction and loyalty.  
      The limited disclosure about the essential accountabilities (SSF) draws and reflects negative 
as well as unclear image about the true and core of IBs. It also increases the negative attitudes 
from stakeholders about these institutions and increasing the negative criticism towards IBs. 
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Thus;  identify disclosure level about these accountabilities and identify the main determinates 
behind SSFD and consequences from increasing level of this disclosure is a critical issue for IBs 
which can assist and support them to enhancing their image and construct a competitive 
advantage and differentiate them comparing with others (conventional banks). Furthermore 
determining the gap between perspectives of board and external stakeholders towards these 
accountabilities is the first step to mitigate this gap then support the uniqueness of IBs.  
1.6 Gaps and motivations 
Islam usually asks for an enhancement in the level of information disclosed by institutions as 
IBs. From an Islamic perspective, the key purpose of corporate reporting that overrides other 
objectives is to allow Islamic enterprises to show their compliance with Sharia (Baydoun and 
Willett, 2000). The consequence of this objective is that IBs have a responsibility to disclose all 
information essential to its stakeholders about their operations (Maali et al., 2006). Full disclosure 
about all accountabilities of IBs derived from the divine duty of accountability that each Muslim 
bears. However, this is not to say that Allah needs to know through disclosure the activities of 
the IBs. Indeed, Allah knows and hears everything and is Omniscient: ‘I know what you reveal and I 
know what you hide’ (Quran, 4:33). ‘He knows what is manifest and He knows what is hidden’ (Quran, 
96:7). Rather, IBs have a duty to disclose their compliance with the Sharia to stakeholders. Maali 
et al (2006), explains “the requirement for Muslims to uncover the truth is intended to help the 
community to know the effect of a person or a business on its wellbeing” (p.273).  
   The existing body of literature on disclosure can divided into three strands. The first strand 
adopts content analysis to measuring the corporate disclosure level as described in the annual 
reports (e.g., Moumen et al., 2015). The second strand explores the determinants of disclosure 
(e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2011). The third strand explores the economic 
consequences of disclosure (Elzahar et al., 2015; Hussainey and Mouselli, 2010). In spite of the 
richness of SSF disclosure content, there is no study that provides a full picture of SSF reporting 
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practices regarding with Islamic banks. The closest studies to this research either look only at the 
level of one type of SSF disclosure (i.e. Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006), or focus 
only on one country or one bank or limited IBs (e.g., Belal et al., 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 
2013). Therefore, the first motivation for conducting this study is to address this research gap by 
looking at the characteristics of SSF reporting in one index for most of IBs around the world.   
   The second strand that explores the determinants of corporate disclosure is in the early 
research stage– to the best of my knowledge – there is a paucity of empirical study testing this 
issue (e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2011). However, both of these studies focus on one 
of my disclosure themes (CSRD). In the first strand, the existing body of literature on 
compliance with AAOIFI focused on using content analysis to explore the compliance level with 
AAOIFI based only on annual reports (e.g., Ullah, 2013; Ahmed and Khatun, 2013; Vinnicombe, 
2010; Al-Baluchi, 2006). However, the determinants of disclosure and compliance with AAOIFI 
that contain firm characteristics and CG mechanisms for BOD and SSB have not yet been 
investigated empirically, particularly for IBs that adopt AAOIFI. 
   The second motivation is related to examine the determinants of corporate SSF reporting. A 
limited number of studies have examined the determinants of SSF reporting (e.g., Farag et al., 
2014; Wang and Hussainey, 2013; Farook et al., 2011; Hussainey and Al-Najjar 2011). The 
closest studies to this study have either limited their analyses to social disclosure (e.g., Belal et al., 
2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) or have ignored the majority of CG variables, (e.g., Samaha et 
al., 2015; Elshandidy et al., 2013) particularly related to SSB- or just have used data for one 
country, (e.g., Bukhari et al., 2013; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013). This study addresses this gap in 
the literature by testing the effect of numerous CG mechanisms related to BOD and SSB, and 
other firm characteristics on SSF reporting. These analyses would provide evidence on whether 
SSF of such reporting are derived from the same factors. 
   There have been very few empirical studies investigating the association between SSB report 
and firm as well as national characteristics in the Islamic banking sector. Few studies investigate 
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disclosure of SSB reports to explore CSR of IBs (e.g., Farook et al., 2011), while limited research 
explores AAOIFI governance standards that focus on compliance with Sharia. This study 
determines the disclosure level for each bank and each country related to SSB report separately 
not as a dimension in a CSR model as prior studies (Maali et al., 2006). This study provides novel 
evidence on the effect of cultural, legal and economic variables on the level of disclosure of 
Sharia compliance. Fourth, this study introduces an SSB disclosure index, which focuses on two 
categories, the first relates to the elements of SSB report and the second focuses on SSB 
members and their responsibilities. 
  The existing body of CSR literature in IBs focuses on either the level of CSRD (e.g., Aribi and 
Gao, 2012; Abdul Rahman et al., 2010) or the determinants of CSRD (e.g., Farook et al., 2011). 
Most of the previous studies that explore CSRD conducted before the issuance of AAOIFI 
governance standard No.7 that represents a benchmark of CSRD in IBs. Thus, this study 
motivated to explore the compliance levels of this standard by IBs and their potential 
determinants based on best practices of AAOIFI governance standard No.7.   
The number of sample banks used in the literature was limited as acknowledged by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2007). My sample is relatively large (117) compared to the largest study so far (90 in Mallinb 
et al., 2014). It also more comprehensive based on exploring all accountabilities for IBs. Although a 
number of studies referred to AAOIFI standards (Hassan and Harahap, 2010), none of them add 
AAOIFI standards items in the indices that tested as standard No.7 for CSR; standards No.1 for 
presentations and disclosure in the annual report and standards No.1, 2 and 5 for SSB report in one 
study. Moreover, this study intended to bridge a gap between the three components of social, 
Sharia and financial disclosure levels. There has been broad researches measure the corporate 
disclosure for banks (e.g., Ibrahim et al., 2011) without dividing between the three 
accountabilities factors. In addition, accountability as an issue for IBs has been unexplored 
(Hasan and Siti-Nabiha, 2010). This research is motivated by the question about the difference 
between the required information that may be published in the corporate annual reports based 
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on the Islamic perspective as well as Islamic standards as AAOIFI, and what is presently being 
practised by these banks around the world (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006; 
Lewis 2001). Most of literature that tested disclosure for IBs focused mainly on measuring the 
disclosure levels with few studies exploring the determinants of corporate disclosure (e.g., Sarea 
and Hanefah, 2013; Ousama and Fatima, 2010).  
There has been very few studies that measured the compliance with AAOIFI and 
determinants of disclosure for banks those adopt these standards. Most of the existing research 
has focused on exploring the compliance level with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) (e.g., Aljifri, 2008; Akhtaruddin, 2005) and with national financial standards (e.g., Fekete 
et al., 2008). Little is known about the compliance level with AAOFII standards (Ullah, 2013; 
Vinnicombe, 2010). Moreover, this study motivated by incentive research, which focuses on 
corporate governance (CG) with BOD as a main category in the CG structure and ignores SSB, 
which represents one of the main components in the CG for IBs. Most of the previous studies 
which explore corporate governance as a factor behind the disclosure level have focused on CG 
variables related to BOD (e.g., Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Bokpin, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012). A limited number of studies explore CG related to SSB as a 
unique mechanism for IBs (e.g., Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Farook et al., 2011). Thus, this 
study aims to fill this gap by exploring the impacts of CG related to BOD and SSB for IBs that 
adopt AAOIFI and measuring to what extent, these variables affect multi-disclosure levels at the 
corporate level. The study of AAOFII accounting standards has grown in recent years with 
substantial contributions from scholars such as Ahmed and Khatun (2013), Hassan and Harahap 
(2010), Vinnicombe (2010). It is notable, however, that the focus of most of these studies is 
descriptive or analytical in nature, emphasising in particular the compliance level with AAOIFI 
without extending their study to explore the main factors behind the disclosure level. The 
present research adds a large-scale academic study examining compliance with AAOIFI 
mandatory disclosures after 2010 (based on the updated version of AAOIFI standards). 
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    The third motivation for this study arises from the need to examine to what extent SSF 
reporting could affect firm value. More specifically, the study investigates whether reporting have 
different effects on market capitalization (MC) and Return on Assets (ROA). SSF information 
involves different categories of information that might be attractive to annual report users. It 
incorporates important information that refers to financial and non-financial information that 
concerned with Sharia and social. Although, previous research has shown the impact of different 
types of reporting in different contexts (e.g., Hussainey and Walker, 2009; Hassan et al., 2009), 
these studies have not provided strong evidence on the potential impact on the firm value. One 
of the main explanations for the mixed results in previous research is the lack of a 
comprehensive and objective measure of disclosure (Beattie et al., 2004). This would add to the 
existing literature, as there is no study –as far as I know- that examines the value relevance of 
SSF reporting in terms of firm value. 
One of motivations behind this research is that the impact of disclosure on FV is still seen as 
an empirical issue (Hassan et al., 2009). As pointed out by Al-Akra et al., (2010), there is little 
empirical evidence to support that association. Thus, this research is motivated to conduct an 
empirical study on IBs to show to what extent disclosure about Sharia, social and financial can 
add value for these banks. It also motivated by rare studies that explore the impacts of different 
kind of disclosure on the FV. Teoh and Thong (1984) focused solely on the social disclosure. 
Vogel (2005) argues that results related to the link between disclosure and FV are remaining 
inconclusive. Such inconclusiveness creates ground for further investigation not just for CSRD, 
but also for other kinds of disclosure. Elzahar (2013) argued that link between FV and disclosure 
is sensitive to the type of disclosure and the proxy employed for FV. This argument is asking for 
further research for IBs. Astonishingly, there is a general absence of academic research that 
investigates the prospective economic consequences and valuation implications Sharia and social 
disclosure for IBs. This study is motivated by a lack of research on financial reporting disclosures 
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and by calls for research on the valuation implications of disclosures (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009; 
Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). 
     The fourth motivation for this study arises from the need to examine to what extent SSF 
reporting could effect on the behaviour of the stakeholders as loyalty and trust. Prior literature 
has been exploring the link between trust, satisfaction and loyalty in banks from a marketing-
theory perspective (Bernhardt et al., 2000) and in particular for Islamic banks (Butt and Aftab, 
2012).  They found support for this association and their impact on financial performance and 
profitability. Customer satisfaction and loyalty positively related to profitability and market share 
(Anderson et al., 1994). There are many studies measure the economic consequences of 
disclosure on financial performance, cost of equity firm value, analysts’ forecasts and share price 
anticipation of earnings (Elzahar et al., 2015; Volkov and Smith, 2015). 
    To date, the literature has devoted insufficient attention to establish a theoretical framework 
and empirical analysis of the effect of disclosure on customer loyalty in Islamic banks. Academic 
literature provides evidence on the effects of CSR activities on customer loyalty (Perez et al., 
2012).  Other studies provide confirmation on the effect of satisfaction on loyalty (Amin et al., 
2011) and trust on loyalty (Kaur et al., 2012). Furthermore, academic literature provides evidence 
on the economic consequences for disclosure (Moumen et al., 2015). However, insufficient 
attention has been given to the non-economic impact of disclosure on loyalty (moderated by 
trust and satisfaction) in IBs. Limited research investigates the association between disclosure 
variables and social exchange variables in explaining stakeholders’ loyalty (He et al., 2012). 
Therefore, this study provides an integrated framework to fill the gaps in current literature. 
The fifth motivation for this study comes from the need to explore the perceptions of different 
stakeholders (who deal as well as who do not deal with Islamic banks) about the accountabilities 
of Islamic banks. This study motivated by several gaps in the previous studies. First, In the case 
of Islamic banking, the previous studies attempted to study customer satisfaction upon Islamic 
banking service quality are still scanty (e.g., Abduh, 2011; Golmohammadi and Jahandideh, 2010; 
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Osman et al., 2009). The previous studies indicated that the role of social accountability in 
determining customer satisfaction has received little research attention (Fornell et al., 2006). 
None of the previous studies explore the perceptions of Muslims who deal as well as who do not 
deal about the Sharia, social and financial practices of Islamic banks. This study also motivated 
by filling the gap in literature that focusing only on the perceptions about CSR Pérez and Bosque, 
(2015); Martínez et al., (2014) to add supplementary dimensions relate to Sharia and financial 
practices. Furthermore, Taap et al., (2011) adopt a SERVQUAL model, which represents only 
one dimension (financial).   
1.7 Research Objectives, Questions and Hypotheses 
1.7.1 Research objectives 
The main aim for this study is exploring and measuring the SSF practices for IBs and its 
impact. To achieve this aim the current study seeks to address five principal objectives.  First, it 
aims to identify the extent to which Islamic banks disclose information about SSF. Thus, this 
study surveyed the Quran to determine the main accountabilities (SSF) for IBs and to provide a 
proper measure or index for SSF reporting based on AAOIFI and concerned literature. Based on 
these steps, this study measured the disclosure level of SSF reporting for most of the IBs around 
the world as well as measuring the compliance level for IBs that have fully adopted AAOIFI 
(this aim is achieved in chapter three). Secondly, it aims to identify the extent to which Islamic 
banks’ SSF reporting levels are correlated with firm characteristics and CG for BOD as well as 
SSB. It aims to explore the main determinants or incentives of SSF disclosure (This aim achieved 
in Chapter 3). Thirdly, the current study aims to identify the consequences of increased SSF 
reporting on the firm value based on two different methods MC and ROA using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) (This aim is achieved in Chapter four). Fourthly, exploring how SSF disclosure 
level effected on the stakeholders’ loyalty directly and indirectly by mediating trust and 
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satisfaction (This aim is achieved in Chapter 4). Fifthly, exploring the SSF issues from two 
different positions (who deal as well as who do not deal) through surveying the opinions of 
stakeholders and non-customers towards SSF practices of Islamic banks and constructing a 
pyramid of Islamic banks’ accountabilities.      
1.7.2 Research questions 
   The main research questions that are addressed by the current study are classified according to 
whether they concern determinants of firm-characteristics, determinants of corporate governance 
of BOD and SSB analysis, economic consequences for SSF disclosure, non-economic 
consequences for SSF disclosure, perceptions and expectations of stakeholders and non-
customers towards SSF practices. Using the same distinctions, the research hypotheses 
formulated. The following summarises the research questions addressed by the current study 
Q1. What are the SSF disclosure levels for IBs?  Sub questions:  
Q1.1 What is the Sharia disclosure level for IBs based on SSBR and the whole annual report?  
Q1.2 What is the social disclosure level for IBs based on CSRR and the whole annual report?  
Q1.3 What is the financial disclosure level for IBs based on FS and the whole annual report? 
Q2. What are the main determinants of the multi SSF disclosure level? Sub questions:  
Q2.1 what are the main determinants of disclosure with AAOIFI concerned with firm 
characteristics; CG of BOD and SSB for IBs that full adopted of AAOIFI?  
Q2.2 what are the main determinants concerned with firm characteristics that affected SSF 
disclosure levels of IBs? 
Q2.3 what are the main determinants concerned with CG that influenced SSF disclosure levels 
of IBs?   
Q3. What are the economic consequences for SSF disclosure on the firm value?  
Q4. What are the non-economic consequences for SSF disclosure?  
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Q5. What are the perceptions and expectations of stakeholders and non-customers towards the 
SSF practices of IBs?   Sub questions:  
Q5.1 what are the criteria for stakeholders’ selection of IBs? 
Q5.2 what may be the main objectives of IBs from views of stakeholders and non-customers?  
Q5.3 what are the actual perceptions of stakeholders about actual SSF practices?      
Q5.4 what are the reactions of IBs’ stakeholders in case of stopping achieving social and Sharia 
accountability practices?  
Q5.5 what are the main constrains behind un-dealing with IBs? 
Q5.6 What are the main factors that motivate customers to deal with IBs? 
Q5.7 what are the expectations of non-customers about SSF practices?      
1.7.3 Research hypotheses  
   To formulate the research hypotheses, five main levels introduced. The first level encompasses 
determinants of compliance with AAOIFI as a mandatory standards based on firm 
characteristics as well as CG of BOD and SSB. The second level investigates firm characteristics 
that significantly influence the decision to disclose information about their SSF reporting. The 
third level involves corporate governance characteristics; this level investigates how BOD 
characteristics explain variations in SSF reporting. The fourth level explores the impacts of SSF 
disclosure on the firm value. The fifth level identifies the consequences of SSF disclosure on the 
stakeholders’ loyalty. The following formulates each level’s hypotheses. 
1.7.3.1 Compliance with AAOIFI (Hypotheses concerned with Empirical study 1) 
      In this level, the associations between firm-characteristics, CG of BOD and SSB towards its 
compliance levels with AAOIFI standards formulated based on agency theory and prior SSF 
compliance literature. Additionally, uncertainty avoidance accounted as a control variable.  
H1.1 the degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in IBs audited by the Big 4 auditors than 
IBs that audited by non-Big 4 auditors  
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H1.2 Older IBs expected to disclose more information than younger IBs  
H1.3 Large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than small IBs 
H1.4 Disclosure level expected to be higher for highly profitable IBs than low profit  
H1.5 The level of disclosure is associated with existing ISAD inside IBs 
H1.6 IBs with high percentages of block holder ownership have low levels of disclosures 
H1.7 There is a negative relationship between disclosure and institutional ownership 
H1.8 There is a positive relationship between disclosure levels and foreign ownership 
H1.9 IBs with duality in position have a lower level of disclosures 
H1.10 IBs with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors on the board have 
higher levels of disclosures 
H1.11 There is a positive relationship between the size of SSB and disclosure levels  
H1.12 There is a positive relationship between SSB cross-membership and disclosure level  
H1.13 There is a positive relationship between SSB reputation and disclosure levels  
H1.14 There is a negative association between uncertainty avoidance and disclosure levels  
1.7.3.2 Firm characteristics (Hypotheses concerned with Empirical study 2) 
In this level, the associations between firm characteristics and its SSF reporting levels 
formulated based on signalling and agency theory. Additionally, other firm characteristics (bank 
age; ownership; riskiness; national culture) and the impact of national characteristics on SSF 
reporting is essentially considered (legal system; GDP Growth; full adoption of AAOIFI from 
central banks; role of central bank for Sharia  supervision; Islamization system; corruption index 
and literacy rate) are also accounted as control variables.  
H2.1 There is no association between profitability and levels of disclosure  
H2.2 There is a positive association between firm size and levels of disclosure  
H2.3 Highly Leverage IBs is more likely to disclose more information compared with Low 
Leverage IBs 
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H2.4 The extent level of disclosure is larger for IBs that audited by one of the Big4 Audit firms 
H2.5 There is an association between levels of disclosure and adopting AAOIFI 
H2.6 The extent of levels of disclosure is associate with existing ISAD inside IBs 
1.7.3.3 Corporate governance (Hypotheses concerned with Empirical study 3) 
 In this level, the associations between CG and SSF reporting levels formulated. Additionally, 
other firm characteristics (age; auditor; SAD and listed firm) accounted as control variables.  
H3.1 IBs with higher percentages of foreign ownership have higher levels of disclosure  
H3.2 There is a positive relationship between Institutional ownership and disclosure 
H3.3 There is a negative association between Family ownership and level of disclosure  
H3.4 There is a negative association between percentages of block holder ownership and level of 
disclosure 
H3.5 There is a positive association between the proportion of IAH to shareholder funds and 
levels of disclosure 
H3.6 There is a negative association between duality in position and level of disclosure  
H3.7 IBs with large board size have a higher level of disclosure  
H3.8 There is a positive association between board independence and level of disclosure  
H3.9 There is a positive association between CEO founder and level of disclosure 
1.7.3.4 Economic consequences for SSF disclosure (Hypotheses concerned with 
Empirical study 4)  
    In the fourth level, the impacts of SSF disclosure on the firm value in terms of MC and ROA 
formulated based on signalling and economic theory and prior economic consequences literature. 
H4.1 The level of SSFD of IBs is positively associated with firm value  
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1.7.3.5 Non-economic consequences for SSF disclosure (Hypotheses concerned with 
Empirical study 5) 
      In the fifth level, the impacts of SSFD on stakeholders’ behaviour in terms of loyalty, trust 
and satisfaction formulated based on information processing theory and social identification 
theory and prior economic as well as non-economic consequences literature for disclosure.  
H5.1 There is a significant direct association between disclosure and stakeholders’ loyalty 
H5.2 There is a significant direct link between disclosure and stakeholders’ satisfaction 
H5.3 There is a significant direct link between stakeholders’ satisfaction and loyalty  
H5.4 Stakeholders’ satisfaction mediates the effect between disclosure and loyalty  
H5.5 Disclosure has a significant direct effect on stakeholders’ trust   
H5.6 Stakeholders’ trust has a significant direct effect on stakeholders’ loyalty   
H5.7 Stakeholders’ trust mediates effect between disclosure and loyalty 
H5.8 Stakeholders’ trust and satisfaction mediates effect between disclosure and loyalty 
1.8 Research methods 
   Related to financial data; Bankers; Zawya databases; websites for IBs and central banks are 
used to obtain a list of IBs as well as variables related to exploring determinants and 
consequences of SSF reporting. Excluding all Islamic windows and IBs that have not SSB and 
any bank without a complete data, these criteria yield a final list of 117 banks across 23 countries 
based on data of 2013. Related to compliance with AAOIFI, 43 IBs chosen based on full 
adoption of AAOIFI. Examining the economic consequences of disclosure, the sample contains 
33 Islamic banks based on availability of MC. The samples are gathering from 15 countries, 
pertaining to two different segments (600 stakeholders who deal with IBs as well as 600 
customers who do not deal with IBs). Survey questionnaire adopted based on convenience 
through online survey as well as direct survey.    
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   Relying on a growing body of accounting and finance literature, firms’ disclosure levels are 
captured using manual content analysis to measuring SSF disclosure levels (e.g., Abdul Rahman 
et al., 2010). Three indices, therefore, are used and measure SSF reporting to count the number 
of SSF-indicator statements in annual reports narratives and websites. Based on a growing body 
of accounting literature, firms’ determinants disclosure levels are captured using OLS regressions 
(e.g., Farag et al., 2014). To investigate the impact of country-level variables on SSF reporting 
particularly for study (1), a nation’s cultural values measured based on Hofstede’s values (1991) 
and other variables added such as legal system, full adoption of AAOIFI, the role of central bank 
in SSB, and corruption index which widely used in general disclosure research (e.g., Elshandidy 
et al., 2013; Dobler et al., 2011)    
   Relying on extensive accounting literature that mainly examines the associations between 
accounting and market-based measures and disclosure (e.g., Elzahar et al., 2015; Abdullah et al., 
2015; Uyar and Kilic, 2012), OLS regression is adopted. In this context, two main measures 
comprehensively capturing firm SSF levels are utilised: ROA used as accounting measure and 
MC used as market measure. Depend on accounting and marketing literature that mainly 
exploring the non-economic impacts of disclosure and association between trust, satisfaction and 
loyalty (e.g., Perez et al., 2012; Amin et al., 2011; Lin et al., 2011), structural equation modelling 
with a partial least squares approach is adopted. Relying on extensive literature that mainly 
examines the perceptions and expectations of customers about SSF practices of Islamic banks 
(e.g., Abdullah et al., 2012; Butt and Aftab, 2012; Osman et al., 2009), descriptive statistics is 
adopted as well as performing Friedman test to rank SSF dimensions according to their 
importance. Table1 gives a full picture of the research map. The Table shows link between study 
objectives, methods, sample, the nature of data and finally the orientation of each question 
(which view: board or stakeholders). 
     Based on Table1, questions 1 and 2 seek to explore the disclosure levels and compliance with 
AAOIFI in addition to identifying the main determinants of disclosure. These questions used 
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OLS regression to see to what extent management of IBs consider SSF practices in their annual 
report. Question 5 explores SSF practices of IBs from another view, which is stakeholders and 
non-customers’ interpretations through surveying their perceptions and expectations as well as 
effects of IBs’ practices of SSF on their decisions to deal with IBs.  Therefore, questions 1, 2 and 
5 complete the picture of testing accountability of IBs from management as well as stakeholders’ 
perspective. Questions 3 and 4 are measuring the consequences of SSF disclosure from different 
viewpoints, as question 3 measures economic consequences from the perspective of IBs’ 
management by testing the impacts of SSF on firm value based on OLS regression. Moreover, 
question 4 investigates the non-economic consequences of SSF disclosure from stakeholders’ 
perspective through measuring the impacts of SSF disclosure on the loyalty as well as trust and 
satisfaction based on Structure Equation Modelling (SEM) and Partial Least Squares (PLS). Thus, 
the answers of these questions construct a holistic picture about accountabilities of IBs related to 
SSF based on disclosure, determinants, consequences and perceptions from different viewpoint 
Table1: Summaries of the research samples; methods and aims  
Research 
Question  
Objectives  Tools   Sample Nature 
of Data 
Sources of 
Data 
Study 
perspective   
Question  
1 
It measuring SSF disclosure level 
(accountability’ practices) and for what 
extent it complies with AAOIFI 
standards   
Content Analysis 
and Disclosure 
Index 
117 Islamic 
banks 
Secondary 
Data 
Annual Reports 
and Websites 
for Islamic 
banks 
 
 
 
 
IBs’ 
management 
perspectives  
  
Question  
2 
It measuring the determinants of SSF 
disclosure (accountability’ practices) 
concerned with firm characteristics; 
CG of BOD and CG of SSB    
Regressions 
Analysis (SPSS) 
117 IBs 
95 IBs 
43 IBs 
Secondary 
Data 
Annual 
Reports; 
Banker and 
Zawya database 
Question  
3 
It testing the impacts of SSF 
disclosure (accountability’ practices) on 
the firm value  
Content Analysis; 
Disclosure Index; 
Regressions 
Analysis (SPSS) 
33 IBs Secondary 
Data 
Annual 
Reports; 
Banker and 
Zawya database 
Question  
4 
It measuring the impacts of SSF 
disclosure (accountability’ practices)  
on the stakeholders’ loyalty; trust and 
satisfaction   
Questionnaires; 
SEM; PLS 
600 
Stakeholders 
with IBs 
Primary  
Data 
Responds of 
stakeholders 
Stakeholders’ 
perspectives  
Question  
5 
It explores the perceptions; 
expectations and consequences of 
Islamic banks’ accountabilities 
practices on the stakeholders and non-
customers of IBs  
Questionnaires 
and 
Descriptive 
analysis  
600 
Stakeholders 
and 600 non-
customers with 
IBs 
Primary  
Data 
 
Responds of 
stakeholders as 
well as non-
customers 
Stakeholders 
and Non-
customers’ 
perspectives  
24 
 
Questions 1 and 2 show how BOD and management of Islamic banks consider SSF based on disclosure these accountabilities whereas Question 3 
shows the impacts of these SSF disclosure levels on the MC and ROA for these banks. From the other side; Question 4 and 5 completes the holistic 
image about the consequences of SSF disclosure as well as practices. Question 4 explores and measures the impacts of SSF disclosure on the 
stakeholders’’ loyalty; trust and satisfaction. Question 5 explores the impacts of SSF’ practices on the perceptions of stakeholders’ as well as non-
customers.           
1.9 Originality and Contribution to knowledge  
This study will bridge a gap between the three broad strands related to existing body of 
literature on disclosure (measures the disclosure; explores the determinants of disclosure and 
explores the consequences for disclosure). Consequently, the originality of this research 
explained based on the added value for each strand and how each study differs from previous 
literature as follows. To the first strand, this study differs from the previous studies that 
exploring disclosure level that contain more than financial information (social and Sharia 
disclosure). It differs from Abdul Rahman et al., 2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 
2006 as they are mainly measuring disclosure level for CSR. Moreover, this research differs based 
on Islamic banks that contained in the sample (Hassan et al., 2012 (13 banks); Sobhani et al., 
2009 (29 banks), whereas this research sample is 117 banks. This study covers Islamic banks that 
located in 23 countries, whereas previous studies just focused on one country (e.g., Belal et al., 
2014). The cross-countries level analysis permits me to construct a holistic picture about 
disclosure reporting for Islamic banks. This research index contains 25 dimensions of SSF area, 
whereas previous studies covered less dimensions (e.g., Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Hassan 
and Harahap, 2010).          
Moreover, this study differs from the previous studies that exploring the compliance level 
with AAOIFI (e.g., Ahmed and Khatun, 2013; Sarea and Hanefah, 2013; Vinnicombe, 2010). 
Sarea and Hanefah (2013) measured compliance with AAOIFI for banks that located only in 
Bahrain, whereas this study covers all Islamic banks that adopt AAOIFI across 8 countries. Ullah 
(2013) measures compliance with one standard of AAOIFI (accounting standard No.1), whereas 
this study measures compliance with several accounting and governance standards. Vinnicombe 
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(2010) measures compliance with AAOIFI based on 42 items for 4 dimensions, whereas this 
study measures compliance with 229 items for 25 dimensions.      
Concerned with the second strand, the research differs from the previous studies that explore 
the determinants of disclosure that contains firm characteristics and CG mechanism variables. It 
differs from Khan et al., (2013) and Farook et al., (2011) which tested the association between 
CG and one dimension of disclosure which is CSRD, whereas this research investigates three 
categories of disclosure. The research model contains 10 CG variables as block holders, 
ownership as well as board size, whereas previous research such as Hidalgo et al (2011), focused 
on two CG variables which are Board independence and ownership structure. Gisbert and 
Navallas (2013); Samaha et al (2012) measured determinants of disclosure for banks that were 
located in one country (Egypt and Spain respectively), whereas this research explores this 
relationship for banks located in 23 countries. The current research therefore differs markedly 
from the previous studies based on sample size. This sample contains 117 IBs compared with 
Farook et al., (2011), which focused on 47 IBs. Moreover this work is focused on IBs, whereas 
other previous studies are testing this association for non-Islamic institutions (Liang et al., 2012). 
Tsamenyi et al (2007) measured impacts of CG on disclosure, whereas this study measures CG 
as well as firm characteristics. This research differs from other works that focused only on CG 
that related to BOD (e.g., Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Cong and 
Freedman, 2011), while this study measures variables concerned with BOD and SSB in one 
model to see for what extent it effected disclosure levels.      
To the third strand the previous studies focused on the impacts of increased disclosure on the 
cost of capital (Elzahar et al., 2015); analysts’ forecasts (Wang et al., 2013); financial performance 
(Wang et al., 2008); and share price anticipation of earnings (Hussainey and Walker, 2009). 
Secondly, the majority of these studies adopt disclosure index to explore the economic impacts 
of disclosure (Volkov and Smith, 2015; Moumen et al., 2015). This strand is focused mainly on 
the international firms and conventional banks in developed countries such as the UK (Elzahar 
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et al., 2015). There have been very few studies that measured the association between disclosure 
and FV (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). This strand is located in the early research stage for IBs. However, 
exploring these consequences has not yet been investigated empirically in Islamic banks based on 
different kinds of disclosure, particularly Sharia and social. Moreover, related to the first strand, 
rare studies measuring Sharia disclosure separately and measuring the impacts of this kind on FV.  
The study is concerned with, but differs from, the work of Dhaliwal et al., (2011), in its 
examination of the impact of social disclosure on frim value. This study examines a broader 
concept of disclosure (SSF). This study differs from Richardson and Welker (2001), who 
examine the relation between the cost of capital and social as well as financial disclosure. This 
study added a further form of disclosure which is Sharia disclosure. This research also differs 
from prior research (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006) based on a holistic disclosure 
index. The model is a unique and comprehensive means of measuring SSF categories of 
disclosure. This study is focused on Islamic banks whereas the previous studies focused on non-
Islamic firms (e.g., Elzahar et al., 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). Moreover this research differs 
from works of Wagner (2010); Dong et al., (2015), which explores the non-financial disclosure. 
This work contains financial and non-financial disclosure. Prior studies were limited to a single 
country or institution (Al-Mehmadi, 2004), but, my sample contains Islamic banks in 12 
countries. This study differs from the outcomes of Wang et al., (2013); Moumen et al., (2015), 
who explored the impact of disclosure on the cost of capital, share price and earnings forecasts, 
whereas this study is focused on FV. Moumen et al (2015); Wang et al (2013) measured one 
category of disclosure which is risk, whereas this study measures different categories of 
disclosure. Furthermore, the previous studies in this strand focused on economic consequences, 
whereas – as far as I know- no study has explored the non-economic consequences for increased 
disclosure on the stakeholders’ loyalty as well as on trust and satisfaction.          
  Based on the originality of this study the current study contributes to the existing literature in 
the following seven distinct respects. 
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First, the present study explores, using firm-level analysis, the determinants of three different 
disclosure types (Sharia, social and financial), with control national-level variables. While prior 
literature provides mixed empirical evidence for social disclosure, no previous work has 
examined the other categories of disclosure. Also, previous literature provides mixed empirical 
evidence for variables related to firm characteristics and other concerned with CG, no previous 
work has examined the existence of an in-house Sharia auditing department and CEO power, 
and no previous studies have measured the impact of variables related to CG of SSB on the four 
types of disclosure. Prior disclosure research, therefore, is advanced by considering whether or 
not the firm-characteristics, CG mechanism for BOD and SSB and national-level variables has 
diverse impacts on the different categories of disclosure (SSF), rather than investigating 
associations between one type of disclosure as social and one type of variable generally (e.g., 
Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Hassan et al., 2012).  
Second, three methods are applied to examine the association between the main variables and 
testing the models; OLS, descriptive statistics, Friedman test, and SEM and PLS. The first two 
approaches have been used frequently in prior research. The third approach (PLS) is first study 
to adopt this method for measuring the non-economic consequences of disclosure.   
Third, previous work has applied manual content analysis to a one-year period within one 
country in addition to limited samples (e.g., Belal et al., 2014; Sobhani et al., 2009), while this 
study contains a larger sample size (117 IBs) spread across more than 20 countries.  
Fourth, there have been few empirical studies investigating the association between Sharia 
disclosures and firm as well as national characteristics in the Islamic banking sector; this is the 
first study that empirically investigates this association. Previous studies which investigated Sharia 
disclosure are always added in the CSR index (e.g., Farook et al., 2011), while limited research 
explores AAOIFI governance standards on compliance with Sharia. Therefore, this study is the 
first one that distinguishes between SSBD from CSRD and measures the factors behind 
variances of disclosure level. 
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Fifth, the study of AAOFII standards has grown in recent years with substantial contributions 
from scholars such as Ahmed and Khatun (2013); Hassan and Harahap (2010). It is notable that 
the focus of most of these studies is descriptive in nature, emphasising in particular the 
compliance level with AAOIFI without extending their study to explore the main factors behind 
the disclosure level. This study is the first one to explore the determinants of disclosure 
concerned with firm factors and CG for most of IBs that have fully adopted AAOIFI standards. 
Sixth, there have been rare empirical studies investigating the link between disclosure and 
financial performance in the banking sector (e.g., Servaes and Tamayo, 2013; Dhaliwal et al., 
2011), as far as I know, this is the first study to empirically investigate this relationship in IBs. 
Finally, there are several previous studies that measure the economic consequences of disclosure 
(Nekhili et al., 2015; Elzahar et al., 2015), while no previous work has examined the other 
consequences of disclosure. This research expands upon the work of previous studies exploring 
the consequences of disclosure through measuring the non-economic consequences of 
disclosure related to stakeholders’ behaviour (loyalty, trust and satisfaction).   
1.10 Organisation of the study 
This section outlines the structure of the thesis, which contains seven chapters, as shown in 
Figure 3. Each empirical study contains a review of the relevant literature. Hence, there is no 
need for an additional chapter for a literature review.  
Chapter (2) outlines the theoretical framework of accountability. It explores the concept of 
accountability from an Islamic approach as well as the theoretical framework for accountability 
based on agency, stakeholders, signalling and accountability theories.  
Chapter (3) outlines the main methods that adopted in this study then followed by the results of 
pilot studies. It also outlines AAOIFI as a benchmark for IBs  
Chapter (4) focuses on the disclosure levels and determinants of SSF reporting. This chapter 
includes three empirical studies. Study (1) explores the main determinants of compliance with 
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AAOIFI. Study (2) measuring the determinants concerned with firm characteristics that affected 
on SSFD. Study (3) measuring the main determinants concerned with CG.  
Chapter (5) measures the economic and non-economic consequences of disclosure. Firstly, it 
investigates whether or not SSF reporting has any influence on firm value. Secondly, it explores 
the impacts of increasing SSFD on the stakeholders’ loyalty directly as well as measuring indirect 
association by mediating trust and satisfaction.  
Chapter (6) surveys the perceptions of stakeholders who deal with IBs as well as non-customers 
who do not deal with IBs about SSF practices through questionnaires.  
Chapter (7) provides the concluding remarks of this thesis. It provides a summary of the 
research questions, and the approach followed. In addition, it presents a summary of the key 
findings of the research and discusses their implications. It includes a summary of possible 
limitations of the study and highlights several avenues of potential future research. 
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Figure 3: Structure of the thesis 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework of Accountability                                                                                
2.0 Introduction 
   This chapter outlines the theoretical framework of accountability as a basis for this thesis. This 
chapter contains three parts. The first part explores the concept of accountability from an 
Islamic approach with outlines contributes of this concept comparing with Western approach. 
Second part outlines the theoretical framework for accountability through reviews agency; 
stakeholders; signalling and accountability theories with identify the contributions for these 
theories from an Islamic perspective. The third part outlines the results of surveying Quran 
about the accountability concept as well as approves about SSF dimensions from Quran 
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Part One: Accountability concept and framework  
2.1.1 Introduction   
   This part seeks to explore the accountability concept from an Islamic approach. It also 
explores the link between accountability and disclosure. This part also explores the existing 
model of accountability. It also modify a holistic framework for accountability from an Islamic 
approach that could be applicable for IBs based on this study   
2.1.2 Accountability concept  
       To get full understanding of accountability from an Islamic perspective; we have first to 
explore this concept from the opposite side which is Western approach. The word accountability 
incorporate a question regarding who may answer to who, for what and under what rules (Lerner 
and Tetlock, 1999). Numerous definitions of accountability have been offered by Western 
scholars. For example, Edwards and Hulme (1996b) define it as ‘‘the means by which individuals 
and organizations report to a recognized authority (or authorities) and are held responsible for 
their actions” (p.967). Gray et al (1995) defines accountability as “The duty to provide an 
account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which 
one is held responsible” (p.38). Adams (2004) demonstrates accountability as “corporate 
acceptance of its ethical, social and environmental responsibility” (p.732). Lozano (2005) states 
“accountability involves much more than simply providing information; it involves building a 
corporate license to operate through interaction with other social actors….. Accountability is not 
a question of metrics but of vision and Accountability is a tool available for firms to show their 
responsibility through corporate reports” (p.21). This vision concerns how a company sees itself 
and its role in the world. Therefore, the corporate reports as CSRR; SSBR and financial reports 
could be used by companies to show accountability and performance in order to build up trust 
which help them to get a licence to operate. 
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      Accountability has long been considered to refer to the requirement or duty to provide an 
account or justification for one's actions to whomever one is answerable. Burchell et al (1985) 
demonstrated that under accountability, those who have power over resources are required to 
explain and justify the use of that power. In this context, Jackson (1982) asserted that 
accountability explains and justifies what has been done, what is currently being done and what is 
to be done. Accountability, therefore, involves disclosing more information (Naser et al., 2006). 
Gray et al (1987) believe that accountability can be the most useful ideological framework for 
analysing accounting information transmission.  
   The two parties in an accountability framework from Western perspective which are usually 
described in principal and agent terms, where principal refers to one who holds to account, and 
agent refers to one who is held accountable(Woodward et al., 1996). These definitions under- 
pining the accountability framework are rooted in agency theory. Sinclair (1995) points out, 
accountability is a somewhat multi-faceted and, indeed, ‘murky’ term that does not lend itself to 
precise definition. The question remains based on Benston (1982) “to whom is the account made? 
Identifies shareholders, stakeholders and society in general as three possible recipient groups and 
concludes that the free market alongside monitoring services will serve shareholders and other 
contractual stakeholders well” (p.88). 
   In contrast to the Western accountability approach, the Islamic view of accountability takes a 
rather holistic approach. It offers an intergalactic spiritual view based on the teachings of Quran 
and Sunna5, providing a better alternative philosophical framework for man's interaction with 
Allah, nature, social, economic as well as his fellow men (Ahmad, 2000). Accountability in Islam 
is a relationship between two parties. Specifically to be accountable to Y for Z, Y in Islam, 
though, is not another agency or the top of the hierarchy, it goes beyond that and emerges as a 
moral obligation. Accountability from Islamic perceptive comes from believe that every 
5 Sunna is the most important source after Quran of the Islamic faith and refers essentially to the prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH) as the supreme example through his practice of faith. Sunna contains each words and actions 
for Prophet Mohammed.  
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individual will be held accountable for their actions by Allah (Lewis, 2001). Accountability is the 
main basis for the Islamic system and all relationships within any Islamic society must consider 
this concept (Aljirari, 1996).  
     Based on Islamic approach; Sharia may organized all the acts and dealing between humans as 
well as all accountabilities for Islamic banks may guide and organize by Islamic low. According 
to A1-Shätibi (as quoted in Nyazee, 2000), the determination of what is beneficial and what is 
harmful cannot be left to human reasoning alone (as most of Western theorists had advocated, e. 
g. the social contract theory and the normative stakeholder theory). Therefore, the 
accountabilities between Allah and Islamic banks as well as between BOD and stakeholders are 
may guide and organize by Sharia.    
     Lewis (2006) states “Accounting in the broad sense is central to Islam, since accountability to 
God and the community for all activities is paramount to a Muslim’s faith” (p.2). The word 
“Hesab” which means accountability is repeated more than eight times in different verses in 
Quran (Askary and Clarke, 1997). They also add that accountability in Islam is as a 
comprehensive ethic can be formulated based on Sharia. The Arabic word Sharia has a literal 
meaning which is the legal guide for behaviour according to Quran and Sunna. It is, in simple 
words, the way of life. Moreover, Sulaiman (1998) states that how people actually behave or how 
they believe they may behave, is affected by the Islamic faith. Therefore, as Al-Humaidhi (1999) 
states the accountability in Islam is addressed on two levels; one level is every individual is 
accountable for his or her actions. The second level includes “the accountability for individual 
and objects under their charge” (p.13).   
   The concept of accountability is derived from Quran and is the powerful of Islamic system of 
business which means accountability in front of Allah (SWT) not only in this world but also in 
the hereafter. Accountability to Allah reflects trustworthiness which includes both instruments 
and goals. Abbasi et al (2012) argue that, the instrument is that what is started with to enhance 
efficiency and effectiveness then by the time is transferred to be goal itself (p.233). As Quran 
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plainly explains: “Then shall anyone who has done an atom’s weight of good, see it, and anyone who has done 
an atom’s weight of evil, shall see it” (Quran, 99:7-8). Allah (SWT) said “Nor can bearers of burdens bear 
another’s burden. If one heavily laden may call another to bear his load, not the least portion of it can be carried by 
the other, even though he is nearly related” (Quran, 35:18). 
      Prophet Mohammad, (PBUH), emphasizes responsibilities and clarifies the intertwined 
responsibilities of applying real accountability. He said that: “Beware that every one of you is a shepherd 
and every one of you is shepherd and everyone is answerable with regard to his folk. The caliph is a shepherd over 
the people and shall be questioned about them. A woman is a guardian over the house hold of her husband and 
his children and has to be questioned about them. A slave is a shepherd over the property of his master and shall 
be questioned about it”. Then He, (PBUH), adds: “beware that every one of you is a guardian and every one of 
you shall be questioned with regard to his trust” (Sahih Bukhari 6719, Sahih Muslim 1829). Afifuddin and Siti-
Nabiha (2010) add that these verses apply to all organizations, not just personal accountability.   
2.1.3 Accountability and disclosure  
    The word that best describes the relationship between a company and its management, on one 
hand, and the external users of the company's published financial reports, on the other hand, is 
"accountability". A company reports to outsiders, because it feels it is accountable. Based on the 
relationship between the two parties, the accountee, "external user" as well as Allah as a primary 
accountee, has a certain right to know. At the same time, the accountor "management" has a 
managerial and divine as well as ethical contract to disclose full information for both of 
accountees (Allah and stakeholders). Accountability is defined according to the motivations of 
the individual and the interest and concern of the related parties (Mulgan, 2000). For example, 
auditors view accountability as a financial or numerical matter, legal scholars as a constitutional 
arrangement, and philosophers as a branch of ethics. Glynn (1985) argues that public sector 
accountability is “those who are charged with drafting and/or carrying out policy may be obliged 
to give an explanation of their actions to their electors” (p.143). Consequently, Islamic banks see 
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accountability as “Amanah6” towards Allah then owners; society and all other stakeholders. This 
accountability contains three cornerstones which are SSF. These accountabilities can achieved 
and communicate for interest parties through disclosure. One of the primary objectives of 
reporting from an Islamic perspective is to ensure that the business discharges the Islamic 
concept of accountability (Maali et al., 2006).  
Information is required to give stakeholders the opportunity to make decisions or take action 
concerning organisational behaviour, if they so choose. If stakeholders do not object to 
corporate behaviour, they are often perceived to have consented to that behaviour by virtue of 
the fact that they have omitted or failed to dissent or censure what could be perceived to be 
irresponsible or unpopular behaviour. The issue of accountability is about whether stakeholders 
have sufficient, accurate, understandable and timely information on which to act (Cohen and 
Eicmike, 1995). A central requirement for corporate accountability is the firm’s ability to signal 
or provide relevant information quickly, accurately and effectively to its shareholders, 
stakeholders or other 
  One of the main objectives of accounting from Islamic approach is to enhance accountability 
through providing a fair information flow between the accountor and the accountee (Lewis, 
2006). This means that accounting plays a very significant role in providing information. It is an 
accountability tool to fulfil the religious duty, as explained by Adnan and Gaffikin (1997) that 
orientation of accounting towards fulfilling the accountability of human being to God implies 
that the accounting information enables individual to account for their zakat.  
   Disclosure is a crucial aspect of the accountability function of IFIs to its stakeholders. Hence, 
it is required that IFIs disclose as much information in a succinct, truthful and understandable 
manner to its stakeholders. From an Islamic perspective, the main objective of corporate 
reporting that overrides other objectives is to allow Islamic enterprises to show their compliance 
6 Amanah or Trusteeship is a comprehensive word that applies to all sorts of material or social or spiritual things, 
committed or entrusted to someone as a task, duty or charge. A Muslims should by no means betray a trust, be it of 
a Muslim or of a non-Muslim.  
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with Sharia (Baydoun and Willett, 1997). The implication of this objective is that IFIs have a duty 
to disclose all information necessary to its stakeholders about their operations, even if such 
information is adverse to the IFIs interest (Maali et al., 2006). This is derived from the divine 
duty of accountability that each Muslim bears. However, this is not to say that Allah needs to 
know through disclosure the activities of the IFI. Indeed, Allah knows and hears everything and 
is Omniscient: ‘I know what you reveal and I know what you hide’ (Quran, 3:33). As representative 
organizations, IFIs have a duty to disclose their compliance with Sharia to stakeholders. This is 
because the stakeholders have a relationship or are represented in some form or manner by IFIs 
even if the IFI has no direct contractual relationship with the individuals. As Maali et al (2006) 
explains, “The requirement for Muslims to uncover the truth is intended to help the community 
to know the effect of a person or a business on its wellbeing” (p.273). Maali et al (2006) 
categorizes three broad objectives that are used as the basis for disclosures by Islamic businesses: 
To show compliance with Islamic principles; to show how operations of the business have 
affected the wellbeing of Islamic community and help Muslims to perform their religious duties.  
   In the context of accountability, one of the major goals of accounting is to provide a fair 
information flow between the accountor and the accountee (Anuar et al., 2009). Based on this 
concept, accounting plays an important role in providing information to stakeholder groups and 
the community at large, and to fill any religious duty. As a result, corporations are responsible for 
publishing their reports for the benefit of users (Gray et al., 1995). If the purpose of accounting 
information is to serve the public interest, it follows that in an Islamic context the Umma 
(Islamic nation) has the right to know about the effects of the operations of the organisation on 
its well-being and to be advised within the requirements of Sharia as to how this has been 
achieved. Accountability is thus interpreted as being, first and foremost, accountability to God 
through making information freely available. Truthful and relevant disclosure of information is 
important, in different aspects of Islamic life. There are responsibilities such as paying zakat, the 
calculation of which requires disclosure of the worth of assets and liabilities in terms of the 
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religious obligation to succour the poor, for it indicates a Muslim's capacity to do so. Full 
disclosure is necessary for predicting future obligations and assessing investment risk.  
     Some researchers argue that financial reporting is the one way for managers of a company to 
discharge their accountability to society. Based on the above and on the accountability 
framework, it is argued that full disclosure by IBs is a way of discharging their responsibility to 
Allah first then to the society; investors and other stakeholders. On the other hand, limited 
disclosure or linked increased disclosure level with expected benefits is insufficient to reflect the 
concept of accountability from the perspective of Sharia (e.g., Lewis, 2001; Baydoun and Willett, 
2000). In the Holy Quran, full disclosure is mentioned in several places by referring to 
“relevance”, one meaning of which is the disclosure of all fact. According to Lewis (2001) and 
Maali et al (2006), relevant information from the perspective of Islam means that financial 
reporting may disclose true, fair and accurate information. Regarding truth, it is mentioned in 
some places, such as: “And do not mix the truth with falsehood or conceal the truth while you know [it]” 
(Quran, 2:42) And in terms of the aspect of justice: “O you, who have believed, be persistently standing 
firm in justice, witnesses for Allah, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives” (Quran, 4:135). 
2.1.4 Accountability Framework  
    As discussed in the previous section; comparing between Western and Islamic approach 
shows the added value for IBs through adopting the holistic framework of accountability from 
the divine approach. Therefore; clarify model of accountability from Western approach provides 
a clear difference and contributions for the framework from an Islamic approach.  
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Figure 4: Accountability model from Western approach  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                      Gray et al., 1988 and 1996 
 
   One definition of accountability, using a principal-agent contract model, is that of Gray et al 
(1995). Based on figure 4, an Accountee (principal) especially owners or stakeholders of the firm 
enters into a contractual relationship with an agent (Accountor) or management. The Accountee 
gives the power over resources along with instructions about actions and rewards to the 
accountor. The accountor is supposed to take certain actions and refrain from others in 
managing the resources given to him, to meet certain objectives and to account to his principal 
through giving information, report of financial as well as non-financial performance about his 
actions to him.  
     From an Islamic approach; Hameed (2001) proposes Islamic accountability model based on 
the dual stewardship model of Chen (1975), Gray et al (1995) accountability model and Islamic 
concept of Khalifa (Vicegerent on earth). Chen (1975) offers a broader view of stewardship as 
encompassing both financial and social stewardship. He asserts that the concept of stewardship 
arose from the religious, teachings that man is a steward of God for the resources given to him 
(a concept akin to the Islamic concept of Khalifa and Amanah (trusteeship). Man as God’s 
steward owes a responsibility to use the property effectively not only for himself (secondary 
stewardship function) but also has a social responsibility for others around him (primary 
stewardship function). The Islamic accountability model is premised on Islamic organisations 
Accountee 
(Principal) stockholders  
Relationship 
(Contract) 
Accountor 
(Agent) management  
Information, reports of performance 
and non-performance 
Authority, responsibilities, resources, 
rewards and reprimands 
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and Muslim owners /investors having dual accountabilities. The prime accountability arises 
through the concept of khalifa in Islam whereby a man as well as institution as Islamic bank is a 
trustee (khalifa) of Allah’s (God’s) resources. Under the khalifa concept, he is also accountable to 
Allah for the care of other human beings (specifically local community, society and employees, in 
the case of organisations), animals and environment. However, this transcendent accountability 
is made visible (through the revelation of the Quran and Hadith) to both investors and managers, 
in the form of Islamic teachings. The secondary accountability is established by contract between 
the owner/investor and manager. The secondary accountability contract between the 
owner/investor and manager implicitly or explicitly embeds the primary accountability 
stipulations of Islam.  As the company performs its activities the Islamic accounting system 
identifies, records, measures and reports these socioeconomic activities to the investor thus 
discharging the secondary accountability. However, the Islamic accounting system also identifies 
measures and reports the socioeconomic activities pertaining to social/economic/environmental 
and other issues to both the owner/investor and the manager. The information thus disclosed 
enables both these parties to monitor the activities of the organisation and ensure their primary 
accountabilities in their capacities as khalifa of Allah, are discharged. The Angels of course 
record these actions and account this to Allah according to Islamic belief.  These information 
flows complete the primary accountability cycle. The proposed model is illustrated in figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Accountability model from Islamic approach  
                               Hameed (2001)                 
 
The previous models for accountability have little but important lacks. For Gray model; it just 
focused on the association between the agent and principal without consider Allah as a main 
accountee from an Islamic perceptive. For Hameed model, the model is mainly applicable for 
Muslim as a general more than for institutions as Islamic banks. Hameed (2001) considers 
investor as an only secondary accountee. The author modifies the previous models. Based on the 
suggested model (figure 6); there are two accountability cycles, one to God and one to 
stakeholders. The accountability to God is partly transcendent and represents the primary one 
for Islamic banks. This accountability comes from the Muslim belief that Allah will account for 
everything on Judgment Day and every individual will be held accountable for what he or she did 
and whether their actions were in keeping with Sharia or not. Allah has mentioned that 
everybody will be asked about her/his actions. As Allah has mentioned that “And stop them; indeed, 
they are to be questioned” (Quran, 37:24) “So by your Lord, We will surely question them all, about what they 
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used to do” (Quran, 15:92-93). Based on modified model; the secondary accountee not contains 
just only investor as Hameed’ model but it also contains society as well as other interested parties.  
The second accountability shows the association between IBs and stakeholders which contains 
three main groups (stockholders; society and other stakeholders). The model shows that, this 
accountability whatever to Allah or to stakeholders can achieve through full disclosure. This 
disclosure can attain through Islamic accounting system as well as adopting Islamic standards as 
AAOIFI. Based on this mode; IBs are required to disclose full information about SSF to satisfy 
Allah as well as all stakeholder particularly stockholders and society. Therefore, the corporate 
disclosure level may not link with specific determinants as profitability and size. It also may not 
link with the consequences whatever economic as FV or non-economic as stakeholders loyalty.             
Figure 6: Modified accountability model from Islamic approach to IBs or any IFIs 
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Based on this model; Allah is the primary accountee who gives power to management to 
manage the firms as well as gives investors and all stakeholders power of money to invest. The 
power is restricted by compliance with Sharia. Related to the contract; first, there is a divine and 
ethical contract between Allah and BOD to manage Islamic banks based on Sharia rules and to 
achieve Sharia; social and financial objectives. Second; there is also a divine and ethical contract 
between Allah and all stakeholders as investors to invest their money based on Sharia as well as 
to benefits all society and giving zakat and Qard Hassan. Thirdly, there is a managerial contract 
between stakeholders and BOD to manage and invest based on Sharia as well as gain high return 
in additional to invest on society as financing developed and social projects. In the other side; 
BOD is required to approve their compliance with Sharia which contains also serving society for 
Allah as a primary accountee. BOD also required disclosing full information for investors; 
society as well as other stakeholders about the three accountabilities (SSF). The applicable 
mechanism that can assist and support BOD to achieve this corporate disclosure is adopting 
AAOIFI standards through using Islamic accounting system.  
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Part Two: Conceptual Framework of accountability and disclosure   
2.2.1 Introduction 
Theory is a conception of the relationship between things. It refers to a mental state or 
framework and, as a result, determines, inter alia, how we look at things, how we perceive things, 
what things we see as being joined to other things and what we see as ‘good’ and…‘bad’ (Gray et 
al., 2009). Theory is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary (2009) as ‘a formal statement of the 
rules on which a subject of study is based or of ideas, which are suggested to explain a fact or 
event or, more generally, an opinion or explanation’. For Krauss (2005) “the researcher is a 
unique individual and…all research is essentially biased by each researcher’s individual 
perceptions” (p.760). The question might arise here, why may the researcher reflect on the 
adoption and adaptation of theory? This is because there are different approaches. If someone 
were to assume they could develop a descriptive theory by simply ‘observing’, this would 
overlook perceptual biases and issues of interpreting meaning (Gray et al., 2009). Consequently, 
it may be inferred that searching for an appropriate theory represents a key part of the research 
process. Gray et al (2009) argue that “the lens of theory enables us to evaluate practice and policy 
against criteria that we deem appropriate” (p.3). Moreover, there is a strong and mutual 
relationship between theory and research, where theory determines the kind of data that may be 
collected and outlines prior argumentation. In researching the social, researchers use description 
and interpretation, and thus require a specific approach and theory (Fawcett and Downs, 1986) 
     The theoretical framework of the current study enables researcher and reader to see how the 
findings are accurately related to the research questions and hypotheses. In other words, it plays 
a significant role in the explanation or justification of the link between what the researcher 
expected, and the findings. Islamic corporate accountability for IBs is considered to be the heart 
of the current study; thus, this section aims to explain potential theories related to Islamic 
accountability and role of disclosure to achieve these accountabilities.  
46 
 
    On the subject of Islamic accountability as an accounting topic, a number of theories have 
been used in the literature to explain its role. Certain theories offering a relevant framework to 
explain the effect of Islamic accountability might be more appropriate and relevant to some 
environments than others and can vary from country to country (Mallin, 2010). Generally, the 
prime theories employed by prior studies and dominant theories which have mainly influenced 
the advancement of Islamic accountability are: agency theory, signalling theory and stakeholder 
theory (Mallin, 2010) with focus on main sources for any Islamic thoughts which is Quran and 
Maqasid Al-Sharia (Objectives of Sharia) as guide for understanding the objectives of 
accountability from an Islamic approach. Agency theory concentrates on the relationship 
between the principal and agents who are given the authority to manage the principal’s interests 
and make beneficial decisions. According to stakeholder theory, society expects corporations to 
behave in a manner which is beneficial in terms of their social or economic role.  
2.2.2 Accountability Theory  
       According to accountability theory, the term ‘accountability’ refers to the duty of accountors 
(agents/directors/managers) to provide an account (information/report) to accountees 
(stakeholders/users/society). Based on definition of Gray et al (1995) for accountability, to 
discharge this accountability requires providing information, financial and nonfinancial. Some 
accountees have a legal right to information. Some stakeholders may have a contractual 
relationship but not expect an account, e.g. employees (Gray et al., 1995), if it may yet be deemed 
desirable that the firm is accountable to them. Moreover, part of emancipatory accounting is to 
render an entity’s socio-economic activity visible. Making social problems visible may be seen as 
an emancipatory potential of accounting, as providing information may bring nearer a resolution 
   Further, the accountability between accountee (principal) and accountor (agent) differs 
depending on the accountee. For example; managers may be accountable to workers for their 
salary and health and safety, as well as all employees’ rights, while employees may be responsible 
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for their work performance. From an Islamic approach; Muslims as well as IBs are accountable 
to Allah to obey him and worship as well as comply with his Sharia. From this, one can 
understand that accountability may be determined by the contractual relationship between the 
different parties (Gray et al., 1995). On another hand, some have a deeper view regarding the 
meaning of accountability. Jeremy Bentham has such a view, as reported by Gallhofer and 
Haslam (1994a) ‘Accountability is not so much about holding responsible and judging behaviour; 
nor does it assume a simple agency-principal relation…Accountability appears equivalent to the 
ability to render accounts conducive to well-being’ (p.326). Nevertheless, doubtless the initial 
accountability, which organisations may take into account, is laid down in law, where each entity 
has to provide an account to all interested parties, but the arguable issues are in account details.  
    Accountability from an Islamic perspective means first responsibility towards Allah as a main 
accountee then owners as well as society and other stakeholders. Thus; accountability theory is 
applicable for this study through extending this concept to contain more than investors and 
owners for IBs. This study modifies the concept of accountability from an Islamic approach 
which may have an influence on categories of disclosure. IBs based on this concept required to 
disclose SSF information to satisfy Allah as well as all stakeholders.            
2.2.3 Agency Theory   
     Agency theory has been widely employed by scholars in various academic areas such as 
accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science and sociology (Clark, 2004). 
Primarily, an agency relationship originates from the separation between ownership and 
management, when one or more principals engage another person as their agent to perform 
services on their behalf (ICAEW, 2007). Thus, the emergence of the agency theory approach has 
been utilized to describe the relationship within organizations. The theory concentrates on the 
relationship between the principal (owners) and agents (management) who are given the 
authority to manage the principal’s interests and make beneficial decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 
48 
 
1976). On the other hand, the principal requires information which is used to evaluate the 
performance. This can result in problems of information asymmetry, which leads to agency 
problems such as: moral hazard and adverse selection (Hoque et al., 2007), which stems from the 
fact that managers may act in their own interests to maximize their personal wealth.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976), proponents of the agency theory, define agency relationship as “a 
contractual relationship between the shareholder as the principal and the managers as the agent 
who are given some authority to perform services on behalf of the principal” (p.5). One of the 
primary concerns over this contractual relationship is the conflict of interest between the two 
parties. The underlying assumption of this agency problem is that, because a management’s pay-
related benefits are based on the firm’s performance, they tend to behave in a manner that would 
fulfil their self-interests (Kim and Mahoney, 2005; Ryan and Schneider, 2003). Such behaviour 
amongst the management serves as an opportunity cost to firm as it contradicts long term wealth 
maximization aim of shareholders (Demirag et al., 1994). From an Islamic approach; agency 
theory defined relationship between Allah and stakeholders as principal and managers as agent.  
    This theory suggests that a firm has incentives to disclose information about itself to owners 
following the agency theory concept. One aim of the agency theory is to provide an explanation 
of the nature of the demand for financial information and the cost of disclosing such 
information (Kam, 1990). It is clear that the owners and the managers have different interests in 
a firm. This leads owners to contract with managers in such a way as to decrease conflicts 
between the objectives of the two groups. Consequently, in monitoring agency contracts with 
management, cost will be incurred. One means by which owners can monitor employment 
contracts with their management is financial disclosure. This traditional type of disclosure is 
referred as to accountability to the owners of the firm. Various researchers have argued that 
voluntary disclosure lowers the agency monitoring costs (e.g., Chow and Wong Boren, 1987). 
Therefore, reporting accounting information reliably to the owners is the best way for managers 
to minimise the agency monitoring costs (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983).  
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Within agency theory, disclosure is viewed as one form of monitoring mechanism used by 
investors. It has the potential to reduce the gap of information asymmetry between an agent and 
the managers (Huang and Zhang, 2008). In other words, disclosure is recognised as one of the 
possible solutions to the agency problem (Eng and Mak, 2003). Well informed investors are 
expected to scrutinize firms on the basis of the information provided to them and this 
subsequently reduces the agency cost (Junker, 2005). Given that disclosure is effective in limiting 
agency cost (Huang and Zhang, 2008), agency theory has been widely used in the prior literature 
to explain variations in disclosure as well as corporate governance. Solomon (2007) argues that 
“Theoretical frameworks suggesting that companies may be accountable only to their 
shareholders are not necessarily inconsistent with theoretical frameworks which champion 
stakeholder accountability, The reason underlying this argument is that shareholder’s interest can 
only be satisfied by taking account of stakeholder interest” (p.14). This implies that, systems 
based on agency theory tend to protect the interests of both shareholder and stakeholder at the 
same time. A disclosure decision not only offers lower information asymmetry to shareholder in 
particular but also to other market players in general. Agent theory is concerned with two 
problems: Firstly, the conflict of goals between the principal and the agent, and secondly, the 
difficulty or cost born by the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing (Eisenhardt, 
1989). The applicability of agent theory to problems of accountability is obvious (Iszkowski, 
2007). Consequently, the relationship between accountor and accountee is often interpreted as 
one between agent and principal (Bovens, 2007). Provision of information is a crucial element of 
the accountability process: The agent is obliged to inform the principal about current or planned 
behaviour and actions in order to reduce information asymmetries (Auel, 2008).  
     Eisenhardt (1989) concluded that agency theory can be used within the research studies 
“…that relate to information asymmetry in cooperative situations” (p.71). Given that the present 
study is designed to examine disclosure (which is associated with information asymmetry in 
principal agent relationships), and corporate governance (which mainly deals with how to reduce 
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the conflict of interest in principal-agent relationship), agency theory is found to be one of the 
most relevant theory for the purposes of the study. Moreover; from an Islamic perspective; 
managers who run firms are trustworthy (Siebels and Knyphausen-Aufseb, 2012). Managers’ 
interests are aligned with owners’ interests (Davis et al., 1997). Agents have access to information 
about the firm, which makes them highly capable of working towards the firm’s welfare. Firms’ 
managers seek to employ the firms’ resources in the best possible way to maximise the firms’ 
value (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Based on these arguments, board of IBs are trustworthy by 
comply their accountabilities towards Allah and all stakeholders. Stakeholders expect a full 
disclosure about SSF from this trustworthy board   
      Based on the agency theory, the agent (Management) is responsible towards owners who give 
them the authority to manage the firm. However, based on Islamic context, the management is 
responsible first towards Allah who create and give them power then responsibility towards 
owners and other stakeholders comes second. Thus, this study can explore for what extent the 
stockholders effected by Islamic banking’s adoption for accountability mechanism. This study 
moreover can test to what extent disclosure of these banks reflects SSF accountability. Then, this 
study can test for what extent this expending concept can effect on the management of Islamic 
banking; opinion of IBs customers and even effects on the Islam’s image. Thus, this study 
extend the scope for the agency theory through add new dimension for the contract between 
agent and owners which is accountability towards Allah and importance of disclosure about SSF 
on achieving this contract accountability. Furthermore; this theory applicable for this study 
though measuring the main determinants behind SSFD for IBs and for what extent firm 
characteristics as well as CG have an impacts of disclosure level about the three accountabilities.     
2.2.4 Stakeholders theory   
   Many studies have argued about the narrow governance relationship underlying agency theory 
between the board of directors, the shareholders and the management in understanding the 
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complexities within an organisation (e.g., Christopher, 2010), and its inability to explain 
accurately the diversity of CG arrangements in different institutional contexts (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). Stakeholder theory refutes the claim of the limited impact of corporations’ 
activities on shareholders. The essence of stakeholder theory is the exposition that CG and 
accountability of management is wider than that offered by agency theory and is extended to 
incorporate other stakeholders. By broadening the CG spectrum, stakeholder theory examines 
situations where management, in addition to shareholders, also pursue the interests of other 
stakeholders (e.g., Solomon, 2010; Collier, 2008; Caldwell and Karri, 2005).  
 Freeman (1994) offers clarity by defining stakeholders as “any group of individuals who can 
affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (p.46). Solomon (2010) 
explains the theoretical basis of stakeholder theory as follows: “Firms are so large, and their 
impact on society so pervasive, that they may discharge accountability to many more sectors of 
society than solely their shareholders .... Not only are stakeholders affected by companies, but 
they in turn affect companies in some way” (p.15). Unlike agency theory, stakeholder theory 
assumes that managers are accountable to all stakeholders (Chen and Roberts, 2010). Donaldson 
and Preston (1995) argue that; stakeholders are all parties that have an interest in firm and can 
exercise power influencing its activities. They summarise the stakeholders as shown in figure 7.  
Figure 7: Stakeholders based on model of Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
 
     Stakeholders’ expectations of a company differ. For instance, shareholders expect a rewarding 
return, while employees expect a good income and job security. However, creditors expect firm 
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to have a strong financial position in order secure the safety of their investments, while policy-
makers expect compliance with CG regulations for stakeholders’ protection. Furthermore; 
shareholders expect from IBs a compliance with Sharia; serving society as a part from Sharia 
accountability in additional to the previous expectations. The Islamic value of Zakat and Qard 
Hassan encourages benevolence to society; therefore, it can be reasonably expected that IBs are 
more likely to be socially responsible. In relation to agency theory, the theoretical exposition of 
CG in stakeholder theory implicitly rejects the notion that shareholders’ wealth maximization is 
the only aim of a corporation. The management is argued to have the responsibility to select 
activities and direct resources to obtain benefits for all legitimate stakeholders (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). Carroll and Buchholtz (2009) asserted “task of management is not only to deal 
with the various stakeholder groups in an ethical fashion but also to reconcile the conflicts of 
interests that occur between the organisation and the stakeholder groups” (p.23). The fiduciary 
duty of management has to suit interests of all parties under the ambit of stakeholder theory. 
   With respect to organisational norms, IBs are viewed as a community embracing a set of 
norms and values based on Sharia principles. Hence, they develop a distinctive corporate culture 
underpinning their various activities and operation. These corporate cultures certainly influence 
the norms and values of various stakeholder groups that interact with IBs. In particular, much 
overlapping can be expected between the norms and values of the organisation and those of the 
employees, managers, shareholders, depositors and other stakeholder groups respectively, since 
they share the common norms and beliefs. If there is any conflicting expectation among the 
various stakeholders of IBs, Sharia norms and principles prevail in dictating which of the 
behaviours are desirable or not. For example, if a conflict exists between shareholders' interests 
and communities' interests at large, the latter may prevail as Islam puts emphasis on the interest 
of the public over private interest according to principles of Maslaha (Benefits)7. 
7 The legal term maslaha means 'the common good,' or, 'in the public interest.' The famed jurist and philosopher al-
Ghazali (1970) defined maslaha just under a thousand years ago: "What we mean by maslaha is the preservation of the 
objective [maqasid] of the Law [shar], which consists of five things: the protection of religion, life, intellect, lineage, and property. 
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   Based on stakeholders theory; corporations may be operated not only for the financial benefit 
of their owners, but also for the interests of the relevant broader society (Chen and Roberts, 
2010). Furthermore; executive directors are equally accountable to all stakeholders, not only the 
firm’s owners and creditors, but also other corporate stakeholders, as employees, government, 
local community and customers (Clarke, 1998). It can contribute based on Islamic approach; 
executive directors of IBs are accountable to Allah as a primary stakeholder. Disclosure could be 
employed to satisfy stakeholders’ expectations about corporate performance with regard to SSF 
aspects. Ulmann (1985) argued that firms use disclosures in order to manage its relationships 
with their stakeholders. Stakeholder theory has been criticised from two perspectives (Sternberg, 
1997): (I) the assumptions of stakeholder theory conflict with the central objective of the firm as 
seeking to maximise the wealth of shareholders; (II) it also conflicts with the agent-principal 
relationship, which suggests that managers are primarily accountable to shareholders. 
Stakeholder theory is arguably incompatible with the basic principles of holistic accountability of 
IBs. But, stakeholder theory remains a key CG and accountability theory (Solomon, 2010). 
Gray et al (1995) argue that among the theoretical perspectives, stakeholder theory draws a 
clear understanding to motive behind voluntary disclosure information. Based on stakeholder 
theory the firm will not be able to continue without stakeholders support. Consequently, firms’ 
CG mechanisms are likely to encourage activities that lead to stakeholders’ acceptance to ensure 
continuity. The effort performed to achieve stakeholders acceptance varies from company to 
another according to stakeholders’ power. Therefore, companies facing powerful stakeholders 
need to show more concern for their issues to get stakeholders' approval based on disclosure. 
Gray et al (1995) added that disclosure forms part of firms’ communication with stakeholders 
reflecting firms' appreciation and respect for society.  
     Disclosure is one of the mechanisms used to communicate a firm’s accountability, which is 
likely to assist in developing their reputation and shaping their image based on this theory. In 
Whatever ensures the protection of these five principles [usul] is maslaha; whatever goes against their protection is mafsada, and to avoid 
it is maslaha" (p.1111) 
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doing so, companies strengthen their link with stakeholders and maintain their existence, 
business growth, and continuity (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006). For example; CSR concept as 
one IB’s accountabilities evolved to be a significant form of firms’ competitive strategy (Gugler 
and Shi, 2009). CSR can be used as a tool to resolve conflict among different stakeholders which 
is could be explained by stakeholder theory (Jo and Harjoto, 2011). Stakeholder theory highlights 
that each group of stakeholders has diverse incentives to deal with a firm and is looking for 
different benefits from their relationship. Therefore, if a firm addresses the concerns of limited 
stakeholders groups and neglects other stakeholders, their advocacy might be compromised 
(Kolk and Pinkse, 2010). Communicating information through annual reports is a response to 
stakeholders’ demands for higher transparency and societal involvement as well as meeting the 
expectations of market actors (Arvidsson, 2010). Stakeholder theory clearly refers to the 
influence of stakeholders' expectations on a firm's disclosure strategy ―corporate disclosure is a 
management tool for managing the informational needs of the various powerful stakeholder 
groups (Reverte, 2009). 
     According to the above discussion, to achieve the trust of significant stakeholders, as well as 
investors, in additional to satisfy Allah as a main IBs’ stakeholders, IBs might show their 
acknowledgement and response to stakeholders needs as well as a higher level of transparency in 
illustrating their SSF practices. Disclosing SSF information reflects banks’ involvement in the 
community and efforts performed to safeguard assets as well as reflect IBs’ compliance with 
Sharia and financial performance. Indeed, effective and continuous dialogue illustrates the firm‘s 
behaviour and assists in obtaining stakeholders' engagement (Hess, 2007) as well as attracting 
trust and providing competitive edge against peers (Simpson and Koher, 2002). This study 
modifies model of Donaldson and Preston (1995) through adding other stakeholders which 
represent based on Islamic approach is the primary one who banks may consider his obligations 
and provide full disclosure especially related to compliance with Sharia as well as social 
accountability towards society as Zakat and Qard Hassan. This one is Allah who is the primary 
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accountee for management of IBs. This contribution for this model may reflect on the 
perceptions of IBs’ management towards disclosure about SSF.         
    For the stakeholders theory; the main stakeholders for corporation are divided into two main 
groups which are primary as customers and secondary as society. However, based on the Islamic 
context, accountability towards Allah may be the main stakeholders for any IFIs and may be 
shown in the disclosure and linked with consequences of acts as well as linked with disclosure 
about these acts. This theory is applicable for this study through measuring the role of IBs 
towards several stakeholders by testing disclosure about their accountabilities (e.g., compliance 
with sharia to satisfy Allah as well as Muslim investors; servicing the society to satisfy Allah as 
well as society and finally achieving high financial performance to satisfy owners).              
2.2.5 Signalling Theory   
This study primarily makes use of agency theory; it is also worth noting that some prior 
studies use signalling theory to explain corporate disclosure decisions (e.g. Wang et al., 2008). 
Signalling theory is considered to be an extension of agency theory (e.g., Buskirk, 2012; Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). It was developed to explain the information asymmetry between managers 
and shareholders (e.g., Black et al., 2006a; Morris, 1987). According to signalling theory, a 
manager discloses information in order to reduce information asymmetry and to signal to 
outsiders that a firm is performing better than its peers (Álvarez et al., 2008). Signalling theory 
posits that, investors rely on the information delivered by firms (Abhayawansa and Abeysekera, 
2009), highlighting that the credibility of information is crucial in ensuring lower information 
asymmetry (Hughes, 1986). In this regard, “A good firm can distinguish itself from a bad firm by 
sending a credible signal about its quality to capital markets. Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2004) 
argue that signal will be credible only if the bad firm chooses not to mimic the good firm by 
sending the same signal” (p.1). 
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Signalling theory can be applied in the event of information asymmetry, and hence this 
problem may be reduced when the party who has more information signals it to other interested 
parties. Signalling is a common phenomenon applicable in any market with information 
asymmetry (Morris, 1987). Therefore, this theory was used to explain managers’ incentives to 
disclose more information in financial reports (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Managers have to 
disclose adequate information in the financial statements to convey specific signals to potential 
users. Morris (1987) claims that in order to ensure that information signalling from firms is 
effective in reducing the information asymmetry the signalling costs “must be borne by agent so 
that he has an incentive to signal truthfully” (p.51). Based on this theory; IBs, will wish to 
distinguish themselves from IBs that are not full comply with the holistic accountability through 
voluntary disclosures about SSF dimensions. It is hoped that this information could assist the 
financial statement users in their decision making on the assumption that market discipline exists. 
From an Islamic approach; IBs will wish to signal their compliance with Sharia; high serving of 
society as well as financial performance to the market even if the performance is not good 
because disclosure by fair and truth is required in any situation. For this study; Signalling theory 
used to explain managers’ incentives to improve SSF reporting in order to convey particular 
signals to the stakeholders. One can expect that they will report more information about their 
SSF practices, in order to signal themselves as high quality managers in the work market. Based 
on signalling theory; IBs can signal to outsiders that these banks are performing better than its 
peers as well as it’s differentiate from others peers particularly conventional banks. These signals 
may contain Sharia and social disclosure. Moreover; 
Signalling theory is the main theoretical framework that used to explain the economic 
consequences of disclosure through measuring association between SSFD and FV. Based on this 
theory, inclusive disclosure signals better CG and fewer agency struggles, then leading to higher 
FV (Sheu et al., 2010).  
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2.2.6 Economic Theory 
     Economic theory was developed by Jensen and Meckling in 1976. The underlying assumption 
of the existing economic theory is that the motivation to invest in acquiring information is based 
on the expected effect of the investment on the party’s share of the contractual pie. A party 
invests in acquiring information in the pre-contractual phase on the basis of its belief that there 
is a high enough probability that some positive information will be revealed, and that 
information may enable it to receive or provide an asset whose value (costs) is higher (lower) 
than the price paid (received). When a disclosure duty is imposed, the investing party bears the 
costs of acquiring information before the contract is formed, but cannot extract the benefits, 
since the price would reflect the actual value of the asset (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
     In particular, this theory has been widely used by accounting researchers to explain and 
understand voluntary disclosure phenomena (e.g. Hossain et al., 1995; Meek et al., 1995; Haniffa 
and Cooke, 2002; Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Akhtaruddin and Hossain, 2008). 
A major link between economic theory and contemporary accounting thought is the notion that 
a firm's commitment to greater disclosure should lower costs of capital that arise from 
information asymmetries and effected positively on the firm value (Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000). 
A commitment to increased levels of disclosure reduces the possibility of information 
asymmetries arising either between the firm and its shareholders. This, in turn, should reduce the 
discount at which firm shares are sold, and hence lower the costs of issuing capital then 
increasing the firm value (Baiman and Verrecchia, 1996). Economic theory used in this study to 
measuring the impacts of increasing disclosure on the firm value. It argues that disclosure has 
positive impacts on FV (Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006). Economic theory shows that 
increased level of corporate disclosures reduce information asymmetries between the agent or 
company and market participants, which have positive effects on the firm’s stock liquidity then 
enhancing FV (Beyer et al., 2010). 
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2.2.7 Summary   
  The previous debate has revealed that there is no one specific theory which can elucidate 
Islamic accountability practices. Each theory looks at the disclosure phenomenon from a 
different perspective. In this context, Gray et al (1995) stated that different theoretical 
perspectives need to be seen as sources of explanation of different factors, at different levels of 
resolution, not as competitors for explanation. In line with this conclusion, Beattie and Smith 
(2012) documented that adopting more than economic and managerial theories will enable us to 
explain manager’s incentives to disclose information. Importantly, the type of relationship 
between principals and agents is still ambiguous in Islamic banking system because of the 
shortage of research in this domain. It can be concluded that agency and stakeholders’ theory are 
the most relevant theories to the research questions of this study related to the disclosure and 
determinants. The both of them predict that BOD and SSB will enhance the integrity of their 
financial reporting (Peasnell et al., 2005). In the other side; singling as well as economic theory 
are the applicable for measuring the economic consequences of disclosure. As result of this 
conclusion by previous studies, the argument needs to be tested empirically. SSF reporting 
incorporates financial and non-financial information. Previous research has found that, in such a 
setting, the incentives behind each type of disclosure and its importance would vary between 
disclosure topics or within its content (Kothari et al., 2009). Therefore, it will not be appropriate 
to use a specific theory, on its own, as a logical base for SSF reporting in practice. Moreover; for 
the previous theories and concerning with disclosure and based on the Islamic approach; 
disclosure about SSF may not be specify based on specific factors related to firm characteristics 
or CG as profitability; size firm and board size. For example; when firms gain high profitability 
levels, we expect a high disclosure level about SSF. However; IBs may provide full disclosure 
about SSF practices as truth agent; as accountability towards Allah and other stakeholders and as 
good signals for all interested parties. 
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Part Three: Accountability Framework from an Islamic context                
(Survey of Quran)                 
2.3.1 Introduction  
    This section explores the main issues concerned with the Islamic accountability framework 
based of Quran’s survey. Based on this survey, it explores verses that show the perfection of 
Islam and his book (Quran) as a guide for Muslim as well as Islamic banks in its services and 
activities. The survey indicates that, the accounting (Allah is recording everything and actions) is 
main foundation for Muslim’s beliefs and it is also basis for accountability framework. 
Consequently, Allah guide and orders us to record; weight and measure by correct and justice 
way as he will account us. Based on the survey of Quran, this study concluded that, the 
accountability from an Islamic approach contains three main pillars which are Sharia /religion 
accountability; social/ethical accountability and economic and financial accountability. The 
consequences for adopting Allah’s Sharia and implement the main three kinds of accountability 
can divide into earth’s rewards and heaven’s rewards. Finally, Quran shows that, implement 
Islamic Sharia may be the main priority for Muslim as well as Islamic banks than any other 
objectives as profitability.  
2.3.2 Perfection of Islam (benchmark for Islamic banks)  
This section explores the verses that indicate the perfection of Islam as a basic and guide for 
Muslim in his life as well as Islamic bank in his activities  
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 2.3.3 Accounting  
Account (Hesab) is the root of accounting (Kamla, 2007). A central Muslim belief is that Allah 
will account for everything on Judgment Day and every individual will be held accountable for 
what he or she did and whether their actions were in keeping with Sharia  or not. As Allah has 
mentioned in the Holy Quran, every person will be asked to account for their actions on the Day 
of Judgment: “And stop them; indeed, they are to be questioned” (Quran, 37:24). Allah created humans 
on the earth with the Islamic tenet of Istekhlaf (vice-regency)8, and the form of trust, individuals 
will then be trustees for everything that have from Allah, such as goods and property. 
Accountability, then, is the main basis for the Islamic system and all relationships within any 
Islamic society must consider this concept (Aljirari, 1996). Kamla (2009) indicates that “the basic 
similarities between hesab in Islam and accounting lie in the fact that, just as every Muslim has a 
responsibility to carry out the duties described in the Quran, so too are the management and 
providers of capital in a business enterprise accountable for their actions both inside and outside 
the enterprise” (p.927). In this context, accountability refers to the accountability to God that 
necessitates compliance with Sharia, the main aim of which is to achieve social justice within the 
Islamic community. Therefore, one of the principal aims of accounting in an Islamic society is to 
provide information that satisfies the accountability of those in the Ummah (Lewis, 2001). The 
verses related to this context contain two facts, first, Allah knows very think and second, that 
Allah through his angels record everything to account each slave in the day of judgement  
8 Allah had promised to those among you who believe and do good works that He will surely make them Successors 
in the earth, as He made Successors from among those who were before them; and that He will surely establish for 
them their religion which He has chosen for them; and that He will surely give them in exchange security and peace 
after their fear: They will worship Me, and they will not associate anything with Me. Then who so is ungrateful after that, they will be 
the rebellious. (Quran, 24: 56) This is known as the istikhlaf verse. 
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2.3.4 Recording; Weight and Measure  
   This section explores Quran to identify the verses that indicate Allah’s orders for all Muslim to 
weight and measure by justice. This measuring is representing accountability for Muslim as well 
as corporations as Islamic banks are an obligation not option as follows: 
 
2.3.5 Accountability   
     The accountability from an Islamic context is Amanah or Trust/honest for Muslim. The 
accountability towards Allah is mean worship of Allah and follows his orders. It means piety and 
fearing him and applying his Sharia in your life. The accountability of BOD of IBs can construct 
based on what prophet Mohamad when He (PBUH) saying, "Any man whom Allah has given the 
authority of ruling some people and he does not look after them in an honest manner, will never feel even the smell 
of Paradise" (Sahih al-Bukhari, Book 89)  
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 Based on the survey of Quran, this study concluded that, accountability from an Islamic 
approach contain three main pillars which are Sharia; Social and financial accountability  
2.3.5.1 Sharia Accountability  
    The three major fundamental principles where mankind plays a vicegerent role on earth, their 
divine accountability to God and the obligation to enjoin good deeds and forbid evils forms 
(Farook, 2008). Sharia is holistic in orientation providing guidance for every aspect of practicing 
Muslims day-to-day life activities (e.g., Vinnicombe, 2010; Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Thus, Sharia 
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acknowledges that practicing Muslims will inevitably have to engage in secular/material 
transactions, but specifies that such dealings must be guided by religious/spiritual/Islamic values 
of accountability, equity, fairness, morality, responsibility and social justice (Maali and Napier, 
2010). In the context of modern large ‘Islamic public corporations’, a major way of ensuring that 
business transactions are Sharia compliant is to set up SSB. Among the SSB’s functions are: (I) 
advising the board/management regarding the religious acceptability of business transactions; (II) 
providing independent reports to shareholders as to the compliance of management with Islamic 
business principles/values; and (III) auditing corporate accounts to verify accurate payments of 
Zakat (Lewis, 2006). To be effective in monitoring managers, SSB must depict accountability, 
independence, confidentiality, competence, and disclosure (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006). 
      One of the principles upon which Sharia was founded is to encourage the welfare of the 
people, protecting and improving their personal rights, property, wealth, etc... (Chapra, 1995), all 
activities are assembled into two classifications: the permissible (halal) and the forbidden (haram). 
Sharia is congregated into three sub-categories which are daruriyyat (Essentials), hajiyyat 
(Complementary), and tahsiniyyat (Embellishments). These three categories summarize the main 
objectives of Sharia in order of significance (Al-Raysuni, 2005; Opwis, 2005). Islam incorporates 
permanent features and mechanisms for adapting to change. While its fundamentals, among 
them `aqidah (creed), `ibadah (worship), and akhlaq (morality and ethics), never change, their 
manifestations in such secondary areas as economics, business, and other worldly activities 
require flexibility and development according to time and space (Kamali, 2007). This is 
embodied in the Sharia, which is central to Islam’s worldview. Generally, the Sharia is predicated 
on benefiting the individual and the community, and its laws are designed to protect these 
benefits and facilitate the improvement and perfection of human life in this world. This 
perfection corresponds to the purposes of the Hereafter. In other words, each of its five worldly 
purposes (preserving faith, life, posterity, intellect, and wealth) is meant to serve the single 
religious purpose of the Hereafter.  
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 2.3.5.2 Social Responsibility  
      IBs are described as having a "social face" (Mashhour, 1996). From the Islamic perspective, 
CSR revolves on the concept of ultimate accountability to God where human beings are stared 
as ‘khalifah’ 9and are predictable to relate with further humans in order to take care of the natural 
environment entrusted to them (e.g., Abbasi, et al., 2012). Siwar and Hossain (2009) indicated 
that Islam is not just a religion but as a holistic way of life. Muwazir et al (2006) highlighted that 
as a vicegerent, leaders in Islamic business corporations are required to practice CSR 
9 KHALIFAH is an Arabic word literally meaning "one who replaces someone else who left or died" (English: caliph). In the 
context of Islam, the word acquires a narrower meaning. The Muslim Khalifa is the successor (in a line of successors) 
to Prophet Muhammad's position as the political, military, and administrative leader of the Muslims.  
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fundamentally from the principle of Tawhid. Kamla et al (2007) identified that as a vicegerent, 
mankind needs to take care of the earth and the environment.  
The concept of CSR in Islam involves a wider meaning embracing taqwa (God 
consciousness)10 dimension by which a business as a group of individuals, assuming the roles and 
responsibility as servants and vicegerents in all situations (Dusuki, 2008). Furthermore, guided by 
the proper relationship with God, the person's daily interactions and transactions would be 
inspired by the values of truthfulness, firmness, fairness, and respect for the law, kindness, 
forbearance, tolerance and uprightness, instead of deceit, haughtiness, class consciousness, 
ostentation, insubordination, envy, backbiting and self-aggrandisement (Hasan, 2002). Hence, to 
fence off social responsibility and declare it to be off-limits to Muslim life would be a shocking 
violation of the principle of taqwa, which is the cardinal Islamic virtue. It would be tantamount 
to a denial of God himself with all the attending consequences in this world and in the Hereafter. 
Each Muslim is considered as a social being that cannot isolate his role and responsibility to the 
society or any of his fellow human beings so far so that he is discouraged from isolating himself 
even for the purpose of worshipping God (Majallat, 2001). 
  Therefore, CSR is a moral and religious initiative based on the belief that a company may be 
'good' regardless of its financial consequences, be they positive or negative. This is not to suggest 
that Islam is against profitmaking. Rather, it is seen as a necessary condition, though not the sole 
purpose, of their existence (Hasan, 2002). The invocation of Sharia and the reflection of the 
taqwa-paradigm in business imply that the entrepreneur is no longer driven only by the principle 
of profit maximization, but also by the pursuit of the ultimate happiness in this life and the 
Hereafter, whereby he acknowledges his social and moral responsibility for the wellbeing of his 
fellow-men (e.g. consumers, employees, shareholders and local communities). Thus, individuals 
10 Taqwa is the most common word used for fear. It comes from the root wiqaayah, which means to protect and is 
used for a shield. Taqwa is to protect yourself from the consequences of your own actions. It implies self-restraint, 
guarding oneself from all sin and wrong deeds. It is to protect yourself in two ways: to abandon sinning and to 
adorn yourself with good deeds because you fear the punishment of Allah. Allah says “And take a provision (with you) 
for the journey, but the best provision is At-Taqwa” (Quran, 2:197) 
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and corporations are encouraged to sacrifice, give up, and spend their wealth on the poor and 
the needy of society while expecting reward only from God. In light of the discussion of maqasid 
al-Sharia, CSR assumes a broader and more holistic significance to Muslim managers, 
corporations, customers, and society as a whole. By doing so, they make themselves ultimately 
responsible to God, the owner of their very selves and the resources that they utilize and manage. 
This responsibility is, in fact, a function of the intrinsic quality of each Muslim’s life as a trust 
from God (Al-Attas, 1996).  
 
2.3.5.3 Financial accountability (Full Disclosure/ Transparency)  
In the context of Islam, accountability is first and foremost to God (Allah), it nonetheless 
explicitly requires corporations to make true, fair, and transparent disclosure of financial facts 
and information not only to shareholders, but also to other stakeholders (Sarker and Sarker, 2012; 
Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). Thus, IBs are arguably subject to greater monitoring and scrutiny than 
69 
 
their non-Islamic counterparts. Therefore, corporations that voluntarily embrace and incorporate 
Islamic values into business operations signal their intention to commit to good governance 
standards. IBs are expected to disclose comprehensive information to the Ummah (Muslim 
nation) about how their activities meet Sharia’ goals and improve the security (consistency/unity) 
of society (Maali et al., 2006; Lewis, 2001). Hopwood (2009) states that “these disclosures can be 
used to increase the company’s legitimacy and, as such, may “even reduce what is known about 
the company” (p. 437).  
In relation to organizations which are governed by the principles of Sharia, stakeholders 
expect certain behavioural practices by these organizations. For example, Hasan (2002) argues 
that the majority Muslim dominated society expects higher level of disclosure practices in 
companies’ annual reports. Such disclosure is seen as a communication mechanism in promoting 
Islamic values practiced by companies. Wilson (1995) debated those IBs, as business entities that 
strive to meet religious obligations, need to compete with other banks to win clients. 
Consequently, IBs need to meet three purposes: run profitable operations for investors; serving 
the society and satisfy religious obligations (Wilson, 1997).  
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2.3.6 Consequences of implementing accountability concept  
     This section surveys verses that show the consequences and value added for Muslim as well 
as corporations as IBs through implement Sharia and follows his orders and obey him. These 
consequences based in Quran, can categorized into two main groups which are: Earth’s Rewards 
and Heaven’s Rewards as follows  
 
 
2.3.7 Approaches of Islamic banks’ objectives  
   There are generally two dissenting views delineating the Islamic banking objectives. One view, 
referred to Chapra’s model (Lewis and Algaud, 2001), sees IB as having a socio-economic 
purpose. According to the proponents of this view as Ahmad (2000); Rosly and Bakar (2003); 
Haron and Hisham (2003) IB must not be solely profit oriented, rather it must aim at promoting 
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Islamic norms and values as well as protecting the needs of Islamic society as a whole. This 
model places greater social welfare responsibilities and religious commitments upon IBs in order 
to achieve the Islamic economic objectives. Chapra’s model is believed to be congruent with the 
spirit of Sharia and overall Islamic worldview. Al-Zuhayli (2003) a renowned Sharia scholar 
endorses the socio-economic framework of IFIs in his famous book Al-Fiqh Al-Islami wa-
Adillatuh, “The primary goal of IFIs is not profit-making, but the endorsement of social goals of 
socio-economic development and the alleviation of poverty” (p.350). He asserts that IFIs 
attempt to link the economic and social development goals in a harmonised overall framework 
based on Islamic teachings and accomplishing the main goal for Muslim in this world which is 
applying Sharia  as Allay saying “Say, "Indeed, my prayer, my rites of sacrifice, my living and my dying are 
for Allah, Lord of the worlds (Quran, 6:162) and also Allah saying “The only statement of the [true] believers 
when they are called to Allah and His Messenger to judge between them is that they say, "We hear and we obey." 
And those are the successful” (Quran, 24:51).  
    On the other hand, Ismail’s model views IBs as a normal commercial entity which has the sole 
responsibility of carrying out business in a manner consistent with Islamic law (Satkunasegaran, 
2003; Lewis and Algaud, 2001). The framework identifies that the bank’s main responsibility is 
towards the shareholders and depositors, while social welfare objectives are to be fulfilled by 
other bodies such as the government and accountability for Allah is important but as a secondary 
level after stakeholders’ objectives as profitability. This view is somehow similar to the Western 
neoclassical worldview, particularly Friedman’s concept of firm’s responsibility, which contends 
that society is served by individuals pursuing their self-interest (Adam Smith’s invisible hand). In 
this framework, profit maximisation is the only legitimate objective of a commercial institution, 
provided that it operates within prescribed rules of the game. 
   This research suggests a holistic model set accountability towards Allah through applying his 
rules and Sharia in the priority as a main objective for IFI. Based on this model, accountability 
towards Allah comes first then accountability towards stockholders as a main owners for IFIs 
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and finally other stakeholders with gives priority to the society and social activities. The 
accountability may be seen as a main framework for IBs which can support IFIs to achieving its 
responsibilities towards Allah and then towards stakeholders’ objectives to get success in this life 
and in the hereafter. Based on this concept, this study state that accountability of IBs towards 
Allah and all stakeholders that contain compliance with Sharia in additional to achieving good 
financial performance and good social roles may be the main priorities for IBs. Based on survey 
Quran, compliance with Sharia may be the main priority for IBs to satisfy Allah first then 
profitability and serving society comes to satisfy other stakeholders  
 
   This study develops a holistic framework for Islamic accountability contain three categories of 
responsibilities to exploring for what extent this model applicable for IBs and determines the 
main consequences and value added for all stakeholders trough adopting this model. The 
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following Table shows the main categories of accountabilities with main objectives and relevant 
mechanism as well as applicable accounting standards that may support IBs to achieve each 
category of accountability through disclosure  
Table 2: Accountability; objective; mechanism and applicable AAOIFI standards  
Accountability Objectives Mechanism Standards of 
AAOIFI 
Sharia / Religion accountability. Implement and compliance 
with Allah's sharia  
SSB Report and sharia 
auditing department  
Goverance standards 1; 2 
and 5 
Ethical; Social and 
Environmental accountability. 
 Serving the society and 
implement the Islamic 
ethics in the banking 
system  
CSR/ Sustainability 
report  
 
Governance standard 7 
Financial and Commercial 
accountability. 
Achieving stockholders 
and other stakeholder's 
aims as profitability and 
stable bank with full 
disclosure level  
Annual report and full 
transparency  
 
Accounting standard 1 
 
2.3.8 Summary         
   Chapter 2 outlines issues concerned with accountability concept from an Islamic approach as 
well as applicable theories for this concept. It shows that accountability from an Islamic 
approach is more holistic as it contains accountability towards Allah as well as stakeholders. This 
chapter outlines how this study contributed for Western theories as agency and stakeholders 
through extend the contract and stakeholders for IBs to added Allah which effects on disclosure 
about SSF in the reporting. Furthermore; it outlines results of surveying Quran as a basis for the 
three accountabilities of IBs which are Sharia; social and financial in additional to support the 
importance of accounting and disclosure from an Islamic approach. The following chapter 
outlines the main methods that adopted to achieve objectives of this study which are content 
analysis and questionnaires. Next chapter moreover shows the result of the pilot studies which 
represent indicators to conduct this study.   
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Chapter Three: Research Methods   
3.0 Introduction 
   This chapter outlines the research’ methods as well as results of pilots studies in additional to 
outlines of AAOIFI. It contains three parts as follows: First part outlines the main methods that 
adopted in this thesis to collected data which are content analysis through disclosure index and 
questionnaire survey. The second part in this chapter outlines AAOIFI as an ideal model for IBs 
and for what extent it is applicable for IBs and how these standards can support IBs to achieve 
its SSF accountabilities through disclosure. The third part comprises the results of pilot studies 
that conducted by the researcher. The main aim from these studies is finding indicators about 
accountability practices for these banks which support the research’s gap.  
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Part One: Methods of the Research  
3.1.1 Introduction   
     This part seeks to outline the main methods that adopted in this thesis which are disclosure 
index and questionnaire. First; disclosure index based on manual content analysis is adopted for 
measuring disclosure and compliance levels. Second; questionnaire is used for measuring the 
impacts of SSF disclosure on the stakeholders’ loyalty; trust and satisfaction. It is furthermore 
adopts for survey the perceptions of stakeholders as well as non-customers about SSF’ practices 
of IBs.  This part is organized as follows: section 3.1.2 outline the Quantitative Method as a 
domain approach for this study then followed by shows the importance of annual reports as 
main basis for data concerned with disclosure levels for IBs. Section 3.1.4 reviews the Content 
Analysis as a first method adopted for testing SSF accountability based on disclosure in the 
annual report as well as websites. Section 3.1.5 shows the disclosure index then final section 
(3.1.7) illustrates the questionnaire survey as a second method to collect data for investigating the 
perceptions of stakeholders.          
3.1.2 Quantitative Method 
Quantitative methodology, based on the positivist philosophy, is concerned with counting and 
measuring aspects of the social world and its structure and processes; theoretical background 
establishes the standards of the approach of the social sciences over a long time (Sarantakos, 
1994). This approach normally has a logical structure, in which theories identify the issues to 
enable the researcher to address sets of hypotheses derived from general theories (Bryman, 2004). 
One type of quantitative method is a survey technique that is usually related to the deductive 
approach and provides information on what people conceive or report (Neuman, 2000). Second 
method is content analysis based on the disclosure index which has been extensively used in 
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social accounting research (Gray et al., 1995). The following section provides more details 
regarding the content analysis method in additional to questionnaire survey. 
3.1.3 Annual Reports in Accounting and Accountability Research 
     Milne and Adler (1999) have stressed that the majority of researchers in the social accounting 
field have “focused on the disclosures organisations make in their annual reports...The research 
method that is most commonly used to assess organisations’ social and environmental 
disclosures and accountability are content analysis” (p.237). In order to justify the reason to 
choose annual reports as the main source for content analysis, it is appropriate to review the 
importance of annual reports in accountability research. Issuing annual reports represents part of 
the entity’s accountability. It is governed not only by matters of custom and the market place, 
but also by legislative and quasi-legislative regulation. Given the dominance of conventional 
accounting, annual reports usually reflect the repressive form of accounting (Gallhofer and 
Haslam, 2003). Annual reports are one of the preferred ways of communication, dialogue and 
discharging of accountability to a wide range of stockholders (Guthrie et al., 2004). The annual 
reports also have a high level of credibility in comparison to other media (Tilt, 1994). The annual 
report may not be the only way for a corporation to discharge accountability, however, Buhr 
(1998) argues that “they are the only form that is institutionalised and provided on a regular basis 
year after year” (p.169). The annual report is easily accessible. For some researchers, annual 
reports may become the key source available as a result of the limited number of other 
documents (Unerman, 2000). Annual reports, according to Campbell (2000) “can be accepted as 
an appropriate source of a company’s attitudes towards social and ethical reporting” (p. 84). For 
many corporations, ethical information which may contains Sharia and social has become part of 
the annual reports. In spite of this, most agree that annual reports remain an important medium 
for the communication of social; Sharia in additional to financial information to all interested 
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parties. Providing ethical as social information in annual reports contributes to enhancing the 
level of accountability and transparency (e.g., Gray et al. 1995b).  
   The annual report is a significant document in which corporations may reflect their attitudes, 
desires and contributions towards society and all stakeholders. The annual report might also 
establish a social image to be seen by a wide range of stockholders (e.g., Gallhofer and Haslam, 
2003). Annual reports might be used as a tool to enhance the corporate image, and as corporate 
propaganda. Annual reports are important sources of information as they are systematically 
produced, widely accessible and communicate details about the companies’ operations 
(Silverman, 1993). Annual reports, according to Unerman (2000), provide credible information, 
which in turn strengthens the findings. For Laine (2009) annual reports are key communication 
tools to portray firms’ strategic choices of rhetoric.  
   Elshandidy et al (2013) focuses on annual reports in his study and argue that “because they 
remain a primary source of information for investors, and there is increasing usage of these 
reports, indicating value relevance to investors” (p.325). The annual report has been transformed 
into a public-relations document intended to convince stakeholders of the well-being of the firm 
and to promote the image and reputation of the firm (Karreman et al., 2014). Furthermore; there 
are several studies used annual reports as a main source for measuring the disclosure level which 
reflects the importance of annual reports from an academic perspective (e.g., Belal et al., 2015; 
Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012; Hussainey and Mouselli; 2010)     
3.1.4 Content Analysis 
     The study uses content analysis to explore if Islamic accountability themes related to 
Compliance with SSF accountabilities are present (or absent) from IBs’ annual reports and web 
sites (e.g., Bauer, 2000 for discussions of using content analysis in social science). For Guthrie 
and Abeysekera (2006): “Content analysis of annual reports is a technique for gathering data” (p. 
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14). Kaya and Yayla (2007) submit that: “One of the effective ways to evaluate the development 
of accounting practices is to consider recent reporting trends of the corporations” (p. 9).  
    Therefore, content analysis of annual reports represents a significant tool for the analysis of 
banks’ reporting. Content analysis and disclosure index as part of it is used widely in the 
accountability literature, more so than other methods, as annual reports and related media are 
significant documents of corporations being seen by a wide range of stockholders and helping to 
create a company’s social image (Branco and Rodrigues, 2006; Gray et al., 1995b). 
It is important here to note that firms’ disclosures are not always an accurate reflection of their 
actual events and practices (e.g., Ullman, 1985). Firms, however, identify what they perceive to 
be their most important accomplishments and objectives through their disclosures (Ingram and 
Frazier, 1980). Unerman (2000) maintains that a key assumption informing many studies is that 
the volume of disclosures signifies the importance of these issues to the company. In the same 
vein, Haniffa and Hudaib (2004) state that disclosure in annual reports and other media as the 
internet are key venues for IBs to demonstrate that their activities are in line with Sharia. 
      Content analysis has been widely adopted in the literature (e.g., Kamla, 2007; Parker, 2005; 
Milne and Adler, 1999). These studies analyse the value of the information disclosed in annual 
reports, and the acknowledgement of certain words and themes within the textual material 
(Beattie et al., 2004). The use of content analysis is justified because they ensure that the study is 
comparable with previous studies in the area and from year to year (Ahmad and Sulaiman, 2004). 
Although content analysis is a popular method in analysing various media including newspaper 
and political speeches, only a few studies have previously applied this methodology to analysis of 
web sites (Hwang et al., 2003). However, with the growing emphasis on communication via 
electronic mediums, there has been an increase in such studies especially in the accounting 
literature. Fisher et al (2004) quote the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) 
which states that in the future business reporting will move entirely to web as the primary format 
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of distributing information. Such a move has prompted many researchers to move their attention 
to company web sites for analysis of textual material (Hwang et al., 2003).  
3.1.5 Disclosure Index  
 In this thesis, the first 3 empirical investigations are considered a form of ‘disclosure index’; this 
is consistent with a broad understanding of ‘Content Analysis’ in the literature review. Beattie et 
al (2004) reported that "disclosure index studies are based on the general principles of content 
analysis - a well-established method in the social sciences" (p.214). For Dragomir (2010), 
disclosure index studies form a part of content analysis, “which involves classifying text units 
into categories” (p.368). Yekini (2009) also confirmed that by stating: "We use content analysis to 
identify what companies disclosed in their annual reports and use this to create a disclosure index 
for each of our sample companies" (p.124). The analysis in this study focused on sections of the 
text that relate to the selected categories (SSF), that is why the analysis here takes the form of a 
disclosure index, and is characterised as a 'partial type of content analysis' (Beattie et al., 2004). 
Yusoff et al (2006) argue that “Using disclosure index as a part of content analysis is considered 
a most useful technique as a result of its important role, where “(1) it is based on the ‘breadth’ 
(number of different topics) and ‘depth’ (specificity of information provided) and (2) it may 
avoid elements of subjectivity” (p.10). Many studies have used a disclosure index as a research 
method (e.g. Cheung et al., 2010; Hossain et al., 2006; Maali et al., 2006). The main differences 
between content analysis and disclosure index, is that the first analyses the whole text of a media 
communication, while the second focuses on particular predefined information from a 
previously selected list to be analysed. However, this does not preclude classifying disclosure 
index as a partial type of content analysis (Dragomir, 2010)  
   Guthrie and Abeysekera (2006) state that “A disclosure index is a research instrument 
comprising a series of pre-selected items which, when scored, provide a measure that indicates a 
level of disclosure in the specific context for which the index was devised” (p. 11). According to 
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Marston and shrives (1991) the first use of disclosure index occurred in 1961 by Cerf to publish 
his research results. Disclosure index based on Marston and Shrives (1991) is “can be used to 
show compliance with regulations if the items in the index are so chosen or conversely it can be 
used to show the level of voluntary disclosure” (p.195). It could identify the level of disclosure 
and particular predefined information in the Islamic banks’ annual report; here, in this study, 
Islamic accountability for Islamic banking, such disclosure could be mandatory or/and voluntary 
information. Also, the disclosure index can cover more than one source of information (e.g. 
annual report and website), as well as covering company and non-company sources of 
information (Hassan and Marston, 2010).  
  Basically, the main approach that has been used in the previous studies was initialised by 
selecting a group of items that will represent the disclosure index which will then be used to 
screen the annual report. The disclosure indices consists of the mandatory disclosure (e.g. 
Arnold and Matthews, 2002) and/or voluntary disclosure (e.g. Botosan, 1997), which depends on 
the requirements in the country where the firms operate, the types of additional voluntary 
information, as well as the motives of the study conducted by the researcher. Most of the prior 
literature used voluntary disclosure index to measure the extent of disclosure quality (e.g. Barako 
et al., 2006; Chau and Gray, 2002). In assessing the disclosure level, the mandatory disclosure will 
be taken out of the list of the disclosure index by prior studies as it can be viewed as minimum 
disclosure requirement imposed by regulators in that particular country (e.g., Raffournier, 1995).  
    Past research has normally developed the disclosure index using several steps. First, the item 
in the disclosure index was compiled from extensive past literatures (e.g. Kamla and Rammal, 
2013; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Williams and Zinkin, 2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et 
al., 2006). The selection of items to be included in the index also must be chosen very carefully. 
Some of them scrutinised the annual reports of large firms in a particular country under study to 
obtain/ understand the patterns of the additional voluntary information that is supposed to be 
included in the disclosure index (e.g. Botosan, 1997). Secondly, the disclosure index which 
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consists of mandatory disclosure items will be crosschecked with the AAOIFI. The items that 
have been found to be disclosed in a mandatory fashion will be removed and the list must 
comprise of voluntary disclosure elements per se (e.g. Barako et al., 2006; Chau and Gray, 2002; 
Raffournier, 1995). 
    Third, the verification of disclosure index takes place. Some research normally employed an 
independent external examiner to validate the disclosure index. They will choose the 
practitioners or experts in the accounting areas to verify the list of the voluntary disclosure index 
like the certified of Islamic public accountants (CIPA), the partner of the audit firms or financial 
managers at IBs (e.g. Barako et al. 2006; Hossain et al, 1995; ; Singhvi and Desai, 1971). 
Nevertheless, some other studies rely on personal judgement and favours not to validate their 
disclosure index before use (e.g. Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Chau and Gray, 2002; Raffournier, 
1995; McNally et al., 1982). 
   Fourth, the researcher will decide whether they want to assign a weighting to the disclosure 
index or not. Those who want to employ an un-weighted disclosure index will treat all items in 
the list as equally important and the dichotomous method will be used to score the item (Gray, et 
al., 1992). The firm will get a score of 1 if they disclosed the item and 0 if they have not disclosed 
(e.g. Meek et al., 1995; Firth, 1979). Past studies which intend to assign the weight to each item in 
the list of disclosure index will take additional step in determining the weight. The disclosure 
index will be sent to the specific respondent for them to rate the items which are highly 
important or less important in making economic decisions. The result from the respondent then 
will be calculated and averaged to determine the weight. 
    Both weighted and un-weighted disclosure indices possess niche and unique features that are 
subject to preference and criticism by prior studies. Cooke (1989) argues that “the drawback of 
weighted disclosure index is the subjectivity involved in assigning the weighting value” (p.182). 
He claims that un-weighted index is superior as compared to a weighted index especially when 
the studies conducted are concentrated to all groups of users of the annual report. This is also 
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supported by Chow and Wong-Boren (1987) who declares that “a weighted index involved high 
subjectivity since the determination of weighting is dependent on the perceptions of the users, 
and it does not portray the specific information that they really want and desire” (p.536). 
Furthermore, Speros (1979) seminal work showed that firms are systematic and constant in their 
disclosure policy because if they disclosed important items excellently, the same condition will 
apply to the less important items, thus emphasising that the weighting index as something 
irrelevant and unnecessary. Un-weighted disclosure index must be exposed to bias since it treats 
all items equally important and must be irrelevant because there must be circumstances whereby 
one item would outweigh another. In addition, the disclosure index also contains bias from the 
researchers’ discretionary judgements and evaluations. Although bias and subjectivity are 
something unavoidable, all these must be carefully addressed and controlled. The bias must be in 
the satisfactory minimum level and overgeneralization may not be manipulated. 
    Although disclosure indices are subject to controversy especially on the subjectivity involved 
from researchers’ discretionary, one may admit that disclosure index has its own strength. The 
complete disclosure index that will be used to screen the annual report revealed the extent of the 
disclosure quality. The disclosure index is very comprehensive and robust in nature because it 
was created based on many sources including past literature and annual reports, crosschecked 
against the mandatory disclosure, screened to current announcement by standard setters and 
validated by experts in the accounting field. Moreover, since the disclosure index has been used 
for more than 45 years since Cerf (1961) era as to measure the extent of disclosure, it seems that 
it has survived the test of time. 
   Content method analysis can be performed either using manual (traditional) techniques or 
computerised techniques. In manual content method analysis, the disclosure index will be cross-
checked with the annual report to detect the specific information that was disclosed by the firms. 
The annual report will be read line by line and the score will be awarded if the company discloses 
the information listed in the disclosure index. Numerous prior literature studies have employed 
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this techniques in assessing the quality and quantity of disclosure by the firms in their annual 
report (e.g., Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Eng and Mak, 2003; Cooke and Haniffa, 2002). 
Traditional content method analysis requires researchers to dedicate long hours in labour 
intensive reading process (Boesso and Kumar, 2007), hence, the number of samples in the study 
which utilised traditional content method analysis is relatively small (Jo and Kim, 2007). 
3.1.6 Validity and Reliability for Disclosure Indices  
    For Neuendorf (2002), reliability may be applied when using the content analysis /disclosure 
index method to confer upon it meaning and credibility. Krippendorff (2004) reported that 
reliability contains three elements: reproducibility, stability and accuracy. For Hassan and 
Marston (2010), there are three common forms of reliability and another three for validity; those 
for reliability include "test-retest, inter-coder reliability, and internal consistency… [while validity 
include]... criterion validity, content validity and construct validity" (p.25). Reliability means that 
the investigation result will not change even with repeated trials by different researchers 
(Reproducibility). Marston and Shrives (1991) argue that "Since the scores are extracted from 
printed annual reports which remain constant over time there is no obstacle to repetition" (p.197)  
     For Krippendorff, (2004) “research procedure is reliable when it responds to the same 
phenomena in the same way regardless of the circumstances of its implementation” (p.211). 
Reliability is related to credibility of measurement, in the sense of impartiality in measuring. 
While, validity means that the data under analysis is the same data, which a researcher aims to 
investigate. Thus, for Macnamara (2006), validity of research can be simply achieved by “careful 
selection of the sample of media content to be analysed” (p.13). In terms of the validity of a 
disclosure index for Omar and Simon (2011), "the index can be considered to be valid if it 
expresses what the researcher intended" (p.177). 
     The researcher endeavoured to ensure the reliability and validity of the research through the 
following steps, including: (1) conducting a pilot study, as is strongly recommended (Gray et al., 
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1995b). According to Milne and Adler (1999), the pilot study could be seen as an essential stage 
before deciding on the actual categories. In this work, the pilot study was conducted to 
familiarise the researcher with banks' activities and the collected data, in terms of categories and 
understanding the content context before starting the process of content analysis (Wolfe, 1991). 
Consequently, the pilot study was conducted for the following purposes: (a) in order to establish 
the suitability of the checklist selection, and to confirm reliability of the research; (b) to ensure 
the selected categories are appropriate to the content of annual reports; (c) to remove any 
ambiguities and translation problems that could exist in the category and (D) to gets indicators 
about SSF reporting. (2) The initial instrument categories were changed to fit AAOIFI context. 
As the initial one was mainly focused on literature, and the researcher's perspective. (3) The 
researcher consulted supervisors, other staff and students in order to make sure he avoided any 
possible errors. The possible errors that could include: ambiguities, misunderstanding or biases 
during the translation, where there are some sentences that might have more than one meaning. 
However, even with consultation and careful selection, the instrument reflects the researcher's 
reading of IBs annual report  
3.1.7 Questionnaire Survey      
     Questionnaires are generally used for descriptive or explanatory research conducted using 
attitude and opinion questionnaires regarding organisational practices (Saunders et al., 2007). The 
questionnaire enables a study to identify and describe the variability in various phenomena. The 
questionnaire survey is better when used to identify specific attitudes (Jankowicz, 2004). The 
questionnaire is more appropriate for stakeholder’s respondents at countries as Egypt; Kingdom 
of Saudi Aribia (KSA); United Kingdom (UK) and Kuwait since they feel freer to express their 
opinions without fear of being identified (Falgi, 2009). The questionnaire survey mainly answered 
the research questions related to the perceptions, expectations and value added for accountability 
to IBs as well as impacts of disclosure on the behaviour of stakeholders as loyalty, trust and 
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satisfaction; however, at the same time it was employed as a support for the secondary data in 
additional to content analysis since using one method may not be sufficient to accomplish the 
study’s objectives. 
      According to Saunders et al (2007) there are two categories of surveying: self-administrated 
and interviewer-administrated. The self-administrated questionnaire is divided into three types: 
internet-mediated questionnaire, postal questionnaire and delivery collection questionnaire; the 
interviewer-administrated questionnaire is divided into two types: telephone questionnaire and 
structured interview. For the purpose of this research, self-administered questionnaires were 
employed for a number of reasons; it is more appropriate for multi-different respondents at 
more than 10 countries, cheaper than other methods, easier for distribution, easier for 
respondents to complete, and the anonymity encourages respondents to complete the 
questionnaire leading to an increased response rate 11 . Finally, this type of questionnaire is 
utilized extensively in surveys. Although most questionnaires were delivered through Qualtrics 
online survey as well as by hand to each respondent and collected later, a number of them were 
emailed to respondents and returned by email.  
3.1.8 Questionnaire Design and Development 
    One of the challenges associated with the use of a questionnaire survey is the need to be 
especially careful when designing the questionnaire due to the fact that the respondent is left 
with absolute reliance on the questions already designed for them to respond (Fowler, 2002). 
Essential considerations underlying the characteristics and the features of a good questionnaire 
have been made to ensure that the use of questionnaire survey will achieve its objective in 
addressing the research questions of this study. Together with this facilitative nature of the 
questionnaire, the researcher will have to appropriately consider the design and development of 
11 Fowler (2002) recommended that these methods are relatively low in cost, require minimal staff and facilities, and 
they also give respondents the time required to provide thoughtful answers. 
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the questionnaire. A useful guide to the construction of questionnaires is given by Evans (1984), 
who identified four important steps to be considered: firstly, there may be a clear definition of 
the purpose of the questionnaire; secondly, the researcher has to decide the data that is required 
from the questionnaire; thirdly, the component parts of questionnaire need to be analysed; and 
finally, a series of questions may be structured in order to elicit the appropriate responds from 
the respondents. When structuring questions Fowler (2002) suggest that design of questionnaire 
to be laid out in a manner that is clear and uncluttered from respondents’ point of view  
   Because this research aims to investigate the level of compliance with the Holistic Islamic 
model for accountability, then investigate the added value or consequences of SSF dimensions 
on stockholders. Moreover, because the research targets several stockholders, effected or 
interested with IBs, the researcher has developed two sets of questionnaire for two targeted 
respondents; stakeholders who deal with IBs as well as Non-customers who do not deal with IBs.  
     The two questionnaire surveys were designed and structured to address the research   
questions for this study based on: the services and products provided by Islamic banks, SSB 
disclosure, objectives of Islamic banks and its roles in the society, reflecting the true image of 
Islam and for what extent IBs are full comply with Sharia. These themes have been identified as 
the fundamental components underlying the scope of the present research corresponding to 
Holistic Islamic accountability Model under investigation. Hence, when developing the questions 
in two questionnaire surveys attention has been made to address the above themes that were 
found in the literature. English as well as Arabic copy of the questionnaire survey along with the 
covering letter to the research participants are attached in Appendix 1. Riley et al (2000) present 
a list of guidelines to keep in mind when constructing questionnaires. Some of these relevant 
guidelines are: The length of the question; Running order or sequence; Avoid statements that 
sound like facts; Questions may be unambiguous to prevent misinterpretation and void 
statements that encourage a specific response or bias.  
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    Nachmias and Nachmias (1996) advised that when formulating the questions to be included in 
the questionnaire consideration may be given to its content, structure, format, and the sequence 
of the questions. In addition, the design of these questions may enable the respondents to 
respond in a minimum time with a minimum effort. In general, this study has used closed-ended 
questions where alternative answers on the questions raised are given to the respondents. Fowler 
(2002) argued that, besides being more convenient to respondents, closed-ended types of 
questions would be appropriate for use when the research involves asking respondents a large 
number of item in a similar form.  
   In addition, the researcher used an ordinal measure of collecting and analysing the data 
through the use of a Likert scale type of questions to elicit the opinion and attitude of the 
respondents on the issues under investigation. Amongst the various Likert scale measurements 
normally used in research projects, and which are implemented in the present study, is the 
continuous scales, where respondents are asked on questions such as measuring between 
strongly agree to strongly disagree. The use of Likert scales in the present research are deemed 
suitable because it allows the researcher to make a relative measurement that is necessary on the 
relationship between the actual practices of IBs and the ideal model for Holistic Islamic 
framework of SSF. This use of Likert scale in measuring these attitudinal relationships is 
supported by Fowler (2002) when He says “Only comparative statements (or statements about 
relationships) are justifiable when one is using ordinal measures” (p.93). In this regard, both 
questionnaires consist of questions designed in the form of Likert scales. Generally, the 
questions require research participants to respond using the scale: (1) strongly disagree; (2) 
disagree; (3) neutral; (4) agree and (5) strongly agree. Meanwhile, other questions contain 
questions that measure respondents’ attitude using the scales: (1) very unimportant; (2) 
unimportant; (3) neutral; (4) important and (5) very important. The last section in the 
questionnaires Survey requires the respondents to provide some of their demographic details, 
such as their gender, age range, qualification and aspects of training received. These questions 
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have been designed in a manner that requires respondents to tick the alternative answers 
provided by the researcher. 
3.1.9 Piloting questionnaire and assessment of Validity as well as Reliability 
   Shortcomings in questionnaires may arise for different reasons, for example unstructured 
formulation, unclear language, illogical, omitted or unsuitable questions, and difficulty in 
answering them, which may lead to unwillingness to reply, missing data, and low response rates 
(Pornupatham, 2006). Validity is defined as ability to provide findings that are consistent with 
theoretical or conceptual values (DeVellis, 2003). Therefore, the questionnaire was validated by 
applying a pilot study that was not a pre-test, which was undertaken to provide relevant 
questions and to enhance specific areas that may not be explicit by obtaining astute feedback. 
For this purpose, 20 questionnaires were distributed which is conceived to be sufficient 
according to Fink, (1995) who suggests that a minimum number of 10 are acceptable for a pilot 
study. The revised questionnaires were then sent to 5 academics in Egypt, 5 external auditors, 5 
employees in Egypt IBs and 5 colleagues who are studying PhD in accounting in Egypt and in 
the UK. The aim of this stage is to assess whether the research instrument is valid for the task or 
not. As Hussy and Hussy (1997) mentioned that validity is the extent to which the research 
findings accurately represent what is really happening in the situation.  
During the pilot study, astute feedback and comments were mostly related to the language, 
omitting and adding some terms, whereas a number of them viewed the questionnaire as 
comprehensively and extensively covering the research questions. According to Burgess (2001) a 
pilot study enables researchers to perform a trial analysis sample that leads to enhanced test for 
the analysis process, the questionnaires of the pilot study are reviewed and examined and will 
provide similar findings to the results analysis. The pre-testing of the questionnaire will reveal 
very serious errors, oversights that would have spelled disaster if they had not been detected and 
corrected before going into the field or the mail. As well as, Stebbins (2001) claimed that "the 
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rise of quantitative research brought with it the need to pre-test measuring instruments and 
conduct pilot studies to iron out kink in procedures and sharpen precision so the main study 
could proceed as flawlessly as possible” (p.29). In the validity assessment, Diamantopoulos and 
Schlegelmilch (2000) argue that: “the basic question that we try to answer is 'Are we in fact 
measuring what we think we are measuring?' (p.34). In addition, the other objective of piloting is 
to detect the validity and reliability of the questionnaire.  
   Reliability is a crucial issue in psychological measurement that can be defined as a measuring 
instrument which gives rise to variable errors, that is lead inconsistently between observations 
either via any one-measurement procedure or each time a given variable is measured by the same 
instrument (DeVellis, 2003). Numerous methods have been employed to measure reliability 
comprising the test re-test, split half, and Cronbach Alpha; however, one of the most commonly-
employed consistencies is Cronbach Alpha. Black (1999) suggest that Cronbach Alpha is the 
optimum indicator for internal consistency of instruments which do not have right-wrong 
marking schemes, and may hence be utilised for both suitable questions and questionnaires 
adopting scales such as the Likert Scale. This research applies Cronbach Alpha as a measurement 
of consistency as it seems to be less biased and more appropriate than other methods and gives a 
more accurate statistical finding (DeVellis, 2003).  
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Part Two: AAOIFI (Benchmark of Islamic banks) 
3.2.1 Summary  
    This section outlines two issues. First; it outlines the overview about AAOIFI as history; 
objectives; AAOIFI structure and AAOIFI standards. Secondly; exploring why IBs need Islamic 
accounting and Islamic standards? This issue answer the question based on reviewing the 
applicability of AAOIFI for IFIs and why this research adopt AAOIFI as a benchmark for IBs 
which support them to achieve SSF reporting.  
3.2.2 AAOIFI 
   The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) is an 
Islamic international autonomous non-for-profit corporate body that prepares accounting, 
auditing, governance, ethics and Sharia standards for Islamic financial institutions and the 
industry. Professional qualification programs (notably CIPA, the Sharia Adviser and Auditor 
"CSAA", and the corporate compliance program) are presented now by AAOIFI in its efforts to 
enhance the industry’s human resources base and governance structures. As an independent 
international organization, AAOIFI is supported by institutional members (200 members from 
40 countries) including central banks, IFIs, and other participants from the international Islamic 
banking and finance industry, worldwide. AAOIFI has gained assuring support for the 
implementation of its standards, which are now adopted in the Kingdom of Bahrain, Dubai 
International Financial Centre, Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, Sudan and Syria. The relevant authorities 
in Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, KSA, and South Africa have issued guidelines that are 
based on AAOIFI’s standards and pronouncements. AAOIFI standards are followed – as part of 
regulatory requirement or IFIs’ internal guidelines – in jurisdictions that offer Islamic finance 
across Middle East, Asia Pacific, South Asia, Central Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America; 
and Islamic Development Bank Group. Consequently, AAOIFI have introduced greater 
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harmonisation of Islamic finance practices across the world (AAOIFI, 2015). The existence of 
these standards has significantly improved transparency and disclosures, and also resulted in 
greater harmonisation of Sharia practices. In part, the Islamic accounting standards are 
adaptations of International Accounting Standards (lAS) concentrating on added disclosure due 
to the uniqueness of the Islamic banks. However, they also fill a number of major gaps in lAS 
when applied to Islamic banks (Ariffin, 2005). 
3.2.2.1 AAOIFI History     
AAOIFI was established in accordance with an agreement of association which was signed by 
Islamic financial institutions on 26 February 1990 in Algiers. AAOIFI was registered on 11th 
Ramadan 1411 corresponding to 27 March 1991 in the State of Bahrain (AAOIFI, 2015)   
3.2.2.2 AAOIFI objectives 
The broad objectives of AAOIFI can be summarised as follows  
1. To develop accounting and auditing thought relevant to Islamic financial institution. 
2. To disseminate accounting and auditing thoughts relevant to Islamic financial institution and its applications 
through training, seminars, publication of periodical newsletters, carrying out and commissioning of research 
and other means;  
3. To prepare, promulgate and interpret accounting and standards for Islamic financial ;and  
4. To review and amend accounting and auditing standards for Islamic financial institutions. 
AAOIFI carries out these objectives in accordance with precepts of Islamic sharia which represents a comprehensive 
system for all aspects of life, in conformity with the environment in which Islamic tinancial institutions have developed. 
This activity is intended. This activity is intended both to enhance the confidence of users of the financial statement of 
Islamic financial statements of Islamic financial institutions in the information that is produces about these institutions. 
And to encourage these users to invest or deposit their funds in Islamic financial institutions and to use their services 
   (AAOIFI, 2015) 
 
AAOIFI Vision: To guide IF’s markets operation and financial reporting on Sharia principle and 
rules. To provide IF markets with a standard that can support growth of the industry 
AAOIFI Mission: Standardization and harmonization of international Islamic finance practices 
and financial reporting in accordance to Sharia  
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3.2.2.3 AAOIFI structure  
Figure 8: AAOIFI structure (Where we are?)   
 
(AAOIFI, 2015) 
3.2.2.4 Members of AAOIFI 
Table 3: AAOIFI’ members  
 
3.2.2.5 Mechanism of dealing with AAOIFI' s standards 
Karim (1995) argues that there are two ways in which Islamic accounting concepts could be 
arrived at: 
93 
 
1. Establish objectives (and concepts) based on the principles of Islam and its teachings and 
consider these objectives in relation to contemporary accounting thought. 
2. Start with the objectives established in contemporary accounting thought, test them against 
the Islamic Sharia, accept those that are consistent with Sharia  and reject those that are not, and 
develop those that are unique. AAOIFI has adopted the second, easier approach in the 
development of their "Statements of Financial Accounting" which they claim is "consistent with 
the broader view of Islamic principles -a view which does not require that a concept be always be 
derived from the Sharia" (p.24 and p.37). This approach is in line with the Islamic judicial 
principle of Ibaha or permissibility (which itself is not uncontested); it suggests that anything is 
permissible unless it is prohibited clearly by the Sharia . Hence, the concepts of decision useful 
accounting information such as relevance and reliability are immediately embraced into Islamic 
accounting by the AAOIFI. This approach has its supporters (e. g. Hamat 1994). However, this 
approach has been objected to earlier by Gambling and Karim (1986) on the grounds that the 
conceptual framework of accounting currently applied in the West is justified in a dichotomy 
between business morality and private morality. Thus it cannot be implemented in other societies 
that have revealed doctrines and morals that govern all social, economic and political aspects of 
life. Further objections to this method arise because neither Western accounting theory nor 
Western accounting standards explicitly deal with the morality of the objectives of commercial 
accounting entities or even of the methods by which they are pursued (Karim, 1995). Hence, the 
approach of not reinventing the wheel adopted by the AAOIFI may be indefensible. The 
AAOIFI has adopted this approach not because of its correctness or intellectual apathy, but due 
to pragmatic considerations of its survival and acceptance of its standards by Islamic Banks. 
Thus for Karim (1995) "In order to gain the recognition and support of IBs in the 
implementation of its standards, AAOIFI might find it necessary to demonstrate to IBs that it 
has not completely discarded the efforts that they have exerted in setting up their own 
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accounting policies with the help of their SSB" (p.292). According to the AAOIFI the 
mechanism of this organization is as follows: 
1. The starting basis is that all Islamic financial institutions should apply the standards issued by the 
Accounting and Auditing organization for Islamic financial institutions, where such standards are available. 
2. Ehen there are no specific standards, the Islamic financial institution may use standards other than those 
issued by AAOIFI as deemed appropriate, which do not contravene the Sharia'h Rules and Principles. 
3. Should the requirements of such standards mentioned in paragraph (h) he in conflict with Sharia'h Rules and 
Principles, and the institution is compelled to use those standards, a disclosure must be made of the point of 
conflict while adhering to the requirments of a Sharia'h necessity. 
4. When ever AAOIFI issue standards that cover the cases in paragraphs (b) and (c), the Islamic financial 
institution must apply the new standards.  
3.2.2.6 AAOIFI standards 
Financial accounting plays an important role in providing the information which users of the 
financial statements of Islamic banks depend on in assessing the bank's compliance with the 
precepts of Sharia . However, to perform this role effectively, accounting standards need to be 
developed and complied with by Islamic banks. The development of such standards must be 
based on clear objectives of financial accounting and agreed upon definitions of its concepts. 
AAOIFI, since its establishment in 1990 until 2015 AAOIFI have issued 88 standards as 
following: (a) 48 on Sharia , (b) 26 accounting, (c) 5 auditing standards, (d) 7 governance, (e) 2 
codes of ethics (AAOIFI, 2015). 
Table 4: AAOIFI standards  
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3.2.3 Applicability of AAOIFI for IFIs 
  The study of Islamic accounting has grown in recent years with substantive contributions from 
scholars such as Lewis and Algaoud (2001); Baydoun and Willet (1997); Gambling and Karim 
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(1986). Islamic accounting is the accounting process which provides appropriate information 
(financial and non-financial data) to stakeholders of an entity which will enable them to ensure 
that the entity is continuously operating within the bounds of the Sharia  and delivering on its 
socio-economic objectives and It is also a tool enables Muslims to evaluate their own 
accountabilities to God (Hameed, 2001). Moreover, Zaid (2000) defined Islamic accounting as "a 
systematic process to record the legitimate transactions in the records and measure the financial 
results based on these transactions in order to be used in decision-making" (p.106). In Islamic 
society, accounting has an essential role in enabling Muslims to fulfil their religious duties, as 
paying Zakat and avoiding the use of Riba as well as giving Qard Hassan (e.g., Karim, 1995; 
Gambling and Karim, 1986). Therefore, accounting may operate in accordance with the 
principles of the Islamic economy.  
The type of information that Islamic accounting is required to provide is different from the 
information provided by conventional accounting. Furthermore, unlike conventional banks, 
Islamic banks have to comply with Sharia, which has a complete code for running a business; 
therefore, their accounting standards need to reflect that law (Al-Abdullatif, 2007). The 
objectives of accounting information of Islamic banks are different from those of conventional 
banks for two main reasons: (I) IBs deal within a Sharia framework. As a result, the nature of 
their transactions is different from that of conventional banks; (II) the users of the information 
generated by IBs have different needs from users of the information published by conventional 
banks (Khan, 1994). Abdel-Magid (1981) found that there is an increasing demand among 
researchers to ensuring the accounting practice is based on Sharia principles. 
   There have been many studies examining the appropriateness of conventional accounting for 
an Islamic economy. Scholars as Haniffa (2002); Haniffa and Hudaib (2001); Baydoun and 
Willett (1995); Hamid et al., (1993); Karim and Tomkins (1987), have suggested that Islam must 
influence the approach and the manner in which accounting is practised. Hameed (2001) asking a 
strong support among Muslim Accountants and Accounting Academics for applying an Islamic 
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accounting as well as accountability framework instead of using the decision-usefulness 
framework of conventional accounting, and the need for developing a specific accounting that 
helps Muslims to fulfil their objectives and achieve God's consent. Mirza and Baydounl (1999) 
found that Islamic societies need their accounting and reporting standards that support them to 
obey Allah and satisfy other stakeholders. Moreover, annual reports of IFIs may include a 
comprehensive disclosure about the firm's operations, financial; compliance with Sharia as well as 
social information. Al-Mehmadi (2004) concluded that, IBs need special accounting standards. In 
addition, International Accounting Standards (IASs) based on such techniques would create 
difficulties for Muslims (Shadia, 2007). 
   Hameed (2001) explains that; the worldview, principles, objectives and values of Islam are 
different from secular Western society. As such, the particular obligations and prohibitions in the 
economic and social arena under Sharia, and the establishment of Islamic organisations require a 
different accounting framework. Therefore, conventional accounting may be an inappropriate 
tool for the task. He considers that an Islamic economy needs a different accounting system that 
corresponds to Islamic values and provides appropriate information for the Muslim users to help 
them in achieving their religious objectives. Obviously, many studies have investigated different 
issues and aspects that affect the nature of accounting in Islam, as Zakat, riba, Islamic reporting 
scheme, disclosure, Islamic financial instruments, as Mudarabah and other issues (e.g., Ayub, 
2007; Lewis, 2006; Maali et al., 2006; Siddiqi, 2005). Haniffa and Hudaib (2001) criticise 
conventional accounting as well as international accounting standards like IFRS as being 
inappropriate for Muslims and for IFIs. They assert that Islamic accounting helps Muslims to 
achieve the consent of Allah. They criticises conventional accounting as being barred from 
religion, as well as failing to ensure society's longer-term well-being. 
   Haniffa and Hudaib (2001), state that disclosure in IBs is a vital factor that helps Muslims to 
fulfil their religious duties. They add, IBs are supposed to disclose any information concerning 
the forbidden transactions they make, information related to Zakat obligation, and bank's social 
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responsibility, as charities, and environmental protection. This shows us that financial reports in 
IFIs are likely to be more detailed than the financial reports in conventional institutions. 
Ullah (2013) stated that compared to other general or banking companies, IBs are required 
complying more legal requirements such as AAOIFI standards. Hossain (2010) moreover stated 
that the Islamic banks are to abide by more rules and regulations than conventional banks, that is, 
AAOIFI standards are not complied by conventional banks. As the activities of IBs are different 
that of their counter parts, therefore, their accounting and reporting is also different. For these 
IBs need to disclose some information which is not required to disclose by conventional banks. 
AAOIFI has been recognized and mandated to develop standards that are in line with Sharia 
principles in order to promote comparable, transparent and reliable accounting information for 
users. Thus, the main objective of AAOIFI is to prepare and develop accounting, auditing, 
governance and ethical standards relating to the activities of IFIs (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013). 
However, Hameed (2001) argues that IFRS is inappropriate for IFIs because the uniqueness 
transactions of IBs. Also, IFRSs are not compatible to IBs (Maali and Napier, 2010). Therefore, 
we suppose enhancing disclosure level about bank’ accountability in case of adopting Islamic 
standards as AAOIFI. Ariss and Sarieddine (2007) argued that the adoption of AAOIFI 
standards by IBs will help to enhance their credibility as well as disclosure levels.  
   From the previous argument; conventional accounting as well as international accounting 
standards as IFRS and GAAP are not applicable for IFIs. In the other side; IFIs need Islamic 
accounting and Islamic standards as AAOIFI that comply with Sharia and support these 
institutions to achieve accountability towards Allah as well as all stakeholders. Consequently, this 
research looks for AAOIFI as a benchmark; ideal model and best practices for all IFIs that could 
support them to disclosure full information about SSF issues and assist IBs to fulfils the contract 
of Islamic banks towards Allah first then towards stockholders; society and other stakeholders.    
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Part Three: The Pilot Studies’ results  
3.3.1 Summary  
Reliability is the extent to which the instrument produces the same results on repeated trials 
(Hassan and Marston, 2010). Thus, the disclosure measure has to be subjected to reliability tests 
in order to obtain useful inferences with regard to using the instrument in a research situation 
(Beattie et al., 2004). To assess the reliability of the research instrument, a pilot studies was 
conducted. It also aimed to check the variation between banks in terms of SSF reporting using 
the research instrument. Piloting has a role of ensuring that the research instrument as a whole 
functions well it may be crucial in relation to research based on self-completion questionnaires 
(Bryman, 2004). Thus, the researcher was able to get an initial idea about the variation between 
IBs with respect to SSF reporting. The researcher conducted three pilot studies to explore the 
actual practices for IBs in additional to explore the stakeholder’s perceptions towards these 
organizations. The main aim from these studies is finding some indicators about accountability 
practices from different perspectives for these banks which support the research’s gap.  
3.3.2 The First pilot study 
This study seeks for testing Accountability through measuring disclosure levels by IBs. It 
measuring the level of disclosure in the annual report for IBs whatever applies AAOIFI or IFRS. 
The main objective is determining the main differences between the banks in the structure of the 
annual report and level of disclosure. It also investigates the disclosure for some important 
elements in annual reports concerned with the nature of IBs as CSR, Zakat and Qard Hassan. 
The study compromise 40 banks (22 IBs that apply IFRS, 11 Islamic windows and 11 IBs that 
apply AAOIFI) from 15 different countries, as UK, Egypt, Pakistan, KSA, UAE, Kuwait and 
Malaysia. It uses annual report for 2011:2013 and website for 2013. It uses suggested constructed 
disclosure index and adopting content analysis method. The main results for this pilot study 
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shows low disclosure levels about suggested index and non-compliance with Islamic value. It 
concludes that disclosure about CSR in the annual reports is narrative. The practices for IBs are 
not complying with the holistic model for Islamic Sharia and it’s out of my expectations. By 
other words, the selected banks is far away from the achieving the accountability towards Allah 
and towards their stakeholders    
Table 5: Similarities and differences between IBs and conventional banks for disclosure  
Unique Items for Islamic Banks 
1 Disclosure in the statement  of sources and uses of funds, Loan Fund (Qard Hassan Fund) 
2 Disclosure in the Statement of Sources and Uses of funds of  Zakat and Sadakat 
3 Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments 
4 Sharia Supervisory Board (Report)  
5 The bank's Responsibility for Zakat   
Similar with Conventional Bank in items but differences in some details  
6 Presentation and disclosure in the Balance Sheet 
 6.1 Murabaha receivables  
 6.2 Accounts receivable salam  
 6.3 Investments in Mushrakah   
 6.4  Accounts payable Istisnats 
 6.5  Zakat and taxes due on the bank 
7 Presentation and disclosure in the Income Statement 
8.1return on unrestricted investment account holders in the income or loss before deducting the share of 
investment bank as a speculator   
8.2 the bank's share of the income of the absolute investment as a speculator  
8.3 the bank's share of investment income restricted as a speculator 
8.4 the share of the bank for the management of restricted investment as an agent   
8.5 Income or loss before zakat  
8 Community 
7.1. Support for organizations that provide benefits to society 
7.2. Participation in government social activities 
7.3. Sponsor community activities 
7.4. Commitment to social role 
9 Vision and Mission Statement 
9.1Commitments in operating within Sharia principles 
3.3.3 The Second Pilot Study 
   This study explores the applicability of AAOIFI for IFIs comparing with IFRS. It investigates 
the compliance level of IFIs with AAOIFI which support IBs to achieve the accountability 
concept towards Allah by compliance with Sharia and towards stakeholders by full disclosure. It 
comparing IFRS/IAS No.1 and AAOIFI accounting standards No.1 associated with disclosure 
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and presentation in the annual report to clarify the differences in the disclosure in the annual 
reports for IBs. It emphases on analysis IBs in across countries to determine to what extent the 
presentation in annual report, differs from Islamic and Western view. This study examines the 
annual reports for 20 IB in 10 different countries and covering period from 2008 to 2013. The 
study uses 2 Disclosure Index (One for IB that applies IFRS and another that applies AAOIFI)  
   It concludes that level of disclosure for IBs that adopting IFRS is high comparing with other 
banks that adopting AAOIFI. Through adopting IFRS, IBs ignore several items related to the 
nature of Islamic banking as Zakat and Qard Hassan. It has impacts on the image of IBs and 
impressions for stakeholders who deal with these banks as a different bank comparing with 
conventional bank. The study also concludes that, IBs that apply IFRS is a full adopting because 
it is a mandatory but IBs that apply AAOIFI is a partial adopting because it is voluntary. 
Therefore, AAOIFI is more suitable and applicable than IFRS for IBs and it can support IFIs to 
achieve accountability towards Allah and stakeholders  
Table 6: The similarities and differences between AAOIFI and IFRS related to disclosure 
 Islamic Banks comply with AAOIFI Islamic Banks comply with IFRS 
Similarities 
(Similar Items 
covered) 
- Background and Basic information about bank 
- Basic Accounting Policies used in annual report 
- Basic statements: 
        - Balance sheet 
        - Income statement 
        - Cash Flow 
        - Changes in the Owner's equity 
- Risk Management 
- BOD and team Management 
Differences 
(Items covered 
separately) 
- Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments 
- Statement of Sources and Uses of funds  
   of  Zakat and Sadakat 
- Statement of sources and uses of Loan Fund 
- Sharia Supervisory Board 
- Segment Reporting 
-Financial Performance 
 
 
    In the previous two pilots studies; we used panel data. The results show insignificant variances 
of disclosure between selected years. Therefore; the main studies for this thesis used the latest 
year (2013).      
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3.3.4 The Third Pilot Study  
   This study explores individuals’ perceptions towards IFI’s accountability. It explores the 
perceptions of 50 individuals about the actual practices of Islamic banks and for what extent it 
reflects their true accountabilities. It explores the individuals’ viewpoints towards IFIs and for 
what extent it differs from conventional banks. It also tests their perceptions towards the 
compliance of these banks with Sharia and its financial performance as well as social activities. 
The study covered period from 12/2013 until 3/2014. The sample contains Muslim, non-
Muslim, accountants, auditors and interested persons for Islamic banking from different 
specializations and geographical area as UK, Egypt and KSA. The researcher uses direct and 
unconstructed interview with open questions. The main conclusion from this study shows 
variances between the actual practices for Islamic banks and the individuals’ expectations for the 
real Islamic banking system which may reflect the real meaning of Islam. By other words, IFI is 
not consisting with accountability model of Islam.  
  Table 7: Summary of the sample   
Main groups Country No % 
Accountants Egypt 10 20% 
Auditors Egypt 10 20% 
Academic staff  Egypt and UK 5 10% 
Investors with IB Egypt; KSA and UK 22 44% 
Muslim scholar  Egypt and UAE 3 6% 
Total  4 50 100% 
 
 Table 8: Main questions’ focus  
Main groups Main focus 
Accountants The applicability of AAOIFI for Islamic banks and for what extent disclosure in the annual reports 
contain information about CSR; SSB report and full disclosure about Islamic values  Auditors 
Academic staff  The accountability model and its pillars  
Investors with Islamic 
banks  
Its perspectives and  expectations about actual practices for Islamic banks and gap with ideal model 
and accountability meaning for them  
Muslim scholars The meaning of accountability from an Islamic perspective and main dimensions and proofs from 
Quran and Sunna   
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Based on the three pilot studies’ results, Islamic banks are not matching with the 
accountability model and there is a gap between the model and the actual practices for these 
banks. This conclusion motivates the researcher to measuring for what extent Islamic banks 
around the world disclosure information that reflect SSF accountabilities. It motivates also the 
researcher to measuring the main factors behind disclosure about these accountabilities. It also 
motivates the author to measuring the consequences of disclosure about SSF accountabilities and 
impacts of these disclosures on the stakeholders’ loyalty; trust and satisfaction. This study aims 
to mitigates the gap between the ideal and actual model accountabilities of Islamic banks  
The subsequent chapter focused on the first track for this thesis which contains three 
empirical studies. These studies measuring the disclosure as well as compliance level related to 
SSFD. These studies furthermore measure the main determinants behind these disclosures which 
contain firm characteristics; CG mechanism for BOD as well as SSB.         
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Chapter Four: Disclosure; Compliance and Determinants of SSF 
reporting  
4.0 Introduction  
   This chapter focused on the disclosure levels for IBs to see to what extent the annual reports 
as well as websites reflects the three accountabilities which are Sharia; social and financial (SSF) 
disclosure based on holistic index. This chapter also investigates the main determinants of 
disclosure levels related to firm characteristics and corporate governance concerned with BOD 
and SSB. This chapter also measuring the compliance level with AAOIFI and main factors 
behind the disclosure levels for IBs that are full adopting these standards. Consequently, this 
chapter contains three studies:  
Empirical study (1): AAOIFI Mandatory Disclosures in Islamic Banks: Determinants of 
Compliance Levels:  
    This study seeks to determine the level of compliance with Accounting and Auditing 
Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) governance and accounting standards 
by Islamic banks (IBs) adopting AAOIFI. The study also aims to contribute to the existing 
compliance literature by examining the determinants of disclosure with AAOIFI. This study uses 
manual content analysis based on 2013 data. The sample consists of 43 Islamic Banks (IBs) 
across 8 countries. It uses 4 ordinary least squares regression analyses to examine the impact of 
firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance mechanisms concerned with BOD and 
SSB on multi-disclosure levels. The study shows that the average compliance level based on 
AAOIFI standards concerning with Sharia  Supervisory Board Report (SSBR) is 68%; corporate 
social responsibility report (CSRR) is 27% and presentation of financial statements (FS) is 73%. 
The aggregate disclosure based on the 3 indices is 56%. The analysis indicates that size, existing 
Sharia auditing department, age, and corporate governance of SSB are the main determinants 
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behind the disclosure levels. The determinants of holistic corporate disclosure for IBs that adopt 
AAOIFI have not been explored so clearly in prior research and, therefore, this study is the first 
of its kind to examine the determinants of IBs that adopted AAOIFI. 
Empirical Study (2): The Determinants of holistic disclosure levels for Islamic banks:  
  This study seeks to examine disclosure levels in the annual report and websites related to 
Islamic accountabilities pillars which are Sharia; social and financial. The study also aims to 
measuring the association between disclosure levels and firm-specific characteristics. Manual 
content analysis is employed. The sample consists of 117 IBs based on data of 2013 across 23 
countries. This study adopted 3 indices for Corporate Social Responsibility Report (CSRR); 
Sharia Supervisory Board Report (SSBR) and financial statements (FS) based on holistic 
benchmark. 2 models regression analysis are employed. Descriptive analysis shows relatively high 
disclosure level for financial and Sharia disclosure (62% and 52% respectively) and relatively low 
for social disclosure (28%). Concerned with holistic disclosure level that measuring 
accountability’ pillars for all sections in the annual report, disclosure levels about Sharia , social 
and financial are 40%; 28% and 81% respectively. The regression analysis shows partial positive 
significant association of disclosure levels with existing Sharia auditing department; size of 
auditor; size of bank and probability. The analysis shows partial negative association with 
ownership of bank and riskiness. This study is the first one that develops and investigates a 
holistic framework about Islamic accountability for IBs around the world. It is also the first one 
that measuring the accountability concept in all sections in the annual report for IBs. It is the 
first study that links all the three accountability’ disclosure with bank-specific characteristics   
Empirical Study (3): Corporate Governance and Multi-Corporate Disclosures: Evidence 
from Islamic Banks:  
   The study assesses the effects of corporate governance variables on the level of CSRD; SSBD 
and FD disclosure for Islamic banks. The study’ sample contains 95 Islamic banks observed 
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during the year 2013. The study’s findings suggest that corporate governance mechanisms 
including number of Block holders; Institutional ownership; Foreign Ownership; Family 
Ownership; Listed share; CEO power; Board size; Board independence and Investment account 
holders are effective in influencing SSBD, CSRD and FD practices in Islamic banks. We also 
find firm age, auditor and Sharia auditing department (SAD) to be important determinants of 
levels of SSBD; CSRD and FD disclosures in Islamic banks. This study encourage regulators to 
improve corporate governance mechanisms in their Islamic banking systems through the 
optimization of ownership structure (dispersed ownership) and the board’s characteristics, in 
order to promote transparency and disclosure. Moreover, the findings support theoretical 
arguments that firms disclose corporate governance information in order to mitigate information 
asymmetry and agency costs and to improve investor confidence in the reported financial 
statements. This study’s empirical evidence enhances the understanding of the corporate 
governance disclosure environment in IBs as a promoting new financial system. 
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Empirical Study (1): AAOIFI Mandatory Disclosures in Islamic Banks: 
Determinants of Compliance Levels 
4.1.1 Introduction 
   The first study conducted by Abdel-Magid (1981) on the need for unique Islamic accounting 
standards to adopt by Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) found that there is an increasing 
demand among researchers to ensure that Sharia principles are incorporate into the accounting 
practice. The study proposed a framework to prepare financial statements based on a unique 
model of accounting standards for IFIs that makes financial statements more comparable, 
transparent and reliable for users. According to Hameed (2001), conventional accounting is 
inappropriate for Muslim users and IFIs. In addition, International Accounting Standards (IASs) 
based on Western accounting practices would create difficulties for Muslims around the world as 
many aspects of the Islamic economy differ greatly from Western economies (Rahman, 2007). 
Therefore, it is crucial to develop accounting standards, which are specially adapted to Islamic 
needs and for Muslim countries as well as for IFIs and IBs (Rahman, 2007). Hossain (2010) 
stated that the IBs have to abide by more rules and regulations than conventional banks. The 
activities of IBs are different to the activities of their conventional counterparts, therefore, their 
accounting and reporting is different. Hence, IBs need to disclose certain information that 
conventional banks are not required to disclose and it questioned whether adopting IFRS 
standards could adequately address the reporting of Islamic financial transactions. Thus, this 
study measures the compliance level with AAOIFI requirements related to different types of 
corporate disclosure (SSF) based on accounting and governance standards. This study aims to 
enhance the understanding of the factors explaining the cross-sectional variation in the quantity 
of the information disclosed by IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards. The study also aims to 
investigate the extent to which firm-specific characteristics and corporate governance 
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mechanisms concerned with the Board of Directors (BOD) and the Sharia  Supervisory Board 
(SSB) explain variations in Sharia , social, and financial reporting (SSFR) for 43 IBs across 
Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, Oman, and Jordan.  
   The existing body of literature that explores the determinants of corporate disclosure (e.g., 
Farook et al., 2011) is in the early research stage, as – to the best of my knowledge – there is a 
paucity of empirical study testing this issue (e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Farook et al., 2011). However, 
both of these studies focus on one of the disclosure themes, which are CSRD. In the first track, 
the existing body of literature on compliance with AAOIFI focused on using content analysis to 
explore the compliance level with AAOIFI based only on annual reports (e.g., Ullah, 2013; 
Ahmed and Khatun, 2013; Vinnicombe, 2010; Al-Baluchi, 2006). However, the determinants of 
corporate disclosure and compliance with AAOIFI that contain firm characteristics and 
corporate governance mechanisms for BOD and SSB have not yet been investigated empirically, 
particularly for IBs that adopt AAOIFI.  
   This study aims to bridge a perceived gap between the two broad strands on corporate 
disclosure as well as filling the research gap in determinants of corporate disclosure for IBs 
which adopt AAOIFI. Much prior research has focused on exploring the compliance level with 
IFRS (e.g., Aljifri, 2008; Akhtaruddin, 2005; Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003) and with national 
financial standards (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009; Glaum and Street, 2003; Street and Bryant, 2000). 
Limited is known about the compliance level with AAOFII standards (Ullah, 2013; Vinnicombe, 
2010). In addition, this study motivated by incentive research, which focuses on corporate 
governance (CG) with BOD as a main category in the CG structure and ignores SSB, which 
represents one of the main components in the CG for IBs. Most of the previous studies which 
explore corporate governance as a factor behind the disclosure level have focused on CG 
variables related to BOD (e.g., Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Bokpin, 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey, 
2012; Cong and Freedman, 2011; Taylor et al., 2010). A limited number of studies explore CG 
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related to SSB as a unique mechanism for IBs (e.g., Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013; Farook et 
al., 2011). Thus, we aim to fill this gap through exploring the impacts of CG related to BOD and 
SSB for IBs that adopt AAOIFI and measuring to what extent, these variables affect multi-
disclosure levels, which include Sharia, social and financial disclosure at the corporate level.  
    Furthermore, considerable attention has recently been paid to compliance with AAOIFI 
requirements, although the majority of the research focuses on a single country (e.g., Hafij, 2013; 
Ahmed and Khatun, 2013), or is heavily restricted to one category of AAOIFI reporting 
standards such as presentation of financial statements in the annual report (Hafij, 2013) or CSR 
(Hassan and Harahap, 2010). None of these studies includes the majority of IBs that adopt 
AAOIFI or measure the extent to which they comply with AAOIFI standards. Secondly, none 
of the previous research explores multi-disclosure categories, which contain SSFD. Finally and 
significantly, based on our knowledge, none of the previous studies has explored the main 
determinants of disclosure for banks that adopt AAOIFI with reference to bank-specific 
characteristics and CG mechanisms. This study extends and contributes to the recent literature 
on compliance with AAOIFI and determinants of disclosure (i.e., Farag et al., 2014; Sarea and 
Hanefah, 2013) by offering empirical evidence on the impact of a comprehensive set of 
corporate governance mechanisms on corporate disclosure for large IBs that adopt AAOIFI. 
This study adopts AAOIFI standards as benchmark indices related to CSRR, SSBR and FS. 
The benchmarks include AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7 recommendations for mandatory 
and voluntary CSR disclosure, AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1 recommendations for SSB 
members as well as the content of the SSB report, and finally AAOFII accounting Standard 
No.1 recommendations for general presentation and disclosure in the financial statements and its 
footnotes for Islamic banks as well as IFIs. The aim of these benchmarks is to produce indices 
that are more comprehensive that covering three dimensions, which are SSF disclosure for a 
sample of IBs that adopted AAOIFI standards during 2013. Based on Belal et al (2014), this 
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study splits CSR and FS index into two strands namely Sharia specific reporting practices related 
to Sharia issues (e.g., Qard Hassan, Waqf management, Zakat and SSBR) and universal specific 
reporting practices which are adopted by IFRS as well as AAOIFI (e.g., balance sheet, a profit 
and loss account and cash flows statement) 
   The study of AAOFII accounting standards has grown in recent years with substantial 
contributions from scholars such as Ahmed and Khatun (2013); Hassan and Harahap (2010); 
Vinnicombe (2010); Lewis and Algaoud (2001); Baydoun and Willet (1997). It is notable, 
however, that the focus of most of these studies is descriptive or analytical in nature, 
emphasising in particular the compliance level with AAOIFI without extending their study to 
explore the main factors behind the disclosure level. This study further contributes to the 
literature by examining the interactions of country (based on culture) and company level factors 
(such as profitability and size) in order to understand more completely how these factors jointly 
impact compliance. The present research adds a large-scale academic study-examining 
compliance with AAOIFI mandatory disclosures after 2010 (based on the updated version of 
AAOIFI financial and governance standards). Second, it provides evidence regarding the 
implications of the use of an un-weighted method for measuring compliance with best practices 
disclosures. Third, it provides evidence regarding the explanatory factors of compliance levels 
with AAOIFI disclosures that contain firm characteristics in addition to CG mechanisms.  
The results indicate that the compliance level with AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1 is 
68%; the compliance level with AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7 is 27% and compliance 
level with AAOIFI accounting Standard No.1 is 73%. The empirical analysis shows that size; age; 
SAD; UA and corporate governance of SSB is significantly associated with levels of disclosure. 
The remainder of this study is organised as follows: Section 4.1.2 identifies the issues of 
compliance with accounting standards such as IFRS and national standards. Section 4.1.3 
discusses compliance with AAOIFI standards and reviews the selected AAOIFI standards. 
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Section 4.1.4 develops the hypotheses. Section 4.1.5 explains the research methodology, sample 
and the OLS regression analysis. Section 4.1.6 outlines the descriptive results of disclosure and 
compliance Levels. The empirical results and discussion results are discussed in section 4.1.7 and 
4.1.8. Section 4.1.9 provides conclusions, limitations and gives suggestions for future research. 
4.1.2 Compliance with Accounting Standards 
   Table 9 provides a summary of the previous studies that reviewed the compliance with national 
standards and regulations as well as IFRS. Except Street and Bryant (2000); Street et al., (1999); 
Craig and Diga (1998) which are multi-country studies, the remaining studies focus on one 
country. Furthermore, with the exception of Naser and Nuseibeh (2003); Tower et al. (1999); 
Patton, and Zelenka (1997), 17 out of the 20 studies employ only one disclosure index method. 
All the studies employ self-constructed indices, which may increase the subjectivity of the 
scoring process. In most studies, compliance levels are very rarely close to 90%, with the 
majority of studies reporting average compliance levels of 70% to 80%. Great variability in the 
compliance scores also documented. Compliance with IFRS disclosures look very similar to 
those regarding disclosures mandated by other national standards. Glaum and Street (2003) 
found that the average compliance level of companies in 2000 financials is significantly lower for 
those applying IAS compared to those applying GAAP. Hodgdon et al (2009) report that 
compliance levels vary considerably, with companies on average providing only 68% of the 
required disclosures. Therefore, these findings provide solid grounds for the concerns regarding 
the “quality” of financial statements after the adoption of AAOIFI by Islamic banks. With regard 
to the present study, they suggest that compliance levels with AAOIFI disclosure requirements 
may also be low for IBs that adopt these standards.  
 
 
112 
 
Table 9: Prior research on compliance with IFRS/National standards 
Authors Country Year Sample Research 
instrument 
Findings 
Prior research on compliance with disclosure of national standards 
Tai et al., 1990 Hong Kong 1986 76 1 Disclosure checklist Average compliance: 78% 
Cooke, 1992) Japan 1988 35 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 95% 
Ahmed and 
Nicholls, 1994 
Bangladesh 1988 63 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Only 4 firms exhibit compliance 
above 90%. 37 firms are to 
found in the range of 60–80%. 
Wallace and Naser, 
1995 
Hong Kong 1991 80 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 73%. 
Owusu-Ansah and 
Yeoh, 2005 
New Zealand 1992:1997 50 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Compliance levels increased from 
an average of 78% in 1992 to 
an average of 88% in 1997. 
Patton and 
Zelenka, 1997 
Czech Republic 1993 50 3 Self-constructed 
index 
Large variability in the 
compliance scores: from 25% to 
80% 
Craig and Diga, 
1998 
Singapore, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, Philippines 
and Thailand 
  1 Self-constructed 
index 
Relatively low mean levels of 
disclosures, ranged from 51%–
61%. 
Naser and 
Nuseibeh, 2003 
Saudi-Arabia  
 
1992:1999 67 2 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 89% 
Ali et al., 2004  
 
India, Pakistan and 
Bangladesh 
1998  566 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 80% 
Akhtaruddin, 
2005) 
Bangladesh  1999 94 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 44% 
Aljifri, 2008 United Arab Emirates  2003  31 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 67% 
Prior research on compliance with IAS/IFRS disclosures 
Abd-Elsalam and 
Weetman, 2003 
Egypt  1995:1996 72 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 83% 
Al-Shiab, 2003 Jordan  1995:2000  50 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Companies' level of compliance 
ranged between 45% and 56%. 
Street, Gray, and 
Bryant, 1999 
12 different countries  1996 49 1 Self-constructed 
index 
20 companies complied in full. 
For the remaining companies, 
compliance with individual 
standards was relatively low. 
Al-Shammari et 
al., 2008  
Bahrain, Oman and 
Kuwait 
1996:2002  137 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Compliance increased over time, 
from 68% in 1996 to 82% in 
2002. 
Tower et al., 1999 
 
Australia, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore & Thailand 
1997 60 2 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 91% 
Street and Bryant, 
2000 
17 different countries  1998 82 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 75% 
Glaum and Street, 
2003  
Germany  2000 
 
100 IAS 
100 US 
GAAP 
1 Ernst and Young 
disclosure checklist 
Levels of compliance with IAS 
ranged from 41.6% to 100%, 
with an average of 81%. 
This % significantly lower 
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compared to the compliance with 
US GAAP (87%). 
Hassan et al., 
2006  
Egypt  1995:2002  77 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 90%. 
Fekete et al., 2008  Hungary  2006 17 1 Self-constructed 
index 
Average compliance: 62% 
4.1.3 Compliance with AAOIFI 
   The AAOIFI formulates and issues accounting, auditing, governance, ethics and Sharia 
standards for IFIs. AAOIFI as an independent international organisation, is supported by 
institutional members (200 members from 40 countries) including central banks, IFIs, and other 
participants from the international Islamic banking and finance industry worldwide (AAOIFI, 
2015). Currently, AAOIFI has published 88 standards including 26 accounting standards, 5 
auditing standards, 7 governance standards, 2 ethics standards, and 48 Sharia standards (AAOIFI, 
2015). The area of empirical research pertinent to this study is the literature on compliance 
indices. Tower et al (1999) define compliance with the IASB's (International Accounting 
Standards Board) standards as being “the degree to which entities comply with a multitude of 
issues in the international accounting standards (IASs)/international financial reporting standards 
(IFRSs) issued by IASB” (p.422). For the purpose of this study, compliance can defined as “the 
degree to which IBs comply with the multitude of issues in the accounting and governance 
standards issued by the AAOIFI”. Of relevance to this study is the development of indices that 
used as benchmarks against which compliance is measured. One of the ground-breaking studies 
in this area is work of Nobes (1990), which used financial statements to measure compliance of a 
sample of listed US companies with IASs. Subsequent studies which use a similar methodology 
(e.g., Tower et al., 1999; Street eta al., 1999). 
    Researchers in the area of financial reporting for IFIs have conducted a large number of 
studies on the issues of compliance with accounting standards. For instance, Hameed et al (2006); 
Abdul Rahman (2007) have examined the level of compliance with accounting standards for IFIs. 
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The level of compliance issues gets top priority in some of the previous studies (e.g., Nadzri, 
2009; Zaini, 2007). Nadzri (2009) concluded that concerning with Zakat, the extent of disclosure 
by the IFIs is much lower than the AAOIFI requirements. Hameed et al (2006) stated that the 
compliance rate of the Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB) is 15%, while the Bahrain Islamic 
Bank (BIB) has a higher level of compliance with the AAOIFI accounting standards at 61%.  
    Finally, these reviews also illustrate that there is no large-scale academic study exploring IBs’ 
compliance with AAOIFI standards after 2010 (the updated version for AAOIFI that includes 
new accounting and governance standards). The present study addresses this gap in the literature 
and contributes to the recent calls for this type of research. The adoption of AAOIFI was an 
important development not only for IBs located in Bahrain but also for all IFIs that aim to 
disclose information and prepare financial statements based on Sharia principles. Table 10 
provides a summary of the previous studies that examined compliance with AAOIFI. The most 
recent studies (e.g., Ullah, 2013; Ahmed and Khatun, 2013) based on 2011 data that has revealed 
the need for further research. The selected studies only measure the compliance level with 
AAOIFI without extending their research to explore the main determinants of disclosure and 
compliance with AAOIFI. In addition, none of these studies explores the three categories that 
are SSF. Thus, this current study will fill all of these gaps in the research. The following section 
explores the three standards, which adopted for this study and reviews related previous studies.  
Table 10: Prior research on compliance with AAOIFI standards 
Study Sample Years Standards Method Compliance 
level 
Hafij Ullah, 2013  7 banks in Bangladesh 2011 AAOIFI/FS1 Un-weighted 
content analysis  
45% 
Al-Baluchi, 2006 34 banks of which 14 banks 
from Bahrain, 26 banks from 
Sudan, 2 banks from Qatar, 
2 banks from Jordan 
2002 AAOIFI/FS1 and 
FS5 
Un-weighted 
content analysis 
44% 
Vinnicombe, 2010 26 banks listed in Bahrain  2004:2007 AAOIFI G1; FA3; 
FA2 and FA9 
Un-weighted 
content analysis  
71% 
Ahmed and Khatun, 
2013 
17 banks in Bangladesh 2011 AAOIFI G1; G2; G3; 
G4 and G5 
Content analysis 75% 
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Hassan and 
Harahap, 2010 
7 Islamic banks at 7 countries  2006 AAOIFI governance 
standard  
Content analysis 38% 
4.1.3.1 AAOIFI and SSBR  
   According to AAOIFI, Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) defined as an independent body of 
specialised jurists in fiqh al mu’amalat (Islamic commercial jurisprudence)12 (AAOIFI, 2010). The 
purpose is to ensure IFIs that complies with Sharia principles. AAOIFI published Governance 
Standard No.1, which specifies the composition of the board, and the basic elements of its Sharia 
report. Farook et al (2011) asserted that the existence of SSBs in IBs might improve the 
transparency of financial reporting and monitoring, and lead to the provision of more 
information about Sharia. Farook et al (2011) investigated the extent and determinants of 
disclosure in the annual reports of 47 IBs from 14 countries. They found that the SSB is the 
most significant factor explaining the disclosure variations. Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) found 
that IBs disclose additional information related to SSB. 
4.1.3.2 AAOIFI and CSR  
   Corporate social responsibility (CSR) for IFIs refers to all activities carried out by an IFI to 
fulfil its religious, economic, legal, ethical and discretionary responsibilities as financial 
intermediaries for individuals and institutions (AAOIFI, 2010). AAOIFI issued Governance 
Standard No.7 in 2010 to organise the activities related to CSR. The primary objective for this 
standard is to ensure that CSR activities and compliance of IFIs communicated in a truthful, 
transparent and comprehensible manner to relevant stakeholders (AAOIFI, 2010). The 
accountability for disclosure under this standard divided between mandatory disclosure (such as 
earnings and expenditure prohibited by Sharia and Zakat) and voluntary disclosure (as Qard 
12 Fiqh Al Mu’amalat is a branch of Islamic jurisprudence that deals with commercial and business activities in an 
economy. Fiqh literally means understanding of rulings and precepts, whilst muamalat, in this particular facet, refers 
to economic transactions and activities. This branch of fiqh covers the rulings that define and govern the 
relationship between humans, i.e., their financial rights and obligations towards each other. 
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Hassan, charitable activities and Waqf management13) (AAOIFI, 2010). The CSR literature on 
IBs has revealed an expectations gap between actual/communicated disclosures and ideal 
disclosures. Maali et al (2006) found that the level of social disclosure by the sample banks was 
well as below their benchmark index. Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) found a significant gap 
between the communicated and ideal ethical disclosure for 7 IBs. Belal et al (2014) found an 
overall increase in both particular and universal disclosures during the study period. Hassan and 
Harahap (2010) concluded that some IBs pay scant attention to disclosing their social activities 
and thus argued for a standard on CSR disclosure relevant to IFIs. Farook et al (2011) found 
substantial variation in CSR disclosures and this variation best explained by the presence of SSB 
governance and the preponderance of Muslims in their sample countries. Aribi and Gao (2012) 
found that the main CSR disclosures were contained in the SSB reports with less disclosure in 
the annual reports on other Islamic-based information such as Zakat, interest free loans and 
charitable donations.  
4.1.3.3 AAOIFI and Financial statements and presentation of the annual report  
   In 1993, AAOIFI issued Accounting Standard No.1 related to general presentation and 
disclosure in the financial statements of IBs. The objectives of financial reports is to provide 
information about the IFI’s compliance with Sharia; information about IFI’s economic resources 
and related obligations; information to assist in the determination of Zakat; IFI’s discharge of its 
fiduciary and social accountabilities (AAOIFI, 2010). Based on this standard, annual report 
contains seven basic statements in addition to basic information about the bank, significant 
accounting policies and other information. Hossain (2010) found that the average compliance 
level with AAOIFI is 88% considering all required aspects of financial statements. Ullah (2013) 
examined the level of compliance with AAOIFI guidelines regarding general presentation and 
13 Waqf, in the Arabic language, means to stop, contain, or preserve. In Islamic terms, Waqf refers to a religious 
endowment i.e. a voluntary and irrevocable dedication of one’s wealth and its disbursement for sharia compliant 
projects.   
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disclosure in the financial statements of IBs listed in Bangladesh. The study found that these 
banks comply with AAOIFI guidelines on average 44%. 
   However, the previous studies rely on data collected only from annual reports to infer 
disclosure. The annual report itself will not provide a true picture of corporate disclosure as IBs 
may disclose some of their social and Sharia compliance separately in other reports such as 
corporate governance reports or on their websites. Therefore, in this study, data collected not 
only from the annual reports but also from all other available reports and websites. Secondly, the 
number of sample banks used in the literature was limited as acknowledged by Haniffa, and 
Hudaib (2007); Maali et al (2006). The sample of IBs is not only relatively large (43) but also the 
data from 2013 is more recent. In previous studies, the most recent years investigated were 2007 
(Farook et al., 2011) and 2011 (Hafij, 2013). Thirdly, although a number of studies referred to 
AAOIFI standards (Hassan and Harahap, 2010), none of them included AAOIFI Standard No.7 
on CSR conduct in which CSR disclosure classification distinguishes mandatory disclosure 
requirements from voluntary disclosure requirements. In addition, most of the studies included 
SSB as a dimension in the CSR index; however, because of the importance of this variable, it 
may measure separately. Finally, none of the studies focuses only on IBs that adopt AAOIFI nor 
do they explore main determinants for disclosure levels.  
4.1.4 Determinants of Disclosure 
   The determinants of disclosure are well grounded in theories. It includes agency and political 
costs theories (Watts and Zimmerman, 1990; Jensen and Meckling, 1976); signalling theory 
(Morris, 1987; Ross, 1977); institutional theory (Oliver, 1997; Meyer and Rowan, 1977); 
legitimacy theory (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; Guthrie and Parker, 1989); contingency theory 
(Doupnik and Salter, 1995; Gray, 1988) and the positive accounting theory (Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1978). Corporate governance mechanisms can considered as key factors explaining 
the decisions of corporate disclosure from agency theory perspectives. The SSB is one of the 
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most important governance mechanisms of an IFI to ensure Sharia compliance (Besar et al., 
2009). Thus, the mechanisms that contain variables related to BOD and SSB will examine in this 
study. It will also examine variables related to firm characteristics. It is worth noting that very 
limited research has been undertaken to examine the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms for BOD and SSB and SSF disclosure. Agency theory, signalling theory, and 
economic and political cost theories used in the literature to explain the determinants of 
corporate disclosure. However; this present study uses both agency and signalling theories to 
identify the potential drivers of corporate disclosure (SSF) in annual reports and websites. In 
developing the research hypotheses, this study looks at the potential association between firm 
characteristics and CG mechanisms of BOD and SSB towards the holistic disclosure as follows:  
4.1.4.1 Firm- characteristics 
4.1.4.1.1 Auditor  
   Auditors play an important role in the credibility of firms’ financial information (Healy and 
Palepu, 2001). Chalmers and Godfrey (2004) state that to maintain their reputation and avoid 
reputation costs, high-profile auditing companies are more likely to demand high levels of 
disclosure. The signalling theory suggests that the choice of an external auditor can serve as a 
signal of firm value. Generally, entrepreneurs are likely to choose a large audit firm since such an 
action signals to investors their acceptance of the auditor’s demands for higher quality disclosure 
(Datar et al., 1991). This expectation is consistent with agency theory, which holds that larger 
audit firms have a stronger incentive to impose more extensive disclosure standards because they 
have more to lose from damage to their reputations. The findings of Hodgdon et al., (2009); 
Guerreiro et al., (2008); Xiao et al (2004) support this proposition with a positive relationship 
between firms employing  one of the Big 4 international auditing firms and their scopes of 
corporate disclosure. Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) drew attention to the fact that size of audit 
firm can significantly affect the amount of information disclosed in financial statements. The 
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largest auditing firms motivate their corporations to disclose more and comprehensive 
information than required to preserve their reputations (Firth, 1979). The first hypothesis is: 
H1.1 the degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in IBs audited by the Big 4 
auditors than IBs that audited by non-Big 4 auditors  
4.1.4.1.2 Age of bank  
   Older, well-established companies are likely to disclose much more information in their annual 
reports than younger companies are because they are less likely to suffer any competitive 
disadvantage. In addition, the cost and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the 
required information may be a contributory factor (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Many studies have 
shown that the level of voluntary disclosure is positively associated with company age (e.g., 
Hossain and Hammami, 2009; Cormier et al., 2005) while others (Alsaeed, 2006; Akhtaruddin, 
2005; Hossain, 2008; Galani et al., 2011) conclude that the age of the corporation has 
insignificant association with the level of disclosure. Abdul Hamid (2004) suggested that the age 
of a bank may influence the level of information disclosure. In the case of banking companies, 
Hossain (2008) claimed that no relationship exists between banking companies’ age and the 
extent of monetary disclosure. In contrast, a significant positive association between the banks’ 
age and the extent of disclosure have been found by Owusu-Ansah (2005). Therefore, the 
Islamic bank age is chosen as one of the independent variables for testing. This leads to 
formulation of the second research hypothesis: 
H1.2 Older IBs expected to disclose more information than younger IBs  
4.1.4.1.3 Firm size 
   According to agency theory, larger firms need to disclose more information to different user 
groups, which leads to a decline in agency costs and reduces information asymmetries (Inchausti, 
1997). In prior disclosure studies, the association between firm size and disclosure reporting is 
mixed. For example, while some studies found a positive association (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2011; 
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Hassan et al., 2009; Vandemele et al., 2009;  Alsaeed, 2006; Chavent et al., 2006; Mangena and 
Pike, 2005), others found an insignificant association (Rajab and Schachler, 2009). Firm size is a 
significant determinant of disclosure and accounting policy choice and a discriminator for 
accounting quality (Goodwin et al., 2008; Rahman et al., 2002). Furthermore, large firms face 
higher demand for information from customers, analysts, and public (Cooke, 1989). A few 
empirical studies on banking disclosure (i.e. Hossain and Taylor, 2007; Hossain and Reaz, 2007) 
have documented empirical evidence in the positive relationship between bank size and extent of 
disclosure. Thus, the third hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H1.3 Large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than small IBs 
4.1.4.1.4 Profitability  
Profitability is central to the discussion of corporate disclosure. Inchausti (1997) suggested that 
profitability is capable of influencing the extent to which companies disclose information items. 
Consistent with the signalling theory, management when in possession of good news due to 
better performance are more likely to disclose more detailed information to the stock market 
than that provided by companies in possession of bad news to avoid undervaluation of their 
shares. Chavent et al (2006); Wallace and Naser (1995) propose that companies with higher 
profitability provide comparatively more information. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) showed that 
the results of prior studies provide mixed evidence on the association between firm’s profitability 
and the level of corporate disclosure. Elshandidy et al (2011); Othman et al (2009); Chavent et al 
(2006); Hossain et al (2006); Gray et al (2001) report a positive association between both 
variables. Agency theory argues that corporate managers of profitable corporations are motivated 
to disclose more information to increase their compensation (Abd El Salam, 1999). Galani et al 
(2011) report an insignificant relationship between banks’ profitability and level of disclosure. In 
a similar vein, previous empirical research on banking voluntary disclosure by Hossain and 
Taylor (2007) shows no significant relationship between the extent of voluntary disclosure in the 
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annual reports of Bangladeshi commercial banks and the profitability variable. In contrast, a 
study by Hossain (2008) found a significant positive relationship between the aggregate 
disclosure levels of listed banking companies in India and their profitability. 
    Signalling theory justify this positive correlation by the fact that corporate boards of highly 
profitable firms are more likely to disclose more information to increase stockholders’ 
confidence and accordingly to raise their compensation and to raise capital at the lowest cost 
(Marston and Polei, 2004). However, from an Islamic perspective, where full disclosure 
represented an accountability towards Allah before stakeholders, Haniffa (2002) argues that a 
corporation may provide full disclosure in any situation whether it is making a profit or 
otherwise. The fourth hypothesis is  
H1.4 Disclosure level expected to be higher for highly profitable IBs than low profit   
4.1.4.1.5 Internal Sharia auditing department (ISAD) 
   The internal audit function plays a unique and critical role in CG by helping to ensure the 
reliability of financial reporting (Carcello et al., 2005; Gramling et al., 2004). The literature 
provides evidence that internal auditing has positive effects on financial reporting oversight and 
level of disclosure. Schneider and Wilner (1990) found that the presence of internal auditors 
deters fraudulent financial reporting. Other studies establish links between internal auditing and 
firm performance (e.g., Gordon and Smith, 1992). Archambeault et al (2008) highlight the need 
for an internal audit to improve governance transparency. Wilson and Walsh (1996) provide a 
basis for predicting that an internal auditing department will increase investors’ confidence in 
financial reporting reliability and perceived oversight effectiveness. Mercer (2004) argues that 
internal Sharia auditing department (ISAD) serve as the first line of defence against disclosure 
errors. Consequently, ISAD is a critical and unique governance mechanism that maintains 
credibility and enhancing the disclosure level. The fifth hypothesis is  
H1.5 The level of disclosure is associated with existing ISAD inside IBs 
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4.1.4.2 Corporate Governance (CG) of BOD characteristics 
   Fama (1980) argues that BOD is the central internal control mechanism for monitoring 
managers. Taylor et al (2010) argued that firms with a strong CG structure are more effective in 
financial management, which reflected in enhanced levels of corporate disclosure. To develop 
research hypothesis, this study reviews prior research that suggests an association between 
disclosure and corporate governance mechanisms (Eng and Mak, 2003; La Porta et al., 2002).  
4.1.4.2.1 Number of block holders 
   Block holder ownership measured based on percentage of stocks held through institutional 
stockholders; this percentage may equal or exceed 5% of full stocks (Eng and Mak, 2003). Early 
research indicated a negative relation between block holder ownership and disclosure (e.g., 
Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Samaha and Dahawy, 2011; Schadewitz and Blevins, 1998; Mitchell et al., 
1995; Hossain et al., 1994), while Haniffa and Cooke (2002) found a positive association. 
Marston and Polei (2004) argue that investors who own a large proportion of equity shares in a 
company can obtain information about the company from internal sources. Setiyonoa and 
Tarazia (2014) find a negative association between the two variables concerned with banking 
industry.  Therefore, more closely held companies are more likely to disclose less information 
because their large investors can access internal sources of information. Thus, the sixth 
hypothesis is: 
H1.6 IBs with high percentages of block holder ownership have low levels of disclosures 
4.1.4.2.2 Institutional ownership 
   Agency theory predicts that ownership structure affects the level of disclosure (Eng and Mak, 
2003). The relationship between institutional ownership and disclosure has been examined in 
prior studies; however, the empirical evidence is mixed. Barako et al (2006); Mangena and Pike 
(2005) found a positive association while Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) found a negative 
whereas Hannifa and Cooke (2002) do not find a significant association between the two 
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variables. Hidalgo et al (2011) supported the previous result by stated that “The results appear to 
corroborate the view that an increase in institutional investor shareholding has a negative effect 
on voluntary disclosure, supporting the hypothesis of entrenchment, whereas an excessive 
ownership by institutional investors may have adverse effects on strategic disclosure decisions” 
(p.490). IBs with a concentrated ownership structure do not have to disseminate more 
information, because the main shareholders can easily obtain it, as they usually have access to 
that information. Akhigbe and Martin (2006) found a positive association between disclosure 
institutional ownership based on financial services industry.  The seventh hypothesis is   
H1.7 There is a negative relationship between disclosure and institutional ownership 
4.1.4.2.3 Foreign ownership 
   Foreign stockholders’ use of disclosure is underpinned by the fact that they are 
“informationally” disadvantaged as compared to domestic stockholders (Choe et al., 2005). 
Based on agency theory, Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that as the number of shareholders 
increases and ownership becomes more dispersed, the demands for additional information 
increase. Several studies have found an association between disclosure and foreign ownership. 
For instance, according to Xiao et al (2004), higher foreign ownership not only encourages 
information disclosure, but also motivates firms to create web pages to facilitate dissemination of 
financial information. The extent of foreign investor ownership is an important determinant of 
the demand for financial information (Soderstrom and Sun, 2007). The demands for disclosures 
are usually higher when foreigners, due to the separation between board and owners 
geographically (Bradbury, 1991). Moreover, foreign stakeholders have diverse values and 
knowledge because of their foreign market exposure. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) find a positive 
association between foreign ownership and disclosures. Concerned with banking sector; Sharma 
(2014) found a significant positive correlation between disclosures and foreign ownership. The 
eighth hypothesis is 
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H1.8 There is a positive relationship between disclosure levels and foreign ownership 
4.1.4.2.4 Duality in position 
   Role duality in position exists when the CEO (chief executive officer) is also the chairman of 
the board. Gul and Leung (2004) add, “Firms with CEO duality are more likely to be associated 
with lower levels of disclosures since the board is less likely to be effective in monitoring 
management and ensuring a higher level of transparency” (p.358). Agency theory predicts that 
role duality creates individual power for the CEO that would affect the effective control 
exercised by the board. Li et al (2008) argue that separation of the roles of chairman and CEO 
may improve monitoring quality in critical decisions. Haniffa and Cooke (2005) offer two 
approaches in this aspect. The first one supports the separation of the two roles to provide 
effective control and balances for the performance of management, whereas the second opinion 
argues that the separation is not critical since several corporations well run even with the roles 
combined and have capable board for monitoring. The results of prior research provide mixed 
evidence on the association between duality in position and corporate disclosure. Some studies 
find a negative association between the two variables (e.g., Laksmana, 2008; Lakhal, 2005; Gul 
and Leung, 2004; Eng and Mak, 2003; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Other studies did not find any 
significant association (e.g., Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; Arcay and 
Vazquez, 2005). For banking sector; Jizi et al (2014) supported positive link between disclosure 
and duality in position. Thus; the ninth hypothesis is  
H1.9 IBs with duality in position have a lower level of disclosures 
4.1.4.2.5 Board independence 
Fama (1980) argues that the board of directors, which elected by the shareholders, is the 
central internal control mechanism for monitoring managers. Chau and Leung (2006) suggest 
that independent directors may increase the quality of monitoring over management, because 
“they are not affiliated with the company as officers or employees, and thus are independent 
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representatives of the shareholders’ interests” (p.246). The presence of independent directors on 
boards may improve the quality of financial statements (Xie et al., 2003). Prior research supports 
the positive association between disclosure and board independence (i.e. Elshandidy et al., 2013; 
Harjoto and Jo 2011; Donnely and Mulcahy, 2008; Abdelsalam and Street, 2007; Chen and Jaggi, 
2000). According to Patelli and Prencipe (2007), independent directors are motivated to build 
their reputation as expert monitors, and they credibly use disclosure as an indicator to market 
that they are efficiently achieving their accountabilities. For banking sector literature; Jizi et al 
(2014) supported positive association between disclosure and board independence based on large 
US commercial banks. The tenth hypothesis is 
H1.10 IBs with higher proportions of independent non-executive directors on the board 
have higher levels of disclosures 
4.1.4.3 Corporate Governance of SSB Characteristics 
    In the context of Islam, the model of corporate governance for business organisations derived 
from the Sharia rulings. For example, they have to design the system according to Sharia 
principles and provide stakeholders’ rights protection (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009). Therefore, SSB 
is the most important distinction between IBs and conventional banks (Farook et al., 2011). 
Previous studies have found that the existence of the SSB and its characteristics have increased 
the disclosure levels of IBs (Farook et al., 2011).  
4.1.4.3.1 SSB size 
Empirical evidence suggests that board size can affect the level of disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 
2009). The common number of SSB members in IBs is between three and five members based on 
AAOIFI Governance Standard No.1. According to Chen and Jaggi (2000), a larger board size may 
decrease the possibility of information asymmetry. Agency theory predicts that larger boards 
incorporate a variety of expertise that results in more effectiveness in the monitoring role of the 
boards (Singh et al., 2004). Moreover, a higher number of board members may also reduce the 
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uncertainty and the lack of information (Birnbaum, 1984). The board’s size is likely to affect its ability 
to control and review all transactions to ensure their operations. With more members, the collective 
knowledge and experience of SSB will increase, and lead to greater disclosure. Concerned with banking 
sector especially IBs; Farag et al (2014) find a positive and highly significant association between the 
Sharia supervisory board (SSB) size and disclosure index. Based on these arguments, the eleventh 
hypothesis is 
H1.11 There is a positive relationship between the size of SSB and disclosure levels  
4.1.4.3.2 SSB Cross-memberships 
Cross-memberships of SSB members may also influence the corporate disclosure of IBs 
(Farook et al., 2011). There is evidence that cross-directorships increase information 
transparency through comparing the knowledge that gained from other companies (Dahya et al., 
1996); and because decisions taken at one board may become part of the information for 
decisions at other boards (Haat et al., 2008). The cross-membership of SSB members is 
preferable because of their ensuing knowledge and credibility (Lorsch and MacIver, 1989). 
Moreover, SSB members with cross-memberships will be able to adopt their tacit and explicit 
knowledge into their application of Sharia rulings in IBs. Thus, the next hypothesis is  
H1.12 There is a positive relationship between SSB cross-membership and disclosure  
4.1.4.3.3 SSB Reputation  
   SSB is composed of Sharia scholars who have wide knowledge of Islamic commercial law, but 
less experience of secular educational institutions. Previous research by Hussain and mallin (2003) 
shows that determinants are affecting the directors’ appointments in Bahraini banks are pertinent 
skills, business practice and reputation. Sharia scholars have an excellent reputation in their 
community because of their universal knowledge of Islam and their credibility and significant 
role in that community. For this reason, reputation can used as a measure for business 
knowledge, and therefore, scholars who have a good reputation will be able to comprehend 
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better the modern applications of the banking industry pertaining to disclosure. Farook et al 
(2011) indicate that reputation is instrumental in measuring the disclosure level among IBs. The 
reputation of an SSB is measure based on SSB membership on AAOIFI committees that is 
similar methodology of Farook et al (2011). Hence, the thirteenth hypothesis of the study is  
H1.13 There is a positive relationship between SSB reputation and disclosure levels  
   This study tested secular educational qualifications14 and expertise of SSB members15 but it 
could not finds a significant result since most SSB members in the selected banks have PhDs as 
well as knowledge of economics, Sharia law and accounting practice.  
3.1.4.4 Culture (UA) 
   When scholars compare the disclosure practice of firms from diverse countries, they may 
consider country systems. A spacious amount of literature (e.g., Dong and Stettler, 2011; Hope, 
2003) has been conducted on determinants that might explain differences in accounting practices. 
Among the many factors studied, cultural values claimed to be most essential. The national 
culture is an institutional factor that influences both managers’ choices and investors’ preferences 
regarding financial reporting (Hope, 2003). Hofstede (2001) proposes six dimensions that have 
been used widely in prior accounting research to examine the impact of culture on accounting16 
(e.g., Doupnik and Tsakumis, 2004). Jaggi and Low (2000) argue that the cultural factors of a 
country have an indirect impact on financial disclosures. Regarding disclosure practices, Zarzeski 
(1996) hypothesises and finds that all of Hofstede’s dimensions have a significant impact on 
disclosure. Erkens (2012) argues that disclosure consider as a function of cultural. However, 
14 Farook et al (2011) indicate that the increase in education level of SSB members has a corresponding increase in 
the level of corporate disclosure by IBs. With regard to the unique role that SSB members expected to fulfil, SSB 
members may have knowledge of Islamic law, economics, and financial and accounting practice, which enables them 
to understand not only Sharia problems but also problems relating to law and economics. Members of the SSB with 
a doctorate (PhD) are evidently better versed in the present implications of Islam for the banks 
15 SSB members are scholars in Islamic commercial jurisprudence and have the necessary expertise in the field of 
IFIs (Al-Mahmoud, 2007; Al-Qattan and Abdul Sattar, 2007), to enable them to fulfil their accountabilities for 
supervising the internal control and financial reporting. 
16 Hofstede six dimensions are power distance (PD), uncertainty avoidance (UA), individualism (IND), masculinity 
(MAS), long-term orientation (LTO) and Indulgence (INDU).  
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Wong (2012) suggests that uncertainty avoidance (UA) is the most influential cultural dimension 
that may affect disclosure. Therefore, in this research; it just added UA in the model to see for 
what extent it has impacts on the disclosure level. This consists with several literatures that used 
only this dimension (e.g., Khlif and hussainey, 2014). Gray (1988) argues that higher a country 
ranks in terms of uncertainty avoidance are more likely it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy or 
rank lower in terms of disclosure. Therefore, this study hypothesize that 
H1.14 There is a negative association between UA and disclosure levels  
4.1.5 Research methodology 
4.1.5.1 Sample selection 
   The potential population for this study includes all fully flagged IBs that adopted AAOIFI. 
Based on AAOIFI (2015), there are 141 associated members, but not all of these banks adopt 
AAOIFI. Obviously, exogenous political, economic, social and geographic factors will impact 
the degree of AAOIFI compliance amongst the member banks of different nations. Due to this 
lack of similarity, it decided to confine the study to member banks that have adopted AAOIFI. 
Based on reviewing websites; annual reports and auditor’ report for each bank; the selected 
banks are located in Bahrain, Yemen, Qatar, Syria, Palestine, Sudan, Oman, and Jordan. 
Compliance with the standards was limited to 2013 because we could find significant differences 
between the last 3 years (2011-2013) and AAOIFI published updated versions of its accounting 
and governance standards in 2010 which contain standards for CSR. All 43 banks in the sample 
are required to comply with the accounting and governance standards issued by AAOIFI. Thus, 
we excluded all non-banks as Takaful firms. We also excluded subsidiaries banks and all IBs that 
adopt national or IFRS standards even if they are members of AAOIFI. The independent 
auditors’ reports accompanying the financial statements examined to confirm that the financial 
statements had been prepared in accordance with AAOIFI. Therefore; the main selection criteria 
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for selecting IBs are (1) it may be full compliance with sharia; (2) it may be adopting AAOIFI (3) 
it may have SSB.  
    Data on explanatory variables found in the annual reports, banker database and websites. This 
study focuses on annual reports since these remain a primary source of information for investors 
as well as all stakeholders (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013). The sample included the hard copy 
annual reports for 2013 as well as current disclosures on the IBs’ websites. The independent 
variables include 3 categories. First, the characteristics’ data for the IBs collected from the IBs’ 
annual reports and websites. Second, CG characteristics of BOD collected from the banker 
database and Zawya database. Finally, CG characteristics related to SSB collected from annual 
reports. 
4.1.5.2 Construction of disclosure indices for assessing the validity and reliability 
   Cooke and Wallace (1990) consider corporate disclosure to be an abstract concept that cannot 
measured directly. Nevertheless, they concede that a suitable proxy such as an index of 
disclosure can used to gain insight into the level of information disclosed by companies. 
Accordingly, three indices of disclosure employed in this study to gauge the extent of multi-
corporate disclosure by IBs that adopted AAOIFI. The disclosure index is un-weighted and 
assumes that each item of disclosure is equally important (Gray et al., 1995). Cooke (1989) 
suggests that un-weighted indices are an appropriate research instrument in disclosure studies 
when the focus of the research is “directed at all users of corporate annual reports rather than 
the information needs of any specific user group” (p.182).17 
   This study took precautionary measures to enhance the validity and the reliability of our 
analysis. The entire annual report read to assess the relevance of a particular item of information 
17 Dhaliwal (1980) compared the results of un-weighted and weighted indices and found similar results, suggesting, 
therefore, that weighting adds little value to the outcomes. The un-weighted disclosure index where compliance is 
calculated as the ratio of the total items disclosed to the maximum possible score applicable for that company is the 
most common approach for determining compliance with disclosure requirements (e.g., Hodgdon et al., 2009; 
Glaum and Street, 2003; Ahmed and Nicholls, 1994). 
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to the firm. This study checked that the index items generated from the classification procedures 
represented what we intended to represent. The authors examined the items of the indices and 
decided what each specific item was intended to measure (Beattie et al., 2004). It used the 
dimensions of Sharia, social and financial indices based on standards disclosure for IFIs issued by 
AAOIFI. The reliability and the validity of content analysis approaches need to review carefully. 
Following disclosure studies (Hassan and Marston, 2012; Tsalavoutas et al., 2011), validity 
ensured through the assessment of content validity. Hence, it achieved by relying on the 
literature while constructing the instrument to make sure that the instrument contains relevant 
and adequate items to measure the disclosures for the three accountabilities’ pillars. For testing 
reliability, the following steps were undertaken to form the basis for the development of the 
disclosure indices for this study. First, we adopted the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI 
Governance Standard No.1; 2 and 5 related to SSB Accounting Standard No.1 related to 
financial statements, and Governance Standard No.7 related to CSR. The researcher reviewed 
the last available editions for AAOIFI (2010 and 2014). Second, we reviewed the literature that 
explores CSR, SSB and FS to approve our indices (e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Belal et al., 2014; 
Ahmed and Khatun, 2013; Rashid et al., 2013; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012; 
Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Ullah and Jamali, 2010; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006; 
Al-Baluchi, 2006). Third, we reviewed our indices with three independent researchers to enhance 
the validity for the study. This method adopted by Tsalavoutas, 2011.  
   Initially, a scoring sheet, which included 218 items required to disclose by AAOIFI, was 
constructed. Then, to ensure the content validity of the initial research instrument, three other 
researchers reviewed it independently. After receiving their comments and suggestions, any 
remaining ambiguities discussed with a fourth experienced academic. The final disclosure 
checklist included 180 items. To ensure the reliability of the research instrument, the author and 
the two independent researchers scored five randomly selected banks. Then, the findings of the 
three researchers compared. Given that all investigators had agreed the final research instrument, 
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differences in the compliance scores across the investigators were not significant. The ultimate 
disclosure checklist presented in the following Table (11) 
Table 11: Ensuring validity of research instrument 
Standards 
 
Items suggested 
by the author 
Items suggested by 
independent researcher 
Items suggested by second 
independent researcher 
Final index (after 4th 
person's advice) 
Weight18 
Accounting standard No.1 110 105 100 90 50% 
Governance standard 
No.1; 2 and 5 
18 20 15 15 8% 
Governance standard 
No.7 
90 100 94 75 42% 
Total  218 225 209 180 100% 
 
4.1.5.3 Model specification and variable measurement 
   To measure corporate disclosure for IBs, this study used content analysis as a method of 
coding, which has been widely employed in previous studies of corporate disclosure (Abdul 
Rahman et al., 2010; Maali et al., 2006). To test for an association between corporate disclosures 
levels with firm characteristics and CG, one overall index and three sub-indices (Sharia, social 
and financial) calculated. The scores for the overall index and sub-indices calculated by assigning 
equal weightings to each item of disclosure, and the indices were derived by computing the ratio 
of actual scores awarded to the maximum possible score attainable for items that were applicable 
to each Islamic bank. Each item of disclosure was scored without a weighting on a dichotomous 
basis taking the commonly used approach of giving the item a score of one, zero (e.g., Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Hence, the corporate disclosure index (CDI) for 
each bank would be the total number of recommended items through AAOIFI disclosed by the 
bank divided by the total number of relevant items of the corporate disclosure index. Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) is the most commonly used technique in disclosure studies (Leventis, 2001) 
where the dependent variable is the compliance/disclosure score and the independent variables 
18 The weight calculated based on final items for each standard dividend into total items (180). For example: weight 
of FSIFI.1 = 90/180*100= 50% 
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include the factors discussed. Therefore, this study uses the following OLS transformed multiple 
regression models:  
Disc i= β0+ β1 AUD+ β2 AGE+ β3 SIZE+ β4 PROF+ β5 SAD+ β6 BLOCK+ β7 
INST+ β8 FORGN+ β9 DUAL+ β10 B.INDEP+ β11 SSBSIZ+ β12 SSBREPU+ β13 
SSBCROSS+ β14 UNCER+ ɛ                                                                                (1) 
Where Disc is the total disclosure provided by the disclosure indices, which measures the level 
of disclosure of SSBR, CSRR, SF and aggregate disclosure for Islamic bank i; β0 is the intercept; 
β1…..β14 are regression coefficients; ɛ is error term. Our variables with supported literature and 
prediction signs are present in Table 12. It shows that the literatures hypotheses a positive 
association between disclosure and auditor; age; size; profitability; SAD; foreign ownership; 
board independence and SSB’ size, reputation and cross membership whereas the previous 
studies supposed negative association with other variables. The Table also shows that annual 
reports is the main source for firm characterises as well as CG of SSB whereas Banker and 
Zawya is the key source for CG of BOD. The disclosure score for each index is calculated as a 
ratio of the total items disclosed to 15 (maximum score for Sharia) for model 1; 90 (maximum 
score for financial) for model 2; 75 (maximum score for social) for model 3 and 180 (maximum 
score for aggregate disclosure) for model 4. 
Table 12: Summary of variable names, description and sources 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Variable 
description 
Data source Supporting from literature  
Dependent variables 
SSB Disc Sharia 
Supervisory 
Board disclosure  
Sharia disclosure level 
based on SSB report 
Annual reports   
CSR Disc Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
disclosure  
Social disclosure level 
based on CSR report 
Annual reports  
FIN Disc Financial 
disclosure  
Financial disclosure 
level based on FS and 
footnotes 
Annual reports  
OVER Disc Overall disclosure  SSBR Disclosure+ 
CSRR Disclosure+ 
Annual reports  
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FIN Disclosure 
Independent variables 
1. Firm-specific characteristics 
Auditor Auditor  1=Bank’s financial 
statements were audited 
by Big 4 auditor19; 
otherwise: 0 
Annual report  Datar et al., 1991, Xiao et al., 2004 
AGE Age of bank  Age of Islamic bank 
based on establish date  
Annual report  Cormier et al., 2005; Roberts, 1992; 
Hossain and Hammami, 2009 
SIZE Size of the bank Log for total assets  Banker 
database 
Hossain et al., 1995, Watson et al., 
2002; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, 
Elshandidy et al., 2011, Vandemele et 
al., 2009 
PROF Profitability of 
the bank 
ROA (Return On 
Assets) 20 
Banker 
database  
Wallace et al., 1994, Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2011 
SAD Sharia Auditing 
department 
1=Bank that has 
Sharia auditing 
department; otherwise: 
0 
Annual report  Besar et al., 2009; Herdman, 2002; 
Bailey et al., 2003; Gramling et al., 
2004; Carcello et al., 2005; Gadziala, 
2005; Schneider and Wilner, 1990; 
Gordon and Smith, 1992; 
Archambeault et al. 2008  
2. Corporate Governance (CG) characteristics for BOD  
BLOCK Number of Block 
holders 
Number of block 
holders– shareholders 
whose ownership ≥5 % 
of total number of 
shares issued. 
Banker and 
Zawya 
database 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe, 1993; 
Mitchell et al., 1995; Schadewitz and 
Blevins, 1998;  Hossain et al., 1994 
INST Institutional 
ownership 
Percent of shares owned 
by Institutional 
shareholders 
Banker and 
Zawya 
database 
Eng and Mak, 2003; Schadewitz and 
Blevins, 1998; Mangena and Pike, 
2005 
FORGN Foreign 
Ownership 
Percent of shares owned 
by Foreign shareholders 
Banker and 
Zawya 
database 
Hossain et al., 1994; Xiao et al., 2004 
DUAL Duality in 
position 
1 if company's CEO 
serves as a board 
chairman, otherwise: 0 
Banker and 
Zawya 
database 
Haniffa and Cooke, 2002, Ho and 
Wong, 2001; Lakhal, 2005; 
Laksmana, 2008; Forker, 1992, Eng 
and Mak, 2003; Gul and Leung, 2004 
BINDEP Board 
independence 
Ratio of the number of 
non-executive directors 
to the total number of 
the directors 
Banker and 
Zawya 
database 
Ho and Wong, 2001, Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002, Hussainey and Al-
Najjar, 2011; Abdelsalam and Street, 
2007; Adams et al., 1998, Chen and 
Jaggi, 2000 
3. Corporate Governance (CG)  characteristics for SSB 
SSBSIZE The number of 
the SSB 
1 for banks with 5 or 
more members and 0 
less than 5 
Annual reports 
and Website 
Singh et al., 2004, Lakhal, 2005, 
Abdel-Fattah et al., 2008, 
Akhatruddin et al., 2009; Chaganti et 
19 Following the collapse of Arthur Andersen in 2002, the Big 5 became Big 4, namely: PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst and Young and KPMG (Bokpin, 2013).  
20 Firm profitability measured by return on assets, which is a more powerful measure of performance as compared 
to return on equity. ROA is used here as a measure of overall earnings power of the company (Bokpin, 2013). 
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al., 1985, Birnbaum, 1984; Rahman 
and Bukair, 2013 
SSBREPU The SSB having 
at least one of 
them sit on the 
board of 
AAOIFI 
Reputable SSB 
member: 1, otherwise: 0  
Annual reports 
and Website 
and AAOIFI 
members  
Hussain and Mallin, 2003, Farook et 
al., 2011; Rahman and Bukair, 2013 
SSBCROSS  Cross 
membership of 
SSB 
Dichotomous21: SSB 
member with a cross 
membership in more 
than one Islamic bank: 
1, otherwise: 0 
Annual reports 
and website  
Farook et al., 2011, Dahya et al., 
1996, Haat et al., 2008; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002; Rahman and Bukair, 
2013 
Control variable  
UNCER  Uncertainty 
avoidance22 
Score for each country  Green 
Hofstede center  
 
4.1.6 Results of Disclosure and Compliance Levels  
4.1.6.1 Level of compliance by banks and countries  
Table 13 shows the compliance levels for each bank over 2013. It shows that Bahrain Islamic 
bank; Qatar first investment bank and Cham bank are the highest bank that complies with Sharia 
disclosure. Jordan Islamic bank is the highest one that discloses information about CSR whereas 
a Qatar Islamic bank is highest bank related to financial disclosure.  In terms of the comparison 
between disclosures types in each country, Table14 shows the disclosure levels for each country 
by number of banks and percentage based on average disclosure. Table 13 indicates that Jordan 
disclosed 65%, which is more than Bahrain (56%) the Host nation for the AAOIFI. This is 
perhaps surprising, since compliance with AAOIFI is mandatory for IBs in Bahrain. Sudan is the 
lowest country for compliance with AAOIFI (46%). Bahrain has the highest number of banks 
that have adopted AAOIFI (15 IBs) not only because Bahrain is the host nation for the AAOIFI, 
but, it is a requirement of the Central Bank of Bahrain that all IFIs licensed must comply with 
AAOIFI (Vinnicombe, 2010).   
21 Dichotomous is a concept used to describe a variable that consists of only two categories (0 &1) (Field, 2006) 
22 Uncertainty avoidance, which is the degree to which individuals in a country prefer structured over unstructured 
situations, from relatively flexible to extremely rigid, to cope with risk and innovation; a low uncertainty culture 
emphasises a higher level of standardisation (Hofstede, 1991, 2001). 
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Table 13: Disclosure and compliance level by bank  
Bank Average Compliance % Total 
disclosure % 
Bank Average Compliance % Total 
disclosure % Sharia Social  Financial  Sharia Social  Financial  
Tadhamon International 
Islamic Bank  40% 13% 85% 46% Qatar Islamic Bank  60% 36% 88% 61% 
Saba Islamic Bank, 
Sana  86% 16% 87% 63% Q invest bank  46% 17% 80% 48% 
Shamil Bank of Yemen 
and Bahrain 60% 21% 72% 51% 
Faisal Islamic Bank 
Sudan 73% 20% 67% 53% 
Al Baraka Islamic 
Bank 86% 49% 73% 69% 
Al Shamal Islamic 
Bank 60% 18% 63% 47% 
Khaleeji Commercial 
Bank  27% 24% 87% 46% 
Animal Resources 
Bank  6% 16% 75% 32% 
First Energy Bank  80% 25% 74% 60% Saving and Social Development Bank  53% 47% 68% 56% 
Arab Banking 
Corporation (ABC) 73% 25% 77% 58% 
Farmer`s 
Commercial Bank  66% 20% 61% 49% 
Bahrain Islamic Bank  93% 46% 77% 72% Al Salam Bank   53% 18% 65% 45% 
Venture Capital Bank  73% 21% 62% 52% Blue Nile Mahsreg Bank 6% 17% 61% 28% 
Ithmaar Bank  73% 12% 83% 56% Al Jazeera Sudanese Jordanian Bank  66% 19% 57% 47% 
Gulf Finance House  80% 21% 86% 62% AlNile bank  73% 18% 72% 54% 
Al Salam Bank of 
Bahrain  80% 18% 72% 57% 
Tadamon Islamic 
Bank 53% 16% 61% 43% 
Bank Alkhair  80% 19% 77% 59% United Capital Bank  73% 17% 64% 51% 
Global Banking 
Corporation  73% 22% 78% 58% Jordan Islamic Bank  80% 60% 72% 71% 
Seera Investment Bank 
BSC 60% 12% 63% 45% 
Islamic International 
Arab Bank  60% 46% 83% 63% 
International Investment 
Bank.  80% 13% 62% 52% 
Jordan Dubai Islamic 
bank 80% 39% 67% 62% 
Citi Islamic Investment 
Bank 60% 9% 74% 48% 
Syria International 
Islamic Bank  80% 21% 63% 55% 
Investors Bank  60% 7% 62% 43% Cham Bank 93% 23% 81% 66% 
Qatar International 
Islamic Bank 46% 17% 66% 43% Arab Islamic Bank  60% 41% 84% 62% 
Qatar First Investment 
Bank  93% 19% 63% 58% 
The Palestine Islamic 
Bank 80% 42% 79% 67% 
Barw Bank 66% 15% 66% 49% Bank Nizwa  66% 21% 66% 51% 
Masraf Al Rayan 60% 16% 66% 47%  
  
Table 14 : Level of compliance by country  
Country No. of 
banks  
% banks 
from sample  
Average Compliance % Total Average 
Compliance % 
Ranking of 
country  sharia Social  Financial  
Yemen  3 7% 62% 17% 81% 53% 5 
Bahrain 15 35% 72% 22% 74% 56% 4 
Qatar 6 14% 62% 20% 72% 51% 6 
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Sudan 11 25% 53% 21% 65% 46% 7 
Jordan 3 7% 73% 48% 74% 65% 1 
Syria 2 5% 87% 22% 72% 60% 3 
Palestine 2 5% 70% 42% 82% 64% 2 
Oman 1 2% 66% 21% 66% 51% 6 
Average disclosure   43 100% 68% 27% 73% 56%  
4.1.6.2 Compliance levels with AAOIFI standards  
   Table 15 shows the compliance levels with AAOIFI Governance Standards No.1, 2 and 5. The 
Table shows that the average compliance level for our selected banks is 68%. The disclosure 
level concerning with SSB members is 70% whereas the disclosure level concerned with SSB 
reports is 66%. Names of SSB are the highest items (95%) whereas 22% only from our sample 
disclose that they are comply with AAOIFI.     
Table 15: Compliance level with AAOIFI governance standards No.1, 2 and 5 (SSBR) 
Items and corresponding AAOIFI standards (Sharia oriented disclosure)  Disclosure % 
Items related to SSB members  70% 
1. Names of Sharia board members 95% 
2. Brief about each members in the Sharia board (Background and qualifications)  40% 
3. The role and responsibilities of the board 70% 
4. The authorities of the board 88% 
5. The Sharia auditing department in the bank 65% 
6. Is the website or annual report disclose the Fatwas for the Sharia board related to Islamic services  63% 
Items related to SSB report  66% 
7. SSB report assigned from the board members 85% 
8. Information about the bank’s responsibilities of Zakat  65% 
9. Information about the bank’s responsibilities of  activities not comply with Sharia and how bank deal with it 65% 
10. Information about how profit distribution process in the bank comply with Islamic Sharia  70% 
11. Information about the independency of the Sharia board with charter shows the objectivity of the board 37% 
12. Information about opinion for the board about completely compliance of the bank with the Islamic Sharia 90% 
13. The board discloses its opinion after reviewing all documents and all financial statements for the bank 74% 
14. Is the report shows that the bank comply with the AAOIFI’s standards 22% 
15. Information about the date of report  and name of bank  85% 
Average disclosure and compliance level  68% 
 
   Table 16 shows the compliance level with AAOIFI Governance Standard No.7. The Table 
shows that the average compliance level for our selected banks is 27%, which is beyond our 
expectations. The disclosure level related to universal-oriented CSR items is 30% while the 
disclosure level related to Islamic-oriented CSR items is 23%. It also shows that screening and 
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informing clients for compliance with Islamic principles has the highest score (42%) and 
disclosure about Waqf management has the lowest score (2%).  
Table 16: Compliance level with AAOIFI governance standard No.7 (CSRR) 
Items and corresponding AAOIFI standard Total Items  Disclosure % 
A. Universal oriented CSR disclosure 30% 
1. Employee welfare  5 30% 
2. Internal  environment preservation policy  8 17% 
3. Par Excellence customers services   5 35% 
4. Micro and small business and social saving and investments and Development   8 33% 
5. Charitable activates  6 37% 
6. Social responsibility 8 28% 
B. Sharia oriented CSR disclosure 23% 
7. Late repayments and insolvent clients and avoiding onerous terms  8 12% 
8. Qard Hassan  7 15% 
9. Zakat  7 35% 
10. Waqf management 5 2% 
11. Earning and expenditure prohibited by sharia 4 32% 
12. Screening and informing clients for compliance with Islamic principles 4 42% 
Average disclosure and compliance level  75 27% 
 
   Table 17 shows the compliance level with AAOIFI Financial Standard No.1. The Table shows 
that the average compliance level is 73%. The disclosure level for universal-oriented financial 
disclosure is 86%. However, the disclosure level related to Sharia -oriented financial disclosure is 
36%. The Table shows that average disclosure level, which recommended by AAOIFI; IFRS and 
GAAP for universal financial statements (Financial Position Statement, profit and loss account, 
Cash Flow Statement, Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity) is 88%. However, the 
disclosure level related to Sharia -oriented financial statements (Statement of Changes in 
Restricted Investments, Statement of Zakat, and Statement of Qard Hassan) is 33%.  
Table 17: Compliance level with AAOIFI financial standard No.1 (Financial) 
Items and corresponding AAOIFI standard Total 
Items 
Disclosure 
% 
A. Universal oriented financial disclosure  86% 
1. Comparative financial statements  1 100% 
2. Basic information about  the bank  8 83% 
3. Disclosure of the currency used for accounting measurement   2 88% 
4. Disclosure of significant accounting policies 6 82% 
5. Disclosure of contingences  2 83% 
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6. Disclosure of accounting policy changes  8 75% 
7. Disclosure about assets and liabilities’ risk  3 82% 
8. Presentation and disclosure in the Financial Position  16 88% 
9. Presentation and disclosure in the Income Statement 9 89% 
10. Disclosure in the statement of Cash Flows 8 88% 
11. Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity   6 85% 
B. Sharia oriented financial disclosure  36% 
12. Disclosure of earning or expenditure prohibited by sharia  2 45% 
13. Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments   12 42% 
14. Disclosure in the Statement of Sources and Uses of funds of  Zakat and Sadakat  4 23% 
15. Disclosure in the statement  of sources and uses of funds, Loan Fund (Qard Hassan Fund) 3 35% 
Average disclosure and compliance level  90 73% 
 
   Table 18 summarises the information provided by the annual reports for our 43 selected banks 
and discloses information about the main Islamic services as Murabaha and Musharakah. The 
Table shows that Murabaha is the most popular service provided by IBs in the sample (91%) 
then Mudaraba 79%. Salam is the lowest service presented (12%).  
Table 18: Disclosure about eight main Islamic services presented  
Main services provided  No  Disclosure % 
Murabaha 39 91% 
Mudaraba 34 79% 
Ijara 30 70% 
Zakat 26 60% 
Musharakah 23 53% 
Sukuk 21 49% 
Istisna’a 11 26% 
Salam 5 12% 
 
   Table 19 shows the overall compliance levels for the 4 models based on disclosure related to 
universal and Sharia orientation. The Table shows that the levels of compliance related to Sharia 
accountability for SSBM and SSBR are close similar (70% and 66%). The compliance for 
universal CSR is 30% and for Sharia CSR items is 23%. In addition, the compliance related to 
financial information common to international standards like IFRS is 86% whereas financial 
disclosure related to Sharia items is 36%. Finally, compliance levels for items related to universal 
orientation are higher than information related to Sharia requirements. This result shows low 
compliance and disclosure level for social reporting of IBs. This result is matching with Maali et 
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al. (2006); Hassan and Harahap (2010) and Farook et al. (2011) that recommend the extent of 
CSRD by IBs falls far short of their expectation (13.3%; 38% and 16.8% respectively). Maali et al 
(2006) indicate that IBs are not completely fulfilling their social role in accordance with the 
prescriptions of Islam. Based on our result; we conclude that IBs are mainly shaped and focused 
on economic incentives more than social norms which consistent with Aggarwal and Yousef, 
(2000). Kuran (2006) maintains that IBs appear to seek profit as aggressively as conventional 
banks. He argues that it is even unrealistic to suppose IBs’ activities and CSRD to differ or be 
more socially accountable than conventional as they run in the equal global capitalistic situations. 
Table 19: Overall disclosure levels  
 SSBR  CSR  Financial  Overall 
Average % of compliance 68% 27% 73% 56% 
Universal oriented compliance % Related to SSBM 70% 30% 86% 58% 
Sharia oriented compliance % Related to SSBR 66% 23% 36% 42% 
SSBM: Sharia Supervisory Board Members 
SSBR: Sharia Supervisory Board Report  
4.1.7 Empirical results 
4.1.7.1 Descriptive analysis 
    Table 20 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables. It shows that the average 
compliance level based on the AAOIFI standard for SSBR requirements is 68%, the compliance 
level for CSR is 27%, and the compliance level for financial accountability is 73%. Finally, the 
overall disclosure for the selected banks is 56%. The Big 4 firms audit 65% of the selected banks 
namely: Ernst and Young, KPMG, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, and 67% 
of the banks have a Sharia Auditing Department (SAD). The average overall age of IBs is 19 
years. The average SSB size is four members. 57% from SSB members have cross-membership 
with SSBs in other Islamic Banks (for example, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah is a member 
of the Sharia Supervisory Boards of more than 10 Islamic Banks). 50% of SSB members are also 
members of AAOIFI committees. The average number of block holders is three, the average 
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institutional ownership is 58% and the average foreign ownership is 63%. The average 
percentage of independent directors on the board is 49%. The average profitability based on 
ROA is 1.68. The average size for the selected banks based on log total assets is 2.87. The duality 
in position is 0.033.      
Table 20: Descriptive statistics 
 Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
Le
ve
ls 
SSB 43 0.06 0.93 0.678 0.19585 -0.351 2.472 
CSR 43 0.08 0.60 0.273 0.12083 0.391 3.148 
FIN 43 0.31 0.85 0.731 0.12888 0.118 -2.161 
OVER 43 .21 .74 0.560 .09600 -0.147 2.555 
Fi
rm
 
Sp
ec
ifi
c 
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s AUDIT 43 0.00 1.00 0.6512 .48224 -0.657 -2.647 
AGE  43 3.00 49.00 19.255 12.16766 0.608 -2.796 
SIZE 43 1.23 4.33 2.8706 .67019 0.222 2.526 
PROFIT 43 -13.39 21.57 1.6814 4.66238 0.170 3.903 
SAD 43 0.00 1.00 0.6744 .47414 -0.772 -2.476 
BO
D
 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e BLOOK 25 0.00 7.00 2.7200 1.88237 0.726 -3.300 
FORIGEN 24 0.00 1.00 0.6328 .35791 -0.683 -2.927 
INSTITU 24 0.00 1.00 0.5750 .29427 -0.145 -2.704 
DUALITY 30 0.00 1.00 0.0333 .18257 0.477 3.000 
B.INDIP 24 0.00 1.00 0.4925 .31958 0.012 -2.962 
SS
B 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
G
ov
er
na
nc
e SSBSIZE 43 0.00 1.00 0.1163 .32435 0.481 2.359 
SSBREPU 42 0.00 1.00 0.5000 .50606 0.000 -2.103 
SSBCROSS 
42 0.00 1.00 0.5714 .50087 
-0.299 -2.008 
Culture UNCER 43 60.00 80.00 71.2558 5.61076 -0.005 -2.995 
SSBR: Sharia  Supervisory Board Report; CSRR: Corporate Social Responsibility Report;  FIN: Financial disclosure that 
located at financial statements;  OVER: Overall disclosure that contain SSBR; CSRR and FIN;   AUD: size of Auditor; 
AGE: Age of bank; SIZE: Size of the bank based on total assets; PROF: Profitability of the bank based on ROA; SAD: 
Sharia  Auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: Number of Block holders; INST: Institutional ownership; 
FORGN: Foreign Ownership; DUAL: Duality in position; B.INDEP: Board independence; SSBSIZ: The  number of 
Sharia  supervisory board members; SSBREPU: The SSB having at least one of them sit on the board of AAOIFI; 
SSBCROSS: The SSB having at least one of them sit on the other Islamic bank’ SSB (Cross membership of SSB); 
UNCER: Uncertainty avoidance 
 
4.1.7.2 Correlation analysis 
Table 21 illustrates the correlation analysis between the overall compliance level disclosure and 
independent variables concerned with firm characteristics and CG. It shows that older IBs, with 
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large assets, with Sharia Auditing Departments, and with more than 3 SSB members are likely to 
provide higher levels of disclosures. It shows that the overall compliance level positively 
correlated with AGE (r 0.385), SSBSIZE (r 0.305), SIZE (r 0.570) and SAD (r 0.462) and these 
correlations are statistically significant at the 5% level for the second and third variables and at 
the 10% level for the first and fourth variables.   
Table 21: Pearson correlation Matrix (N=43) 
 OVERALL AUDIT AGE  SIZE PROFIT SAD UNCER BLOOK FORIGEN INSTITU DUALITY B.INDIP SSBSIZE SSBREPU SSBCROSS 
OVERALL 1               
AUDIT 
.300 
1              
AGE  .385* -.175 1             
SIZE .570** .264 .245 1            
PROFIT .027 .105 -.058 -.171 1           
SAD .462** .325* -.035 .303* .250 1          
UNCER -.099 .509** -.209 .190 .067 .023 1         
BLOOK .085 -.285 -.022 -.091 -.200 -.185 -.245 1        
FORIGEN -.096 .208 .186 -.220 .266 -.173 .161 -.042 1       
INSTITU .054 .303 .286 -.246 .284 .209 -.015 -.144 .229 1      
DUALITY -.079 .062 -.099 .325 .030 .093 .224 -.080 -.374 -.335 1     
B.INDIP -.352 -.255 -.125 -.218 
-.087 
-.211 .310 -.291 .128 .259 -.328 1    
SSBSIZE .305* -.039 .065 .152 -.028 .097 .036 .303 .208 -.290 -.073 .095 1   
SSBREPU .203 .547** .024 .274 .115 .202 .499** -.110 .439* .086 .137 .119 .074 1  
SSBCROSS .205 .660** -.090 .268 .093 .204 .690** -.345 .315 .083 .107 .289 .021 .866** 
1 
This Table shows the correlation analysis between the overall disclosure reporting variables and firm characteristics and corporate governance 
for BOD and SSB; AUD: size of Auditor; AGE: Age of bank; SIZE: Size of the bank based on total assets; PROF: Profitability of the bank 
based on ROA; SAD: Sharia Auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: Number of Block holders; INST: Institutional ownership; 
FORGN: Foreign Ownership; DUAL: Duality in position; B.INDEP: Board independence; SSBSIZ: The  number of Sharia supervisory board 
members; SSBREPU: The SSB having at least one of them sit on the board of AAOIFI; SSBCROSS: The SSB having at least one of them sit 
on the other Islamic bank’ SSB (Cross membership of SSB); UNCER: Uncertainty avoidance (culture) *** Correlation is significant at the 1% 
level; ** Correlation is significant at the 5% level; * Correlation is significant at the 10% level 
 
Table 22 shows the Pearson correlation results for the three models of disclosure levels. For 
Sharia disclosure, the SAD is more likely to provide higher levels of voluntary disclosures about 
Sharia accountability. It shows that Sharia disclosure positively correlated with SAD (r 0.551) at 
the 5% level. It also shows that banks with Big 4 auditors and with more than four SSB members 
are more likely to provide higher levels of disclosures related to Sharia accountability (r 0.323 for 
auditor and r 0.317 for SSB size at the 10% level). Concerning social disclosure, IBs with high 
value of total assets, as well as old established banks are more likely to provide higher levels of 
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disclosures about social accountability. Thus, CSRR positively correlated with SIZE (r 0.423) and 
with AGE (r 0.595) at the 5% level. For financial disclosure, size and age of bank are the main 
variables that correlated with financial disclosure. There is a positive correlation at the 10% level 
for age and at the 5% level for size.  
Table 22: Person correlation for Sharia; social and financial models   
 Sharia disclosure 
SSBR 
Social disclosure 
CSRR 
Financial 
disclosure 
AUDIT 0.323* 0.156 0.037 
AGE  -0.045 0.595** 0.354* 
SIZE 0.181 0.423** 0.607** 
PROFIT 0.107 -0.046 -0.058 
SAD 0.551** 0.218 0.000 
UNCER 0.000 -0.226 -0.021 
BLOOK 0.045 0.107 -0.023 
FORIGEN -0.019 -0.119 -0.070 
INSTITU -0.001 0.178 -0.056 
DUALITY -0.126 -0.129 0.117 
B.INDIP -0.102 -0.337 -0.267 
SSBSIZE 0.317* 0.016 0.175 
SSBREPU 0.158 0.066 0.141 
SSBCROSS 0.263 0.004 0.045 
size of Auditor; AGE: Age of bank; SIZE: Size of the bank based on total assets; PROF: Profitability 
of the bank based on ROA; SAD: Sharia Auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: Number of 
Block holders; INST: Institutional ownership; FORGN: Foreign Ownership; DUAL: Duality in 
position; B.INDEP: Board independence; SSBSIZ: The  number of Sharia supervisory board 
members; SSBREPU: The SSB having at least one of them sit on the board of AAOIFI; SSBCROSS: 
The SSB having at least one of them sit on the other Islamic bank’ SSB (Cross membership of SSB); 
UNCER: Uncertainty avoidance (culture) *** Correlation is significant at the 1% level; ** Correlation 
is significant at the 5% level; * Correlation is significant at the 10% level 
 
4.1.7.3 Regression results 
   Regression results are show in Table 23. It shows the cross-sectional OLS regressions for the 
aggregated score of disclosures and three subcategories (SSBR, CSRR and FS). For the SSBR 
score (model 1), it finds that the coefficient estimate on Sharia disclosure is positive and 
significant with all variables related to corporate governance of SSB at the 10% level. This result 
supports hypotheses H1.11, H1.12 and H1.13 that IBs which have SSBs with more than 4 
members, as well as SSB members who have cross-membership with SSBs in other IBs and IBs 
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with SSB members who are also members of AAOIFI committees disclose more Sharia 
information in their annual reports and websites. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates that IBs, 
which have Sharia auditing departments (SADs), disclose more information about Sharia 
compliance. This supports hypothesis H5. Concerning model 2, the Table shows that CSRR is 
positive and significant with SIZE of bank at the 10% level. This result supports hypothesis 
H1.3. Furthermore, the coefficient estimates that older IBs disclose more information about 
social activities at the 1% level, which supports hypothesis H1.2. For model 3, it finds that the 
coefficient estimates on financial compliance are positive for SIZE and SAD at the 1% level and 
the 10% level. Therefore, we partially accept hypotheses H1.3 and H1.5. Regarding aggregate 
compliance (model 4), we find significant positive association between disclosure and SIZE, 
AGE and SSBSIZE at the 10%; 5% and 10% level respectively. Therefore, hypotheses H1.2, 
H1.3 and H1.11 are partially accepted. For culture, we find that UA has a negative association 
with Sharia as well as aggregate disclosure level at the 10% level. This result is matching with 
Elshandidy et al., 2013; Dong and Stettler, 2011  who argue that cultural values of a country has a 
significant impact on its mandatory practices as well as corporate disclosure. They found a 
negative association between UA and disclosure. These results support the acceptance of H1.14. 
Table 23: Regression results 
 
Categories   
 
Variables  
Model 1 
Sharia disclosure 
Model 2 
Social disclosure 
Model 3 
Financial disclosure 
Model 4 
Aggregate disclosure 
 
 
VIF23 Beta  t Sig Beta t Sig Beta T Sig Beta t Sig 
Constant   2.605 .015  1.140 .264  .993 .329  3.301 .003 
 
Firm-specific 
characteristics 
AUDIT .156 .772 .447 .252 1.437 .162 -.054 -.270 .789 .185 1.162 .255 2.354 
AGE  .000 .001 .999 .522 3.770 .001*** .098 .619 .541 .275 2.197 .036* 1.466 
SIZE -.026 -.152 .881 .277 1.824 .079* .670 3.841 .001*** .393 2.856 .008** 1.767 
PROFIT .016 .105 .917 .054 .399 .693 .106 .679 .503 .083 .677 .504 1.417 
SAD .443 2.757 .010** .028 .203 .841 .283  1.762 .089* .187 1.472 .152 1.498 
Culture UNCER -.365 -1.710 .098* -.185 -.997 .328 .004 .018 .986 -.317 -1.880 .071* 2.648 
 BLOOK .093 .586 .563 .081 .584 .564 -.061 -.386 .702 .068 .538 .595 1.473 
23  Multicollinearity occurs when two or more predictors in the model are correlated and provide redundant 
information about the response. The Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is one of the most methods that can help to 
identify multicollinearity (Norusis, 2009; Allison, 1999). Values of VIF that exceed 10 are often regarded as 
indicating multicollinearity (Stevens, 2009). The result shows that all values of VIF are lower than 10 which reflect 
that there is no multicollinearity problem.    
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Corporate 
governance of 
BOD 
FORIGEN .010 .056 .956 -.225 -1.484 .149 -.130 -.749 .460 -.145 -1.053 .301 1.766 
INSTITU -.024 -.140 .889 .062 .417 .680 .138 .807 .427 .060 .447 .658 1.696 
DUALITY -.020 -.114 .910 -.249 -1.597 .121 -.145 -.812 .424 -.189 -1.344 .190 1.854 
B.INDIP -.008 -.048 .962 -.174 -1.136 .265 -.197 -1.125 .270 -.162 -1.174 .250 1.786 
Corporate 
governance of 
SSB 
SSBSIZE .288 1.841 .076* -.016 -.114 .910 .159 1.021 .316 .261 2.122 .043* 1.417 
SSBREPU .560 1.788 .085* .027 .097 .923 .276 .883 .385 .248 1.003 .324 5.693 
SSBCROSS .831 2.209 .035* .005 .015 .988 -.240 -.641 .527 .463 1.562 .130 8.194 
             Model Summary: R Square 
                                     F-value  
   P-value                                                                
0.517 
2.142 
0.042 
0.634 
3.464 
0.002 
0.518 
2.153 
0.041 
0.700 
4.663 
0.000 
 
This study formulated 3 models and aggregate model. Model 1 focus on compliance with sharia AAOIFI disclosure requirements. Model 2 
emphasis on compliance with social AAOIFI disclosure requirements. Model 3 emphasis on compliance with financial AAOIFI disclosure 
requirements, Model 4 gathering the three models (Sharia; social and financial); AUD: size of Auditor; AGE: Age of bank; SIZE: Size of the 
bank based on total assets; PROF: Profitability of the bank based on ROA; SAD: Sharia Auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: Number 
of Block holders; INST: Institutional ownership; FORGN: Foreign Ownership; DUAL: Duality in position; B.INDEP: Board independence; 
SSBSIZ: The  number of Sharia supervisory board members; SSBREPU: The SSB having at least one of them sit on the board of AAOIFI; 
SSBCROSS: The SSB having at least one of them sit on the other Islamic bank’ SSB (Cross membership of SSB); UNCER: Uncertainty 
avoidance (culture) *** Correlation is significant at the 1% level; ** Correlation is significant at the 5% level; * Correlation is significant at the 
10% level, The R Square indicates that the corporate characteristics as well as CG selected for the purposes of this study explain at 52% (sharia 
model); 63% (social model); 52% (financial model) and 70% (aggregate model) the variation in banks’ levels of compliance with AAOIFI 
disclosures requirements 
The following Tables summarized the conclusion of research hypotheses. This study accepted 
H1.2; H1.3; H1.5; H1.11; H1.12; H1.13 as well as H1.14 and it rejected others.   
Table 24: Summary of the hypotheses’ results 24 
Variables  Model  
1 
Model  
2 
Model 
3 
Model  
4 
Expected 
sign 
The study 
result  
Auditor  0 0 0 0 + R 
Age 0 + 0 + + PA 
Size 0 + + + + PA 
Profitability   0 0 0 0 + R 
SAD + 0 + 0 + PA 
UA - 0 0 - - PA 
Block holders  0 0 0 0 - R 
Foreign ownership  0 0 0 0 + R 
Institutional ownership  0 0 0 0 + R 
Duality in the position  0 0 0 0 - R 
Board independence   0 0 0 0 + R 
SSB size + 0 0 + + PA 
SSB reputation  + 0 0 0 + PA 
SSB cross membership  + 0 0 0 + PA 
24 (+) is a positive association; (-) is a negative association; (0) is insignificant association; (A) is accepted hypothesis; 
(R) is a rejected hypothesis; (PA) is a partial accepted hypothesis; (PR) is a rejected hypothesis  
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4.1.8 Discussion 
   The analysis shows interesting results concerned with the determinants of disclosure. The 
insignificant associations between corporate disclosure and auditors are consistent with prior 
research (Barako et al., 2006). The analysis identifies a significant association between disclosure 
level and existing SAD. This finding is consistent with previous literature, which presents SAD 
as one of the main determinants of disclosure and compliance with AAOIFI and shows that the 
internal audit function can enhance the disclosure quality (Carcello et al., 2005; Bailey et al., 
2003). Bank age positively correlated with corporate disclosure. Empirically, it confirms the 
findings of Cormier et al (2005); Hossain, and Hammami (2009) who reported a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between company age and corporate disclosure. As bank ages, 
it establishes itself as a continuing business and a measure of the stage of development and 
therefore it would be in a better position to disclose more information about their accountbilites.  
The significant associations between corporate disclosure and bank size are consistent with prior 
empirical studies, which identified company size as a determinant of disclosure level (e.g., Barako 
et al., 2006; Street and Gray, 2001; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; Cooke, 1991). Furthermore, large 
companies face higher demand for information from investors, analysts, and the general public 
(Cooke, 1989) that causes an increased pressure to disclose information. This study found that 
profitability is not associated with disclosure level. This result supports the argument that 
providing full disclosure in any situation is important whether it is achieving a profit or not 
(Haniffa, 2002). In addition, this result is consistent with the findings of other researchers who 
failed to find any association between profitability and disclosure (Aras et al., 2010). This result 
may explained based on main basics of these institutions that are are guided by Sharia and aim to 
achiving their accountbiliuty towards Allah who asking Muslim as well as IBs to be full honest 
and full disclosure about all information.  
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    The results do not support that CG attributes concerned with BOD have a significant effect 
on corporate disclosure. Based on our analysis, it found an insignificant link between duality in 
position and corporate disclosure. This result supported by Vandemele et al (2009); Cheng and 
Courtenay (2006) and Arcay and Vazquez (2005). Related to institutional ownership, the 
outcome is consistent with Eng and Mak (2003) who found an insignificant relationship between 
the two variables. This study concludes an insignificant association between corporate disclosure 
and board independence which is consistent with Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002). This study finds that the coefficient estimates on block holders and foreign 
ownership have an insignificant association with corporate disclosure. The insignificant sign on 
the number of block holders is consistent with the research of Samaha and Dahawy (2010 and 
2011) who did not find any evidence for association. The insignificant link between foreign 
ownership and disclosure is consistent with Mangena and Tauringana (2007). 
The significant associations between disclosure and CG variables concerned with SSB are 
consistent with prior empirical disclosure reporting research (e.g., Rahman and Bukair, 2013; 
Farook et al., 2011; Akhtaruddin et al., 2009). Gray (1988); Salter and Niswander (1995) show 
that measures of national culture can help explain cross-country differences in accounting 
practices particularly with regard to disclosure level. The Table shows that culture based on UA 
has a negative association with disclosure level (Sharia and aggregate) at the 10% level. This result 
supported by Ding et al (2007); Hope (2003) who shows that cultural values are a determinant of 
differences between disclosure levels. Consequently, the purpose to achieve international 
convergence for IFIs, a main goal of AAOIFI, may expanded from merely adopting a single set 
of high-quality accounting standards to considering the cultural values of Islamic countries as 
well as other that have IBs or even Islamic windows around the world. 
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4.1.9 Concluding remarks  
    This study measured to what extent IBs that adopt AAOIFI standards are consistent with 
AAOIFI requirements. It also associated variations in SSBR, CSRR and financial statements 
disclosure levels with variations in both firm characteristics and corporate governance 
mechanisms related to BOD and SSB. The findings of this study illustrate a relatively low 
average level of compliance with AAOIFI disclosures related to social requirements (27%). It 
also indicates a relatively high average level of compliance with AAOIFI disclosures related to 
Sharia and financial requirements. This approximates to 68% for SSBR and 73% for financial 
disclosure level. It finds that the corporate governance mechanisms related to SSB have 
significantly high explanatory power over Sharia disclosure variations compared with corporate 
governance mechanisms related to BOD. This can explained because AAOIFI standards for 
selected banks are mandatory, and BOD does not have a direct role in ensuring compliance with 
standards, whereas SSB has a significant role in preparing reports about the compliance level 
with Sharia. This study finds moreover that firm characteristics (age, size and SAD) have a 
significant impact on disclosure variations.  
    These results have theoretical and practical implications. They suggest that more attention 
considering to variables that may explain the variations in SSFD particularly those concerned 
with SSB. This suggestion is consistent with a recent trend in the accounting literature (e.g., 
Abdul Rahman and Bukair, 2013) for research to look more deeply at the SSB characteristics of 
CG. The practical implication of these results lies in empirical evidence relevant to the 
importance and benefits of compliance with AAOIFI standards, which has a significant impact 
on the image of IBs as well as approving Sharia compliance and serving society, which represent 
the main competitive advantages for these banks. The results suggest that more attention to the 
adoption of AAOIFI particularly for IBs who are members without adopting. Looking more 
closely at the variations in compliance with AAOIFI and the disclosure levels between the IBs in 
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each country is useful for either clearly identifying the extent to which the regulatory approach 
relies on regulations or mandatory and voluntary disclosure. In addition, AAOIFI may take 
measures to make their standards mandatory for all their members as a first step to making it 
compulsory for all IFIs. When measured the disclosure levels for each country, it found that 
Bahrain is located in the fourth place after Jordan, Syria and Palestine. Consequently, this study 
recommend that the Central Bank of Bahrain further investigate this issue and explore the 
reasons and the scope for enhancing compliance with AAOIFI. 
    The results related to disclosure levels of banks with AAOIFI adds significantly to the 
disclosure literature by emphasising the importance of widening this research scope to pay more 
attention to variations above the mandated requirements (AAOIFI adoption), which provide a 
minimum amount of information to all stakeholders. The results indicate that organising 
reporting by IBs that formally implement an accounting standard (AAOIFI) significantly 
improves the disclosure level for Sharia compliance by encouraging them to care about their SSB 
report. This study support and assist IBs as well as IFIs that aim to enhancing level of SSFD and 
aims to reflect the three accountabilities for all stakeholders. This study shows the importance of 
CG as well as firm characteristics for develop SSFD. The results support the current trend in the 
regulations in Bahrain, Sudan and Jordan, which encourage the mandatory adoption of AAOIFI 
by IBs. The un-weighted disclosure index is adapted to measure the compliance level with 
AAOIFI. However, this kind of disclosure index has an important limitation as the number of 
disclosure items required by different standards varies considerably. As in this research, some 
standards require a large number of items (90 items) to be disclosed (Accounting Standard No.1) 
whereas others require only a few items (15 items) to be disclosed (Governance Standard 
No.1and5). This may become a significant problem when studies examine compliance with 
AAOIFI disclosures. An alternative method recommended for future research to avoid this 
problem is the partial compliance un-weighted approach which was employed by Tsalavoutas et 
al (2011); Al-Shiab (2003); Street and Gray (2001). Furthermore, this study only focused on three 
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AAOIFI standards and further research is required to explore the compliance level with other 
standards and to identify the main determinants behind the variances in compliance and 
disclosure levels.  
Further research could usefully include some other explanatory variables in the model, which 
might decrease the unsystematic unexplained variations in corporate disclosure for IBs. Thus; the 
further model may contain variables as GDP, corruption index, audit committee and leverage.  
In this study, the sample is restricted to IBs in 8 countries that adopted AAOIFI standards 
during 2013. Future studies could extend the sample to other countries that have IBs and extend 
the covered period. Previous research has examined the quality of aggregated disclosure 
reporting (e.g., Miihkinen, 2012). Future research might also investigate the quality of corporate 
disclosure for IBs more than quantity disclosure. Moreover, in this research, we used manual 
content analysis as a basic method for analysis of compliance and disclosure levels. However, 
future research can use computer software packages to measure disclosures for a large number 
of IBs with minimal time and effort. Moreover, future research could also include other IFIs as 
Takaful firms to investigate to what extent they comply with AAOIFI and to what extent the 
determinants of disclosure differ from Islamic banks. In this research, we just adopted UA 
therefore supplementary research could explore the impacts of the whole six dimensions of 
Hofstede on the disclosure level. Auxiliary investigation may consider the role of AAOIFI to 
enhancing adoption level of IBs particularly their members and for what extent the linking 
between full adoption and membership may effect on the compliance and disclosure level. 
Finally, additional research could be undertaken to examine the economic consequences of 
Sharia, social and financial reporting  
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Empirical Study (2): The Determinants of holistic disclosure levels for 
Islamic banks  
4.2.1 Introduction 
   Contrasting with conventional banks, IBs have to adhere to Islamic law in their contacts. 
Among the rules that Sharia prescribes are the prohibition of paying and charging of interest and 
prohibition of speculation (Hidayat, 2010). As a result, there are differences in the method of 
presentation; disclosure between Islamic and conventional banks and differences about the 
accountability for each bank. In the context of accountability, one of the main objectives of 
accounting is to provide a fair information flow between the accountor and the accountee 
(Anuar et al., 2009). Concerned with this concept, accounting plays a significant role in providing 
information to all stakeholders as well as the society, to fill any religious duty. Therefore, firms 
are accountable for publishing their reports (Gray et al., 1995) for the benefit of users as well as 
satisfy their needs of stakeholders about bank’ accountabilities compliance.   
      The main objectives for this study are explore for what extent the disclosure level for IBs 
reflects the main three pillars of Islamic accountabilities which contain Sharia ; social and 
financial. It critically evaluates the degree of disclosure practices of IBs about its accountabilities 
through the annual reports and websites for all stakeholders. Furthermore, the study seeks to 
explore the association between disclosure levels about accountabilities pillars and bank-specific 
characteristics as accounting standards; profitability; leverage and size. The analysis contains also 
control variables to investigate the differences between the selected banks at different countries. 
Despite these concerns, there are very few academic studies that investigate the disclosure levels 
for all accountability’ pillars reporting and for a large sample of IBs. Further -as I know- there is 
no study examines the association between disclosure levels of IBs’ accountability pillars and 
firm -specific characteristics for most of IBs around the world. Based on my knowledge; there is 
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no any previous studies explore the comprehensive pillars of accountabilities (SSF) for IBs in 
one study. Considering these gaps in the literature, it first develops and apply three indices to 
measure the disclosures about accountability of IBs related to CSR; SSBR and financial 
statements. In addition, it explores the disclosure levels about SSF in whole segments in the 
annual report as vision; mission; strategy report and CEO statement. Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) 
examined disclosure of information deemed crucial to Islamic ethics in business. They found a 
major gap between communicated and ideal ethical disclosure in the annual reports of a sample 
of seven IBs. Consequently, this study aims to exploring all accountabilities for IBs in different 
culture to see to what extent it can effect on the disclosure levels about accountability. The 
number of sample banks used in the literature was limited as acknowledged by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2007); Maali et al (2006). The sample is relatively large (117) compared to the largest 
study so far (90 for Mallinb et al., 2014). It also more comprehensive based on exploring all 
accountabilities for IBs. Although, number of studies referred to AAOIFI standards (Hassan and 
Harahap, 2010), none of them add AAOIFI Standards items in indices that tested as standard 
No.7 for CSR; standards No.1 for presentations in the annual report and standards No.1; 2 and 5 
for SSBR in one study.  
    This study is motivated to bridge a perceived gap between the three broad components of 
social; Sharia and financial disclosure levels. Secondly, calls for greater accountability from 
corporations regularly voiced these days, both in the academic literature and in public discussions 
more generally (Messner, 2009). In accounting research; concern for more accountability has 
been shared by those who have criticized extant financial and management accounting practices 
for contributing to what they see as a very limited understanding of accountability (e.g. Young, 
2006; McKernan and MacLullich, 2004; Gray et al., 2001). There has been extensive researches 
measure the corporate disclosure for banks (e.g., Al Baluchi, 2006) without segregate between 
the three accountabilities disclosure. In addition, accountability issue for IBs have been 
unexplored (Hasan and Siti-Nabiha, 2010). However, there are very limited studies that focus on 
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disclosure analysis related to SSFD levels. During recent years, there has been a growing interest 
in CSR across a range of disciplines as one of accountabilities for IBs. Researchers strongly 
believe that corporations may not judge just on their economic success (Jamali et al., 2008, 
Shahin and Zairi, 2007). Even though CSR is becoming increasingly significant, research still 
shows that CSR performance and CSR reporting by companies all over the world is limited. 
Moreover, this research motivated by answer the question about the difference between the 
required information that may be published in the corporate annual reports based on the Islamic 
perspective as well as Islamic standards as AAOIFI and what is presently being practised by 
these banks around the world (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006). Most of 
literature that testing disclosure for IBs focused mainly on measuring the disclosure levels with a 
little studies that exploring the determents of corporate disclosure (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013; 
Ousama and Fatima, 2010). Another motivating factor is the lack of literature on disclosure in 
IFIs context, particularly on IBs, as prior studies have not considered different categories of 
disclosure for this sector. This gap needs to explored and filled. 
    The findings show high variations in disclosure reporting practices about Islamic 
accountabilities’ pillars across the sample and countries with a clear tendency to focus on 
financial disclosure accountability more than other accountabilities. The average disclosure 
scores are relatively low (28%) for social throughout the whole banks examined and relatively 
high (more than 50%) for Sharia and financial disclosure. These scores indicate that the banks 
disclose less information about social and fail to follow the Islamic standards as AAOIFI 
guidelines as a best practices particularly for social disclosure. Furthermore, the high scores 
indicate that although the banks disclose information about financial accountability related to 
financial statements, they fail to disclose the financial statements that concerned with Islamic 
identification as Zakat and Qard Hassan statement. The empirical results show that the 
disclosure levels are significantly affected by standards; size of firm; SAD. The empirical results 
moreover shows different correlation based on different model or different disclosure kind  
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    Based on these findings, this study makes several incremental contributions to the literature 
on Islamic accountability and IBs. First, this study applies an objective; holistic and context-
specific measure of the accountabilities reporting for any IFIs based on Islamic approaches 
(AAOIFI and related literature). As highlighted by Leuz and Wysocki (2008), there is a lack of a 
measure, which combines all of the desirable properties for disclosure. The approach we follow 
which focus on survey all sections in the annual report for IBs could be beneficial for future 
studies dealing with disclosures. Second, it adds empirical evidence about the significant impact 
of the firm characteristics (accounting standards; SAD; size) on the quality of the disclosures 
about IBs’ accountability pillars. These results may be of interest to IBs and regulators as they 
indicate that the requirement for banks to disclose annual reports contains value relevant 
information for IBs’ stakeholders in additional to satisfy Allah by sufficient disclosure. There 
have been a few empirical studies that investigating Islamic accountability pillars in the banking 
sector. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study that investigate this 
relationship in IBs using a more comprehensive accountability disclosure indices which 
distinguishes between Sharia; social and financial disclosures and applied on the most of IBs 
around the world. The study’s themes developed as follows: Section 4.2.2 elaborates 
accountability framework from an Islamic approach. Section 4.2.3 has a review the three 
accountabilities of IBs. The relevant literature and developed hypotheses presented in section 
4.2.4. Section 4.2.5 discusses the research design. Section 4.2.6 presents the empirical analysis 
and discusses the results. Section 4.2.7 outlines the conclusion and limitations with suggestion 
for further research. 
4.2.2 Accountabilities of Islamic banks 
    Hasan and Siti-Nabiha (2010) argue that, issues regarding with accountability in IBs needs 
further research. Consequently, there is a need for good accountability practices in IBs as they 
are viewed as public trusts, existing for the benefit of society. A central Muslim belief is that 
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Allah will account for everything on Judgment Day and every individual will be held accountable 
for what he did and whether their actions were in keeping with Sharia  or not. Allah has 
mentioned in Quran, every person will ask to account for their actions on the Day of Judgment: 
“And stop them; indeed, they are to be questioned.”(Quran, 37:24) and said “So by your Lord, We will surely 
question them all, about what they used to do” (Quran, 15:92-93). Accountability is the core basis for the 
Muslims as well as for Islamic system and all relationships within any Islamic society must 
consider this concept (Aljirari, 1996). 
    Emdadul (2010) confirms the concept of accountability in Islam in the following statement: 
“Accountability to Allah for all activities is vital to a Muslim's faith. Sharia specifies how business 
may conduct, organized and governed. Under Islam, the paramount rule in business is honesty, 
just measurement and fair dealing with the customers; such obligations impose a responsibility 
on the business community to adhere to moral accountability under Islam” (p.26). Samuel and 
Stewart (2009) point to the consequence of forming sustainable accountability. They add that 
most of thinkers consider that there is no sustainable accountability; they are far from the reality 
because they were looking for enforced accountability and they ignore accountability that comes 
from deep belief as moral and ethics. Lewis (2006) argues, “Accountability to God and the 
community for all activities is paramount to a Muslim’s faith” (p.2). Al-Humaidhi (1999) states 
the mainstream of accountability in Islam addressed on two levels. First level is where every 
person is accountable for his actions. The second level comprises the accountability for 
individual and objects under their charge. Therefore, accountability of IBs is located under the 
second level through accountability towards all stakeholders. This accountability can achieve and 
deliver by disclosure in annual reports and website. The concept of disclosure therefore 
connected with the concept of accountability: In an Islamic context, the Ummah (nation) has the 
right to know how corporations that are part of the Ummah affect its well-being (Maali et al., 
2006). The accountability to disclose the truth is a very significant issue in the Islamic context, 
and this accountability applies to businesses (IBs) as much as to individuals. Importance of 
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disclosure highlighted in the Quran as Askary and Clarke (1997) argue that six verses of the 
Quran refer to relevance; one meaning of the relevance referred to is disclosure of all facts.  
    Disclosure is a crucial aspect of the accountability function of IBs to its stakeholders. 
Therefore, it is required that IBs disclose as much information in a succinct, truthful and 
comprehensible method to its stakeholders. From an Islamic perspective, the key purpose of 
corporate reporting that overrides other objectives is to allow Islamic enterprises to show their 
compliance with Sharia and serving the society (Baydoun and Willett, 2000). The consequence of 
this objective is that IBs have a responsibility to disclose all information essential to its 
stakeholders about their operations (Maali et al., 2006). Full disclosure about all accountabilities 
for IBs derived from the divine duty of accountability that each Muslim bears. However, this is 
not to say that Allah needs to know through disclosure the activities of the IBs. Indeed, Allah 
knows and hears everything and is Omniscient: ‘I know what you reveal and I know what you hide’ 
(Quran, 4:33). ‘He knows what is manifest and He knows what is hidden’ (Quran, 96:7). IBs have a duty 
to disclose their compliance with Sharia to stakeholders.  
  Based on the Islamic values, profit maximization may not be the only target of IFIs (Ali et al., 
2012).  According to Hameed and Yahya (2003), IBs as an Islamic business institution is required 
not only to report its economic performance but also its Sharia compliance, social concern and 
environment concern to its stakeholders. Stakeholders expected to have wider objectives 
covering Sharia; social value; ethical conduct as well as financial, which are a necessary part of 
their value proposition (Warde, 2013). The perception of disclosure from an Islamic approach is 
based on two general requirements: the concept of social accountability that contains Sharia and 
social disclosure and the full disclosure concept that focus on financial disclosure as well as 
Sharia and social (Baydoun and Willett, 2000). Haniffa and Hudaib (2002) claimed that the full 
disclosure of applicable and reliable information may support external users in making both 
economic and religious decisions, in addition to assisting management in achieving their 
accountability to God; society and all other stakeholders. Based on Maali debating and based on 
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our survey Quran and Sunna, IBs has three accountabilities (SSF) which can be achieved through 
disclosure. Disclose these accountabilities is guided to satisfy Allah first and all stakeholders. In 
the following section, we explore the 3 kind of accountabilities as follows:    
Sharia Accountability: In the context of Islam, the originally and the key aim of IFIs’ reporting 
is to show that their activities complies with Sharia principles (Baydoun and Willet, 2000). 
Hameed (2001) claimed that the disclosure of Sharia compliance is one of the essential Islamic 
accounting purposes. Therefore, this information may disclose, even though it may not require 
mandatory. The information about Sharia compliance is similar to that in the SSB report. The 
need of Sharia compliance becomes progressively significant to bridge the gap between models 
and practice (Sarea and Hanefah, 2013). To make sure that the religious prospects of those who 
deal with IBs have been met, IBs appoint Sharia Supervisory Boards (SSB) (Daoud, 1996). They 
issue a report to the users confirming that the bank has adhered to Sharia (Karim, 1995). The 
accountabilities of SSB comprise ex ante and ex post auditing of transactions, the calculation and 
payment of Zakat and counselling the bank on its accounting polices (Karim, 1995). This board 
provides the essential assurance for those who deal with IBs that their religious expectations 
have been met. SSB report is the main source for all stakeholders about achieving Sharia 
accountability for IBs. Disclosure by the SSB may be seen as a crucial aspect of accountability by 
the IBs to its stakeholders (Mallinb et al., 2014).  
Social Accountability: Corporations expected to communicate their actions towards CSR to 
their broad range of stakeholders (Golob and Bartlett, 2007). CSR Reporting mainly considered 
as one of the main approaches firms use to make the public aware of their CSR activities (Said et 
al., 2009). Several studies have used CSR disclosure as a proxy for corporate social performance 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002; Gray et al., 2001). CSR reporting in this sense based on Gray et al 
(1995) is “... extends the accountability of organisations, beyond the traditional role of providing 
a financial account to owners of capital, in particular shareholders” (p.3). IFIs promote a social 
and ethical identity and the promotion of social welfare and justice are significant to IBs as part 
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of their CSR (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). As trustees, man is accountable for God other 
creations, and will be accountable for his actions in the hereafter (Maali et al., 2006). Therefore, 
in Islam, man’s accountability comprises accountability to the community and the environment. 
Thus, the companies are accountable to the society (Baydoun and Willett, 2000) hence; they may 
disclose information, which can help discharge this accountability. From the Islamic perspective, 
CSR revolves on the concept of ultimate accountability to God where human beings are 
regarded as ‘khalifah’ (vicegerent) and are predictable to relate with other humans in order to 
take care of the natural environment entrusted to them (e.g., Abbasi et al., 2012; Farook et al., 
2011). The philosophy of Islamic CSR is diverse from conventional CSR where CSR in Islam 
motivated not only on the economic perception but also incorporates the spiritual values as 
derived from Quran and Sunna. Therefore, it expects that IBs may disclose information about 
their roles towards society. CSR report is the ideal segment in the annual report to assist firms to 
satisfy their social accountability.    
Financial Accountability: Assessing the decision makers in stakeholders making of economic 
decisions is a secondary goal from the Islamic viewpoint, whereas in the Western model, 
achieving the financial accountability and maximizing the profit considered the primary objective 
(Muwazir et al., 2006). IBs, similar to other financial firm, expected to respond to their crucial 
stakeholders through good financial and governance performance (Belal et al., 2014). The main 
objective of financial reporting is to provide information about the financial strength, 
performance and fluctuations in financial position of an enterprise that is valuable to a wide 
range of users in making economic decisions. Therefore, corporations are responsible for 
publishing their financial reports for the benefit of stakeholders (Gray et al., 1992). Financial 
disclosure is very significant to whole stakeholders; it provides them with the essential 
information to diminish uncertainty and support them to make appropriate economic and 
financial decisions. The annual reports published by corporations considered one of the most 
significant sources of information to outsiders (Betosan, 1997). However, as the uniqueness of 
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IBs that required more financial disclosure about their operations, we expected that the financial 
statements for these banks would contain additional statements of Zakat and Qard Hassan. 
Therefore, in this research the accountability concept is means the responsibilities towards Allah, 
society, stockholders and other stakeholders. In this research, it explores these accountabilities 
for IBs through measuring how IBs discloses information that concerned with these 
accountabilities by annual reports and websites. The disclosure about IBs’ accountabilities 
contains Sharia; social and financial accountability. Sharia disclosure accountability is means that 
the level of disclosure about compliance with Sharia through SSBR as well as Sharia compliance 
indicators in the completely annual report’ sections. The social disclosure is reflects for what 
extent the banks serving society as well as paying Zakat and Qard Hassan based on CSR and 
social statements in the whole annual report’ sections. Finally; financial disclosure accountability 
is means for what extent the financial statements and financial performance reflect all financial 
information for stakeholders        
4.2.3 Hypotheses Development 
4.2.3.1 Profitability 
   For further debating about the association between disclosure and profitability, reviews section 
4.1.4.1.4. This study formulates the first hypothesis as follows:  
H2.1 There is no association between profitability and levels of disclosure  
4.2.3.2 Size 
For further debating about the association between disclosure and firm size; reviews section 
4.1.4.1.3. This study formulates the second hypothesis as follows: 
H2.2 There is a positive association between firm size and levels of disclosure  
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4.2.3.3 Leverage  
Based on the agency theory, Xiao et al (2004) argue that increased disclosure can reduce debt 
holders’ inclinations to price-protect against transfers from themselves to stockholders. 
Debreceny and Rahman (2005) find that increases in the debt-equity ratio create agency costs. 
Therefore, corporate managers are report more voluntary information to assist creditors to 
monitor continually the affairs of the corporation and help them evaluate the ability of the firm 
to pay its obligations on time. Managers tend to provide more information in order to send a 
good signal to debt holders regarding the corporate ability to meet its obligations. Empirical 
evidence on the association between leverage and disclosure is mixed. While, Elshandidy (2011); 
Taylor et al (2010); Marshall and Weetman (2007); Barako et al (2006) found a positive 
relationship, Rajab and Schachler (2009); Abraham and Cox (2007) found insignificant 
association. Related to banking industry; Sharma (2014) found a significant positive correlation 
existed between disclosures and leverage. The third hypothesis is  
H2.3 Highly Leverage IBs is more likely to disclose more information compared with 
Low Leverage IBs  
4.2.3.4 Auditor Size  
   For further debating about the association between disclosure and auditor size; reviews 
section 4.1.4.1.1. This study formulates the fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H2.4 The extent level of disclosure is larger for IBs that audited by one of the Big4 Audit 
firms   
4.2.3.5 Accounting standards (AAOIFI) 
Accounting standards used to produce comparable and reliable accounting information to 
support investors, creditors and all stakeholders to make investment decisions. The adoption of 
IFRS improves transparency, disclosure and comparability (Biddle and Saudagaran, 1989). The 
higher disclosure requirements and financial reporting quality that stem from IFRS implies that 
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the adoption of IFRS gives a positive indicator to investors as information asymmetry and 
agency costs tend to diminish (Tarca, 2004). Besar et al (2009) claim that one of the main tools to 
enhance the Islamic banking industry is adopting Islamic standards which can effect on the 
disclosure and transparency levels for IFI. Therefore, the fifth hypothesis of the study 
H2.5 There is an association between levels of disclosure and adopting  AAOIFI 
4.2.3.6 Internal Sharia auditing department (ISAD) 
For further debating about the association between disclosure and ISAD; reviews section 
4.1.4.1.5. This study formulates the sixths hypothesis as follows: 
H2.6 The extent of disclosure levels is associated with existing ISAD inside IBs 
4.2.3.7 Control Variables 
     To address the issues related to the omitted correlated variables, our models have a 
comprehensive list of control variables. First, this study control age of the bank. Majority of 
studies found association between firm age and disclosure (e.g., Rahman et al., 2011; Haniffa and 
Cooke, 2002). Second, this study control ownership. Eng and Mak, 2003 argue that, private 
companies’ disclosure is less transparent, because they face less market demand for it. Third, this 
study controls the riskiness. Managers may publish more information in order to diminish 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders (Elshandidy et al., 2013). Company with 
high-risk levels will try to increase disclosure to reduce uncertainties among stockholders 
implying a better evaluation of risk by market (Hassan, 2009). Fourth, our models have a list of 
variables to control differences between countries as our research explores accountabilities of 
IBs across 23 countries. The national culture is an institutional factor that influences on 
companies choices regarding financial reporting and disclosure level (Hope, 2003). Hofstede 
(2001) recommends four dimensions that have been used widely in prior accounting research to 
examine the impact of culture on accounting practices and disclosure (e.g., Doupnik and 
Tsakumis, 2004). These dimensions, defined in Table 25. Regarding disclosure practices, 
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Zarzeski (1996) hypothesises and finds that all of Hofstede’ dimensions have a significant impact 
on disclosure. Gray (1988) hypothesized financial disclosures in different countries would be 
influenced negatively through cultural. Wong (2012) argues that one of the most influential cultural 
dimensions that may affect disclosure is uncertainty avoidance. Ahmed and Courtis (1999) argue that 
differences in disclosure levels could be due to differences in socio economic and political 
environments between countries. Hence, this study uses legal system as one of the control 
variable. Dobler et al (2011) suggest that legal system may affect disclosure quality and its 
determinants in common and civil law systems or other law (Sharia law). Dong and Stettler (2011) 
find significant impacts of both legal system and cultural values on aggregated disclosure. It also 
controls GDP Growth (Andres and Vallelado, 2009). It also added for our model other variables, 
which are full adoption of AAOIFI from central banks as Sudan, and Bahrain that make 
AAOIFI is mandatory for all Islamic banks; Role of central Bank for Sharia supervision as 
Malaysia which has central SSB that control Sharia compliance for all IBs; Islamization system; 
Corruption Index and Literacy rate.  
Table 25: Hofstede Model dimensions and scores for our selected countries  
Country Culture Hofstede dimensions 
Power 
distance 
Individualism Masculinity Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
1. UK  35 89 66 35 
2. UAE  90 25 50 80 
3. Pakistan  55 14 50 70 
4. Yemen  85 35 65 66 
5. Egypt  70 25 45 80 
6. Bahrain  87 30 55 75 
7. Qatar  85 45 60 80 
8. Sudan  80 38 53 68 
9. Kuwait  90 25 40 80 
10. Srilanka  80 35 10 45 
11. Jordan  70 30 45 65 
12. Malaysia  100 26 50 36 
13. KSA  95 25 60 80 
14. Thailand  64 20 34 64 
15. Bangladesh  80 20 55 60 
16. Syria  80 35 52 60 
17. Brunei  80 39 52 64 
18. Lebanon  75 40 65 50 
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19. Palestine  85 35 65 66 
20. Kenya  70 25 60 50 
21. Oman  85 35 56 66 
22. Iraq  95 30 45 85 
23. Philippine  94 32 64 44 
Power distance, which is the extent to which power is distributed equally within a society and the degree to which society 
accepts this distribution, from relatively equal to extremely unequal 
Individualism, which is the degree to which individuals base their actions on self-interest versus the interests of group 
Masculinity, which is a measure of a society's goal orientation: a masculine culture emphasises status derived from 
wages and position; a feminine culture emphasises human relations and quality of life 
Uncertainty avoidance, which is the degree to which individuals in a country prefer structured over unstructured 
situations, from relatively flexible to extremely rigid, to cope with risk and innovation; a low uncertainty culture 
emphasises a higher level of standardisation (Hofstede, 2005) http://geert-hofstede.com/countries.html  
4.2.4 Research Design  
This study examines reporting by 117 IBs across 23 countries. It explores for what extent 
disclosure of IBs is reflect the holistic accountabilities based on Sharia and AAOIFI standard as a 
benchmark for any IFIs. It explores SSF accountabilities in all sections that reported in the 
annual reports as well as websites. Thus, our research divided into two stages. The first stage 
measuring the accountability disclosure related to SSF in a specific section that reflect these 
accountabilities which are SSBR; CSR and financial statement. The second stage is measuring the 
three disclosure accountabilities in all sections in the annual report. In this stage, it explores SSF 
disclosure vision and mission; CEO statement and strategy report. Consequently, the study 
testing 8 models which related to disclosure about SSBR; CSR; financial; aggregate; total Sharia; 
total social; total financial and holistic disclosure. For this purpose, the study uses content 
analysis 25 to explore if certain themes related to Sharia; social and financial accountability are 
present or absent from annual reports and websites. Haniffa and Hudaib (2004) state that 
disclosure in annual reports and other media such as the websites are key venues for banks to 
demonstrate that their activities are in line with Sharia. This study conducts a pilot study on a 
sample of 30 IBs for 2011-2013. Based on t-test; the finding shows insignificant differences 
25 The use of content analysis techniques in research into corporate disclosure used based on manual scoring (e.g. 
Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Santema et al., 2005). The disclosure index is unweight and assumes that each item of 
disclosure is equally important (Gray et al., 1995). The preference for using the un-weighted approach is to avoid the 
subjectivity involved in assigning the weights of importance to items by different user groups (Raffournier, 1995; 
Cooke, 1991).  
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between the three years (sig 0.392 which is > 0.05 for Sharia); (sig 0.367 which is > 0.05 for 
social) and (sig 0.263 which is > 0.05 for financial).  
4.2.4.1 Sample selection and Data collection 
   This study uses Bankers databases for the sample selection in additional to central banks for 
most of countries that provide Islamic banking services at 23 countries. The chosen banks 
selected based on banks with 100% compliance with Sharia. The selected banks chosen also 
based on availability of the least three annual reports and it may be publishing by Arabic or 
English. Thus, this study excluded IBs in Iran (17) and in Turkey (4) as they do not have the SSB, 
which represent one of our main pillars for our accountability framework. It excluded 
subsidiaries from our sample (19) and we exclude 13 banks that different languages publish their 
annual reports not available or it. Therefore, this study collect data for 117 IBs from 23 countries 
namely Bahrain, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jordan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Sudan, Syria, UAE, Egypt; Yemen; Brunei; Lebanon; Iraq; Philippines; Kenya; Palestine; 
Thailand; Srilanka and UK. The variables concerned with countries as GDP and legal system 
collected from World Bank database and United Nations database. The dimensions related to 
culture collected from Hofstede Green centre and variables of firm-characteristics collected from 
annual report and banker database    
4.2.4.2 Construction disclosure indices with assessing the validity and reliability 
  The benchmark for accountability is pragmatic and takes into account the different secular 
effects facing IBs. However, this does not prevent them from disclosing our suggested items on 
a voluntary basis, even if they not required by regulation. The benchmark is contracted based on 
manly AAOIFI standards that is related to accounting; governance issues and previous studies 
that explore Sharia; social and financial accountability for IBs. As AAOIFI is construct based on 
Sharia. Therefore, compliance level reflects compliance with Sharia basics more than compliance 
with AAOIFI requirements. Related to validity and reliability issues, it examined the items of the 
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indices and decided what that specific item was intended to measure (Beattie et al., 2004). This 
study developed the dimensions of our SSBR; CSR and financial indices based on standards for 
IFIs issued by AAOIFI (mainly) and the previous literature (secondary). For testing reliability; 
the preceding studies argues that content analysis is not considered reliable if it is conducted only 
once or only by one specific person (Neuendorf, 2002). Hence the following procedures were 
undertaken to construct our three indices as well as sure about validity and reliability issues as 
follows: First: it adopting the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI governance standards No. 1; 2 
and5 that reflect the Sharia  accountability based on SSB report and SSB members. It also adopts 
the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI financial standards No.1 that focusing on the 
presentation and disclosure of financial statements that reflect the financial accountability of IBs. 
Finally, we adopt AAOIFI governance standard No.7 that guide IFI for social accountability 
based on CSR report. The researcher reviews the least available edition for AAOIFI, which is 
2010 and 2014. This study modifying disclosure indices based on literature review that measuring 
Sharia; social and financial for IBs (e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Rashid et al., 2013; Kamla and Rammal, 
2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Ullah and Jamali, 2010; Williams and 
Zinkin, 2010; Besar et al., 2009; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Mohammed, 2007; Maali et al., 2006). 
This study also surveys Quran and Sunna to observe the main themes for compliance with Sharia 
accountability towards Allah and for social activities. Based on this survey, we get some items 
that the annual report for IFIs may contains and disclose as Zakat and Qard Hassan. Third: this 
study reviews our three indices with three academics and three professional to enhance the 
validity for the study’ results.  
   Initially, a scoring sheet, which included 229 items required to disclose by AAOIFI in 
additional to discussions with four independent researchers as well as reviews the previous 
studies was constructed. Then, to ensure the content validity of the initial research instrument, 
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two other researchers reviewed it independently 26 . After receiving their comments and 
suggestions, any remaining ambiguities discussed with a fourth experienced academic. To ensure 
the reliability of the research instrument, the author and the two independent researchers scored 
five randomly selected banks. Then, the findings of the three researchers compared. Given that 
all investigators had agreed the final research instrument, differences in the compliance scores 
across the investigators were not significant as shown in Table 26. The final disclosure checklist 
shown in Table 27 
Table 26: Ensuring validity of research instrument 
Standards 
 
Items suggested 
by the author 
Items suggested by 
independent researcher 
Items suggested by second 
independent researcher 
Final index (after 4th 
person's advice) 
Weight27 
FSIFI.1 120 105 100 114 49% 
GSIFI.1; 2 and 5 25 20 15 20 9% 
GSIFI.7 100 100 94 95 42% 
Total  245 225 209 229 100% 
 
Table 27: Holistic Disclosure Checklist  
 Main Dimensions   Sources 
Sh
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Names of Sharia board members 
T
ot
al
  I
te
m
s 2
0 
  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Rashid et al., 
2013; AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Brief about each members in the Sharia board 
(Background and qualifications)  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Ghayad, 2008; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; 
Aribi and Gao, 2012; AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Numbers of board members Maali et al., 2006 
Pictures of the board members Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Rashid et al., 2013 
The administration position for the Sharia board 
in the organization structure  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007 
The role and responsibilities of the board IFSB, 2006, Ghayad, 2008; AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010 
The authorities of the board AAOIFI, 2014; Ghayad, 2008; Vinnicombe, 2010 
The Sharia auditing department in the bank AAOIFI, 2014; IFSB, 2006; Shafiia et al., 2014; Besar et al., 2009 
The account of board’s meeting Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Rashid et al., 
2013 
Is the website or annual report disclose the 
Fatwas for the Sharia board related to Islamic 
services  
Aribi and Gao, 2012; AAOIFI, 2014 
26 Content validity indicates whether the instrument ‘adequately measures the concept of interest’ (Vlachos, 2001) 
(compliance with disclosure requirements). It is usually established when the items which are supposed to measure 
the concept are evaluated by a group of expert judges to ensure that they in fact do so (Kidder and Judd, 1986). This 
is a common approach supported by Camfferman and Cooke (2002). 
27 The weight calculated based on final items for each standard dividend into total items (229). For example: weight 
of FSIFI.1 = 114/229*100= 49% 
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Is the website disclose the board’s role for 
spreading the awareness about the Islamic 
banking thoughts  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Hassan and Harahap, 2010 
SSB report assigned from the board members Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Rashid et 
al., 2013; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013  
Information about the bank’s responsibilities of 
Zakat  
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Farook 
et al., 2011; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
Information about the bank’s responsibilities of  
activities not comply with Sharia and how the 
bank deal with it 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et 
al., 2003; Sofyan, 2003; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Vinnicombe, 2010; 
Kasim et al., 2013 
Information about how profit distribution process 
in the bank comply with Islamic Sharia  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Sofyan, 2003; Hassan and 
Harahap, 2010; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
Information about the independency of the Sharia 
board with charter shows the objectivity of the 
board 
AAOIFI, 2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Information about opinion for the board about 
completely compliance of the bank with the rules 
of Islamic Sharia 
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et 
al., 2003; Aribi and Gao, 2012; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
The board discloses its opinion after reviewing all 
documents and all financial statements for the 
bank 
AAOIFI, 2014; Rashid et al., 2013; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Aribi 
and Gao, 2012 
Is the report shows that the bank comply with 
the AAOIFI’s standards 
AAOIFI, 2014 
Information about the date of report  and name 
of bank  
AAOIFI, 2014; Vinnicombe, 2010; Kasim et al., 2013 
So
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Employee welfare  
T
ot
al
  I
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m
s 9
5 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; Hassan 
and Harahap, 2010; Farook et al., 2011; Farook, 2007; Rashid et al., 
2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Internal  environment preservation policy  Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007) Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla 
and Rammal, 2013;  Maali et al., 2003; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; 
Farook et al., 2011; Farook, 2007 
Earning and expenditure prohibited by sharia AAOIFI, 2014; Farook, 2007; Rashid et al., 2013 
Par Excellence customers services   AAOIFI, 2014; Farook, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Late repayments and insolvent clients and 
avoiding onerous terms  
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et 
al., 2003; Farook et al., 2011; Rashid et al., 2013 
Qard Hassan  Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; 
Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Farook, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Micro and small business and social saving and 
investments and Development   
AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Farook, 2007 
Screening and informing clients for compliance 
with Islamic principles 
 AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Farook, 2007; Aribi and 
Gao, 2012 
Zakat  Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006;  AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla 
and Rammal, 2013; Maali et al., 2003; Farook et al., 2011; Farook, 
2007; Rashid et al., 2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Charitable activates  Belal, 2001; Maali, et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007;  AAOIFI, 
2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Farook et 
al., 2011; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
Waqf management AAOIFI, 2014; Farook, 2007 
Social responsibility OECD, 2011; AAOIFI, 2014; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Maali et al., 
2003; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Farook, 2007; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
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Comparative financial statements  
T
ot
al
  I
te
m
s 1
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IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Basic information about  the bank  IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014; Sofyan, 2003 
Disclosure of the currency used for accounting 
measurement   
IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of significant accounting policies IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of earning or expenditure prohibited 
by sharia 
AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; Sofyan, 2003; Farook et al., 2011 
Disclosure about assets and liabilities’ risk  IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of contingences IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure of accounting policy changes  IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Presentation and disclosure in the Financial 
Position  
IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Presentation and disclosure in the Income 
Statement 
IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Disclosure in the statement of Cash Flows IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity   IFRS, 2014; AAOIFI, 2014 
Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments   AAOIFI, 2014; Sofyan, 2003 
Disclosure in the Statement of Sources and Uses 
of funds of  Zakat and Sadakat  
Maali et al., 2006; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; Sofyan, 2003; 
Aribi and Gao, 2012; Vinnicombe, 2010 
Disclosure in the statement  of sources and uses 
of funds, Loan Fund (Qard Hassan Fund)  
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; AAOIFI, 2014; Maali et al., 2003; Sofyan, 
2003; Aribi and Gao, 2012 
4.2.4.3 Research models  
    To investigate the relationship between accountability pillars (Sharia; social; financial and 
aggregate) and firm-specific characteristics, we use the following OLS regressions: 
Panel A: The dependent variable in the following model is focus on the specific indices that are 
SSB; CSR; Financial statements and aggregate disclosure as follows:  
𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 𝒊𝒊 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽10𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽11𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽12𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽14𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽15𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽17𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽18𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽19𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒                                                                                      (2) 
Panel B: The dependent variable is focus on the all sections in the annual report. Consequently, 
it contains Sharia ; social; financial and holistic in all sections which are vision; mission; CEO 
statement; Management report; strategy report and governance report in additional to CSR; 
SSBR and financial statements.   
168 
 
𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻𝑻 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫 𝒊𝒊 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽4𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽8𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽9𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽10𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽11𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽13𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽14𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽16𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽17𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽18𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +   𝛽𝛽19𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 +  𝑒𝑒                                                          (3) 
   Where DISCLOSE it is the disclosure provided by Disclosure Indices, which measures the 
level of disclosure of SSBR (1); CSR (2); financial statements (3); aggregate (4). Where Total 
DISCLOSE i is the disclosure provided by Disclosure Indices, which measures total Sharia 
disclosure (5); Total social disclosure (6); Total financial disclosure (7) and Holistic aggregate (8) 
in Islamic bank (i). All variables described in Table 28. The disclosure score for each model 
calculated as a ratio of the total items disclosed to 20 (maximum score for Sharia) for model 1; 
114 (maximum score for financial) for model 2; 95 (maximum score for social) for model 3 and 
229 (maximum score for aggregate disclosure) for model 4. It also calculated for 20 items in 
additional to any words or sentences related to Sharia for model 5; 95 items plus any words or 
sentences related to social for model 6; 114 items plus any words or sentences related to financial 
for model 7 and 229 items plus any words or sentences related to SSF for model 8. 
Table 28: Models specification and variables measurements 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Variable description Predicted 
sign 
Data source 
Dependent variable   
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑈𝑈𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  Disclosure 
level 
Sharia disclosure accountability level based on SSB report   Annual reports and 
Website based on 
indices related to 
AAOIFI standards 
requirements   
 
Social disclosure accountability level based on CSR report  
Financial disclosure accountability level based on FS and footnotes  
Total disclosure accountability level based on SSB; CSR and FS  
Sharia disclosure accountability based on all annual report’s sections  
Social disclosure accountability based on all annual report’s sections 
Financial disclosure accountability based on all annual report’s 
sections 
Total disclosure accountability based on all annual report’s sections 
The annual report sections contain 5 sections which are: Vision; Mission; Values and Objectives; Chairman’ Statement and 
CEO’ Statement; Directors’ Report; Strategy Report and Corporate Governance Report 
Firm-Level Independent variables 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Standards 1=Bank that use AAOIFI; 0=Bank that use IFRS or Local 
standards  
+ Annual report 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Auditor 1=Bank’s financial statements were audited by Big 4 auditor; 
0=Bank’s financial statements were not audited by Big 4 auditor 
+ Annual report 
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𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Size The natural log of total assets + Annual report 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Profitability  Return on assets (ROA)
28 + Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Leverage  Total liabilities (Debts)/Total assets + Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Sharia 
Auditing 
department 
1=Bank that has Sharia auditing department; 0=Bank that has not 
Sharia auditing department 
+ Annual report 
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Ownership 1= Publicly-held Islamic bank; 0= Privately-owned Islamic bank  + Annual report 
Control  variables related to country 
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Risk 
Adequacy 
Tier 1 capital   Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Ownership  1= public Islamic banks; otherwise=0 Annual report 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Age Age of bank from the foundation date  Annual report 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Hofstede 
Culture 
dimensions 
Power distance 
Individualism 
Masculinity  
Uncertainty avoidance 
Hofstede green centre 
database 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Country legal 
System 
1 = Sharia Law; 0 = Other non-Sharia Law (e.g. Civil Law, 
Common Law, or Hybrid Law) 
World Bank 
Database  
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Full adoption 
for AAOIFI 
1 = Full adoption of AAOIFI; 0 = Not full adoption of AAOIFI Central banks 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Role of central 
Bank for SSB 
1 = Countries where the central bank has Central SSB; 0 = 
Countries where the central bank doesn't have Central SSB  
Central banks 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Islamization 
system 
1 = Complete Islamic banking system; 0 = Non-complete Islamic 
banking system 
World Bank 
Database  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 GDP GDP growth rate  World Bank 
Database  
𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 Corruption 
Index 
% of Corruption level for each county  World Bank 
Database  
4.2.5 Disclosure levels with accountability’ pillars Indices  
The following Table (29) shows the average disclosure level for SSBR. It shows that, average 
disclosure level is 53% which not consisting with our expectation that assumes that IBs may be 
disclose information about compliance with Sharia. The Table indicates that the disclosure about 
names of SSBM is higher than any other item (74%). It shows the lowest item is the information 
about the independency of SSB (10%). The report also states that 58% of selected banks 
published signed SSBR. The Table also shows that only 25% from selected banks disclose 
information about fatwas (Sharia opinions) which issued by SSB as a signal for all stakeholders 
28 Consistent with prior studies, this study uses return on asset (ROA) to proxy for the profitability of IFIs as it 
better reflects performance (Debreceny and Rahman, 2005). 
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that the whole bank activities are consist with Sharia. The Table shows that only 39% have 
internal SAD. Our result (53%) is consistent with Hassan and Harahap (2010) who found that 
the average disclosure for banks related to SSB was 53%. However, 53% is not consisting with 
other studies that conclude high disclosure about Sharia as Vinnicombe (2010) who finds a high 
level of disclosure (90 %) with SSB requirements. Aribi and Gao (2012) concluded that 
disclosure about SSB is more than 90% for 21 IFIs. The average index scores indicate that Syria 
has the highest score of 78% followed by Palestine and Jordan 70% and 68% respectively.  
Table 30 shows that the average disclosure level of CSR index is 28%. It finds that the social 
responsibility in screening its investments dimension generally scores highly across all banks 
whilst the social responsibility in its relationship with customers and clients is generally scores 
the lowest. The highest disclosure score related to whole CSR index is Charitable activates which 
is 44%. The lowest disclosure scores are Waqf management and late repayments in additional to 
Qard Hassan (1%; 1% and 8% respectively). Overall, Table 30 shows low disclosure level related 
to CSR (28%). This finding is consistent with studies that found low disclosure level about CSR 
(e.g., Hasan, 2008 (23%); Farook et al (2011) (17%); Abdul Rahman et al (2010) (8%); Maali et al 
(2006) (13%). In addition, our result (28%) is low comparing with other studies that find 
disclosure about CSR is high in IBs (e.g., Abdul Rahman and Bukair (2013) (83%); Hassan et al 
(2012) (49%); Farag et al., 2014 (44%)). The average index score indicates that Jordan has the 
highest score of 47% then followed by Bangladesh and Kuwait 43% and 38% respectively. Iraq 
and Philippine (15% and 16% respectively) are the lowest countries 
Table 29: Compliance level based on SSBR index  
Items related to SSB members % * 
1 Names of Sharia board members 74% 
2 Brief about each members in the board 35% 
3 Numbers of board members 47% 
4 Pictures of the board members 25% 
5 The administration position for the board in the organization structure  37% 
6 The role and responsibilities of the board 53% 
7 The authorities of the board 63% 
8 The Sharia auditing department in the bank 39% 
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9 The account of board’s meeting 17% 
10 Is the website for the bank contain the Fatwas for the Sharia board related to Islamic services  25% 
11 Is the website disclose the board’s role for spreading the awareness about the Islamic banking thoughts  40% 
Items related to SSB report %* 
1 The SSB report assigned from the board members 58% 
2 Information about the bank’s responsibilities of Zakat  49% 
3 Information about the bank’s responsibilities of  activities not comply with Sharia and how the bank deal with it 42% 
4 Information about how profit distribution process in the bank comply with Islamic Sharia  48% 
5 Information about the independency of the Sharia board with charter shows the objectivity of the board 10% 
6 Information about opinion for the board about completely compliance of the bank with the rules of Islamic Sharia 62% 
7 The board discloses its opinion after reviewing all documents and all financial statements for the bank 60% 
8 Is the report shows that the bank comply with the AAOIFI’s Sharia standards 13% 
9 Information about the date of report (Period covered) and name of bank  58% 
Average disclosure for SSBR  53% 
* The un-weighted approach attaches equal weights to all disclosed items within the checklist. Therefore, if the item disclosed in the 
annual report it takes "1" otherwise it takes "0". The disclosure score for each accountability level calculated as a ratio of the total items 
disclosed to 20. The level of disclosure (%) is measured for each bank as the ratio of the score obtained to the maximum possible score 
(20) relevant for that company (this methodology was first proposed by Cooke (1989) 
 
Table 30: Compliance level based on CSR index  
   Table 31 shows full disclosure about financial position statement and statement of 
comprehensive income (100%) and very high disclose about Statement of Cash Flows (98%) and 
88% related to Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity. However, the Table shows low 
disclosure level about other statements, which related to Islamic identification that include 
statement of Zakat; Qard Hassan and changes in Restricted Investments (11%; 8% and 4% 
respectively). We notice that Yemen has the highest score of 83% followed by Syria and UAE 70% 
Dimensions of Holistic Islamic CSR Disclosure % 
A. Social responsibility within the organization   28% 
A1. Employee welfare 33% 
A2. Internal  environment preservation policy  26% 
A3. Earning and expenditure prohibited by sharia 26% 
B. Social responsibility in its relationship with customers and clients   16% 
B4.Par Excellence customers services   40% 
B5.Late repayments and insolvent clients and avoiding onerous terms  1% 
B6. Qard Hassan  8% 
C. Social responsibility in screening its investments   43% 
C7.  Micro and small business and social saving and investments and Development   40% 
C8. Screening and informing clients for compliance with Islamic principles 34% 
D. Social responsibility in its relationship with greater society  27% 
D9. Zakat  26% 
D10. Charitable activates  44% 
D11. Waqf management 1% 
D12. Social responsibility 35% 
Average over all disclosure level 28% 
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and 69% respectively. The average score indicate that Lebanon and Philippine (49% for both) 
are the lowest countries  
Table 31: Compliance level based on financial index 
Footnotes  % 
Comparative financial statements  100% 
Basic information about  the bank  100% 
Disclosure of the currency used for accounting measurement   100% 
Disclosure of significant accounting policies 80% 
Disclosure of earning or expenditure prohibited by sharia  14% 
Disclosure about assets and liabilities’ risk  65% 
Disclosure of contingences  30% 
Disclosure of accounting policy changes  50% 
Financial statements  % 
Presentation and disclosure in the Financial Position  100% 
Presentation and disclosure in the profit and loss account  100% 
Disclosure in the statement of Cash Flows 98% 
Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity   88% 
Statement of Changes in Restricted Investments   11% 
Disclosure in the Statement of Sources and Uses of funds of  Zakat and Sadakat 8% 
Disclosure in the statement  of sources and uses of funds, Loan Fund (Qard Hassan Fund) 4% 
Average over all disclosure level 62% 
   Table 32 illustrates the descriptive statistics of accountabilities indices scores across 23 counties 
in additional to the aggregate disclosure that contain all sections in the annual report. Figure 9 
shows the highest 10 country based on the disclosure levels. Table 33 summarize the disclosure 
level for the main five sections in the annual report that measuring for what extent reflecting the 
three Islamic accountability pillars. These sections comprise vision, mission and objectives CEO’ 
statement; directs’ report; strategy report and finally, CG report. Regarding to vision, mission 
and objectives, 75% of selected banks disclose information about Sharia accountability in their 
vision and mission; 45% about social accountability. Finally, it shows 100% missions and 
objectives related to financial issues as high return and enhancing services. The other sections in 
the annual report as CEO statement and CG report indicate high disclosure levels about 
financial accountability and low levels related to Sharia and social accountabilities. Table 33 
shows that, vision and mission is the highest section in the disclosure level (73%) then CG report 
and followed by CEO statement (62% and 56% respectively). 
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Figure 9: Islamic Accountability’ disclosure pillars across highest 10 countries 
 
Table 32: Final disclosure levels for countries related to accountability’ pillars  
 
Country  
 
No of 
banks  
Group A: Disclosure for SSB; CSR and 
Financial 
Group B: Holistic Disclosure 
(Aggregate) 
SSBR 
Index 
CSR 
Index 
Financial 
Index  
Average Sharia Social Financial Holistic 
Average 
UK  4 47% 19% 57% 41% 39% 20% 79% 46% 
UAE  8 52% 21% 69% 47% 39% 28% 85% 50% 
Pakistan  9 65% 31% 66% 54% 53% 34% 83% 56% 
Yemen  3 55% 20% 83% 53% 35% 17% 92% 48% 
Egypt  2 45% 29% 60% 45% 38% 24% 80% 48% 
Bahrain  15 62% 22% 63% 49% 48% 22% 82% 51% 
Qatar  6 52% 20% 66% 46% 37% 20% 83% 47% 
Sudan  11 45% 21% 66% 44% 25% 23% 83% 44% 
Kuwait  5 54% 38% 63% 52% 37% 27% 82% 49% 
Srilanka  1 65% 43% 49% 52% 53% 52% 75% 60% 
Jordan  4 68% 47% 68% 61% 54% 39% 84% 59% 
Malaysia  16 51 % 33% 62% 49% 38 % 24 % 81% 47 % 
KSA  5 43% 31% 66% 47% 49% 33% 83% 55% 
Thailand  1 40% 45% 52% 46% 60% 53% 76% 63% 
Bangladesh  9 59% 43% 66% 56% 50% 48% 83% 60% 
Syria  2 78% 22% 70% 57% 59% 16% 85% 54% 
Brunei  1 60% 38% 63% 54% 30% 19% 82% 44% 
Lebanon  2 38% 21% 49% 36% 29% 10% 75% 38% 
Palestine  2 70% 42% 69% 59% 55% 46% 85% 62% 
Kenya  2 43% 20% 54% 39% 32% 15% 78% 42% 
Oman  3 60% 20% 57% 46% 43% 33% 79% 52% 
Iraq 5 19% 15% 53% 29% 24% 22% 77% 41% 
Philippine  1 10% 16% 49% 25% 15% 28% 75% 39% 
Average  117 53% 28% 62% 48% 41% 28% 81% 50% 
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Table 33: Disclosure levels for all sections in the annual report 
   Hence, this study presents two groups from selected IBs to shows for what extent Vision and 
mission reflect Sharia; social and financial accountability. First group shows highly reflectance it 
is Sharia; social and financial accountabilities in their vision and mission. First National bank 
Modaraba at Pakistan stated in his mission “The fundamental Mission is to seek the pleasure of 
Allah” and mentioned, “Our main aim is attaining the rights of Allah”. Al-Arafah Islamic bank at 
Bangladesh stated “Achieving the satisfaction of Almighty Allah both here and hereafter is one 
of the main objectives”. Social Islamic bank at Bangladesh stated two objectives, which are, 
ensure best CSR practices and ensure Green Banking. Second group indicates sample from IBs’ 
vision and mission that not reflect Sharia and social accountabilities. All banks reflect financial 
accountability as Alliance Islamic Bank at Malaysia, which focus on customer services as a main 
vision and build sustainable financial performance as a main mission. Islamic bank of Britain 
mentioned that “Our Vision is to be the UK’ first choice Islamic bank”. Abu Dhabi Islamic bank 
state that “To become a top tier regional bank”. This Vision does not contain any guide for bank’ 
Sharia and social accountability. Bahrain Islamic Bank shows for what extent Islamic bank ignore 
state it’s accountability in their Vision and Mission as follows “To leverage our core 
competencies of customer intimacy, service, leadership and product innovation, in order to 
exceed the expectations of our stakeholders”. Table 34 shows examples for IBs that reflects low 
orientation towards the three accountabilities in their vision and mission. Table35 presents 
examples for banks that have highly refection about Sharia; social and financial accountability in 
vision and mission  
       
 Sharia 
Accountability 
Social  
Accountability 
Financial 
Accountability 
Average 
Vision; Mission; Values and Objectives 75%  45% 100% 73% 
Chairman’ Statement and CEO’ Statement  30%  38% 100% 56% 
Directors’ Report 25 %  22% 100% 49% 
Strategy Report 20 %  35% 100% 52% 
Corporate Governance Report 45%  40% 100% 62% 
Average  31% 28% 100% 53% 
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Table 34: Examples for IBs that reflect low disclosure about Islamic accountability  
Bank Vision Mission 
Alliance Islamic Bank, 
Malaysia29  
The best customer services 
bank  
To Build: Sustainable and Consistent Financial 
Performance; To Deliver: Superior Customer 
Experience and To deliver: Engaged Employees With 
The Right Values 
Islamic Bank of Britain, 
UK30 
To be the UK’s first choice 
Islamic bank 
-------------------- 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank, 
UAE31  
To become a top tier regional 
bank 
Islamic financial solutions for everyone 
Bahrain Islamic Bank, 
Bahrain32  
To be the best Sharia-
compliant financial solutions 
provider 
To leverage our core competencies of customer intimacy, 
service, leadership and product innovation, in order to 
exceed the expectations of our stakeholders 
Bank Alkhair, Bahrain33  To be a leading global 
provider of Sharia-compliant 
financial services 
-------------------- 
 
Table 35: Examples for IBs that reflect high disclosure about Islamic accountability  
Bank Vision Mission 
First National 
Bank 
Modaraba, 
Pakistan34 
Preserve to replace Riba driven instruments with Islamic 
modes of financing in a manner to achieve optimum 
customer satisfaction by developing relationship.  
To be an institution of excellence, which will create and 
maintain an environment of state-of-art management 
system and a high standard of integrity efficiency 
professionalism and innovation 
Attain the status of most professionally and profitability.  
Run Modaraba among its competitors. It shall place a 
special emphasis on human resources development, 
dignity, and security, welfare of people who operate and work 
for the Modaraba. 
The fundamental Mission is to seek the pleasure 
of Allah through making humble contribution in 
the transformation of our mercantile and financial 
system and business in accordance with the principles 
enshrined in the sharia commitments to provide 
Riba free investment and financing opportunities to the 
investors, the business community and industry in all 
business dealings of Modaraba, the rights of Allah, 
the rights of all certificate holders and all other rights 
shall be sincerely safeguarded 
Al-Arafah 
Islamic bank, 
Bangladesh35 
To be a pioneer in Islamic Banking in Bangladesh and 
contribute significantly to the growth of the national economy 
- Achieving the satisfaction of Almighty Allah 
both here and hereafter 
- Proliferation of Sharia Based Banking 
Practices. 
- Fast and efficient customer service; Maintaining high 
standard of business ethics. 
- Steady and competitive return on shareholders' 
equity; Innovative banking at a competitive price 
- Firm commitment to the growth of national economy; 
Involving more in Micro and SME  
Social Islamic Working together for a caring society - Fast, accurate and satisfactory customer 
29 http://www.allianceislamicbank.com.my/VisionMissionValues 
30 http://www.alrayanbank.co.uk/useful-info-tools/about-us/vision-and-values/ 
31 http://www.adib.ae/mission-objectives 
32 http://bisb.com/en/who-we-are/corporate-profile.html 
33 http://www.bankalkhair.com/ 
34 http://www.nbmodaraba.com/pg/?pid=2 
35 http://www.al-arafahbank.com/profile.php 
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bank limited, 
Bangladesh36 
service; Optimum return on shareholders’ 
equity 
- Introducing innovative Islamic Banking Products; 
Attract and retain high quality human resources 
- Empowering real poor families and creating 
local income opportunities 
- Providing support for social benefits 
organizations by way of social services 
CIHAN Bank 
for Islamic 
Investment and 
Finance, Iraq37  
To be a leading financial institution that provides fully-
fledged banking services compliant with Sharia 
to contribute in the development of the society. 
To translate Islamic financial principles into 
practical solutions that serve the human 
community 
Arab Islamic 
Bank, 
Palestine38 
The Bank works to establish the principle of dealing 
with the Islamic banking  system as a first option for 
dealing bank. It takes an active role in the advancement 
of the Islamic economic system to achieve the principle of 
solidarity and Social objectives. The Islamic Bank 
is committed to providing solutions and modern Islamic 
banking services with High quality and continuing to 
market and deepen the principles of Islamic economics locally 
and internationally.  
 
----------------------------- 
Qatar Islamic 
Bank, Qatar39  
A leading, innovative and global Islamic bank adhering 
to the highest Sharia and ethical principles; 
meeting international banking standards; partnering the 
development of the global economy and participating 
in the advancement of the society. 
- To provide innovative Sharia-compliant 
financial solutions and quality services to our 
customers; To maximize returns for our shareholders 
and partners. 
- To nurture an internal environment of qualified 
professionals and cutting-edge technology 
4.2.6 Results and discussion 
4.2.6.1 Descriptive Statistics of continuous variables 
   Table 36 presents the descriptive statistics of 8 models scores. It shows that the average of 
disclosure level for SSBR are 53% and 42% related to Sharia disclosure level in all sections in the 
annual report. This result is out of our expectations regarding with corporations raise flag of 
Islam and compliance with Sharia as the main basis for its activities (e.g., Visser, 2009; El-Gamal, 
2006; Kuran, 2004). Related to CSRD, the disclosure level is 28% and for social disclosure in the 
annual report is 28% which relatively low. Concerned with financial disclosure, the compliance 
36 http://www.siblbd.com/home/vision 
37 http://www.cihanbank.com/lang/en/Vision_and_mission.aspx 
38 http://www.aibnk.com/post/en/238/overview/22 
39 http://www.qib.com.qa/en/footer/about-us/mission-vision-values.aspx 
 
177 
 
                                               
level about financial accountability in the financial statements is 63% and disclosure for financial 
in all sections in the annual report is 82% which is relativity high. 37% from our selected banks 
adopted AAOIFI and 61% audited by the big4 auditors. Average age for our banks is 19 years.  
Table36 also reports that the average Leverage ratio is 72% whereas the Risk adequacy is 29%. 
The percentage of public banks is 78.6%.  
Table 36: Descriptive statistics of continuous variables 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Skewness Kurtosis 
SSBR 117 0.00 0.90 0.5316 0.215 -0.601 -3.001 
CSRD 117 0.08 0.60 0.2761 0.128 0.615 -2.844 
FIN 117 0.46 0.86 0.6256 0.078 0.038 -2.044 
TOTAL 117 0.22 0.70 0.4775 0.108 -0.145 -2.276 
SHARIA .T 117 0.00 0.93 0.4168 0.184 0.303 2.392 
SOCAIL.T 117 0.04 0.68 0.2762 0.159 0.794 -2.236 
FIN.T 117 0.73 0.93 0.8162 0.039 0.023 -2.152 
TOTAL.T 117 0.30 0.81 0.5021 0.100 0.719 2.845 
Standards 117 0.00 1 0.37 0.484 0.557 -3.720 
Auditor 117 0.00 1 0.61 0.491 -0.443 -3.835 
Age 117 2 54 18.80 12.056 0.712 -2.441 
Size 117 1.18 4.87 3.0886 0.807 -0.130 -2.439 
Profitability 117 -13.39 21.57 1.0553 3.467 0.915 2.166 
Risk Adequacy 117 -0.38 1.73 0.2940 0.278 0.348 3.467 
Leverage 117 0.02 0.98 0.7279 0.259 -0.394 2.723 
SAD 117 0.00 1 0.60 0.492 -0.406 -2.867 
Ownership 117 0.00 1 0.79 0.412 -1.415 2.003 
Power distance 117 35 100 82.42 14.84 -0.383 2.073 
Individualism 117 14 89 30.71 13.320 0.810 2.577 
Masculinity 117 34 66 52.91 6.567 0.013 2.157 
Uncertainty avoidance 117 35 85 64.49 15.904 -0.804 -2.632 
GDP per capita 117 0.00 1.00 0.0342 0.182 0.194 3.409 
Corruption  117 -6.00 7.30 3.6128 3.463 -0.000 3.028 
Country legal System 117 1 8 4.01 1.808 0.012 -2.251 
Role of Central Bank  117 0 1 0.68 0.467 -0.801 -2.383 
Full adopting AAOIFI 117 0 1 0.30 0.460 0.889 -2.231 
Literacy Rate 117 0.00 1.00 0.3248 0.470 0.758 -2.450 
Islamization system 117 0 1 0.77 0.166 -0.864 -2.640 
Sharia  Supervisor Board Report index; CSR Index: Corporate Social Responsibility Index; Financial Index: Financial Statements Index; 
Total Index: Total disclosure (SSBR; CSR and Financial) Index; Total Sharia  Index: Total Sharia  disclosure for annual report Index; Total 
Social Index: Total social disclosure for annual report Index; Total Financial Index: Total financial disclosure for annual report Index; 
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Holistic Index: Holistic disclosure (Sharia ; social and financial) Index; Standard: Financial standard (AAOIFI or IFRS) (1 if the bank is 
adopted AAOIFI and 0 otherwise); Size Auditor: Size of auditor (Big-4 firms) (1 if the bank is audited by one of the big-4 firms and 0 
otherwise); Age:  bank age since foundation; B. Size: Bank size (natural logarithm of bank’s total assets in US$ as a proxy for bank size); 
ROA: Return of Asset (Profitability); Riskiness: Risk adequacy (Tier 1 Capital); Leverage: Gearing (TD/TA); Sharia  Department: Existing 
Sharia  department ((1 if the bank has Sharia  auditing department inside the bank and 0 otherwise)); Ownership: Public or Private 
Ownership (1 if the bank is Public and 0 otherwise); Hofstede Model for culture (Power distance; Individualism; Masculinity and Uncertainty 
avoidance); GDP: GDP growth (natural logarithm of the gross domestic product of country i as a proxy for country macroeconomic 
factors); Corruption: Corruption perception index; Legal: Country legal system  (1 if the bank in country that adopted Sharia  law and 0 
otherwise as common and code); Central Bank: Role of central bank for SSB and Social (1 if the bank on country that central bank has SSB 
and 0 otherwise); Full adoption: Full adoption of country for AAOIFI (1 if the bank in country adopt AAOIFI for all banks and 0 
otherwise); Literacy: Literacy rate for country; System: Complete Islamization banking country system (1 if the bank in a full Islamization 
banking system country and 0 otherwise)   
 
4.2.6.2 Pearson Correlations Matrix  
   Tables 37 and 38 report the outputs of the correlation matrix. Table 37 shows that the 
accounting standard is positive significant with financial models (3 and 7), whereas size is 
significant association with all models except model one. The Table also shows that SAD is 
positive significant for seven models except model 6 related to total social. Related to culture, 
Table 38 shows that Individualism is the most associated demission from Hofstede model by 
negative association and legal system has a positive association related to models 1; 2; 3; 4 and 7.  
Table 37: Correlation matrix for firm-specific characteristics 
Model 𝑫𝑫𝑻𝑻𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 𝑺𝑺𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑳𝑳𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑶𝑶𝑶𝑶𝒊𝒊 
Model 1 0.169 0.187* 0.028 0.131 0.037 0.068 -0.027 0.558** 0.193* 
Model 2 -0.220* 0.100 0.219* 0.418** -0.121 -0.175 0.394** 0.199* 0.185* 
Model 3 0.306** 0.095 0.221* 0.363** 0.003 -0.200* 0.189* 0.330** 0.045 
Model 4 0.094 0.185* 0.161 0.346** -0.011 -0.069 0.189* 0.532** 0.212* 
Model 5 0.029 0.164 0.045 0.215* -0.023 0.062 0.044 0.497** 0.127 
Model 6 -0.162 -0.085 0.220* 0.186* -0.090 -0.184* 0.259** 0.093 0.145 
Model 7 0.280** 0.070 0.245** 0.323** 0.035 -0.198* 0.145 0.356** -0.018 
Model 8 -0.034 0.070 0.177 0.276** -0.062 -0.088 0.192* 0.402** .161 
 
Table 38: Correlation matrix for country-specific characteristics 
Model 𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑶𝑶𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑶𝑶𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 𝑴𝑴𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑶𝑶𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 𝑨𝑨𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑶𝑶𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑫𝑻𝑻𝒊𝒊 𝑫𝑫𝑺𝑺𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒊 
Model 1 -0.127 -0.110 -0.001 -0.001 0.132 0.082 0.278** 0.152 0.134 -0.048 0.030 
Model 2 0.007 -0.310** -0.286** -0.174 0.187* -0.102 0.216* 0.024 -0.190* -0.089 -0.086 
Model 3 0.053 -0.114 0.090 0.160 -0.110 -0.074 0.288** 0.214* 0.174 -0.248** 0.136 
Model 4 -0.069 -0.223* -0.097 -0.038 0.131 -0.007 0.341** 0.161 0.053 -0.127 0.020 
Model 5 -0.126 -0.167 -0.059 0.067 0.294** 0.100 0.145 0.009 0.007 -0.002 -0.096 
Model 6 -0.068 -0.245** -0.167 0.054 0.163 -0.122 0.097 -0.051 -0.166 -0.222* 0.002 
Model 7 0.007 -0.142 0.083 0.165 -0.088 -0.091 0.299** 0.223* 0.150 -0.280** 0.188* 
Model 8 -0.123 -0.235* -0.110 0.078 0.249** -0.010 0.180 0.005 -0.068 -0.150 -0.032 
Model 1: Sharia Supervisor Board Report index; Model 2: Corporate Social Responsibility Index; Model 3: Financial Statements Index; Model 4: 
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Total disclosure (SSBR; CSR and Financial) Index; Model5: Total Sharia disclosure for annual report Index; Model6: Total social disclosure for 
annual report Index; Model: Total financial disclosure for annual report Index; Model8: Holistic disclosure (Sharia; social and financial) Index; STAi : Financial standard (AAOIFI or IFRS); AUDi : Size of auditor (Big-4 firms); AGEi :bank age since foundation; SIZEi : Bank size (natural 
logarithm of bank’s total assets in US$ as a proxy for bank size); ROAi: Return of Asset (Profitability); RISKi: Risk adequacy (Tier 1 Capital); LEVi: 
Gearing (TD/TA); SDEPi: Existing Sharia department; OWNi: Public or Private Ownership; Hofstede Model for culture (Power distance: POWi ; 
Individualism: INDi; Masculinity: MASi  and Uncertainty avoidance: UNCi ); GDPi: GDP growth (natural logarithm of the gross domestic product 
of country i as a proxy for country macroeconomic factors); CORRi: Corruption perception index; LEGi: Country legal system (Sharia law and 
other as common and code); CENTi: Role of central bank for SSB and Social; ADOPTi: Full adoption of country for AAOIFI; LITi: Literacy rate 
for country; SYSi: Complete Islamization banking country system ; *p<0.01; **p<0.05; ***p<0.001 
4.2.6.3 Regression Analysis  
   Table 39 presents the outputs of regression analysis. Related to model 1 (SSBR); the Table 
shows - as expected - a significant and positive coefficients of SAD with disclosure about Sharia 
(β = 0.581 at the 1% level). Model 2 (CSRR) reports significantly and positively effects of size of 
bank (β = 0.347, at the 1% level); SAD (β 0.169, at the 10% level). Table also shows significantly 
and negatively affects culture based on uncertainty avoidance (β = -0.372, at the 5% level). Table 
also shows significantly and negatively affects for Corruption Index (β = -0.455, at the 5% level). 
According to model 3 (FS); the Table shows significantly and positively affects accounting 
standards (β = 0.811, at the 1% level); size and profitability (β = 0.390, at the 1% level and β = 
0.024, at the 5% level respectively). Table also shows significantly and negatively effects of 
ownership (β = -0.192, at the 5% level) and significantly and negatively affects for literacy rate (β 
= -0.500, at the 1% level). According to model 4 (aggregate disclosure); there is a significantly 
and positively effects of accounting standards (β = 0.458, at the 5% level); size of bank (β 0.246, 
at the 5% level) and SAD (β = 0.486, at the 1% level). Table also shows significantly and 
negatively effects of power distance (β = -0.251, at the 10% level); Masculinity (β = -0.218, at the 
10% level) and uncertainty avoidance (β = -0.291, at the 5% level).  
     Model 5 (Holistic Sharia disclosure) reports significantly and positively effects of SAD (β = 
0.226, at the 1%) and GDP growth (β = 0.432, at the 5% level). Table also shows negatively 
effects of power distance (β = -0.301, at the 10% level). Model six (Holistic social disclosure) 
shows positively affects GDP growth (β = 0.469, at the 10% level) and negative association with 
role of central bank (β = 0.381, at the 10% level). Model seven (Holistic financial disclosure); 
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shows significantly and positively affects standards adopted by banks (β = 0.778, at the 1% level); 
size of bank (β = 0.387, at the 1% level); SAD (β 0.159, at the 10% level); corruption level (β = 
0.335, at the 5% level) and legal system (β = 0.227, at the 10% level). Table also shows negatively 
affects riskiness (β = -0.220, at the 5% level); ownership (β = -0.266, at the 1% level); full 
adoption of AAOIFI and literacy rate (β = -0.361, at the 10% level and β = -0.420, at the 5% 
level respectively). Model 8 (Holistic aggregate disclosure) reports significantly and positively 
affects SAD (β = 0.331, at the 1% level); GDP growth (β 0.518, at the 5% level) and legal system 
(β = 0.261, at the 10% level). Table40 summarizes the status of the whole hypotheses based on 
our eight regression models. 
Table 39: Determinants of Islamic accountability’ pillars disclosure (Regression analysis)  
 
Variables/Models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8  
VIF Standardized 
β 
Standardized 
β 
Standardized 
β 
Standardized 
β 
Standardized 
β 
Standardized 
Β 
Standardized 
β 
Standardized 
β 
Constant 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝑂𝑂𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑈𝑈𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Model Summary: 
R2 value  
F  value   
P value  
 
0.353 
0.049 
-0.006 
0.009 
-0.049 
-0.025 
0.043 
0.581*** 
0.099 
-0.222 
-0.026 
-0.184 
-0.195 
0.198 
-0.171 
0.069 
0.048 
-0.074 
0.125 
0.046 
 
 
0.464 
4.154 
0.000 
 
0.063 
0.110 
0.073 
0.347*** 
-0.072 
0.009 
0.097 
0.169* 
0.080 
-0.218 
-0.072 
-0.191 
-0.372** 
0.281 
-0.445** 
0.097 
-0.157 
0.223 
-0.076 
-0.143 
 
 
0.484 
4.503 
0.000 
 
0.811*** 
0.107 
0.028 
0.395*** 
0.024** 
-0.184 
0.196 
0.122 
-0.192** 
-0.054 
0.040 
-0.070 
-0.009 
-0.048 
0.310 
0.181 
-0.181 
-0.320 
-0.500*** 
0.052 
 
 
0.569 
6.337 
0.000 
 
0.458** 
0.100 
0.032 
0.246** 
-0.042 
-0.052 
0.116 
0.486*** 
0.052 
-0.251* 
-0.040 
-0.218* 
-0.291** 
0.224 
-0.220 
0.124 
-0.073 
-0.043 
-0.067 
-0.016 
 
 
0.573 
6.440 
0.000 
 
0.253 
-0.132 
0.007 
0.136 
-0.056 
-0.006 
0.113 
0.465*** 
0.038 
-0.301* 
0.001 
-0.126 
-0.013 
0.432** 
-0.213 
0.157 
-0.011 
-0.037 
0.303 
0.043 
 
 
0.424 
3.536 
0.000 
 
0.115 
-0.157 
0.140 
0.112 
0.006 
-0.122 
0.176 
0.028 
0.066 
-0.039 
0.236 
-0.191 
-0.030 
0.469* 
0.026 
0.243 
-0.381* 
0.122 
-0.325 
0.057 
 
 
0.270 
1.775 
0.035 
 
0.778*** 
0.055 
0.082 
0.387*** 
0.047 
-0.220** 
0.129 
0.159* 
-0.266*** 
-0.102 
0.039 
-0.077 
0.007 
0.003 
0.335** 
0.227* 
-0.174 
-0.361* 
-0.420** 
0.149 
 
 
0.571 
6.384 
0.000 
 
0.323 
-0.154 
0.092 
0.188 
-0.026 
-0.106 
0.189 
0.331*** 
0.029 
-0.224 
0.161 
-0.200 
-0.026 
0.518** 
-0.077 
0.261* 
-0.229 
-0.014 
-0.038 
0.077 
 
 
0.420 
3.481 
0.000 
 
7.151 
2.664 
1.339 
2.599 
1.369 
1.623 
2.580 
1.701 
1.464 
4.267 
7.522 
2.727 
4.705 
7.819 
6.291 
3.349 
5.740 
8.332 
7.574 
5.988 
This table presents the regression matrix for the 8 models in 2013. STAi: Financial standard (AAOIFI or IFRS); AUDi: Size of auditor (Big-4 
firms); AGEi:bank age since foundation; SIZEi: Bank size (natural logarithm of bank’s total assets in US$ as a proxy for bank size); ROAi: Return 
of Asset (Profitability); RISKi: Risk adequacy (Tier 1 Capital); LEVi: Gearing (TD/TA); SDEPi: Existing Sharia department; OWNi: Public or 
Private Ownership; Hofstede Model for culture (Power distance:  POWi  ; Individualism: INDi ; Masculinity:  MASi   and Uncertainty 
avoidance: UNCi ); GDPi: GDP growth (natural logarithm of the gross domestic product of country i as a proxy for country macro-economic 
factors); CORRi: Corruption perception index; LEGi: Country legal system (Sharia law and other as common and code); CENTi: Role of central 
bank for SSB and Social; ADOPTi: Full adoption of country for AAOIFI; LITi: Literacy rate for country; SYSi: Complete Islamization banking 
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country system; ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% levels 
 
Table 40: Summary of hypotheses’ research 40 
 H2.1 
Standards 
H2.2 
Auditor 
H2.3 
Age 
H2.4 
Size 
H2.5 
Profitability 
H2.6 
Risk 
H2.7 
Leverage 
H2.8 
SAD 
H2.9 
Ownership 
Model 1 (SSBR) R R R R R R R A+ R 
Model 2 (CSRR) R R R A+ R R R A+ R 
Model 3 (Financial) A+ R R A+ A+ R R R A- 
Model 4 (Aggregate)  A+ R R A+ R R R A+ R 
Model 5 (Holistic sharia) R R R R R R R A+ R 
Model 6 (Holistic social) R R R R R R R R R 
Model 7 (Holistic financial) A+ R R A+ R A- R A+ A- 
Model 8 (Holistic ) R R R R R R R A+ R 
Final results Partially 
accepted  
Totally 
rejected  
Totally 
rejected  
Partially 
accepted 
Partially 
accepted  
Partially 
accepted  
Totally 
rejected  
Partially 
accepted  
Partially 
accepted  
4.2.7 Discussion and Conclusion 
    The analysis reports – as expected- that STAit (proxy for accounting standards) is positive and 
marginally significant with Models 3; 4 and 7. This result shows the impact of AAOIFI adoption 
on enhance disclosure level related to financial accountability disclosure. This result is consistent 
with Ariss and Sarieddine, (2007) who argued that the adoption of accounting standards has a 
positive impact on corporate disclosure levels. This result is consistent with Besar et al (2009) 
that argue adopting Islamic standards is one of the main mechanisms to enhance Islamic banking 
industry. Therefore, H2.1 accepted partially for model 3, 4 and 7. This result can justifies based 
on applicability of AAOIFI as these standards consider nature of IBs especially sharia and social 
issues. Thus, adopting Islamic standards as AAOIFI is support IBs through enhancing SSFD.  
AAOIFI issues standards that support IBs and IFIs to disclose information related to SSF 
accountability. Related to the size of auditor; the coefficient estimates on 𝛽𝛽2AUD is insignificant 
related to all accountabilities disclosure models. The results suggest that the disclosure levels 
about accountability pillars not affected by the size of larger auditor. Therefore, H2.2 rejected. 
This result is matching with several studies that found no association between disclosure level 
40 (A) is accepted hypothesis; (R) is rejected hypothesis   
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and audit firm size (e.g., Ali et al., 2012; Alsaeed, 2006). This may justify based on orientation of 
auditing firm to focus on mainly on financial issues more than sharia and social.  Also; the 
majority of selected IBs are audited by one of the big4 firms which effected on the link between 
SSFD and size of auditor.     
   Table 40 regarding to size of bank reports – as expected- that SIZEit is positive significant in 
2; 3; 4 and 7 models which more related to social and aggregate disclosure. This suggests that 
there is a positive relationship between bank size and their CSR disclosure. This result is 
consistent with Mallin and Michelon (2011); McWilliams and Siegel (2001) where they argue that 
big banks are highly likely to monitor their activities towards wider society. However, the result is 
not matching with other studies that found a positive association between firm size and levels of 
disclosures (e.g., Hassan et al., 2009; Chavent et al., 2006). Therefore, H2.3 is partially accepted. 
According to agency theory, larger firms need to disclose more information to different user 
groups which lead to reduce information asymmetries (Watts and Zimmerman, 1983). Larger 
firms may tend to disclose more information than smaller firms in their annual reports due to 
their competitive advantage 
    Table 40 also shows that ROAit (proxy for profitability) is insignificant with all models except 
model 3 related to FS disclosure. The results shows an impact of profitability on enhance 
disclosure level related to financial disclosure. This result is not consistent with Othman et al 
(2009); Gray et al (2001) who found a significant association between profitability and corporate 
disclosure. However, our result is matching Haniffa (2002) who argues that firm from an Islamic 
approach may provide full disclosure regardless the financial position or profitability. Therefore, 
it accepted H2.4, which debated, is no link between profitability and disclosure for IBs. This 
result differentiates IBs comparing with conventional banks that linked their disclosure level with 
their profitability performance. Agency theory expects that managers of firms with high 
profitability would tend to provide more SSF information in the annual reports, in order to 
justify their present performance to the shareholders as well as all stakeholders.  
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     Table 40 illustrates – as unexpected- that Leverage is insignificant with all models of 
disclosure. This result is consistent with Abraham and Cox (2007); Linsley and Shrives (2006) 
who found insignificant association between the disclosure and Leverage ratio. The result is not 
matching with other studies that found a positive association between Leverage and disclosure 
(e.g., Elshandidy, 2011; Taylor et al., 2010; Marshall and Weetman, 2007). Therefore, H2.5 is 
rejected.  According to signaling theory, firms’ managers will disclose more information if their 
liquidity ratios are high, to distinguish their skills in managing liquidity risks comparing with 
other managers in companies with lower liquidity ratios.  
     Regarding to the association between SAD and disclosure levels; the results indicate that the 
coefficient estimates on SDEPit is significant for all models except models (3 and 6) related to 
financial disclosure as well as aggregate social disclosure. Therefore, H2.6 is accepted. This result 
is consisting with Archambeault et al (2008) that show significant association between disclosure 
and SAD. In addition, the literature provides evidence that internal auditing has positive effects 
on financial reporting oversight and reliability (Schneider and Wilner, 1990). The result also 
shows mixed association between disclosure and culture based on Hofstede model, which reflect 
that Islamic banks does affected, by culture.41  This study seeks to explore different kinds of 
disclosure related to IBs, which contain SSF as well as aims to measuring the association 
between these different categories of disclosure and firm-specific characteristics. The disclosure 
levels measured through three indices for CSR; SSB and Financial statements based on AAOIFI 
standards and several previous studies. Furthermore, the disclosure levels contain all sections in 
the annual report. Based on this analysis; the descriptive analysis shows relatively high disclosure 
41 In robustness test, I replace Hofstede dimensions with Gray Model through testing Sharia disclosure. Gray (1988) 
developed four accounting value dimensions of statutory control versus professional regulation of accounting, 
uniformity versus flexibility of accounting rules, conservatism versus optimism in accounting measurement, and 
transparency versus secrecy in accounting disclosures. The last of these dimensions – transparency versus secrecy - 
is of relevance to our disclosure study. Gray (1988) argued: “the higher a country ranks in terms of uncertainty 
avoidance and power distance and the lower it ranks in terms of individualism and masculinity, then the more likely 
it is to rank highly in terms of secrecy” (p. 11).  The result are consistent with the main tests with the variable 
"existence of Sharia auditing department" being significant (β = 0.546, t-value = 5.927). Untabulated results are 
significant with R2 of 0.443. This finding shows that Sharia disclosure affected by cultural differences based on 
Hofstede or Gray models.   
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level for financial level and SSBR (62% and 52% respectively) and relatively low for CSR 
disclosure (28%). Concerned with holistic disclosure level that measuring accountability’ pillars 
for all sections in the annual report, disclosure levels about Sharia , social and financial are 40%; 
28% and 81% respectively.  
   The results show that adopting AAOIFI standards is positive and marginally significant with 
financial disclosure rather than other kinds of disclosure which matching with Besar et al (2009) 
and reflects the importance of adopting AAOIFI for all IBs. The analysis shows that whatever 
the age of IBs, it does not influence the disclosure level which consists with Alsaeed, 2006. 
Furthermore, the analysis displays the importance of size as one of the determinants related to 
disclosure. This finding is matching with Brammer et al (2006).  Haniffa (2002) argues that from 
an Islamic perception, IBs may provide full disclosure whether it is making a profit or otherwise. 
The result approves her argument through shows insignificant association between disclosure 
and profitability. The same result for profitability is repeated with risk level as well as leverage 
which show insignificant correlation with disclosure levels as Dobler et al (2011) concluded for 
the risk and Rajab and Schachler (2009) argue for the leverage. One of the main important 
results for this study is shows for what SAD effect on disclosure level. Chik (2011) described the 
existing of Internal Sharia auditing as the true accountability, where IBs is not only accountable 
to their stakeholders or authorities but most significantly to Allah as part of religious 
responsibility to be the best solution to achieve good corporate governance. This study shows 
the role of size; accounting standards; SAD; profitability; risk and ownership to enhancing SSFD 
for IBs as well as IFIs.   
     As such, the consequences of this study may be of implication to policy makers, Islamic 
windows, regulators and stakeholders, particularly investors. However, this study is limited 
through focusing on one year, which motivates further research that can consider time series, 
which can shows for what extent disclosure levels changes and for what extent it effects on the 
financial performance. Based on the significant impacts of the culture on the disclosure levels for 
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corporations’ particularly related to Islamic values, it recommends to exploring the impact of 
Islamic culture on the disclosure levels by more core analysis. Moreover, related to financial 
accountability disclosure we limited our study by does not measuring the earning management 
issues in the annual report for IBs. Therefore, it recommends explore for what extent disclosure 
in the annual report contain any level of earning management. This study focused only on IBs, 
which suggest further research to contain other IFIs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186 
 
Empirical Study (3): Corporate Governance and Multi-Corporate 
Disclosures: Evidence from an Islamic Banks 
4.3.1 Introduction  
   Studies in Corporate disclosure have primarily focused on the effect of firm characteristics on 
the extent of corporate disclosure (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). In contemporary years, one of the 
most extensively discussed topics in this field has been how to design corporate governance 
mechanisms that lead to more disclosure level (Cormier et al., 2005; Gul and Leung, 2004). 
Agency theory provides a framework for connecting the disclosure behaviour to corporate 
governance through considering both as mechanisms used to protect stakeholders and assist 
them reduce agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Aksu and Kosedag (2006) propose 
that disclosure practices followed by corporations are a significant element and a leading 
indicator of corporate governance quality. Beeks and Brown (2005) argue that businesses with 
high CG quality make more disclosures that are informative. With concern to the research on 
accountability model, which comprises pillars as CSR and SSB, three categories of empirical 
studies characterize the research in this field. The first one is concerned with ‘descriptive studies,’ 
which focused on the extent of disclosure. The second stream related to ‘explicative studies,’ 
which emphasis on the determinants of disclosure reporting. The third one is interested in the 
‘impact of disclosure reporting’ on several users or on the FV. This study adopts the second 
orientation, as it focused on analysing whether CG characteristics are possible determinants of 
disclosure practices by IBs.  
   Considering that efficient governance is an important incentive for the IBs to take the decision 
to disclose information related to SSF, it propose to establish which factors of its internal 
mechanism influence the decision-making process. Thus, the interest rests on the board of 
directors, with regard to its size, the extent of the independence of its directors, CEO founder 
187 
 
and if there is CEO duality. Likewise, this study focuses on the ownership structure whether they 
are foreign ownership, institutes ownership and family ownership. This study also explores other 
CG variables as Block holder, listed firm and IAH.  With these parameters, it aims to cover 
important aspects of corporate governance, which we believe make SSFD in IBs possible. For 
the purpose of this study, it investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
CSRD; SSBD and FD in 95 IBs based on data in annual reports at 2013.  
   The results indicate that in the context of IBs, although block holders; CEO founder and 
Institutional ownership generally has a positive relationship with the level of overall and financial 
disclosures and such relationship is significant and positive for foreign ownership related to 
overall, SSBD and FD. It also finds greater listed share and Board size to have positive impacts 
on the four kinds of disclosures. In the context of Islamic banks, we find a positive association 
between Investment account holders and overall, SSBD and FD.  It also finds a negative 
association between Family Ownership and overall, SSBD and FD; we found also a negative 
association between Duality in position and SSBD. Finally, it finds a negative association 
between Board independence and overall, SSBD and CSRD. However, it does not find any 
significant impact of all CG mechanism on the extent of CSR disclosures except listed bank (+); 
board size (+) and board independence (-). Overall, the results suggest that despite corporate 
governance mechanisms involving Block holders; Institutional; ownership; Foreign Ownership; 
Family Ownership; Listed share; Duality in position; CEO Founder; Board size; Board 
independence and Investment account holders are effective in influencing SSBD; CSRD and FD 
practices in IBs. It furthermore finds firm age, auditor and Sharia auditing department (SAD) to 
be important determinants of levels of SSBD; CSRD and FD disclosures in IBs. 
   The study differs from the previous studies that exploring the association between disclosure 
and CG in many themes. The study differs from Khan et al (2013) and Farook et al (2011) that 
tested the association between CG and one dimension of disclosure, which is corporate social 
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responsibility disclosure, whereas this research investigates the link between CG and multi kind 
of disclosure. The model contains 10 CG variables as block holders; listed share; different kind 
of ownership as well as variables related to board as size, whereas previous research as Hidalgo 
et al (2010) just focused on two CG variables, which are Board Independence and ownership 
structure. Bukhari et al (2013); Gisbert and Navallas (2013) examining the association between 
CG and disclosure for IBs that located in one country (Pakistan and Spain respectively), whereas; 
this study is explore this relationship through using data for banks that located in 20 countries as 
GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council); UK; Pakistan; Egypt; Malaysia and other. This study differs 
from the previous studies based on sample size. The sample is 95 IBs comparing with Farook et 
al (2011) that focused on 47 IBs. Finally; this study focused on IBs, whereas, other previous 
studies are testing the association between CG and disclosure for non IFIs as Liang et al (2012).  
   The study contributes to the existing literature. First, it measures the annual report Sharia; 
social and financial disclosure levels of IBs based on a benchmark derived from AAOIFI as well 
as related literature, which reflect Islamic principles and represent an ideal model for Islamic 
banks’ disclosure. For El-Gamal (2006), the standardization of Islamic accounting through the 
AAOIFI has helped legitimize these standards as Islamic and reduce suspicion by Muslims as to 
their Islamic nature. Secondly, we ascertain the determinants of Islamic banks’ SSF disclosures, 
which will subsequently tested utilising the disclosure measures obtained. Departing from 
previous research, this study also tests the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and Sharia; social and financial disclosure. The results also imply that banks with 
high foreign ownership report more disclosures that are corporate as a proactive legitimacy 
strategy to satisfy ethical foreign investors and to get more foreign capital (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). It also extends the corporate disclosure literature by providing empirical evidence of 
determinants of SSBD; CSRD and FD in Islamic banking system context. The analysis presented 
in this study provides strong support for the agency theory arguments that suggest that firms 
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with strong CG mechanism are more likely to disclose more information to users about their 
compliance with Sharia; their activities towards the society and their financial performance. This 
contributes to the current debate by regulators on the role of CG mechanisms by testing how 
effective the governance recommendations are improving firm disclosure strategy. This study 
provides evidence that factors related to CG may explain the variability of results found in this 
research field. In this sense, our results show that variables related to the IBs’ board has a 
positively associated with multi disclosure which has important implications for the regulatory 
definition of board independence, and leads to the recommendation of the use of more stringent 
and specific criteria to define this CG mechanism.  
The study is connected with that which examines the association between corporate 
governance characteristics and corporate disclosure, which has received growing attention in the 
disclosure literature in the last years (e.g., Patelli and Prencipe, 2007; Cheng and Courtenay, 
2006). This study adds to the growing literature on global disclosure practices and their 
determinants. The study also benefits stakeholders with IFIs generally and IBs particularly 
because knowing disclosure characteristics will help stakeholders find desired information about 
IBs. The rest of the study structured as follows. The next section elaborates the CG and 
disclosure from an Islamic perspective. This followed by a section, which reviews related 
literature and develops hypotheses. Subsequent sections then discuss the research design and 
empirical results. The final section concludes the study. 
4.3.2 Corporate governance and disclosure from an Islamic perspective 
   The core characteristic of the Islamic economy is its aim to create a just, honest, fair and 
balanced society. Sharia states that Islamic businesses must found on ethical norms and social 
obligations, and must grounded on the moral framework of the Sharia (Ahmad, 2000). The holy 
Quran and Hadith have comprehensively stated and supported all the fundamentals behind 
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corporate governance, through focusing on the accountability concept when the prophet said 
(PBUH) ‘‘each one of you is a guardian, and each guardian is accountable to everything under his care’’ 
(Bukhari, 7: 200). The beliefs of Muslims concerning with accountability of their actions in this 
world and beyond have resilient implications on how the application corporate governance is 
perceived particularly in financial services. There has been a need to adapt CG values to Sharia 
requirements. The Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Accounting and Auditing 
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) have stepped in and issued well-known 
CG guiding principles for IFIs.  
     In the context of Islam, the model of corporate governance for business derived from the 
Sharia rulings regarding property rights and contracts. According to Grais and Pellegrini (2006), 
the unique characteristics of IBs must explain in order to develop corporate governance 
mechanisms. The model of Islamic Corporate Governance (ICG) not studied in detail (Bhatti 
and Bhatti, 2009). It can get the definition of ICG by adding Sharia rules to the suggested 
stakeholder model of corporate governance. ICG means that a firm governed by Sharia and 
companies need to consider the effects of Sharia policies and practices on corporate policies and 
practices. Governance of an Islamic corporate structure done in such an approach that each 
person linked with bank is actually the shareholder to bank, which implies that success of bank 
means success of the shareholder (El-Gamal, 2006). 
      Hamid et al (1993) argue that Islam has the potential for influencing accounting policy and 
practices (including disclosure) and also that religion can influence business leaders' behaviour 
and attitudes (including CG) (Baydoun et al., 1999). Leadership in Islam is a trust. Beekun and 
Badawi (1999) argue that there are two primary roles of a leader. First, leader is the servant of his 
followers who aims to seek their welfare and guide them toward good. This concept of 'servant 
leader' is consistent with Carver and Carver's (2004) view that the members of board are servant-
leaders rather than authoritative ones. The second role of a leader is to protect the community 
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against tyranny and oppression, to encourage God-consciousness and Taqwa, and to promote 
justice. This role is termed 'guardian-leader'. In the context of firms, the ultimate leadership rests 
collectively with the BOD. Consequently, it can conclude that the accountability of BOD guided 
into Allah, stockholders, society and other stakeholders. Also accountability of IBs which 
transferred through disclosure can dividend into Sharia disclosure which focus on comply with 
Allah Sharia; social disclosure which focus on serving society and finally financial disclosure 
which focus on disclose financial information for stockholders and all decision makers.       
   There is an expectation by both Allah (God) and Muslim society that, due to the notions of 
unity of purpose of life in Islam, universal brotherhood and trust and accountability of Muslims 
who hold leadership positions in every facet of life, there may be greater transparency and highly 
disclosure about all accountabilities of banks (Sulaiman and Willett, 2003). In the context of the 
current study, we expect that the annual reports as well as websites of an Islamic bank may be a 
medium for promoting Islamic values as well as Islamic accountabilities towards Allah then other 
stakeholders- for example Sharia compliance, zakat, social responsibility and full disclosure about 
financial position-vis-a-vis sound CG practices and disclosures. Consisting with Islamic values, 
profit maximization may not be the only aim of IFIs (Ali et al., 2012). This study expected wider 
objectives covering social value and ethical conduct as well as compliance with Sharia (Belal et al., 
2014). Chapra and Ahmad (2002) consider the corporate governance of IFIs as a mechanism, 
which tolerates ensuring fairness to all stakeholders by fully transparency and accountability with 
Sharia. Corporate governance for these institutions stems from two principle elements: faith 
based approach that mandates conduct of the business in harmony with Sharia and profit-motive 
that identifies business and investment transactions and maximization of shareholder’s wealth. 
Moreover, this study can add social based approach that aiming to serving society.    
    Islam has laid stress on the disclosure of information. The word of account used numerous 
times in Quran and means that a human being is accountable to Allah Almighty. Allah has 
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provided man with countless blessings so he may conduct economic and financial activities with 
justice and honesty. All required information may be transparent to the associated persons so 
that truth will retained all across the corporation (Bhatti and Bhatti, 2009). Disclosure is most 
significant in order to exemplify an ethical business and honest dealings (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). 
In Islam, the practice of transparency and adequate disclosure is being stressed and suggested in 
business dealings. This is to ensure that the corporations’ transaction is free from any form of 
misuse. In the Quran, numerous verses have highlighted the demand for fair, transparent and 
ethical behaviour in all business transactions as Allah mention (Quran, 2:282).  
   Transparency is utmost importance as Quran definitely forbids concealing of evidence. Allah 
saying “And if you are traveling and cannot find a scribe, then there be mortgage taken...…and do not conceal 
not evidence for whoever hides it, surely his heart is tainted with sin and Allah is knower of what you do” 
(Quran, 2: 283). The Prophet (PBUH) said, "Truthfulness leads to righteousness, and righteousness leads to 
Paradise. And a man keeps on telling the truth until he becomes a truthful person. Falsehood leads to Al−Fojur 
(i.e. wickedness, evil−doing), and Al−Fojur leads to the (Hell) Fire, and a man may keep on telling lies till he is 
written before Allah, a liar” (Bukhari, 8:116). Disclosure is a central aspect of the accountability 
function of Islamic banks to its stakeholders. Therefore, it is required that Islamic banks disclose 
as much information in a succinct, truthful and comprehensible way to its stakeholders. From an 
Islamic perception, the key aim of corporate reporting that overrides other objectives is to 
permit Islamic enterprises to show their compliance with Sharia as well as serving their society 
(Baydoun and Willett, 1997). The implication of this objective is that IBs have a responsibility to 
disclose all necessary information to its stakeholders about their activities. Maali et al (2006) 
categorize three extensive purposes that adopted as the basis for accountability disclosures by 
IFIs, which are display compliance with Sharia; showing how the operations of the business have 
affected the wellbeing of the Islamic community and helping Muslims to achieve their religious 
obligations. Board in IBs is not only supposed to maximize the profits and welfares of 
193 
 
stockholders but they are also obligated to work under Sharia rules and regulations as well as 
achieving their social accountability towards the society (Archer et al., 1998).  
4.3.3 Literature review and research hypotheses  
     Governance used as a weapon towards agency issues (Beasley, 1996). Gompers et al (2003) 
defined the improvements were a consequence of applying a governance structure. The 
development of the agency theory has resulted in the implementation of governance structures 
whereby the control of decisions is separate from the management (Fama and Jensen, 1983a). A 
number of preceding studies have used the theoretical framework of the agency theory to test 
hypotheses concerning with the extent of disclosure to corporate governance characteristics 
(Xiao and Yuan, 2007). The governance of banking industry has caught the attention of scholars 
and regulators. Hagendorff et al (2007) concentrate their research on the banking sector backed 
by the argument that it requires a separate agency analysis. The uniqueness of the agency 
relationships at banks stems from the managers’ duty to safeguard the funds of all capital 
providers. Islamic banks must follow both the regulations set by the supervisors and principles 
of Sharia (Archer et al., 1998). Therefore, while agency problems in conventional banks arise 
when board deviate from their accountability to maximize shareholders’ wealth, any divergence 
by board of IBs from placing all supplied funds in Sharia-compliant investments creates an added 
source of agency problems. Corporate disclosure presents a brilliant opportunity to apply agency 
theory as managers with better access to a company’s private information can transmit credible 
and reliable communication to market to optimize the corporation’s value.  
   Corporate disclosure influenced by values of those who are involved in formulating and taking 
decisions in the banks, consideration of corporate governance mechanisms (Haniffa and Cooke, 
2005). The limited research in this area (e.g., Harjoto and Jo, 2011) have mainly found corporate 
disclosure and performance to be positively associated with corporate governance mechanisms 
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as board independence, Duality in position and Board size. In addition, existing empirical 
evidence recommends that corporate governance mechanisms and corporate disclosure are 
positively associated with the market value of the firm (Beltratti, 2005). There have been a 
number of studies that hypothesized a link between firm-specific characteristics and disclosure 
with rare that measuring the corporate governance and corporate disclosure for IFIs. However, 
most of the prior studies focused primarily on CSRD as well as focused on non-IFIs. Corporate 
governance mechanisms can consider as main factors illumination the decisions of corporate 
disclosure from agency theory perspectives (Samaha et al., 2012). It is also value noting that rare 
research has been undertaken to study the association between corporate governance 
mechanisms and Islamic accountabilities model disclosure that contains Sharia ; social and 
financial. Some studies have examined corporate governance mechanisms that may be associated 
with disclosure practice. CG attributes examined in these studies primarily comprise board 
independence and ownership (e.g., Hossain and Reaz, 2007; Hanifa and Cooke, 2005). 
    Corporate governance mechanisms can be considered as essential factors illustrative the 
decisions of corporate disclosure related to SSF from agency theory perspectives. Consequently, 
these mechanisms will be measuring in this study. It is also worth noting that very limited 
research has been undertaken to examine the link between corporate governance mechanisms 
and the holistic corporate disclosure for IBs that covers all accountabilities of these banks. To 
the best of my knowledge, there are no previous studies that explore the holistic accountabilities 
pillars (SSF) concerned with the corporate governance variables for most of IBs around the 
world. The current study develops hypotheses on the association between Islamic accountability’ 
pillars disclosure levels and governance mechanism. Gul and Leung (2004) argue that the role of 
corporate governance on the agency relationship between managers and stakeholders best 
examined by looking at several CG mechanisms. The literature review focuses on prior empirical 
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studies that are concerned with the link between corporate disclosure and governance 
mechanism variables.  
4.3.3.1 Foreign Ownership 
    For further debating about the association between disclosure and foreign ownership, reviews 
section 4.1.4.2.3. Thus, the first hypothesis is  
H3.1 IBs with higher percentages of foreign ownership have higher levels of disclosure  
4.3.3.2 Institutional Ownership 
For further debating about the association between disclosure and institutional ownership, 
reviews section 4.1.4.2.2. Therefore, the second hypothesis will be: 
H3.2 There is a positive relationship between Institutional ownership and disclosure  
4.3.3.3 Family Ownership 
   Family companies’ boards tend to be less independent, with considerable representation by 
family members (Anderson and Reeb, 2004). Continuing lack of transparency of corporate 
governance practices may enable getting family members on board without much interference 
from non-family stockholders. The resulting concern that the non-controlling stockholders may 
have lack of transparency in corporate governance practices of family companies would reduce 
to the extent that these companies deliver superior performance (Anderson and Reeb, 2003a). 
Agency theory claims that in a dispersed ownership environment, conflicts of interest between 
boards, stockholders are high, and corporations will increase the disclosure level to decrease 
agency costs. Furthermore, recent literatures have recognized family ownership as one of the 
main factors for the miserable level of disclosures (Belal and Owen, 2007). Ashiq et al (2007) 
found that the level of disclosure of family corporations was lower than that of non-family 
corporations. Thus, the following hypothesis is: 
H3.3 There is a negative association between Family ownership and level of disclosure   
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4.3.3.4 Number of Block holders 
   For further debating about the association between disclosure and number of block holders, 
reviews section 4.1.4.2.1.  Therefore, the fourth hypothesis as follows: 
H3.4 There is a negative association between percentages of block holder ownership and 
level of disclosure 
4.3.3.5 Investment account holders (IAH) 
   The combined investment portfolio of IBs financed by IAH funds and stockholder’s equity 
and further sources of funds available to the bank (Archer et al., 1998). The bank’ management 
acts as an agent not only for the stockholders, but furthermore for IAHs as a mudarib. IB invests 
these funds in Sharia allowable activities. The key problematic is that the IAH and shareholders 
have inferior information to that possessed by management, mainly about the application of 
Islamic laws in relative to the banks’ operations. Further, investment accounts with IBs are 
commonly more accessible than shares of IBs. Whereas IAH do not have any formal voting 
rights, they nevertheless affect the level of monitoring of management “vicariously” through 
stockholders (Archer et al., 1998). This is because the incomes of stockholders determined by 
the profits earned by the utilization of IAH funds. If IAHs are more concerned than 
stockholders in the bank’s compliance with Sharia, then the relative effect of IAH will determine 
the extent to which the bank complies with Sharia and accordingly the level of disclosure 
obtainable by the bank. This suggests that accountability disclosures for IBs that contain SSF 
positively related to the relative size of IAH funds as a proportion of shareholder funds: 
H3.5 There is a positive association between the proportion of IAH to shareholder funds 
and levels of disclosure  
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4.3.3.6 Duality in position 
    For further debating about the association between disclosure and duality in position, reviews 
section 4.1.4.2.4. Based on these arguments, the sixth hypothesis as follows: 
H3.6 There is a negative association between duality in position and level of disclosure  
4.3.3.7 Board size 
   The size of board directors is another component that clarifies disclosure, as is proved by the 
studies showed by Lim et al (2007); Mangena and Tauringana (2007). Agency theory proposes 
that large boards can play a critical role in controlling the board and in making strategic decisions 
and forecasts that larger boards incorporate a diversity of expertise that outcomes in more 
efficiency in boards’ monitoring role (Singh et al., 2004). Hussainey and Wang (2010) suggest 
that large boards are less likely to dominant by the management. Majority of the previous studies 
are finding a positive association between board size and disclosure (e.g., Samaha et al., 2015; 
Elshandidy et al., 2013). For measuring association between the two variables in banking sector 
literature; Jizi et al (2014) found a positive association between disclosure and board size 
according to the large US banks. This study expects larger boards will increase board-monitoring 
capabilities that have positive influences of disclosure level. Based on these arguments, this study 
sets the following hypothesis: 
H3.7 IBs with large board size have a higher level of disclosure  
4.3.3.8 Board independence 
     For further debating about the association between disclosure and Board independence; 
reviews section 4.1.4.2.5. Based on the debate; the eighth hypotheses is   
H3.8 There is a positive association between board independence and level of disclosure  
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4.3.3.9 CEO Founder 
     The CEO power in the board has received considerable attention in the corporate finance 
literature. To capture CEO power, previous studies have used different variables: CEO founder, 
CEO tenure, the CEO is the only insider on board and CEO is the only person who signs the 
letter to shareholders in the annual report… (e.g., Liu and Jiraporn 2010; Skaife et al., 2006; 
Fiegener et al. 2000). The presence of a firm’s founder could give the CEO more Leverage to 
take managerial decisions, including disclosure of information, it could influence positively on 
the companies’ performance, it could add value (Amit, 2006) and it could lower debt levels 
compared to those without the duality arrangement (Mishra and McConaughy, 1999). Collett and 
Hrasky (2005) provide evidence that the presence of CEO helps improve the level of voluntary 
disclosure of corporate governance information. This study therefore hypothesis: 
H3.9 There is an association between CEO founder and level of disclosure 
4.3.3.10 Control variables 
The study control four different variables, which are Auditor; SAD; bank age and listed share. 
Support for investigative audit firm size as a determinant of disclosure level has come from 
numerous studies (Wallace et al., 1994). Most studies have found that large audit firms show a 
significant relationship with higher disclosure levels (e.g., Han et al., 2012). Majority of studies 
found an indirect association between company age and disclosure (e.g., Akhtaruddin, 2005). 
Moreover, previous research has argued that the age of corporation effects on CSR involvement 
of the firm and that long-established firms are likely to make greater voluntary social disclosures. 
Cormier et al (2005) reported a positive relationship between disclosure and age of firms, while 
others (Rahman et al., 2011) denied any relationship between the two variables. The Sharia 
scholars hired by the banks (Safieddine, 2009) verify the compliance with Sharia in Islamic banks. 
Besar et al (2009) revealed that the Sharia committee is only satisfying a minimum requirement of 
the report with recommend for SAD inside the bank to enhance compliance with Sharia and 
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support social accountability for IBs. Hodge (2001) indicate that investors generally find audited 
information to be more reliable than unaudited information. According to Cooke (1989), when 
firm listed on stock market, it expected to disclose more holistic information since it might need 
to identify the disclosure instructions of two or more stock exchanges. Therefore, disclosure 
limits the monitoring and agency costs resulting from the existence of superior number of 
shareholders. Supporting the previous arguments, Robb et al (2001) find that; corporation that 
listed is important determinant of disclosure level.  
4.3.4 Research methodology 
4.3.4.1 Sample and data 
   The study examines annual reports and websites of the most active IBs over the world. The 
disclosure data measured using a content analysis technique. Data on explanatory variables found 
either on the annual reports, Zawya database or on the companies’ websites. This study limits 
analysis to 95 IBs due to limited data access and to the fact that measuring corporate disclosure 
levels by the traditional content analysis requires a considerable time and effort. The sample 
included the hard copy annual reports for 2013, as well as current disclosures on the IBs’ 
websites. As a starting point, this study examined official IBs websites in order to get 
information concerning the annual reports for 2013, internet reporting and any other reports for 
2013. IBs characteristics data as age, auditors… collected from IBs’ annual reports or websites.  
4.3.4.2 Construction disclosure indices with assessing the validity and reliability 
   This study tested that the index items are created from the classification procedures 
represented what we intended to represent. The author surveyed the items of the index and 
decided what that exact item was planned to measure (Beattie et al., 2004). In addition, it made 
sure that each item and the overall index closely related to SSB; CSR and Financial statements 
with footnotes in IBs as we carefully chose. This study developed the dimensions of our SSBR; 
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CSR and financial indices based on standards disclosure for IFIs issued by AAOIFI (mainly) and 
the previous literature (secondary). Furthermore, there are more than 200 IFIs located at more 
than 30 countries as members in AAOIFI, which reflect trust in these standards as a benchmark 
framework for Islamic banking system. To develop the reliability, the indices items checked twice 
and we discussed any possible discrepancies. This study made sure that the matching coder is 
constant overtime when coding the same item of the indices (stability), the coders produce the 
same consequences when coding the same item and accuracy as well as (Beattie et al., 2004) 
   For a valid implication, Weber (1990) argues that the classification procedure may be reliable 
and valid. The reliability and the validity of content analysis approaches need to review carefully. 
In human-scored schemes, reliability – that is, the reproducibility of the measurement – is a 
major concern (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Validity defined as ‘the extent to which any instrument 
measures what it is intended to measure’ (Marston and Shrives, 1991). Following many 
disclosure studies (Tsalavoutas et al., 2011; Hassan and Marston, 2010), validity ensured through 
the assessment of content validity. Hence, it achieved by relying on the literature while 
constructing the instrument to make sure that, the instrument contains relevant and adequate 
items to measure the three accountabilities’ pillars disclosures. Reliability is the extent to which 
the instrument produces the same results on repeated trials. For testing reliability, the following 
steps undertaken to form the basis for the development of the disclosure indices for this study: 
Stage 1: Adopting the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI governance standards No. 1; 2 and 5 
that reflect the Sharia accountability. It also adopts the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI 
financial standards No.1 that focusing on the presentation and disclosure of financial statements 
that reflect the financial accountability of IBs. Finally, this study adopts AAOIFI governance 
standard No.7 that guide IFI for social accountability. The researcher reviews the least available 
edition for AAOIFI, which is 2010 and 2014. Stage 2: Some modifications were made to the 
disclosure indices developed based on literature review (e.g., Farag et al., 2014; Rashid et al., 2013; 
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Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012; Vinnicombe, 2010; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; 
Besar et al., 2009; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006). Stage 3: Reviewing the index 
with four academics and five accountants and auditors who deal with banking’s reports and they 
are specialize in the area of disclosure and financial reporting to enhance the validity for the 
study; indices and results. Marston and Shrives (1991) argue that the index scores awarded to 
firms could be considered reliable if other researchers could replicate the same results.  
4.3.4.3 Model specification and variable measurement 
   To test for an association between disclosure levels and CG attributes in IBs, one overall index 
(OV Disc) and three sub-indices, corresponding to the three Categories have been calculated. 
The dependent variables listed and defined in Table 41 presents the definition of our dependent 
variables and the definitions and the source of information for each independent and dependent 
variables. The scores for the overall and sub-indices are calculated by assigning equal weightings 
to each item of disclosure, and the indices were derived by computing the ratio of actual scores 
awarded to the maximum possible score attainable for items that were applicable to each Islamic 
bank. Each item of disclosure was scored without a weighting on a dichotomous basis taking the 
commonly used approach of giving the item a score of 1, 0, or not applicable N/A (e.g., Ghazali 
and Weetman, 2006). To ensure that companies were not penalized for non-disclosure of 
irrelevant items each annual report (hard copy or on the companies’ websites) was read in its 
entirety, following Cooke (1991). Furthermore, all annual reports (hard copy or on the 
companies’ websites) were read twice to ensure consistency in scoring. The second examination 
was done after analysing all annual reports in the first round to ensure consistency in scoring. In 
the few cases where differences existed between the first and second scoring, the annual reports 
(hard copy or on the companies’ websites) were subjected to a third final assessment. This study 
uses the following OLS transformed multiple regression models: 
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OVD= 𝛽𝛽 0 + 𝛽𝛽 1 BLOCK + 𝛽𝛽 2 INST+ 𝛽𝛽 3 FORGN+ 𝛽𝛽 4 FAM+  𝛽𝛽 5 LISTED+ 
𝛽𝛽 6DUAL+ 𝛽𝛽 7 CEO Founder+ 𝛽𝛽 8 BDSIZE+ 𝛽𝛽 9 BDIND+ 𝛽𝛽 10 IAH+  𝛽𝛽 11 
AUDITOR+ 𝛽𝛽12 BKAGE+ 𝛽𝛽13 SAD+ ɛ                                                               (4) 
   This study uses the following regression models to examine the association between corporate 
governance voluntary disclosure subcategories and corporate governance mechanisms. It used 
the transformed OLS multiple regression for the following sub categories of corporate 
governance disclosure (SSB Disc; CSR Disc and FIN Disc): 
SSBD= 𝛽𝛽 0+ 𝛽𝛽 1 BLOCK+ 𝛽𝛽 2 INST+ 𝛽𝛽 3 FORGN+ 𝛽𝛽 4 FAM+  𝛽𝛽 5 LISTED+ 𝛽𝛽 6 
DUAL+ 𝛽𝛽7 CEO Founder+ 𝛽𝛽8 BDSIZE+ 𝛽𝛽9 BDIND+ 𝛽𝛽10 IAH+ 𝛽𝛽11 AUDITOR+ 
𝛽𝛽12 BKAGE+ 𝛽𝛽13 SAD+ ɛ                                                                                    (5) 
CSRD= 𝛽𝛽0+ 𝛽𝛽1 BLOCK+ 𝛽𝛽2 INST+ 𝛽𝛽3 FORGN+ 𝛽𝛽4 FAM+  𝛽𝛽5 LISTED+ 𝛽𝛽 6 
DUAL+ 𝛽𝛽7 CEO Founder+ 𝛽𝛽8 BDSIZE+ 𝛽𝛽9 BDIND+ 𝛽𝛽10 IAH+ 𝛽𝛽11 AUDITOR+ 
𝛽𝛽12 BKAGE+ 𝛽𝛽13 SAD+ ɛ                                                                                   (6) 
FIND= 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 BLOCK+ 𝛽𝛽2 INST+ 𝛽𝛽3 FORGN+ 𝛽𝛽4 FAM+  𝛽𝛽5 LISTED+ 𝛽𝛽6 
DUAL+ 𝛽𝛽7 CEO Founder+ 𝛽𝛽8 BDSIZE+ 𝛽𝛽9 BDIND+ 𝛽𝛽10 IAH+ 𝛽𝛽11 AUDITOR+ 
𝛽𝛽12 BKAGE+ 𝛽𝛽13 SAD+ ɛ                                                                                   (7) 
The disclosure score for each disclosure level is calculated as a ratio of the total items disclosed 
to 229 for model 4 (overall disclosure level); 20 for model 5 (SSB disclosure level); 95 for model 
6 (CSR disclosure level) and 114 for model 7 (financial disclosure level).  
Table 41: Model specification and variable measurement 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Variable description Predicted 
sign 
Data source 
Dependent variables 
OV Disc Overall disclosure index Total disclosure accountability level 
based on SSB; CSR and FS 
 Annual reports and 
Website 
SSB Disc Sharia Supervisory Board 
disclosure index  
Sharia disclosure accountability level 
based on SSB report 
 Annual reports and 
Website  
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CSR Disc Corporate Social 
Responsibility disclosure index    
Social disclosure accountability level 
based on CSR report 
 Annual reports and 
Website 
FIN Disc Financial disclosure index  Financial disclosure accountability level 
based on FS and footnotes 
 Annual reports 
Independent variables 
BLOCK Number of Block holders 
 
Number of block holders– shareholders 
whose ownership ≥5 % of total number 
of shares issued. 
- Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
INST Institutional ownership % of shares owned by Institutional 
shareholders 
+ Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
FORGN Foreign Ownership % of shares owned by Foreign 
shareholders 
+ Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
FAM Family Ownership % of shares owned by family - Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
DUAL Duality in position 1 if company's CEO serves as a board 
chairman, 0 otherwise 
- Annual reports 
CEO Founder CEO Founder 1 if company's CEO is the founder of 
the Islamic bank, 0 otherwise 
 Annual reports 
BDSIZE Board size The number of board members + Annual reports 
BDIND Board independence Ratio of the number of non-executive 
directors to the total number of the 
directors 
+ Annual reports 
IAH Investment account holders Total Profit-Sharing Investment account 
divided by total assets 
+ Annual reports 
Control variables 
Auditor Auditor  1=Bank’s financial statements were 
audited by Big 4 auditor;  otherwise= 0 
+ Annual report  
SAD Sharia Auditing department 1=Bank that has Sharia auditing 
department; otherwise= 0 
+ Annual report  
AGE Bank age Bank age + Bank website 
LISTED Listed share % of shares listed in the stock exchange + Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
4.3.5 Analysis  
4.3.5.1 Descriptive analysis 
   Table 42 shows the descriptive statistics for the independent variables. For disclosure level, the 
analysis shows that average Sharia disclosure is 40%; social disclosure is 28%; financial disclosure 
is 81% and finally aggregate disclosure is 50%. The average bank age is 21 years. The mean 
percentage of independent directors on the board is 40.5%. Average board size is 8 members. 
The average number of block holders is 2; mean institutional ownership is 65.8%; mean foreign 
ownership is 43.2%, mean family ownership is 2.3% and mean listed shares is12.4%. Only 10.4% 
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of Islamic bank's CEOs serve as a board chairman and 30.9% of CEOs are the founder of the 
Islamic bank. On average, the ration of investment account holders to total assets represents 
41%. 58% from selected Islamic banks audited through one of the 4big auditing firms and 52% 
from our selected banks has Sharia auditing department inside the bank.   
 Table 42: Descriptive statistics 
 N Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
OV Disc 95 0.496 0.142 0.26 0.82 
SSB Disc 95 0.398 0.256 0.00 0.93 
CSR Disc 95 0.281 0.183 0.04 0.68 
FIN Disc 95 0.811 0.044 0.69 0.93 
BLOCK 95 2.00 1.769 0 9 
FORGN 95 0.432 0.425 0 1 
INST 95 0.658 0.348 0 1 
FAM 95 0.023 0.112 0 1 
DUAL 95 0.104 0.306 0 1 
CEO founder 95 0.309 0.464 0 1 
BD SIZE 95 8.504 3.05 3 21 
BD IND 95 0.405 0.295 0 1 
IAH 95 0.410 0.305 0 0.884 
Auditor 95 0.576 0.496 0 1 
Age 95 20.65 13.34 2 86 
SAD 95 0.523 0.501 0 1 
LISTED 95 0.124 0.253 0 1 
OV Disc (overall disclosure): is the aggregate disclosure level based on SSBR; CSRD and FSD; SSB Disc: 
is the Sharia disclosure level based on SSB report; FIN Disclosure: is the financial disclosure level based 
on financial statements and footnotes;  BLOCK: Number of block holders– shareholders whose 
ownership ≥5 % of total number of shares issued;  FORGN: is the % of shares owned by Foreign 
shareholders; INST: is the % of shares owned by Institutional shareholders; FAM: is the % of shares 
owned by family; DUAL: is the Duality in position when company's CEO serves as a board chairman; 
CEO founder: is the company's CEO is the founder of the Islamic bank; BD SIZE: is the number of 
board members; BD IND: is the ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of 
the directors; IAH: is the  Total Profit-Sharing Investment account divided by total assets; Auditor: is the 
Bank’s financial statements were audited by Big 4 auditor; Age: is the Bank age; SAD: is the Bank that has 
Sharia auditing department; LISTED: is the % of shares listed in the stock exchange.  
4.3.5.2 Correlation analysis 
    Before, performing the multivariate analyses, we perform a correlation analysis. Table 43 
presents the correlation analysis between the overall voluntary disclosure (OV Disc) and 
independent variables. It shows that IBs with concentrated foreign ownership structured; with 
large board size, Auditor and SAD are more likely to provide higher levels of voluntary 
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disclosures. It shows that OV Disc positively correlated with FORGN (r 0.20), BDSIZE (r 0.37), 
Auditor (r 0.33) and SAD (r 0.44) and these correlations are statistically significant at the 5% and 
1% level. The Table also shows that Islamic bank with role duality is more likely to provide less 
voluntary disclosures. It shows that OV Disc negatively correlated with role duality (DUALT) (r 
−0.35) and this correlation is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Table 43: Pearson correlation Matrix (N=95) 
  (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) (I) (J) (K) (L) (M) (N) 
OV Disc (A) 1              
BLOCK (B) -0.03 1             
FORGN (C) 0.20** -0.11 1            
INST (D) -0.05 -0.13 0.30** 1           
FAM (E) 0.04 0.24* -0.16 -0.05 1          
LISTED (F) 0.09 0.03 -0.17* -0.31*** 0.29*** 1         
DUAL (G) -0.35*** -0.11 -0.22** 0.13 0.07 -0.13 1        
CEO founder (H) -0.01 0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.17* -0.06 0.11 1       
BD SIZE (I) 0.37*** -0.08 0.01 -0.20** 0.11 0.04 -0.32*** -0.03 1      
Board IND (J) -0.15 -0.15 0.05 0.07 -0.07 0.23*** -0.18** 0.06 -0.04 1     
IAH (K) 0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.04 -0.14 0.08 -0.12 -0.36*** 0.24*** -0.014 1    
Auditor (L) 0.33*** 0.03 0.28*** 0.14 0.03 0.09 -0.29*** -0.06 0.06 0.31*** -0.06 1   
Age (M) -0.05 -0.05 -0.11 0.25*** 0.01 -0.02 0.25** -0.37*** -0.03 0.02 0.21** -0.09 1  
SAD (N) 0.44*** 0.01 0.04 -0.19** 0.1 0.08 -0.16* 0.18** 0.21** -0.01 -0.03 0.31*** -0.15* 1 
OV Disc (overall disclosure): is the aggregate disclosure level based on SSBR; CSRD and FSD; BLOCK: Number of block holders– 
shareholders whose ownership ≥5 % of total number of shares issued;  FORGN: is the % of shares owned by Foreign shareholders; 
INST: is the % of shares owned by Institutional shareholders; FAM: is the % of shares owned by family; DUAL: is the Duality in 
position when company's CEO serves as a board chairman; CEO founder: is the company's CEO is the founder of the Islamic bank; BD 
SIZE: is the number of board members; BD IND: is the ratio of the number of non-executive directors to the total number of the 
directors; IAH: is the  Total Profit-Sharing Investment account divided by total assets; Auditor: is the Bank’s financial statements were 
audited by Big 4 auditor; Age: is the Bank age; SAD: is the Bank that has Sharia auditing department; LISTED: is the % of shares listed 
in the stock exchange. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% levels 
4.3.5.3 Discussion of Regressions results 
   Table 44 reports the regression results. This Table reports the cross-sectional OLS regressions 
for the aggregated Voluntary disclosure score (OV Disc) and the three subcategories (SSB Disc, 
CSR Disc and FIN Disc). The Table presents the R2, F-ratio, ß-coefficients and t-statistics for 
the four models. The regression results are unaffected by robustness testing. The Fisher test is 
significant in the four OLS models. 
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Table 44: Regression results 
 OV Disc SSB Disc CSR Disc FIN Disc 
BLOCK 0.02*** 
(2.59) 
0.018 
(1.56) 
0.004 
(0.42) 
0.039*** 
(4.94) 
FORGN 0.072** 
(1.96) 
0.117** 
(2.13) 
0.012 
(0.25) 
0.081** 
(2.14) 
INST 0.105** 
(2.25) 
0.076 
(1.08) 
0.059 
(0.98) 
0.191*** 
(3.98) 
FAM -0.271** 
(1.96) 
-0.36* 
(1.73) 
-0.198 
(1.10) 
-0.275** 
(1.94) 
DUAL -0.075 
(1.28) 
-0.156* 
(1.75) 
-0.115 
(1.52) 
0.044 
(0.72) 
CEO founder 0.07** 
(1.94) 
0.041 
(0.75) 
0.050 
(1.06) 
0.113*** 
(3.05) 
BD SIZE 0.024*** 
(6.06) 
0.025*** 
(4.10) 
0.018*** 
(3.45) 
0.032*** 
(7.67) 
Board IND -0.109* 
(1.94) 
-0.203*** 
(2.41) 
-0.207*** 
(2.86) 
0.078 
(1.36) 
IAH 0.009** 
(2.15) 
0.153** 
(1.94) 
0.073 
(1.08) 
0.093* 
(1.73) 
Auditor 0.078** 
(2.15) 
0.112** 
(2.05) 
0.039 
(1.48) 
0.049 
(1.33) 
Age 0.002* 
(1.86) 
0.001 
(0.75) 
0.003 
(1.58) 
0.003** 
(2.28) 
SAD 0.087*** 
(2.71) 
0.162*** 
(3.36) 
0.030 
(0.73) 
0.07** 
(2.15) 
LISTED 0.159*** 
(2.70) 
0.182** 
(2.05) 
0.128* 
(1.69) 
0.179*** 
(2.97) 
Adjusted R2 0.9364 0.8321 0.7470 0.9722 
F-value 104.02 36.68 21.67 245.90 
P-value 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
OV Disc (overall disclosure): is the aggregate disclosure level based on SSBR; CSRD and FSD; SSB Disc: is the 
Sharia disclosure level based on SSB report; FIN Disclosure: is the financial disclosure level based on financial 
statements and footnotes;  BLOCK: Number of block holders– shareholders whose ownership ≥5 % of total 
number of shares issued;  FORGN: is the % of shares owned by Foreign shareholders; INST: is the % of shares 
owned by Institutional shareholders; FAM: is the % of shares owned by family; DUAL: is the Duality in position 
when company's CEO serves as a board chairman; CEO founder: is the company's CEO is the founder of the 
Islamic bank; BD SIZE: is the number of board members; BD IND: is the ratio of the number of non-executive 
directors to the total number of the directors; IAH: is the  Total Profit-Sharing Investment account divided by 
total assets; Auditor: is the Bank’s financial statements were audited by Big 4 auditor; Age: is the Bank age; SAD: 
is the Bank that has Sharia auditing department; LISTED: is the % of shares listed in the stock exchange. ***, **, 
* indicates significance at the 1%, 5%and 10% levels 
   As reported in Table 44, for the overall (OV Disc) score, the OLS model reported an adjusted 
coefficient of determination (R2) of 93.63%. However, between the three models with sub 
scores as dependent variables, there are apparent differences in the adjusted coefficients of 
determination (R2). The highest explanatory power (97.22%) observed for the regression with 
FIN Disc as the dependent variable. With SSB DISC as the dependent variable, the regression 
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presents a high (R2) equal to (83.21%) and the lowest (R2), equal to 74.70%, is observed for the 
regression with CSRD as a dependent variable.  
   The results of the regression show that; there is a statistically significant interaction between 
corporate disclosures and CG variables among the sample firm. Concerned with the effect of 
firm characteristics on the extent of corporate disclosure; our four models show mixed results. 
Model (1) related to overall disclosure shows positive significant association for all CG variables 
except Family Ownership and Board independence with negative association and Duality, which 
has insignificant association with disclosure. Concerned with model (2) that measuring Sharia  
disclosure; it found positive association for Foreign Ownership; listed share; Board size and 
Investment account holders, whereas, Family Ownership; Duality in position and Board 
independence has a negative association with Sharia disclosure. Other variables that contain 
Block holders; Institutional ownership and CEO founder has no significant association with 
disclosure. Related to model (3) that focus on CSR disclosure; it shows positive association with 
listed share and board size. In contrast, this study finds negative association with board 
independence whereas other variables show no association with social disclosure. Finally; for 
model (4) that testing the association between financial disclosure and CG; this study found 
positive association between disclosure and Block holders; Foreign Ownership; Institutional 
ownership; Listed share; CEO founder; Board size and IAH. Furthermore, it found negative 
association between disclosure and Family Ownership and with no significant association with 
other variables.     
    Concerned with Foreign Ownership; the analysis show positive relationship between this 
variable and overall; Sharia and financial disclosure at 5% level.  Mangena and Tauringana (2007) 
offer the evidence of the association between disclosure and foreign ownership relationship. 
They found a positive association between the two variables. This is consistent with the findings 
of Nekhili et al (2012) that document foreign investors are more likely to influence positively the 
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level of disclosure. This suggests that companies with high foreign ownership report more 
disclosures as a proactive legitimacy strategy to satisfy foreign investors so that they get more 
foreign capital. This suggests that foreign share ownership enhance disclosure in the annual 
report for IBs. Thus, this study accepted H3.1 for all categories of disclosure expect social 
disclosure. The result concerned with Institutional ownership illustrates a positive association 
with overall and financial disclosure at 5% level for overall model and at 1% level for financial 
model. Similar results have been reported in Barako et al (2006) who found positive relationship 
between institutional ownership with disclosure. On the other hand, Naser et al (2002) could not 
document any significant relationship between Institutional ownership and firms' disclosure. 
Thus, partially it accepted H3.2. Agency theory predicts that ownership structure affects the level 
of monitoring in the firm; therefore, it has an impact on the level of corporate voluntary 
disclosure (Eng and Mak, 2003). Firms with a concentrated ownership structure do not have to 
disseminate more SSFD information, because the key shareholders can easily obtain it, as they 
usually have access to that information. For family ownership, it finds a negative significant 
coefficient of the interaction with overall disclosure; Sharia disclosure and financial disclosure at 
5%; 10% and 5% respectively. This outcomes is supported the results of the previous studies 
(Belal and Owen, 2007) that find a negative association between the disclosure and family 
ownership. Based on this result; this study accepted H3.3. In a more concentrated ownership 
situation as a family onwership, the impact on disclosure is more complicated. When ownership 
control is high enough to ensure its position, management has the incentive to behave against 
the interests of smaller shareholders because of its strong voting power to appoint someone it 
trusts to be CEO, directors or board chairman. Firms may be more likely to disclose less 
information because less demand for information exists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 ). 
    Disclosure is indicator of CG framework quality (Aksu and Kosedag, 2006) and evidence 
provided by Beeks and Brown (2005) show that strong CG mechanism has positive 
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consequences on enhancing corporate disclosures. Therefore, firms with an institutionalized CG 
structure would be more transparent than firms that have weaker corporate governance 
frameworks. To block holders; the result shows significant association with overall and financial 
disclosure at the 1% level. The result is matching with Tsamenyi et al (2007); Marston and Polei 
(2004) who found that the level of disclosure is significantly related with block holder ownership. 
Their results suggest that firms with block shareholders disclosed more. Thus, this study partially 
rejected H3.4. Marston and Polei (2004) argue that shareholders who own only a small 
percentage of stocks in a firm have limited access to information about the company. Therefore, 
it is likely that firms with a more dispersed ownership of shares may disclose more information 
to satisfy investors’ needs. In contrast, investors with large equity shares in a company can 
obtain information about the company from internal sources. Thus, more closely held firms are 
more likely to disclose less information because their large investors can access internal sources 
of information. 
    Furthermore, Investment account holders are positively associated with three category of CG 
disclosure, which are overall; Sharia and financial disclosure at 5%; 5% and 10% respectively. 
Hypothesis H5 shows that disclosure increases with increase of IAH. Consequently, we accepted 
this hypothesis. This study tests the relationship between CEO duality and the extent of Sharia; 
social and financial disclosures. It documents a negative association with Sharia disclosure at 10% 
level. It also shows insignificant coefficient for other kinds of disclosure. In other words, it 
implies that CEO duality does not influence overall; social and financial disclosures for the 
sample banks. The finding seems to suggest that the custom of selecting the CEO and chair 
from the same family has turned the CG mechanism of CEO/chair duality into a mere ritual and 
has not an impact on the level of disclosure. The result is consistent with prior empirical 
evidence that support the conclusion about a negative association between CEO duality and 
disclosure (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013; Khan et al., 2013; Hussainey and AlNajar, 2011). 
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Therefore, this study partially accepts H3.6. Concentration of decision-making power resulting 
from role duality may impair the board’s governance role regarding SSF disclosure policies (Li et 
al., 2008). This study finds that the coefficient estimates on board size are statistically positive 
significant in the 4 OLS disclosure models at the 1% level. These findings are in line with prior 
research (Samaha et al., 2015; Elshandidy et al., 2013). Thus, this study fully accepted H3.7 that 
reflects a positive association between board size and disclosure. This result supported the 
argument about positive association between board size and SSFD, as larger boards’ members 
would have more incentives to signal their SSF performance to the firm shareholders. Moreover, 
large board may help in increasing number of members who have Sharia, financial and 
accounting background, which could affect mangers voluntary disclosure decisions and extend 
SSFD level. In addition, it suggests that large boards are less likely to dominant by 
themanagement (Hussainey &Wang, 2010). Furthermore, large boards lead to increase the 
expertise diversity in the board.  
     For the listed share, result shows positive association with overall disclosure at 1% level; with 
Sharia disclosure at 5% level; with social disclosure at 10% level and with financial disclosure at 1% 
level. This result is consisting with (Robb et al., 2001). Therefore, this study fully accepted H3.8. 
Furthermore, this study examines the relationship between board independence and the level of 
disclosures. It finds a negative significant coefficient at 10% for overall disclosure and 1% for 
both of Sharia and social disclosure. This result is contrast with work of (Donnely and Mulcahy, 
2008; Lim et al., 2007) that find a positive association between the two variables. Consequently, 
this study rejected H3.9. Eng and Mak (2003) suggest that the presence of outside directors may 
limit management opportunism. Further, non-executive directors are perceived as being 
respected advisors who should increase the quality of a firm’s disclosure (Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002). As it finds significant positive association between CEO founder and overall disclosure as 
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well as, financial disclosure at the 5% and 1% level respectively, hypothesis H3.10 is partially 
accepted. This finding for IBs is line with prior research of Collett and Hrasky (2005). 
   In relation to control variables, it finds that Auditor is statistically positive significant in overall 
and Sharia disclosure models at the 5% level. It also finds a positive association between age of 
bank and overall disclosure at the 10% level and at the 5% level for financial disclosure. It usually 
expected that old firms arrange for voluntary disclosure more often than new ones. Finally, the 
coefficient estimates found that SAD is statistically positive significant for overall; Sharia and 
financial disclosure at the 1%; 1% and 5% level respectively.  
4.3.6 Conclusion Remark  
   The association between corporate governance mechanisms and corporate disclosure has been 
examined in the previous studies. However, limited studies examine the extent to which 
corporate governance mechanisms affect Islamic banks’ decisions to voluntarily report corporate 
information in their annual reports as well as websites concerned with SSFD. This study extends 
and contributes to recent governance and disclosure literature (e.g., Gisbert and Navallas, 2013; 
Samaha et al., 2012) by offering empirical evidence on the impact of a comprehensive set of 
corporate governance variables on a holistic corporate disclosure that contain SSF for a large 
sample of IBs. In this study, the relations between CG and multi disclosure examined.  
   For the purpose of this study, it investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms 
on CSRD; SSBD and FD in 95 IBs based on data at 2013. In terms of overall disclosure practice, 
we find that there are generally low levels of disclosure about Sharia and social whereas financial 
disclosure is high.  To sum up, the reasons for the variances in the category of disclosure level 
may attributed to the lack of legal CG disclosure requirements and adopting IFRS or partial 
compliance with Islamic standards as AAOIFI. Regarding the determinants of SSFD concerned 
with CG and after controlling auditor; age and SAD; it finds interesting result with respect to the 
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interaction between CG and multi disclosures dimensions. This study found a positive 
association between disclosures and block holders; foreign ownership; institutional ownership; 
listed share; CEO founder; board size and Investment account holders 
    Moreover, it observed a negative association with family ownership; duality in position and 
board independence. The insignificant association between ownership structures (foreign 
ownership; institutional ownership and family ownership) and financial disclosure are consistent 
with Ghazali and Weetman (2006) who found ownership structure is not statistically significant 
in explaining disclosure. The results show that; association between disclosure and CG variables 
differ based on nature of the disclosure. Moreover, the study’ outcomes shows that CG 
mechanism has an equal consequences on the financial as well as non-financial disclosure. The 
findings in the study may interpret with a number of caveats. Firstly, the sample size and nature 
may be a source of criticism. Whilst this sample is contains only IBs as a category for IFIs. 
Nevertheless, future studies may endeavour to use larger sample size that contains other kinds of 
IFIs as Takaful (insurances firms). CG mechanism contains only variables related to board of 
disclosure. Supplementary research may consider CG variables that concerned with Sharia 
supervisory board particularly when we exploring Islamic banks that guided by Sharia. It would 
be interesting to examine the impacts of CG mechanism on the firm value of IBs. 
    The succeeding chapter (5) contains two empirical studies that aim to measuring the 
consequences of SSFD.  It aims to identify the impacts of disclosure on the firm value or what 
we called economic consequences.  It furthermore aims to investigate the influence of disclosure 
on stakeholders’’ behaviour or what we called non-economic consequences.    
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Chapter Five: Consequences of Disclosure                                                                     
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter outlines the result of empirical studies related to consequences of SSF disclosure. 
It is dividends into two studies. First, one related to economic consequences of disclosure. The 
second study is concerned with non-economic consequences of disclosure. The overview about 
the two studies (aim; methodology and results) presented as follows:           
Empirical study (4): Economic Consequences of Multi-Corporate Disclosure: Evidence 
from IBs:  
    This study examines the impact of multi-corporate disclosure, which contain Sharia; social and 
financial level on the firm value (FV) for 33 IBs across 12 countries based on data of 2013. It 
finds, after controlling firms' characteristics and corporate governance’ variables that the Sharia; 
social and overall disclosure have a positive impact on the FV based on the accounting-based 
measure (ROA). It also finds that Sharia as well as overall disclosure has a positive significant 
impact on the FV based on market-based measure Market Capitalization (MC). It argues that the 
association between disclosure and FV is sensitive to the type of disclosure, and the proxy 
employed for FV. The evidence contributes to the literature suggesting that IBs can differentiate 
themselves and enhancing their value through enhancing their overall disclosure and their Sharia 
as well as social information. These results inform regulatory bodies as AAOIFI; investors; 
stakeholders and the academic literature about the potential economic consequences of these 
categories of disclosure for IBs and other Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs).   
Empirical study (5): The non-economic consequence of disclosure: Evidence from IBs:  
    This study aims to examining the effect of Sharia; social and financial disclosure on 
stakeholders’ loyalty towards Islamic banks. It aims also to examining to what extent trust and 
satisfaction mediate this effect. The study uses data collected from 600 respondents to survey 
215 
 
questionnaires disseminated to stakeholders from 15 countries dealing with Islamic banks. 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) is adopting with a partial least squares (PLS) approach. The 
results indicate that, there is a significant association of disclosure on stakeholders’ trust, 
satisfaction, and loyalty. The results also indicate that, there is a partial mediating of trust and 
satisfaction in the relationship between disclosure and loyalty. This study is one of the first 
studies examining the effect of disclosure on stakeholders’ loyalty. This study provides novel 
findings having theoretical and practical implications for disclosure in Islamic banks and their 
relationship with stakeholders. 
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Empirical study (4): Economic Consequences of Multi-Corporate 
Disclosure: Evidence from Islamic Banks 
5.4.1 Introduction 
   Demand for financial reporting and disclosure ascends from information asymmetry and 
agency conflicts between managers and stockholders (Kothari et al., 2009). The corporate 
disclosures can help diminution the information gap, enhance the credibility of financial 
reporting, and add to empathetic the role of accounting information in valuation firm. Klein et al 
(2005) have documented the consequences of disclosure on FV. Moreover, the greater 
availability of corporate information can improve capital market efficiency and attract investors 
(Wang et al., 2008). Hassan et al (2009) state that disclosure is a mechanism to mitigate agency 
costs arising from the possibility that managers may not act in the best interest of shareholders. 
Disclosure is a mechanisms that allowing investors to increase their ability in firm’ monitoring as 
well as enhancing FV (Pagano et al., 2002).  
   IBs are institutions that guided by Sharia and differentiate themselves by compliance with 
Islamic law and serving the society as well as achieve high financial performance. According to 
Al-Gazzali as reported in Kamla (2007) the purpose of Sharia is “to promote the welfare of the 
people, which lies in safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, their prosperity and their 
wealth” (p.112). Iqbal and Mirakhor (2007) argue that IBs is very comparable to conventional 
banking, except that contracts must comply with Sharia. Fuad et al (2011) explain the need and 
importance of Sharia compliance for IBs. IBs play a significant role in economic regeneration 
and social justice (Siddiqi, 1995). This acknowledged by El-Ashker (1987) “Social activities are 
emphasized in IBs’ articles of association among their objectives and functions” (p. 45). IBs’ 
system needs to reconstruct pre-modern contracts by strictly embedding Sharia and social 
responsibility into the banks’ business practices (El-Gamal, 2006). IBs practice of moral 
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economy philosophy illustrated for religious and support the inclusion of social aims in their 
investment policies (Belal et al., 2014). IBs may comply with Sharia  to obey Allah then satisfy all 
stakeholders (Sharia  accountability), endeavour to achieve a balance between providing 
sufficient returns to their shareholders (financial accountability) while at the same time not 
neglecting their social activities (social accountability). However, there is a little direct empirical 
evidence with regard to the relationship between disclosure and FV in general and for IBs in 
particular. Thus, the main purpose of this study is to determine the impact of multi different 
categories of disclosure that contain SSF dimensions on FV. Prior literature has investigated 
disclosure levels of firms and determinants of disclosure; whereas there is not a sizable body of 
research that examine the impact of disclosure on FV (Uyar and Kılıc, 2012). Thus, there is a 
need for elaboration on the value that corporate information has in IBs.  
One of motivations behind this research is that the impact of disclosure on FV is still an 
empirical issue (Hassan et al., 2009). As pointed out by Al-Akra et al (2010), there is little 
empirical evidence to support that association. Hassan et al (2009) touched upon this issue and 
stated, “There is little direct empirical evidence with regard to the relationship between 
disclosure and FV” (p.80). Thus, we motivated to conducting an empirical study in IBs to shows 
for what extent disclosure about SSF can add value for these banks. It also motivated by rare 
studies that explore the impacts of different kind of disclosure on the FV. Teoh and Thong 
(1984) just focused on the social disclosure. Vogel (2005) argues that results related to the link 
between disclosure and FV remaining inconclusive. Such inconclusiveness creates ground for 
further investigation not just for CSRD, but also for other kinds of disclosure. Evidence 
proposes proactive social accountability enhance firm value (Alvarez et al., 2001) which asking 
further research about the impacts of Sharia disclosure on the FV. Elzahar (2013) argued that 
link between FV and disclosure is sensitive to the type of disclosure, and the proxy employed for 
FV. This argument is asking further research for IBs. Astonishingly, there is absence of academic 
research that investigates the prospective economic consequences and valuation implications 
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Sharia and social disclosure for IBs. Focusing on the IBs, AAOIFI has issued accounting and 
governance standards to organize these kinds of disclosure for all IFIs. But, none of the previous 
studies are measuring the economic consequences for disclosure of IBs based on this benchmark. 
Finally, this study is motivated by a lack of research on financial reporting disclosures and by 
calls for research on the valuation implications of such disclosures (Hassan et al., 2009; Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008). 
This study makes several incremental contributions to the literature of disclosure and 
economic consequences. Although, there have been a rare empirical studies investigating the link 
between disclosure and financial performance in the banking sector, as far as I know, this is the 
first study to empirically investigate this relationship in IBs using a more holistic disclosure. Thus, 
we classify the holistic disclosure index into three main categories. The first includes items 
related to Sharia disclosure; the second category includes those expected to be disclosed 
concerned with social activities. The third category contains items related to financial dimension. 
The study offers a unique contribution to existing literature by looking at the economic 
consequences of disclosure in IBs around the world. This study contributes to the literature by 
extending the traditional research on corporate disclosure beyond the narrow focus of financial 
disclosure to contain disclosure that is more comprehensive for IBs. This study also contributes 
to the extant literature by indicating the positive firm value arising from voluntary disclosure of 
comprehensive information. However, despite several studies having gone on to investigate this 
relationship, the exploring impacts of multi categories of disclosure on the FV for IBs have 
seldom been explored  
   Prior studies have generally suggested that the level of disclosure positively related to FV; it 
remains unclear whether an increase for information can guarantee a better MC as well as 
profitability. Thus, the potential effect of disclosure on FV efficiency is still an open empirical 
question particularly for IBs. This study fills this gap in the literature by providing a direct 
analysis of the relationship between disclosure and FV through adopting different measures of 
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FV (ROA and MC). This study focus on IBs that provides a unique empirical setting allowing us 
to differentiate clearly between impacts of Sharia; social and financial disclosure on FV. Our 
study contributes to the literature by showing that corporate disclosure is a prerequisite for 
efficient FV. This suggests that policymakers as well as accounting bodies as AAOIFI may 
seriously consider the quality and comprehensive of SSF information when attempting to 
facilitate capital market efficiency for IBs by introducing a new form of disclosure’ standards. 
Prior economic consequences studies tend to focus on the cost of equity and remain relatively 
silent over the FV (Dhaliwal et al., 2011). The findings generate incremental insights to managers 
who seek to enhance the FV of IBs. Moreover, we add to the disclosure literature by examining 
the impacts of financial and nonfinancial disclosure on the FV. Prior studies mostly focus on the 
different categories of financial disclosures and found mixed results (Francis et al., 2008). Our 
evidence on the impacts of financial as well as non-financial disclosure on the FV contribute to 
prior disclosure literature by proposing an extended boundary which the different forms of 
disclosures can have different effects on FV.  
The dominant build of literature on disclosure may congregate into three tracks. The first 
track uses content analysis for determining the disclosure level as described in the annual reports 
(e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007). The second track identifies the main factors behind disclosure 
(e.g., Farook et al., 2011). The third track investigates the consequences for disclosure (Elzahar et 
al., 2015). This study is motivated to bridge a perceived gap between the first and third broad 
strands. This study observed from the previous studies in the third track that; the previous 
studies focused on the impacts of increased disclosure on the cost of capital (Kothari et al., 2009); 
analysts’ forecasts (Wang et al., 2013); financial performance (Wang et al., 2008) and share price 
anticipation of earnings (Schleicher et al., 2007). Secondly, the majority of studies adopt 
disclosure index to explore the economic impacts of disclosure (Volkov and Smith, 2015; 
Moumen et al., 2015). This track is focused mainly on the international firms and conventional 
banks in developed countries as UK (Elzahar et al., 2015). Rare studies that measuring the 
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association between disclosure and FV (Uyar and Kilic, 2012). This strand is located in the early 
research stage– to the best of our knowledge –for IBs. However, exploring these consequences 
have not yet been investigated empirically in IBs based on different kinds of disclosure 
particularly Sharia and social. Moreover, related to first strand, rare studies measuring Sharia 
disclosure separately and measuring the impacts of this kind on FV. 
   This study is concerned with, but differs from, the work of Richardson and Welker (2001); 
Dhaliwal et al (2011); that examine the impact of social disclosure on FV. This study examines a 
broader concept of disclosure which includes SSF dimensions42. This study also differs from 
Richardson and Welker (2001), who examine the relation between the cost of capital and social 
as well as financial disclosure. This study added further dimension of disclosure which is Sharia 
disclosure in additional to using ROA and MC as a proxies for FV. This research also differs 
from prior research (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006) based on a holistic disclosure 
index. This study constructs comprehensive model to measuring the three main categories of 
disclosure for IBs. This study focused on IBs whereas the previous studies focused on non-
Islamic firm (Elzahar et al., 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). This study differs from works of Dong 
et al., 2015 that explore the non-financial disclosure. This study contains financial and non-
financial disclosure. Prior studies were limited to a single country or institution (Al-Mehmadi, 
2004), but, sample contains IBs in 12 countries. This study differs from outcomes of Wang et al 
(2013); Moumen et al (2015) that explore the economic consequences for disclosure on the cost 
of capital; share price and earnings forecasts, whereas this study is focus on the FV. Moumen et 
al (2015) measure one kind of disclosure, which is risk, whereas this study measure different 
categories of disclosure. To my best knowledge, this study is among the first to examine the 
impacts of multi different categories of disclosure on the FV for IBs.       
     The study’ findings show significant positive association between disclosure level and FV 
based on accounting and market measures. In the two panels, we find a positive association 
42 Most prior research on the relation between disclosure and FV focuses on financial disclosure (Leuz and Wysocki 
2008).  
221 
 
                                               
between Sharia and overall disclosure with FV. Related to accounting-based measure; it finds a 
positive impact of social disclosure on ROA. In both of panels, we find no association between 
financial disclosure and FV. Related to control variables; it finds significant impacts of size, 
accounting standards, SAD, Leverage and risk on the corporate disclosure, whereas; we find no 
significant association between FV and CG mechanism. The remainder of this study structured 
as follows; section 5.4.2 provides a discussion of the consequences of disclosure from an Islamic 
approach. Section 5.4.3 reviews the previous studies; theoretical framework and hypothesis 
development. Research design present in section 5.4.4. Section 5.4.5 provides a discussion of the 
results. The research conclusion; implications; limitations and suggestions for future work 
presented in section 5.4.6. 
5.4.2 Consequences of disclosure from an Islamic approach  
   Allah said, “Whoever does a good deed - it is for himself; and whoever does evil - it is against the self” (Quran, 
45:15). This verse shows that from an Islamic approach; Muslims’ as well as IBs’ acts have 
consequence whatever good or bad. The good consequences for Muslim and IBs’ deeds can 
summarize in El-falah or success. This success or rewards based on Sharia can dividends into 
two groups which are earth’ rewards and heaven’ rewards or success as Allah said, “Those who 
believed and feared Allah, for them are good tidings in the worldly life and in the Hereafter” (Quran, 10:63, 64). 
Quran containing more than 200 verses about the Heaven’ consequences and earth’ rewards for 
Muslims as well as corporations’ acts. The heaven’ consequences can reflect in one word 
‘Paradise’. Allah saying, “For them who have done good is the best [reward] and extra, No darkness will cover 
their faces, nor humiliation. Those are companions of Paradise; they will abide therein eternally” (Quran, 11:26). 
The earth’ consequences for Muslim as well as IBs’ acts can dividend into satisfaction of Allah 
and economic success. Allah said, "O my servants, who have believed, fear your Lord. For those who do 
good in this world is good” (Quran, 39:10). Concerned with economic consequences for IBs’ acts 
approved by several verses as Allah said “Indeed, those who recite the Book of Allah and establish prayer 
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and spend [in His cause] out of what we have provided them, secretly and publicly, [can] expect a profit that will 
never perish. That He may give them in full their rewards and increase for them of His bounty” (Quran, 35:29, 
30). Qard Hassan in Islam provides great opportunities for IBs to assume a special social role in 
society as well as obey Allah (Farook, 2008)43. Qard Hassan and its rewards is one of the main 
examples for economic consequences for IBs’ acts as Allah said, “Who is it that would loan Allah a 
goodly loan so He may multiply it for him many times over?” (Quran, 2:244). Thus, we can argue that acts 
of IBs as a Muslim has economic impacts. In this research; we focused on the Earth’ Rewards 
for IBs, which can express in ‘Baraka’ or blessed and translated into high FV.   
     IBs need to meet several accountabilities as gain profit; serving society and satisfy religious 
obligations. These accountabilities as main acts for IBs may conduct as well as disclose 
information about it. Disclosure from an Islamic approach is an essential requirement from Allah 
“Give full measure and do not be of those who cause loss, and weigh with an even balance” (Quran, 26:181). 
Quran is containing more than 25 verses about the importance of disclosure. From an Islamic 
perspective; disclosure is addressed to Allah first then into all stakeholders. Allah said “O my 
people, give full measure and weight in justice and do not deprive the people of their due and do not commit abuse 
on the earth, spreading corruption” (Quran, 11:85). 
   Jackson (1982) declared that; “accountability explains and rationalizes what has been done, 
what is currently being done and what is to be done” (p.144). Accountability, therefore, contains 
disclosing more information (Naser et al., 2006). One of the primary objectives of reporting 
from an Islamic perspective is to ensure that the business discharges the Islamic concept of 
accountability (Maali et al., 2006). In the context of Islam, accountability is first and foremost to 
God (Allah), it nonetheless explicitly requires companies to make accurate, fair, timely and 
transparent disclosure of financial and non-financial information for the whole stakeholders 
(Abu-Tapanjeh, 2009). IBs are expected to disclose comprehensive information to the Muslims 
nation about how their activities meet Sharia’ goals and improve the security of society (Lewis, 
43 Farook (2008) explains that by implementing Qard Hassan in their institutions, IBs can channel funds from 
depositors and customers and allocate them to those who need them most  
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2001). Hassan (2005) argues that the majority Muslims dominated society expects higher level of 
disclosure practices for IBs. Such disclosure is a communication mechanism in promoting 
Islamic values practiced by these banks. Disclosure has an impact through getting satisfaction of 
Allah. Allah said, “Whoever does righteousness, whether male or female, while he is a believer - We will surely 
cause him to live a good life, and we will surely give them their reward in the Hereafter according to the best of 
what they used to do” (Quran, 16:97). Allah asked his servants to disclose everything by accurate and 
trustful way. Thus, this study expects full disclosure about SSF activities for IBs and it expects 
economic consequences for these disclosures on FV 
5.4.3 Theoretical framework; Literature and hypothesis development 
The influence of disclosure on FV can be understood based on 2 theories; signalling and 
economic theory.  Signalling theory is the main theoretical framework that used to explain the 
association between disclosure and FV. Based on this theory, comprehensive disclosure signals 
better CG mechanisms and fewer agency conflicts, therefore leading to higher FV (Sheu et al., 
2010). Curado et al (2011) point out that corporate disclosure influences FV as perceived by 
markets. Gordon et al (2010) illustrate that disclosures send signals to the marketplace, which 
expected to increase a firm’s net present value and its stock market value. Cormier et al. (2011) 
claim that, disclosure delivers value-relevant information to stock markets. Gallego-Alvarez et al 
(2010) provided evidence that disclosure have a positive consequence on shareholder value 
creation. Economic theory argues that increased corporate disclosure has an influence on FV 
(Lundholm and Van Winkle, 2006). First, better quality information permits investors to make 
accurate appraisals of the parameters underlying the future stock returns, lessening non-
diversifiable estimation risk and uncertainty about future cash flows as well as future profitability 
(Clarkson et al., 1996). Second, through enhanced disclosure, the willingness for investors to 
trade is increase in additional to increases the shares’ liquidity and improving FV (Easley and 
O’Hara, 2004). Economic theory advocates that increased voluntary disclosures level reduce 
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information asymmetries between the firm and market participants, which increase the firm’s 
stock liquidity as well as enhancing FV (Beyer et al., 2010).  
   The importance of corporate disclosure arises from being a means of communication between 
management and outside investors and market participants. Enhanced corporate disclosure 
believed to mitigate asymmetry problem and agency conflicts (Lambert et al., 2007). The 
consequences of increasing disclosure level often discussed in terms of reduced mispricing; 
cumulative profitability and growing FV (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002). Consequent empirical 
studies provide supporting evidence about the association between disclosure and FV. For 
instance, Healy et al (1999) find that firms with expanded disclosure level experience substantial 
corresponding increases in FV. The direct effects of the corporate disclosures have possible to 
change the FV by affecting managers’ decisions and hence varying the distribution of future cash 
flows (Lambert et al., 2007). Thus, improved corporate disclosure may increase the market value 
for firms (Elzahar et al., 2015). Concerned with the economic consequences for social disclosure; 
Legitimacy theory argues that corporation may be enthusiastic to disclose social information to 
legitimize its position within society (Deegan et al., 2002). McDonald and Rundle-Thiele (2008) 
find influence of CSR on the corporate profitability through creation of intangible assets as good 
reputation, trust and commitment, which drive the long-term success of the business. This 
improves the firm’s ability to attract resources, enhance performance, and build competitive 
advantages and enhancing FV (Fombrun et al., 2000). Widespread preceding research proposes 
that disclosure reporting can influence positively on stakeholders’ perceptions of firm 
performance and thereby on firms’ profitability and share price (Lourenco et al., 2012).  
Extensive literatures explore the impacts of disclosure generally, but the number of studies 
that investigated the influence of disclosure on FV is limited. Several empirical studies concluded 
that voluntary disclosure enhancing investors’ ability to predict future earnings, which have 
consequences on FV (e.g., Hussainey et al., 2003). Stakeholders view non-disclosure of 
information as unfavourable, which can mark the FV down (Verrecchia, 1983). Rhodes and 
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Soobaroyen (2010) argue that disclosure can curtail agency problems by decreasing information 
asymmetry, thus enhance FV. Al-Akra et al (2010) specified the existence association between 
disclosure and FV using panel data for Jordanian listed companies. Sheu et al (2010) specifies 
that the market provide a higher valuation only to those corporations that elect to disclose 
inclusive information. Gordon et al (2010) conducted a study in Untied States (US) about value 
relevance of information security disclosures and provided strong evidence that voluntarily 
disclosed information are associated positively with the FV. Anam et al (2011) proved that the 
extent of disclosure has a significant positive effect on the FV based on MC. Previous studies 
reveal that increasing disclosure level results in decreasing misevaluation of share price, hence 
increasing firm’s MC (Anam et al., 2011). Garay et al (2013) find that an increase of 1% in the 
corporate disclosure causes an upsurge of 0.15% in the Tobin's Q and an increase of 0.0119% in 
the firm's ROA. Dhaliwal et al (2011) find a positive association between FV and disclosure 
based on investigate the link between the cost of equity and CSRD. Thus, the largest portion of 
studies shows a positive relationship. This study hypothesis that  
H4.1 The level of Sharia; social and financial disclosure of IBs is positively associated 
with the firm value  
5.4.4 Research design  
   This study analyses the content of corporate annual reports and web sites on the presence of 
Sharia; social and financial information44. The sample consists of 33 IBs across 12 countries. The 
fiscal year of 2013 chosen to ensure a reasonable access to bank, reports’ and gives a reasonable 
picture of full disclosure practice. The sample selection considers only those IBs fully Sharia 
approved as well as availability of information concerned with MC45. It collects our variables 
44 Kothari et al (2009) indicate that annual report is a widely favoured information source as well as Internet sites 
which provide information that facilitates external users to better understand the true economic picture of the 
business  
45 The sample in the first stage was 117 IBs from 20 countries. But based on the availability of MC for these banks 
in many database (banker; bank scope; data stream); It contains only 33 IBs that located in 12 countries in our 
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related to firm characteristics and CG mechanism from bank scope; DataStream and banker 
database. The disclosure index consists of 229 items classified into: Sharia accountability (20 
items); social accountability (95 items) and financial accountability (114 items) as shown 
empirical study (1). Sharia disclosure index reflects two categories; items related to SSB report 
and items related to SSB members. Social disclosure index reflects 12 categories of social 
information as employees’ welfare; environmental policy; earnings prohibited by Sharia; 
customers’ services; late repayments; micro business; Zakat; charitable activities and Waqf. The 
index also reflects 15 categories of financial information as general information; footnotes and 
information related to seven financial statements.  
  In line with previous research, this study focuses on self-reported information that provided 
by the firms in their annual reports (Gray et al., 1995) as well as websites. To assess the level of 
multi corporate disclosure, the study uses content analysis to explore if certain themes related to 
SSF are present (or absent) from IBs. The process of constructing the disclosure index involved 
several steps. The first step was to select an initial list of items of information that IBs might 
disclose related to SSF items. The list is constructed based on AAOIFI accounting and 
governance standards as ideal Islamic standards for all IFIs and previous studies that explore the 
three accountabilities for IBs. It adopts the disclosure requirements of AAOIFI governance 
standard No. 1 related to SSBR. It also adopts AAOIFI governance standard No.7 that 
concerned with social accountability. Finally, it adopts AAOIFI accounting standard No.1 
related to presentations of financial statements. Secondly; it made some modifications to the 
disclosure indices based on literature review that measuring the three accountabilities of IBs (e.g., 
Rashid et al., 2013; Kamla and Rammal, 2013; Aribi and Gao, 2012; Hassan and Harahap, 2010; 
Besar et al., 2009; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006; Haniffa and Cooke, 2005).  
sample. IBs in this sample is high comparing with samples in other previous studies that measuring disclosure for 
IBs (e.g., Belal et al., 2014 (1 bank); Kamla and Rahman, 2013 (19 IBs); Hassan et al., 2012 (16 IBs); Aribi et al., 
2012 (21 IBs)).    
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The list further revised by using a sample of banks' annual reports to find out what IBs did 
actually disclose. The amended list of items of information was applied to the entire sample of 
banks and filtered for items of information that were rarely or never disclosed by the sample 
banks over the research period. Thirdly; once these disclosure indices were created, it was 
necessary to assess whether they were relatively reliable proxies for the extent of disclosure. Thus, 
we review the indices with 3 academics and 3 professionals to enhance the validity of indices and 
results. Consequently, the checklist contains totally 229 items. Furthermore, the reliability of the 
multi disclosure scores checked based on the Cronbach alpha score, which commonly used to 
assess the level of agreement between two or more coders. Previous studies tend to suggest that 
alpha values of 75 % or above considered generally acceptable (Holder-Webb et al., 2009). This 
study obtains the value of 0.86 for this metric, which support the reliability of our indices. It also 
tests reliability by follow additional method of Marston and Shrives (1991). Consequently, the 
index is tested by 2 researchers and shows the same results without significant variances 
Dependent variables: Empirical studies used different proxies in order to measuring FV. 
Among 95 studies that Margolis and Walsh (2001) reviewed, 49 adopted accounting measures, 12 
adopted market measures and the rest used a mixed set. It uses two alternative dependent 
variables associated with FV to test our hypothesis which is consisting with several literatures 
(Sheu et al., 2010; Barontini and Caprio, 2006). The two measures have diverse theoretical 
implications (Hillman and Keim, 2001). First, this study uses MC, which used in the corporate 
disclosure literature (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013). Second, it uses ROA which is used extensively 
in the disclosure literature (e.g., Garay et al., 2013; Aras et al., 2010; Holmstrom and Kaplan, 
2003; Klapper and Love, 2002). It follows approach of Matsumoto et al (2011) who adopt 
accounting and market-based measures to me assuring FV to capture impacts of disclosure on 
FV. Selection two proxies may support researcher to construct the holistic view about the 
impacts of disclosure on FV through different proxies. Furthermore; adopting the two proxies 
are based on availability of data from different databases.        
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Independent variables: The main independent variable is DISCL which denotes the multi 
disclosure level of IBs that contain Sharia; social; financial and aggregate scores. The disclosure 
level of a bank was calculated by dichotomous procedure which assigns a score of 1 if a bank 
discloses an item and a score of 0 if it does not (Hossain and Hammami, 2009). The disclosure 
index is un-weighted and assumes that each item of disclosure is equally important (Gray et al., 
1995). Cooke (1989) suggests that un-weighted indices are an appropriate research instrument in 
disclosure studies. Accordingly, the disclosure index for each bank calculated as follows  DISCL = � dj
n
.
j=1
                                           (8)                                     
     Where DISCL is disclosure level; dj =1 if the item j is disclosed; 0 if the item j is not 
disclosed; n is number of items. In additional to the above dependents and independents 
variables as well as to avoid model misspecification, this study controls additional variables, 
which might also influence FV. Therefore, this study added variables concerned with firm-
characteristics (size; risk; profitability; leverage; SAD; accounting standard) and CG (board size; 
board independence and block holders). Almilia (2009) found that firm size is the main 
determining of financial reporting. A positive association reported between firm size and FV 
(Ezat, 2010). With regard to profitability, firms that report higher profits would signal their 
capabilities to the investors. It might perceive that these firms have competitive advantages that 
enable them to achieve higher profits, which positively affect shareholder value. Hence, in line 
with Hassan et al (2009), a positive relationship expected between profitability and FV. Leverage 
is associated negatively with financial performance, which is consistent with the pecking order 
theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Hodgson and Stevenson-Clarke (2000) stated that high 
Leverage lead to positive change in FV. Risk used in previous studies that consider firm 
performance as the dependent variable (González et al., 2012; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). This 
study added accounting standard and SAD with high expectation for impacts on the FV based 
on their impacts on their activities; image and reputation. Daske et al (2013) show that 
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accounting standards’ adoption as IFRS is associated with improvement in FV based on the 
analyst forecast accuracy as well as enhances transparency, disclosure and reinforces stock 
market liquidity. It is evident that the adoption of IFRS leads to higher MV (Leuz and Verrecchia, 
2000). Related to SAD; Al-Matari et al (2014) provides evidence that internal auditing has 
positive effects on financial reporting; reliability and financial performance  
Drawing upon agency theory, the broad objective of CG mechanisms is to align managers’ 
interests with shareholders’ interests. It predicted that CG mechanisms motivate managers to 
enhancing shareholder’s value (Bruce et al., 2007). Ntim et al (2012) found that good CG 
practices enhance FV. Thus, this study considers several CG mechanisms on FV which is board 
size; ownership structure and board independence. It claimed that the collective experience and 
knowledge of board members is crucial in today’s complex business environment (Conger et al., 
1998). However, previous studies have shown positive association between board size and FV 
(Ujunwa, 2012). La Porta et al (2002) specified that controlling shareholders are willing to pay 
more for financial securities when they feel that their rights are better protected which improve 
their valuation of a firm. The extant literature generally articulates the effect of ownership 
concentration on disclosure (e.g. Jaggi et al., 2009) and FV (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A 
positive association between block holders ownership and FV document by Aggarwal et al 
(2008). Bhagat and Black (1999) found a negative correlation between FV and the proportion of 
independent directors of board. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) find a very slight increase in stock 
prices when a firm appointed an additional outside director. Based on the model of Callan and 
Thomas (2009); Hope (2003); the theoretical model for this study is: 
FV = 𝛼𝛼 +DISCL+ (control variables) + ε                                                              (9) 
Moreover, this study using a one year data to measuring association between dependent and 
independent variables, which supported by previous studies (Lu and Abeysekera, 2014; Oliveira 
et al., 2013; Nelling and Webb, 2009). To test this hypothesis, this study applies two OLS 
regressions and we employ the following regression model. The dependent variable is MC for 
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model 1. As an alternative proxy for market value, we also use the ROA as dependent variable 
for model 2. Independent variables include the Sharia; social; financial and aggregate disclosure 
levels and other variables identified in the prior empirical research cited below as being related to 
market value. This leads to the following: 
FV based on market measure (MC)  
FV (MC) n= α + 𝛽𝛽1 DISCL n (SHAR,SOCAI,FIN)+ 𝛽𝛽2 ROA n+ 𝛽𝛽3 STAND n+ 𝛽𝛽4 
SIZE n+ 𝛽𝛽5 LEV n+ 𝛽𝛽6 SAD n+ 𝛽𝛽7 BLOCK n+ 𝛽𝛽8 B.SIZE n+ 𝛽𝛽9 B.INDEP n+ 𝛽𝛽10 
RISK n+ ɛ                                                                                                      (10)                                                                                                                                                    
FV based on accounting measure (ROA) 
FV (ROA) n= α + 𝛽𝛽1 DISCL n (SHAR, SOCAI, FIN) + 𝛽𝛽2 STAND n+ 𝛽𝛽3 SIZE n+ 
𝛽𝛽4 LEV n+ 𝛽𝛽5 SAD n+ 𝛽𝛽6 BLOCK n+ 𝛽𝛽7 BD.SIZE n+ 𝛽𝛽8 BD.IND n+ 𝛽𝛽9 RISK n 
+ Ɛ                                                                                                                  (11)                          
Where (FV) is the firm value based on MC, which is the multiplying, a bank's shares 
outstanding by the current market price of one share as well as based on ROA. DISCL is the 
disclosure level; (α) the intercept; (β) the regression coefficients; (n) IB; (ɛ) the error term. Table 
45 shows the models specifications and variables measruments  
Table 45: Model specification and variable measurement 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Variable description Data source 
Dependent variables 
FV (MC) Firm value based on market 
capitalization  
By multiplying a company's shares 
outstanding by the current market price of 
one share 
Bank scope database  
FV (ROA) Firm value based on Profitability  Return on assets Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
Independent variables 
OVER Disc Overall disclosure index Total disclosure accountability level based 
on SSBR; CSRR and FS 
Annual reports and 
Website 
SHARI Disc Sharia Supervisory Board 
disclosure index  
Sharia disclosure accountability level 
based on SSB report 
Annual reports and 
Website  
SOCIA Disc Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure index    
Social disclosure accountability level based 
on CSR report 
Annual reports and 
Website 
FININ Disc Financial disclosure index  Financial disclosure accountability level Annual reports 
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based on FS and footnotes 
Control variables 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 Standards 1=Bank that use AAOIFI; 0=Bank 
that use IFRS or Local standards  
Annual report 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 Size The natural log of total assets Banker data base 
𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿 Leverage  Total liabilities (Debts)/Total assets Banker data base 
𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐴𝐴 Sharia Auditing department 1=Bank that has Sharia auditing 
department; otherwise= 0 
Annual report  
𝐵𝐵𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑈𝑈𝑅𝑅 Number of Block holders 
 
Number of block holders– shareholders 
whose ownership ≥5 % of total number 
of shares issued. 
Zawya data base- bank 
website-annual report 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 Board size The number of board members Annual reports 
𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴. 𝑆𝑆𝑂𝑂𝐴𝐴 Board independence Ratio of the number of non-executive 
directors to the total number of the 
directors 
Banker data base 
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 Risk Adequacy Tier 1 capital  Banker data base- 
bank annual report 
5.4.5 Empirical results  
5.4.5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive statistics presented in Table 46. It shows mean values of the multi corporate 
disclosure for our 33 IBs. It shows that, on average, IBs publish 54% of Sharia  list of items of 
disclosure; 27% of the list of social information items and 64% of the list of financial 
information items whereas, IBs publish overall 49% of total list of items. This result exhibits that 
IBs obviously present a larger amount of financial information compared to non-financial 
information. It illustrates variances in disclosure level between banks as well as between different 
kinds of disclosure. These variances in disclosure levels are matching with Ball et al., 2000. 
Different theories advanced in the literature to explain variations in the extent of corporate 
disclosure. Agency theory explains such variations (Wallace et al., 1994). Lindblom (1984) used 
legitimacy theory; Ullmann (1985) used stakeholders’ theory, while Gray et al (1987) employed an 
accountability approach to explain the differences in disclosure levels. Moreover, the average MC 
is 14680251 $. ROA for our selected banks is positive with average 1.58. 30% from our IBs are 
adopted AAOIFI standards. The average Leverage is 80% and 79% from sample have SAD. The 
average board size is nine members and board independence is 42%.  
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Table 46: Descriptive statistics for all variables 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
MC 33 22500 109557497 14680251 24730799 2.722 7.816 
ROA 33 -1.85 6.68 1.5761 1.78333 .887 2.288 
SSBD 33 .00 .85 0.5424 .21906 -.767 .046 
CSRD 33 .11 .57 0.2712 .12767 .861 -.388 
FD 33 .52 .80 0.6445 .05995 -.004 .455 
OV.D 33 .22 .68 0.4858 .10843 -.279 -.026 
STAND 33 .00 1.00 0.3030 .46669 .899 -1.274 
SIZE 33 1.30 4.87 3.3380 .83627 -.477 .097 
LEV 33 .35 .96 0.8052 .14944 -1.761 2.715 
SAD 33 .00 1.00 0.7879 .41515 -1.476 .187 
BLOCK 33 .00 5.00 2.0385 1.45549 .350 -.532 
BD.SIZE 33 3.00 20.00 9.3667 3.85499 1.070 1.324 
INDEP 33 .00 1.00 0.4214 .32117 .239 -1.168 
RISK 33 .08 1.19 0.2597 .22186 2.759 9.435 
MC: is firm value based on market capitalization; ROA: probability for banks based on return on assets;  SSBD: is the sharia 
disclosure based on sharia supervisory board report to reflect sharia accountability; CSRD: is the social disclosure based on 
corporate social responsibility report to reflect social accountability; FD: is the financial disclosure based on financial 
statements to reflect financial accountability; OVERD: is overall disclosure that contain three accountabilities which are 
sharia, social and financial; STAND: is the accounting standard adopted by banks (AAOIFI or IFRS); SIZE: size of the 
bank based on the logarithm of total assets; LEV: leverage of bank based on total debts on total assets;  SAD: is the sharia 
auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: block holders as one of the ownership structure kind for bank;  BD.SIZE: 
board size for bank; INDEP: is represent the board independence; RISK: risk ratio based on tier 1 capital 
Data analysis: Panel 1: Market-based measure result  
5.4.5.2 Univariate analysis 
A non-parametric correlation test used to determine the association between FV and 
disclosure levels. The results (based on Table 47) show that; different categories of disclosure 
have insignificant correlations with FV. However, to draw a firm conclusion about the 
relationship between FV and disclosure level, it is advisable to analyse the results from a multiple 
regression that controls for the influence of other variables affecting FV. There is a significant 
correlation between FV and the asset size with no correlation with other variables. The overall 
disclosure level has insignificant correlation with FV. Moreover, the results indicate that firm size 
have significant positive association with FV. Later on, in Multivariate analysis, calculated VIF 
values support the absence of multi-collinearity problem as they do not exceed 10 (Acock, 2008) 
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Table 47: Correlation coefficient (N=33) 
 MC OV.D ROA STAND SIZE LEV SAD BLOCK BD.SIZE INDEP RISK 
MC 1 0.234 0.343 0.173 0.572** 0.227 0.125 0.020 0.318 -0.160 -0.273 
OV.D  1 -0.135 0.104 0.145 0.337 0.620** -0.322 0.162 -0.175 -0.296 
ROA   1 -0.017 0.120 -0.357* -0.226 -0.091 0.083 -0.085 0.030 
STAND    1 0.090 -0.284 0.020 -0.122 0.116 0.204 0.187 
SIZE     1 0.329 0.117 0.306 0.495** -0.013 -0.269 
LEV      1 0.140 0.097 0.314 -0.155 -0.431* 
SAD       1 -0.248 -0.073 -0.153 -0.164 
BLOCK        1 -0.157 0.143 0.346 
BD.SIZE         1 -0.038 -0.605** 
INDEP          1 0.171 
RISK           1 
This table shows the Correlation matrix for model 4 related to overall disclosure; MC: is firm value based on market capitalization; ROA: 
probability for banks based on return on assets;  SSBD: is the sharia disclosure based on sharia supervisory board report to reflect sharia 
accountability;  CSRD: is the social disclosure based on corporate social responsibility report to reflect social accountability; FD: is the 
financial disclosure based on financial statements to reflect financial accountability;  OVERALLD: is the overall disclosure that contain 
three accountabilities which are sharia, social and financial; STANDARD: is the accounting standard adopted by banks (AAOIFI or 
IFRS); SIZE: size of the bank based on the logarithm of total assets; LEV: leverage of bank based on total debts on total assets;  SAD: is 
the sharia auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: block holders as one of the ownership structure kind for bank;  BOARDSIZE: 
board size for bank; INDEP: is represent the board independence; RISK: risk ratio based on tier 1 capital;  *** Significant at 1% level; 
**Significant at 5% level ; *Significant at 10% level 
 
5.4.5.3 Multivariate analysis 
   To provide a more comprehensive analysis of the relationship between disclosure and FV, a 
multivariate analysis is conducted that controls for other variables expected to affect FV: namely, 
asset size; profitability based on ROA; leverage, risk; accounting standards; SAD; block holders; 
board size and board independence as outlines in Table 48. It performed 4 ordinary least square 
(OLS) regression to examine the association between the multi disclosure level and FV based on 
MC. Model (1) that focused on the Sharia  disclosure shows significant positive association with 
FV (0.073 with β 0.431). Model (2) reveals insignificant association between social disclosure and 
FV. Financial disclosure has no significant association with FV based on model (3). Model (4) 
displays a significant positive association between the two variables (0.060 with β 0.428). This 
result expected within the context of IBs as well as economic consequences for disclosure 
literature that shows core benefits for disclosure generally and for Sharia disclosure particularly.  
To summarize, the results indicate that Sharia disclosure appears to have a positive association 
with FV because compliance with Sharia is representing competitive advantage as well as main 
criteria to invest in IBs. It is reflects importance and benefit through disclosure about Sharia on 
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FV. Our results also show that social and financial disclosure has a positive, but insignificant 
association with FV. When we jointly the 3 kind of disclosure; we find a positive association 
between disclosure and FV. These results emphasize that association is complex, mixed and 
depends on the interplay of a category of disclosure (Hassan et al., 2009). The associations 
between FV and control variables in model 2 are similar to those in model 3, which shows 
positive association with size. The result shows positive correlation with accounting standard; 
size and SAD in model 1 and model 4.  
Table 48: Regression analysis  
 Model 1 (SSBD) Model 2 (CSRD) Model 3 (FD) Model 4 (OVERALLD) 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig VIF Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig VIF Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig VIF Standardized 
Coefficients 
Sig VIF 
(Constant)  0.461   0.733   0.559   0.260  
SSBD 
CSRD 
FD 
OV.D 
0.431 0.073 2.417 
 
 
0.280 
 
0.161 
 
1.619 
 
 
0.070 
 
 
0.754 
 
 
1.956 
 
 
 
0.428 
 
 
 
0.060 
 
 
 
2.174 
ROA -0.010 0.956 1.527 -0.004 0.982 1.533 0.047 0.815 1.540 -0.009 0.960 1.523 
STAND 0.382 0.038 1.378 -0.259 0.153 1.329 -0.343 0.139 1.991 0.378 0.038 1.362 
SIZE 0.858 0.000 1.925 0.741 0.002 1.849 0.759 0.002 1.896 0.803 0.001 1.841 
LEV -0.240 0.277 2.136 -0.206 0.359 2.103 -0.123 0.585 1.955 -0.263 0.238 2.190 
SAD 0.468 0.059 2.536 -0.219 0.227 1.356 -0.161 0.379 1.284 0.412 0.062 2.052 
BLOCK -0.147 0.427 1.529 -0.133 0.486 1.537 -0.148 0.460 1.543 -0.131 0.478 1.535 
BD.SIZE -0.147 0.427 1.514 -0.219 0.274 1.659 -0.137 0.489 1.514 -0.201 0.284 1.564 
INDEP -0.025 0.876 1.162 -0.030 0.855 1.162 -0.036 0.837 1.232 -0.011 0.944 1.172 
RISK 0.026 0.882 1.400 -0.032 0.861 1.453 0.022 0.908 1.403 -0.008 0.962 1.408 
R Square 
F value  
P value   
0.723 
2.403 
0.042 
0.703 
2.145 
0.065 
0.669 
1.783 
0.012 
0.728 
2.474 
0.037 
This table shows the regression analysis for 4 models; Model 1: It explore the sharia accountability disclosure; Model 2: It 
explore the social accountability disclosure; Model 3: It explore the financial accountability disclosure; Model 4: It explore 
the overall accountability disclosure; MC: is firm value based on market capitalization; ROA: probability for banks based on 
return on assets;  SSBD: is the sharia disclosure based on sharia supervisory board report to reflect sharia accountability;  
CSRD: is the social disclosure based on corporate social responsibility report to reflect social accountability; FD: is the 
financial disclosure based on financial statements to reflect financial accountability; OVERALLD: is the overall disclosure 
that contain three accountabilities which are sharia, social and financial; STANDARD: is the accounting standard adopted by 
banks (AAOIFI or IFRS); SIZE: size of the bank based on the logarithm of total assets; LEV: leverage of bank based on total 
debts on total assets;  SAD: is the sharia auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: block holders as one of the ownership 
structure kind for bank;  BOARDSIZE: board size for bank; INDEP: is represent the board independence; RISK: risk ratio 
based on tier 1 capital; * 0.01; ** 0.05; *** 0.001   
Panel 2: Accounting-based measure result  
 Table 49 shows the correlation matrix for the dependent and continuous independent variables. 
Consistent with our expectation, the overall disclosure is significantly positive correlated with the 
FV based on ROA (0.439) with level 10%. It shows that overall corporate disclosure level of our 
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selected banks has a strong effect on profitability. The correlation between ROA and the other 
variables is not statistically significant.  
Table 49: Correlation matrix (N=33) 
  ROA OV.D STAND SIZE LEV SAD BLOCK BD.SIZE INDEP RISK 
ROA 1          
OV.D 0.439* 1         
STAND 0.133 0.119 1        
SIZE 0.158 0.206 0.128 1       
LEV -0.103 0.336 -0.158 0.455** 1      
SAD 0.084 0.632** 0.020 0.122 0.114 1     
BLOCK 0.235 -0.268 -0.133 0.282 0.237 -0.260 1    
BD.SIZE 0.063 0.258 -0.050 0.396* 0.333 0.004 -0.216 1   
INDEP -0.104 -0.220 0.224 0.099 0.034 -0.181 0.110 -0.167 1  
RISK 0.297 -0.006 0.197 -0.111 -0.071 -0.001 0.342 -0.378* 0.147 1 
MC: is firm value based ROA (return on assets);  SSBD: is the sharia disclosure based on sharia supervisory board report to 
reflect sharia accountability;  CSRD: is the social disclosure based on corporate social responsibility report to reflect social 
accountability; FD: is the financial disclosure based on financial statements to reflect financial accountability;  OVERD: is the 
overall disclosure that contain three accountabilities which are sharia, social and financial; STAND: is the accounting standard 
adopted by banks (AAOIFI or IFRS); SIZE: size of the bank based on the logarithm of total assets; LEV: leverage of bank 
based on total debts on total assets;  SAD: is the sharia auditing department inside the bank; BLOCK: block holders as one of 
the ownership structure kind for bank;  BD.SIZE: board size for bank; INDEP: is represent the board independence; RISK: 
risk ratio based on tier 1 capital; * 0.01; ** 0.05; *** 0.001   
5.4.5.4 Multivariate analysis 
      This study presents evidence those IBs with more comprehensive corporate disclosure 
exhibit better ROA related to our main hypothesis as show in Table 50. For panel 2 that 
measuring FV based on ROA; it performed four OLS models. Model (1) shows significant 
positive association between Sharia disclosure and FV (0.003 with β 0.759). Model (2) reveals 
positive significant association between social disclosure and FV. This result expected within the 
context of the IBs as a social face. In contrast, Table shows insignificant association with 
financial disclosure in model (3). Model (4) displays a significant positive between FV and 
aggregate disclosure (0.001 with β 0.810). Therefore, the results indicate that Sharia and social 
disclosure appears to have positive impacts on the FV. The association between FV and control 
variables in panel 2 shows negative sign with Leverage in models 1, 2 and 4. It shows positive 
association between FV and SAD related to Sharia and overall disclosure. The regression analysis 
shows positive link between FV and risk concerned with Sharia disclosure. 
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Table 50: Regression analysis 
 Model 1 (SSBD) Model 2 (CSRD) Model 3 (FD) Model 4 (OVERALLD) 
 Standardized 
Coefficients  
Sig VIF Standardized 
Coefficients  
Sig VIF Standardized 
Coefficients  
Sig VIF Standardized 
Coefficients  
Sig VIF 
(Constant)  0.828   0.535   0.269   0.242  
SSBD 
CSRD 
FD 
OVERALLD 
0.759 0.003 2.372  
0.557 
 
0.010 
 
1.583 
 
 
0.331 
 
 
0.184 
 
 
1.904 
 
 
 
0.810 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
 
 
2.139 
STANDARD -0.061 0.728 1.330 0.165 0.367 1.306 -0.135 0.589 1.989 -0.063 0.700 1.317 
SIZE 0.301 0.143 1.744 0.088 0.671 1.718 0.129 0.578 1.717 0.207 0.268 1.683 
LEV -0.431 0.030 1.542 -0.392 0.054 1.511 -0.323 0.145 1.491 -0.487 0.011 1.590 
SAD 0.412 0.085 2.321 0.010 0.954 1.232 0.079 0.682 1.198 0.348 0.084 1.872 
BLOCK 0.225 0.235 1.511 0.255 0.201 1.522 0.228 0.302 1.519 0.258 0.150 1.519 
BOARDSIZE 0.189 0.316 1.512 0.042 0.836 1.659 0.206 0.348 1.510 0.085 0.633 1.563 
INDEP -0.085 0.605 1.158 -0.089 0.601 1.158 -0.072 0.712 1.217 -0.055 0.721 1.169 
RISK 0.323 0.081 1.388 0.208 0.281 1.448 0.336 0.118 1.394 0.258 0.135 1.399 
R Square 
F value  
Sig  
0.639 
2.368 
0.046 
0.659 
1.960 
0.093 
0.544 
1.074 
0.041 
0.738 
3.063 
0.015 
This table shows the regression analysis for 4 models; Model 1: It explore the sharia accountability disclosure; Model 2: It 
explore the social accountability disclosure; Model 3: It explore the financial accountability disclosure; Model 4: It explore the 
overall accountability disclosure; MC: is market value based ROA (return on assets);  SSBD: is the sharia disclosure based on 
sharia supervisory board report to reflect sharia accountability;  CSRD: is the social disclosure based on corporate social 
responsibility report to reflect social accountability; FD: is the financial disclosure based on financial statements to reflect financial 
accountability; OVERALLD: is the overall disclosure that contain three accountabilities which are sharia, social and financial; 
STANDARD: is the accounting standard adopted by banks (AAOIFI or IFRS); SIZE: size of the bank based on the logarithm 
of total assets; LEV: leverage of bank based on total debts on total assets;  SAD: is the sharia auditing department inside the bank; 
BLOCK: block holders as one of the ownership structure kind for bank;  BOARDSIZE: board size for bank; INDEP: is 
represent the board independence; RISK: risk ratio based on tier 1 capital;  * 0.01; ** 0.05; *** 0.001   
5.4.6 Discussion  
    Thus, in Panel 1; the Sharia and overall disclosure models support the significant association 
between corporate disclosure and FV. This result corroborates the results of previous studies 
(Anam et al., 2011; Sheu et al., 2010). The social and financial disclosure models indicate 
insignificant association between disclosure and FV, which supported by work of Murray et al 
(2006). While, concerned with Panel 2; the Sharia; social and overall disclosure models support 
the significant correlation between disclosure and FV. This finding validates the consequences of 
preceding studies (Margolis and Walsh, 2003). The financial disclosure model indicates 
insignificant association, which supports finding of Murray et al (2006). Whereas, Behn et al 
(2008) suggest that the availability of financial disclosures are positively associated with FV  
   Concerned with the association between social disclosure and FV, the result is supported 
outcomes of Dhaliwal et al (2011), that suggests proactive social accountability activities enhance 
firm’s market value and financial performance. However, results of Plumlee et al (2009) contrast 
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this result, which reports a negative relationship between FV and social disclosure. Moreover, 
Hassan et al (2009) find insignificant association between FV and disclosure. The research 
indicates that FV based on accounting-based measure statistically significantly related to CSR 
disclosure. This is in line with findings by Scholtens (2008). The empirical findings of Simpson 
and Kohers (2002) support the notion of a positive social - financial performance link. Orlitzky 
et al (2003) perform a meta-analysis of 52 quantitative studies and confirm a positive relationship 
between social disclosure and FV, while Margolis and Walsh (2003); Roman et al (1999) 
summarize 127 and 52 studies, respectively, and find a generally positive association between 
these two variables. The result is consistent with findings of studies that adopting signalling 
theory (Curado et al., 2011). Signalling theory used to explain managers’ incentives to disclose 
more information in financial reports (e.g. Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). The result particularly 
related to the impacts of Sharia and social disclosure on the FV supported views of managers 
that have to disclose adequate information in the financial statements to convey specific signals 
to potential users, which gain value for the firms. Furthermore, the result is matching with the 
previous studies that adopted economic theory (Easley and O’Hara, 2004) which suggest a 
positive impact of disclosure on FV. Moreover; the study’ results are consist with theoretical 
bases for economic theory that argue that improved disclosure has positive consequences on 
investor through increases the shares’ liquidity and improving FV. Overall, the outcomes for the 
two panels based on the aggregate disclosure are matching with Tsalavoutas and Dionysiou 
(2014); Abdullah et al (2015) that recently posited a significant relationship between firm value 
and disclosure levels   
   From an Islamic approach, IBs may not link between disclosure and its consequences. IBs may 
disclose information about SSF not just to gain the earth’ rewards which is high profitability but 
also to get a heaven’ rewards which is heaven and get satisfaction of Allah in this life and in the 
hereafter. Allah said, “That He may give them in full their rewards and increase for them of His bounty” 
(Quran, 35:30). Allah also states verse shows that reward of Allah is higher than earth reward 
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“Say, In the bounty of Allah and in His mercy - in that let them rejoice; it is better than what they accumulate” 
(Quran, 10:58). Furthermore, the results are matching with the Islamic approach about the 
economic consequences for good acts as well as disclosure about these acts. This consequence 
can express by Baraka as Allah said “If you loan Allah a goodly loan, He will multiply it for you and forgive 
you. And Allah is Most Appreciative and Forbearing” (Quran, 64:17). 
    The mixed results are consisting with Vafaei et al (2011) who reports significant and 
insignificant association between disclosure and FV in one study. The results also approved 
outcomes of Botosan and Plumlee (2002) who find that the impacts of disclosure are sensitive to 
the category of disclosure being made. Furthermore, the insignificant association between FV 
and financial disclosure is matching with Murray et al (2006) who found no direct association 
between FV based on share returns and corporate disclosure for the UK’s firms. Therefore, this 
study accepted the main hypotheses related to the impacts of disclosure on the FV that 
concerned with Sharia; social and overall disclosure. However, it rejected the hypothesis related 
to the impact of financial disclosure. Thus, financial disclosure has insignificant consequence on 
the FV whereas non-financial disclosure has a significant economic impact on the FV.  
The results support the importance of compliance with Sharia and serving the society for IBs, 
which reflect the role of these accountabilities and disclosure about it on enhancing the 
performance of IBs. A rich information could lead to desirable economic consequences as a 
reduction in the firm’s cost of capital (Beyer et al., 2010) and an increase in the firm’s value (Leuz 
and Wysocki, 2008). The variances in the result between the two panels particularly concerned 
with social disclosure is can justify based on adopting different measures of FV (ROA and MC). 
This result support work of Uyar and Kiliç (2012); Hassan et al (2009) that find the association 
between disclosure and FV varies depending on the proxy used for FV and based on the 
category of disclosure. The result of financial disclosure is matching with Wang et al (2008) that 
find no evidence about the benefit from extensive financial disclosure on FV. This insignificant 
association can justify based on the ethical identification for IBs and ethical behaviour and 
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attitude for investors who deal with these banks, which gives high weight for Sharia and social 
disclosure more than financial.        
The benefits behind Sharia disclosure is can justify because compliance with Sharia is the main 
motivation for dealing with IBs (Haque et al., 2009). Echchabi and Olaniyi (2012) found that the 
religious factor is the main influence for the stakeholders to patronize IBs. Therefore, it can 
conclude that; disclosure about Sharia compliance has an impact on profitability through 
increasing the number of customers and investing in these banks as well as enhancing the image 
and reputation, which generally have consequences on FV. The economic consequences for 
social disclosure can justify based on intangible benefits for this category of disclosure as firm’ 
reputation (Schwaiger, 2004), increased employee motivation and improved brand image 
(Epstein and Roy, 2001) which influence on financial performance. Disclosure about CSR 
activities is a signal for organizational attractiveness (Turban and Greening, 1997) which has 
impact on the FV. These results supported signalling theory (Boulding and Kirmani, 1993) which 
suggests the impact of social disclosure on FV. 
5.4.7 Concluding remarks 
   This study contributes to the disclosure literature by being the first study to measure the 
economic consequences for multi categories of disclosure (SSF) for 33 IBs. In particular, it 
analyses the impact of the three brands of disclosure on FV based on accounting and market 
methods. After controlling firm characteristics and CG variables; the research’ finding confirms 
the significant positive association between disclosure and FV based on accounting and market 
measures which consisting with Cheung et al (2010); Jiao (2011).  
   This study provides a number of theoretical arguments and a range of empirical evidence as to 
why such an association might arise. The positive link between disclosure and FV confirms the 
traditional view that more information adds value to firms. The relationship is statistically 
significant on an individual basis disclosure (Sharia and social) as well as is jointly significant with 
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aggregate disclosure. This result is consisting with Gelb and Zarowin (2002) who find that firms 
with high disclosure are more likely to show a stronger FV. In addition, our result related to 
social disclosure is supported the debating about socially responsible firms appeal to consumers 
who care about the corresponding social issues, which lead to superior FV (Lev et al., 2010). The 
current study provides evidence that IBs tend to benefit from greater Sharia; social and aggregate 
disclosure. This results support the idea that IBs can use corporate disclosure differentiate them 
self and enhancing their competitive advantage through increasing FV for IBs.  
This finding provides important implications for investors, managers, regulatory bodies, policy 
makers and IBs. This result tells investors that Sharia and social disclosures have a positive effect 
on market value of their banks. Managers who engage in good practices of information 
disclosure recommended continuing doing so. For those who refrain themselves from providing 
information to the stakeholders, our results call for more transparency if they want their bank’ 
value to be more attractive. Regulatory bodies as AAOIFI expected to guide IBs toward the best 
practices of disclosures since banks look for such guidance. They play a motivating role in this 
area of information disclosure. This results has shown that disclosure of non-financial was 
absent in many annual reports and websites for our selected IBs. Therefore, regulatory bodies 
may identify a minimum level for Sharia and social disclosure that publish by each bank. 
Moreover, this result has an implication on IFRS that may consider Sharia and social information 
for IBs to enhancing their value through issuing a comprehensive accounting standard related to 
IBs. This study’ result has an implication on the policy makers through provide evidence that 
non-financial disclosure have an economic consequence on FV by mandatory of IBs to disclose 
this kind of information. Furthermore, this finding is important for IBs, which may be aware 
that more Sharia and social disclosure might have a significant impact on their value. This study 
moreover provides a valuable contribution to researchers as it extends the understanding of how 
the holistic disclosures affected on the FV of IBs.  
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   This study adopts disclosure indices to investigate disclosure levels. Therefore, the results are 
only valid to the extent that the disclosure indices used is applicable. The selection of the items 
included in the index involves some degree of judgment and subjectivity. However, the reliability 
test is satisfactorily. It also acknowledged that the single-year data used for testing the 
relationships hypothesized might restrict the generalization of findings. Thus, the study may 
replicated by using panel data to observe the trend in investigations. This sample is relatively 
small, which may limit the application of the findings to other IFIs (The limited sample 
explained based on limited data about MC for IBs). It asking further research to contain other 
kinds of IFIs to see for what extent the association between disclosure and FV are variance. 
Future research could also explore the association between Sharia and social disclosure with cost 
of capital for IBs. Forthcoming research also could study whether or not the quantity and quality 
of Sharia; social and financial information have different effects on FV. Using other research 
tools in measuring non-financial disclosure quality represents another direction as undertaking 
questionnaires and interviews with investors’ which might reveal great insights into their 
perceptions about the economic consequences for disclosure   
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Empirical study (5): The non-economic consequence of disclosure: 
Evidence from Islamic banks 
5.5.1 Introduction 
   Enhancing stakeholders’ value is an essential purpose for business entities and financial 
institutions are no exception. The stability of financial institutions, their financial performance 
and the ability to intermediate resources depends on stakeholders’ confidence in individual 
institutions and the industry. A unique feature of the confidence in Islamic banks (IBs) is their 
ability of conveying to stakeholders that financial transactions are conducted in conformity with 
Islamic principles and rulings, i.e. Sharia (Grais and Pellegrini, 2006).  IBs faced with strong 
competition not only from IBs but also from non-Islamic rivals. When competition intensifies 
and banks start to offer similar products and services, the stakeholders’ satisfaction, trust and 
loyalty can influence the performance of IBs and determines its competitiveness and success. 
Hence, it is of paramount importance to assess the degree of stakeholders’ satisfaction, trust and 
loyalty towards Islamic banking operations. Furthermore; bank disclosure in annual reports and 
bank website along with other media are the main tools to deliver necessary information about 
Islamic banking activities to stakeholders.  
   Prior literature has been exploring the link between trust, satisfaction and loyalty in banks from 
a marketing-theory perspective (Bernhardt et al., 2000) and in particular for IBs (Butt and Aftab, 
2012).  They found support to the association among trust, satisfaction, and loyalty and their 
impact on financial performance and profitability. Customer satisfaction and loyalty positively 
related to profitability and market share (Anderson et al., 1994). Moreover, many studies measure 
the economic consequences of disclosure on financial performance; cost of equity; firm value; 
analysts’ forecasts and share price anticipation of earnings (Elzahar et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015; 
Volkov and Smith, 2015). 
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    To date, the literature has devoted insufficient attention to establish a theoretical framework 
and empirical analysis of the effect of disclosure on customer loyalty in IBs. Recent studies 
propose that CSR could be useful to explore the relationship between companies and their 
stakeholders (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2003). Academic literature provides evidence on the effects 
of CSR activities on customer loyalty (Perez et al., 2012).  Other studies provide confirmation on 
the effect of satisfaction on loyalty (Amin et al., 2011) and trust on loyalty (Kaur et al., 2012; 
Castaneda, 2011). Furthermore, academic literature provides evidence on the economic 
consequences for disclosure (Wang et al., 2015; Volkov and Smith, 2015; Moumen et al., 2015). 
However, insufficient attention has been given to the non-economic impact of disclosure on 
loyalty (moderated by trust and satisfaction) in IBs.  Limited research investigates the association 
between disclosure variables (SSF disclosure) and social exchange variables (trust and satisfaction) 
in explaining stakeholders’ loyalty (He et al., 2012). Therefore, this study provides an integrated 
framework to fill the gap in prior literature. 
    Most of the prior studies focused on the link between CSR and loyalty (Perez et al., 2012) and 
did not investigate the impact of compliance with Sharia on stakeholders’ loyalty. Furthermore, 
fairly recently the CSR notion has been used in studies incorporating the customer loyalty model. 
In this sense, He and Li (2011), demonstrate a positive association between CSR and customer 
loyalty. According to these studies, CSR is a significant attribute of corporate image in the sense 
that it is able to attract consumers and investors. This study considers the impact of disclosure 
about CSR on customer loyalty by seeking a better explanation through social exchange variables 
(trust and satisfaction). Little research has provided a conceptual model to understand how CSR 
influences firms’ stakeholders loyalty formation process (Mason et al., 2006) and how disclosure 
about CSR, Sharia compliance, and financial performance can influence stakeholders’ loyalty of 
IBs.46     
46 Hameed (2001) argued that the disclosure of Sharia compliance is one of the fundamental Islamic accounting 
objectives. Thus, this information should disclose voluntarily, even though it may not be required mandatorily.  
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   Therefore, the main aim for this study is investigate the direct effects of disclosure that contain 
SSF aspects on the stakeholders’ loyalty. It also aims to investigate to what extent trust and 
satisfaction mediate this effect. This study motivated by several aspects. First, the role of services 
in business markets has not been thoroughly conceptualised or researched (Barr and McNeilly, 
2003). The financial service industry is an interesting field for studying the service provider-
consumer relationship (Ryals, 2005). Second, this study motivated by the on-going debate on 
whether dealing with IBs based on trust and whether abstaining from dealing with IBs is mainly 
a matter of distrust. Therefore, it investigates the role of disclosure in enhancing trust and loyalty 
of stakeholders.  Third, most prior research focuses on the economic consequences of financial 
disclosure (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Hence, it investigates the non-economic consequences of 
disclosure as a multi-faceted phenomenon including SSFD. Finally, retaining existing customers 
and strengthening customer loyalty is very crucial for banking services to gain competitive 
advantage (Deng et al., 2010). This study investigates the extent to which the disclosure of IBs 
has an impact on customer loyalty.   
   The findings show a significant association of disclosure on trust, satisfaction, and stakeholders’ 
loyalty. Therefore, it provides novel empirical evidence on the non-economic impact of the 
disclosure. In this regard, we find that the more IBs disclose about Sharia compliance, social, and 
financial performance, the more they benefit from stakeholders’ trust, satisfaction, and loyalty. 
These results suggest that disclosure about SSF accountability in annual reports and bank 
websites affects stakeholders’ behaviour, the bank’s image and its market share. This may be of 
interest to IBs as well as conventional banks with Islamic windows.  
    The reminder of the study is organised as follows: section 5.5.2 explores the theoretical 
framework of disclosure from accounting and marketing perspectives. Section 5.5.3 surveys the 
literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and provides the development of research 
hypotheses. Section 5.5.4 introduces the research design. Section 5.5.5 presents the empirical 
analysis. Section 5.5.6 discusses the results. Finally, section 5.5.7 concludes. 
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5.5.2 Conceptual framework 
5.5.2.1 Theoretical Accounting perspectives for disclosure 
    Voluntary disclosure theories conclude that one of the main benefits of voluntary disclosure is 
a reduction in information asymmetry and a lower cost of capital (Lambert et al., 2007). Prior 
research argued that a joint consideration of disclosure theories may be of great help in 
explaining a particular phenomenon by providing richer insights into the understanding of 
corporate disclosure practices, thus disclosure theories may considered as complementary rather 
than competing (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001). Current theories typically focus on direct outcomes 
of firm disclosure activities. These outcomes include liquidity, cost of capital and firm valuation 
(Leuz and Wysocki, 2008). The theoretical literature has suggested various channels through 
which disclosures can affect firm value and performance. Grossman (1981) argue for the 
importance of high quality and expanded disclosures in attracting investors. 
   Based on agency theory, Akhtaruddin and Hossian (2008) affirm that information disclosure 
motivated by the wish of the managers to treat the potential conflicts between companies’ 
managers and stakeholders. In a similar vein, corporate financial reporting and disclosures play 
the role of a control mechanism for managers’ performance recognitions to which managers are 
likely to disclose more voluntary information (Khlifi and Bouri, 2010). Signalling theory suggests 
that voluntary information disclosure in corporate annual reports can used as a signal in order to 
improve the corporate image/reputation, attract new investors, and help to improve its 
relationships with the relevant stakeholders (Hawashe, 2014). As has been asserted by Álvarez et 
al (2008) voluntary information disclosures can considered a signal to capital markets, directed to 
reduce the asymmetry of information that often exists between insiders and outsiders of a 
company, and to enhance corporate value. Legitimacy theory has its roots in the idea of a social 
contract between the corporation and society. A company’s survival and growth depend on its 
ability to deliver desirable ends, to distribute economic, social, or political benefits to the groups 
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from which it derives its power (Shocker and Sethi, 1974). This theory employed extensively as 
an explanatory theory to explain the motivations behind voluntary corporate social and 
environmental disclosures (Cowana and Deegan, 2011). All the previous disclosure theories 
focused on the economic consequences of enhanced disclosure with no reference to non-
economic impacts of disclosure. Therefore, this study tends to add value to prior research by 
exploring the non-economic consequences of disclosure through measuring its impact on the 
stakeholders’ trust; satisfaction and loyalty.  
   Islamic banks must adhere to the regulations set by bank regulators and the Islamic principles 
of Sharia. Capital providers (shareholders and investors) to IBs are extremely concerned that 
their funds invested in a Sharia -compliant manner (Chapra and Ahmed, 2002). Thus, while 
agency problems in conventional companies arise when managers deviate from their duty to 
maximize shareholders’ wealth, any divergence by managers of IBs from placing all supplied 
funds in Sharia -compliant investments creates an additional source of agency problems. 
Corporate disclosure identified as one of the most fundamental elements contributing to good 
Corporate Governance (Healy and Palepu, 2001). Availability of information is essential to 
minimize the information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and to allow general 
investors to assess company performance (Cheung et al., 2010).  
   Table 50 presents prior studies measuring the consequences of disclosure. Accordingly; all the 
studies focused on the impacts of increased disclosure -mandatory or voluntary- on firm value 
(Elzahar et al., 2015); cost of capital (Kothari et al., 2009); analysts’ forecasts (Wang et al., 2015); 
financial performance (Wang et al., 2008) and share price anticipation of earnings (Hussainey and 
Walker, 2009). Moreover, most studies adopt disclosure indices to investigate the economic 
impacts of disclosure (Volkov and Smith, 2015). Additionally, the majority of prior studies rely 
on the annual reports for measuring the consequences of disclosure (Moumen et al., 2015). 
Consequently, to our knowledge, none of these studies investigates the non-economic 
consequences of disclosure on stakeholders’ behaviour. Furthermore, none of the prior literature 
247 
 
collects data from primary sources using questionnaire design, focuses on non-financial 
disclosure like Sharia compliance and social disclosure, or investigates the consequences of 
disclosure in Islamic-banking setting. Finally, no prior study focuses on multiple stakeholders as 
customers and investors. Based on the previous studies; we expect a significant impacts on 
investors and all stakeholders by enhancing their loyalty; trust by enhancing firm value and 
reducing the cost of capital. 
Table 51: The economic consequences for increased disclosure  
Studies Research Issue Country Findings 
Elzahar et al., 
2015 
Economic consequences of Key 
Performance Indicators’ 
disclosure quality 
UK We find a significantly negative (weakly positive) 
relationship between disclosure quality of financial KPIs 
and the implied cost of capital (firm value). 
Moumen et al., 
2015  
The Value Relevance of 
Disclosure in Annual Reports 
MENA 
countries 
Found a positive relationship between voluntary 
disclosure information and the market’s ability to 
anticipate two-year ahead future earnings change. It 
approves the usefulness of disclosure in annual reports.  
Wang et al., 2015  
 
Management earnings forecasts 
and analyst forecasts 
China Showed that such selective disclosure negatively 
influences analysts’ forecasts and reduces analyst 
following and forecast accuracy.  
Miihkinen, 2013  The usefulness of firm risk 
disclosures under different firm 
riskiness, investor-interest, and 
market conditions 
Finland It found that momentum in stock markets affects the 
relevance of firms' risk reports 
Uyar and Kilic, 
2012  
Value relevance of voluntary 
disclosure 
Turkey Voluntary disclosure is value-relevant; i.e. influences 
firm value. Therefore, this finding might accepted as a 
signal to corporations to disclose more information to the 
stakeholders.  
Jiao, 2011  
  
Corporate Disclosure, Market 
Valuation, and Firm 
Performance 
USA A positive and significant relationships between the 
AIMR rankings on firms’ mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures and stock returns, market valuation, future 
operating performance, and future Randd intensity.  
Hussainey and 
Mouselli, 2010  
The link between accounting 
information and disclosure 
quality 
UK Showed that future-oriented earnings statements in the 
annual report narratives increase the stock market’s 
ability to anticipate future earnings change three years 
ahead.  
Cheung et al., 
2010  
Transparency matters among 
Chinese listed companies 
China There is a positive and significant relation between 
company transparency and market valuation 
Kothari et al., 
2009  
The effect of disclosures by 
business press, management on 
cost of capital, return volatility, 
and analyst forecasts  
USA Found that when content analysis indicates favourable 
disclosures, the firm’s risk, as proxies by the cost of 
capital, stock return volatility, and analyst forecast 
dispersion, declines significantly. Unfavourable 
disclosures accompanied by significant increases in risk 
measures 
Hussainey and 
Walker, 2009 
The effects of voluntary 
disclosure and dividend 
UK Found that share price anticipation of earnings 
improves with increasing levels of annual report 
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 propensity on prices leading 
earnings 
narrative disclosure, and that firms that pay dividends 
exhibit higher levels of share price anticipation of 
earnings than non-dividend-paying firms 
Hassan et al., 
2009  
The association between 
mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures and firm vale  
Egypt It shows highly significant negative association between 
mandatory disclosure and firm value. Also showed a 
weaker positive relationship between voluntary disclosure 
and firm value 
Wang et al., 2008  Determinants and consequences 
of voluntary disclosure in an 
emerging market 
China Found a significant positive relationship between 
voluntary disclosure and a company’s financial 
performance measured by return on equity  
Haggard et al., 
2008  
Does voluntary disclosure 
improve stock price 
informativeness  
USA The disclosure improves investors access to firm-specific 
information and makes stock prices more informative, 
which may in turn improve the efficiency of corporate 
governance and firm investment  
Da Silva and 
Alves, 2004  
The existence of associations 
between voluntary disclosure of 
financial information on the 
Internet and Firm value  
Argentina, 
Brazil and 
Mexico 
The disclosure of financial information on the Internet 
obtained greater market values. The disclosure of 
financial information on the Web can maximize the 
firm value as the investors have easy access to the source 
of information in order to make decisions of investment. 
 
5.5.2.2 Theoretical Marketing perspectives for loyalty, trust and satisfaction   
5.5.2.2.1 Stakeholders Trust  
   Trust defined as a belief that the service provider can be relied on to behave in such a manner 
that the long-term interests of the consumers will be served (Crosby et al., 1990). In this sense, 
Reichheld and Schefter (2000) observe “to gain the loyalty of customers, you must first gain their 
trust” (p.107). The importance of trust concerned with explaining customer loyalty supported by 
Ball et al (2004). Moreover, trust considered key to building relationships within the Banking 
industry as well as Islamic banking system. Trust is a dynamic and multi-faceted concept 
(Dimitriadis et al., 2011). In an Islamic banking context, trust defined as a moral obligation of 
every individual in the performance of his or her duties in society. Islam places the highest 
emphasis on trust and considers being trustworthy as an obligatory personality trait (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2007). Thus, the foundation of the philosophy of the dimension of trust in the Islamic 
banking system can see as a symbol of trustworthiness, honesty, equity, equality among human 
beings, and moral values that established to enhance the business relationship between banks 
and customers (Sauer, 2002). Similarly, ethics and compliance with Sharia highly regarded and 
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sustained as pillars in running Islamic banking activities based on trust (Kayed and Hassan, 2011). 
The trust from a several perspective further recommended because trust is a source of 
competitive advantage as well as it increases satisfaction with interaction and it is a fundamental 
asset in every business and non-business relationship (Pivato et al., 2008). 
5.5.2.2.2 Stakeholders Satisfaction 
    Customer satisfaction described by Kotler (2003) as a person’s feeling of pleasure as a result 
of comparing a services’ perceived performance with his or her prior expectations of its 
performance. Under this concept, consumers form expectations of product performance prior to 
purchase. These expectations derived from experience with the product itself or with similar 
products, other marketing stimuli, and existing attitudes and confidence felt by the consumer 
(Moon et al., 2011). Stakeholders’ satisfaction is a key issue for all organisations that wish to 
create and keep a competitive advantage in this highly competitive world (Fonseca, 2009).  
Regardless the nature of business, the success of the banks depends on their ability to 
understand and satisfy their customers’ needs (Selamat and Abdul-Kadir, 2012).  
    The importance of customer satisfaction in financial services as banks has been studied 
extensively in the existing literature (Abdullah et al., 2014; Arbore and Busacca, 2009). Fonseca 
(2009) defines customer satisfaction as “an overall assessment of the performance of various 
attributes that constitute a service” (p.353). It is essential for organisation to know how satisfied 
their customers are in order to device successful marketing strategy and organisational 
development as well as discloses information related to their activities. Customer satisfaction 
plays a vital role in marketing because it encourages repeat sales; re-invest; stimulates positive 
word-of-mouth recommendations, and builds brand loyalty (Goode et al., 1996). 
5.5.2.2.3 Stakeholders Loyalty  
    Building a loyal stakeholders base is an important foundation for developing a sustainable 
competitive advantage. Stakeholders loyalty has been recognized over several decades for its role 
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in the creation of many successful businesses (e.g. Kotler and Armstrong, 2008; Lewis and 
Soureli, 2006). Loyalty refers to a consumer’s commitment to reinvest a preferred service 
consistently in the future. Stakeholders’ loyalty has become a top priority in service industries as 
banks, since it proven to affect profitability (Verhoef, 2003). In the banking industry, customers 
often develop an attitude toward purchasing behaviour based on experience, which either leads 
to loyalty (Anthanassopoulos et al., 2001). According to Sivadass and Baker-Prewitt (2000), 
customer loyalty is the ultimate objective of customer satisfaction measurement and found to be 
a key determinant of a brand’s long-term viability. Loyalty considered an energetic aim for a 
firm’s survival and growth. Building a loyal investor base has not only become a foremost 
marketing goal (Kotler and Armstrong, 2008), but it is also a significant basis for developing a 
sustainable competitive advantage (Dick and Basu, 1994). Compared with loyal customers, non-
loyal customers influenced by negative information about services (Donio et al., 2006) 
5.5.3 Development of hypotheses 
    This study proposes that Sharia, Social, and Financial Disclosure (SSFD) to be a higher-order 
construct composed of three dimensions. In particular, this study conceives a second-order 
factor structure in which the three distinct components are the manifestation of a broader, more 
general and more abstract higher-order latent variable (SSFD). In such a second-order factorial 
structure, each factor can consider a manifestation of SSFD, and each item is a manifestation of 
its respective factor (see Figure 10). Based on this reasoning, this study proposes that SSFD is a 
second-order construct composed of three dimensions (SSF) 
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Figure 10: Research Conceptual framework 
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      Information Processing Theory points out that human information processing includes at 
least the following stages that are personal focus of attention, encoding, and judging in short-
term memory; recoding and reasoning through retrieving long-term memory; and finally making 
a behavioural response (Miller, 1956). Accordingly, it believed that stakeholders process CSR 
information; Sharia compliance and financial performance. Stakeholders’ trust of CSR; Sharia 
compliance and financial performance is generally defined as stakeholders’ expectation that the 
bank is willing to keep promise and to fulfil obligations with honesty, goodwill, and non-
opportunistic motives as well as comply with Sharia and achieving the expected financial target 
(Blomqvist, 1997). Drumwright (1996) found that even though managers described firm’s 
motives as mixed (serving economic or financial as well as social objectives) these same 
managers believed that stakeholders are simplistic in their judgments about CSR initiatives and 
view them as either serving economic ends or reflecting sincere social concerns. This study 
added compliance with Sharia as one of the main objectives for IBs. 
5.5.3.1 Pillars of Islamic accountability framework    
    In order to gain stakeholders’ satisfaction, trust and loyalty towards IBs performance, it is 
important for the banks to know the stakeholders’ concerns related to disclosure particularly SSF 
issues. IBs governed by the principles of Sharia. Ahmad and Haron (2002) reveal that the 
economic and religious factors are the most important factors for customers selecting IBs. 
Stakeholders 
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Consequently, disclosure about compliance with Sharia might influence stakeholders’ satisfaction 
and trust towards the Sharia compliance; subsequently affecting their loyalty. Naser et al (1999) 
assessed customer satisfaction towards IBs in Jordan. Their findings indicated that the majority 
of customers dealt with IBs because of religious factors.  
    Achieving the social accountability towards the society is one of the main factors behind 
dealing with IBs. Haque et al (2009) confirms the significant positive relationship of the social 
perspective and confidence in bank with customers’ perception about IBs. The same results 
found by Dusuki and Abdullah (2007). CSR plays a crucial role in achieving customer loyalty and 
sustainable competitive advantages (Nemec, 2010). A firm's CSR practices positively affect 
consumer's attitude toward the corporation (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2003). A growing body of 
academic research attests that CSR has positive influence on stakeholders’ evaluations and 
purchase intentions of services (Ellen et al., 2006). The positive link between CSR and consumer 
patronage makes managers realize that CSR is not only an ethical/ideological imperative, but also 
an economic one in today’s marketplace (Smith, 2000). Schwartz and Carroll, 2003 state that, the 
bottom and largest part of the firms’ accountability is maximizing the profit and creates 
economic value for their stakeholders. Elkington (1977) suggested that, reporting may contain 
information about the firm economic, financial and social impacts.   
5.5.3.2 Disclosure and loyalty    
    Compliance with Sharia; social activities and good financial performance has been used in 
studies incorporating the loyalty. In this sense, recent studies empirically demonstrate a positive 
relationship between performance and customer loyalty (Perez et al., 2012). Most of studies 
propose that performance directly generates more customer loyalty, without requiring the 
intervention of mediating variables. According to these studies, performance as CSR is such a 
significant attribute of corporate image that it is able to attract the consumer. Recently, social 
identification theory is receiving increasing attention for customer loyalty (He et al., 2012). 
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Mandhachitara and Poolthong (2011) demonstrate that firm’ performance has a significantly 
strong and positive relationship with attitudinal loyalty. 
     Eakuru and Nik Mat (2008) studied the antecedents of customer loyalty in banks in Thailand. 
They viewed customer loyalty as crucial to long-term profitability, which is, can approve by 
disclosure. Garland (2002) identify direct and strong relationship between customer loyalty and 
firm financial performance based on the profitability, while Wisskirchen et al (2006) found that 
long-term growth and profitability of banks rely on banks’ ability to attract and retain loyal 
customers. Several studies have reported that CSR can positively affect consumer loyalty towards 
the firm (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). Performance as CSR and financial practices can increase 
loyalty (Berens et al., 2007). This results support our hypotheses that disclosure about financial 
results; Sharia compliance and social performance will effect on the loyalty of stakeholders.  
H5.1 There is a significant direct association between disclosure and loyalty 
5.5.3.3 Satisfactions (direct and mediating association) 
     Some researchers find a significant association between disclosure and customers’ satisfaction 
(Bigné et al., 2011)47. Similarly, it suggests that disclosure of SSF activities can influence customer 
satisfaction. Dusuki and Abdullah (2007) concluded that Muslim customers’ satisfaction level is 
affected by good social responsibility practices as well as compliance with Sharia. As suggested by 
Heskett et al (1997), the service-profit firm as bank establishes relationships between financial 
performance, customer loyalty and satisfaction. Bernhardt et al (2000) suggest that a positive and 
significant relationship exists between changes in customer satisfaction and changes in financial 
performance of a firm. Therefore, it argues that; disclose information about this performance for 
stakeholders may enhance their satisfaction level. In the banking industry, as competition 
increases its level, banks may be more focusing on increasing customer satisfaction through 
47 Maignan et al (2005) suggest company’s customers can be potential stakeholders who care about not only the 
economic performance of organizations but also to social performance of the company. A strong record of CSR 
creates a favourable image that positively enhances consumers’ evaluations of the firm (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2003).  
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increasing the level of disclosure about the bank’ performance (Goode and Moutinho, 1996). 
Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) found a positive link between CSR and customer satisfaction. 
Financial performance may contribute directly to shape the influence of satisfaction (Lam et al., 
2004). However, the effect of disclosure on other non-economic factors on satisfaction is still 
unexplored particularly in IBs’ context   
   Prior literature extensively tested the association between satisfaction and loyalty. For example, 
Othman and Owen (2001) linked satisfaction and loyalty, reporting that a satisfied customer will 
be loyal to the organisation, which is a measure for organisational performance. Customer 
satisfaction has a positive impact on customer loyalty (Amin et al., 2011). In banking context, 
although it recognized that customer satisfaction plays an important role in enhancing the long-
term relationship between customers and the banks, customer satisfaction shown to be the 
better predictor of customer loyalty (Bontis et al., 2007). Ehigie (2006) concluded that 
satisfaction is significant determinants of customer loyalty. It stated that customer satisfaction is 
the most influential factor on customer loyalty (Hoq and Amin, 2010). Regarding the banking 
sector, Ladhari et al (2011) defined customer satisfaction as the total evaluation of the overall 
level of services provided with add compliance with Sharia for IBs. Chang and Chen (2008) have 
stated the positive linkage between satisfaction and loyalty. It viewed that, consumer satisfaction 
and consumer loyalty as a tool to develop sustainable competitive advantage. According to Cooil 
et al (2007), customer satisfaction is a key determinant of long-term consumer retention. It 
expects that disclosure of Sharia compliance, social, and financial performance have an effect on 
the satisfaction of stakeholders. Moreover, previous studies supported the association between 
the satisfaction and loyalty. Combining the preceding arguments, we hypothesise a mediating of 
satisfaction for the relationship between disclosure and loyalty. Hence, this study proposes the 
following hypotheses: 
H5.2 There is a significant direct link between disclosure and stakeholders’ satisfaction 
H5.3 There is a significant direct link between stakeholders’ satisfaction and loyalty  
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H5.4 Stakeholders’ satisfaction mediates the effect between disclosure and loyalty  
5.5.3.4 Trust (direct and mediating association)  
    Similar to satisfaction, trust positively affected by level of disclosure (Ball et al., 2004). Trust 
affected by the existence of values that the company and its consumer share (Morgan and Hunt, 
1994). Stakeholders trust in a firm’s performance and disclosure level considered to significance 
for firms in order for them to create value (Borglund et al., 2009). Deegan and Underman (2006) 
argue that, the increase reporting level is part form the firms’ strategy to build value then creating 
trust among their stakeholders groups. For IBs; disclosure about SSF could construct and 
enhancing stakeholders’ trust. In support of this view on CSR disclosure, Pivato et al (2008) 
proposed, “The creation of trust is one of the most immediate consequences of a company’s 
social performance or the most proximate outcome of CSR activities” (p.5). As Hosmer (1994), 
states that firms can enhance the trust of all stakeholders by injecting ethical and responsible 
principles into companies’ strategic decision-making processes. High levels of disclosure are 
more likely to attract investors, who are more trusted that stock transactions occur at ‘‘fair’’ 
prices, and thereby increase the liquidity in the firm’s stock (Kim and Verrecchia, 1994). It 
shown repeatedly that a company’s CSR policy is an antecedent of consumers trust in the 
company (Herault, 2012).  
     Stakeholders trust in an IBs context refers to stakeholders’ belief that the bank will not only 
act in a competent and reliable manner and achieving high financial performance indicators, but 
will also fully comply with Sharia principles. This study refers to stakeholders’ trust in terms of 
trust in the whole IBs’ accountabilities. Trust considered as a determinant of loyalty particularly 
when a consumer perceives a relatively high degree of risk (Anderson and Srinivasan, 2003). 
Consumers trust in organization or its brands, not only help building loyalty, but also generate 
positive word of mouth (Kassim and Abdullah, 2010). Prior studies, exploring the causal linkage 
between trust and loyalty, considered it as the most critical factor in establishing, building and 
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maintaining customer relationships (Chopra and Wallace, 2003). In service entities as IBs, it 
appears that when a customer trusts a brand (Islamic services), customers are likely to build a 
positive behavioural attitude towards that brand (Nguyen and Leclerc, 2011). In this respect, 
trust acknowledged as an important indicator in developing customer loyalty (Shainesh, 2012). A 
high level of trust may turn a satisfied customer into a loyal customer (Dimitriadis et al., 2011). 
Based on agency theory; a rich disclosure environment and low information asymmetry have 
many desirable consequences. These comprise the effectual allocation of resources, capital 
market development, liquidity in the market, reduced cost of capital, lower return volatility, and 
high analyst forecast accuracy (Leuz and Wysocki, 2008; Lambert et al., 2007). These 
consequences have a positive effect on construct the stakeholders’ trust.   
In linking this evidence with our direct-effects hypotheses joining disclosure attributions to 
trust, this study expects a link between disclosure and trust. With as incentive literature about the 
relationship between trust and loyalty; we expect that, disclosure have a significant association 
with loyalty through mediating trust. As increased disclosure, level may enhance level of 
stakeholders’ trust about IBs’ compliance with Sharia as well as serving society well as Islam said 
in additional to achieving high financial performance. Enhancing stakeholders’ trust then may 
increase degree of loyalty. Combining the preceding arguments, we also hypothesise a mediating 
role of trust and satisfaction together on the link between disclosure and loyalty:  
H5.5 Disclosure has a significant direct effect on stakeholders’ trust   
H5.6 Stakeholders’ trust has a significant direct effect on stakeholders’ loyalty   
H5.7 Stakeholders’ trust mediates effect between disclosure and loyalty 
H5.8 Stakeholders’ trust and satisfaction mediates effect between disclosure and loyalty 
 
257 
 
5.5.4 Methodology  
5.5.4.1 Measurement of Constructs  
    Using a multi-stage approach, this study collected data on IBs external stakeholders’ 
perception of disclosure using a questionnaire survey design. This study initially started to 
measure the constructs in this study based on the analysis of prior studies in order to ensure 
content validity. Then, it enhanced the design by the insight gained from discussions with experts, 
academics and professionals, who are working in IBs. For the measurement of variables, we 
adopted a multiple-item 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree 
(5). The scales used to measure the constructs came from the extant literature. Stakeholders’ loyalty 
indicators were adapted from Lin and Wang (2006); Reichheld and Detrick (2003); Sirdeshmukh 
et al (2002); Zeithaml et al (1996); Reichheld (1993); while trust indicators were adapted from 
Flavian et al., (2005); Othman and Owen (2002); Morgan and Hunt (1994). Meanwhile, 
stakeholders’ satisfaction indicators measured by adapting scales developed by Croinet et al 
(2000); Fornell et al (1996); Levesque and McDougall (1996). However, it modifies the questions 
related to satisfaction; loyalty and trust variables based on the accountability pillars for Islamic 
banks. Regarding the multi-faceted disclosure variable, it contains three dimensions of disclosure 
based on the nature of IBs; namely Sharia compliance; social and financial disclosure. The main 
source for measuring disclosure is the conceptual framework that issued by IASB and contains 
section about the qualitative characteristics of useful financial information. For each category of 
disclosure, this study adopts Beest and Braam (2012) 48 and Chakroun and Hussainey (2014) 
approach. They measure disclosure quality based on qualitative characteristics of reporting 
information. This study adopts four qualitative characteristics of reporting information; which 
48 Beest and Braam (2012) examined whether there were differences between IFRS and US GAAP based financial 
reports in meeting the fundamental and enhancing qualitative characteristics for decision usefulness as defined in the 
Conceptual Framework of the IASB (2015). Fundamental and enhancing qualitative characteristics are the 
underlying attributes which contribute to the decision usefulness of information for financial information to be 
useful, it must be relevant and faithfully represent what it purports to represent. The enhancing qualitative 
characteristics of understandability, comparability, verifiability and timeliness are complementary to the fundamental 
characteristics and distinguish more useful information from less useful information (IASB, 2015). 
258 
 
                                               
are reliability; relevance; faithful representation and understand ability. The questions are adapted 
from Dusuki (2008); Al-Abdullatif (2007); Brown and Dacin (1997). The final measures provided 
in the Table 51. 
5.5.4.2 Data Collection and Sample Description  
This study sent out 1000 questionnaires to stakeholders who deal with IBs with 600 valid 
questionnaires returned (60% response rate). The data collected based on two sources. First, it 
contacted several official offices with databases about IBs and their customers. Second, it 
contacted managers in 20 IBs located in different countries. Accordingly, it developed a cross-
country dataset of stakeholders of IBs aged 21 and above in 15 countries.49Face validity checked 
in this study in line with Hair et al (2009) to see if questionnaire looks valid to the respondents. 
For this purpose, several drafts made and reviewed with the consultation of five academics 
and three professionals in IBs prior to the finalization of the questionnaire. The questionnaire 
included a set of general questions in order to determine the perception towards the IBs 
accountability, identify the factors that foster or discourage dealing with IBs, and the level of 
trust, loyalty, and satisfaction towards the accountability of IBs. A section of the questionnaire 
focused on importance of disclosure about Sharia compliance, social, and financial performance 
to stakeholders. This study conducted a pilot test on 10 of the respondents for their comments 
before sending out the questionnaire to the total sample through asking them for feedback on 
our survey and revised questions based on their suggestions. To ensure consistency and reliability, 
a standard definition of relevant terminologies provided on the cover page of the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
49 The countries included in the cross-country dataset are UK; Egypt; KSA; Jordan; Kuwait; Qatar; Bahrain; Sudan; 
Yemen; Libya; Algeria; Tunisia; Syria; Malaysia and Iraq. 
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Table 52: Measurement of Construct 
Factors Items Sources 
Stakeholders 
Satisfaction  
1. I am satisfied with my bank's financial performance 
2. I am satisfied with services provided by my bank 
3. I am satisfied with compliance of my bank with Islamic sharia    
4. I am satisfied with my bank’s accountability towards the society  
Fornell et al., 1996; 
Levesque and McDougall, 
1996 
Stakeholders  
Trust  
1. I have a trust that my Islamic bank is truly concerned with Islamic principles 
2. I have a confidence and trust in Bank's Sharia advisors 
3. I believe that my Islamic bank serving society well   
4. I have a confidence and trust in Bank's staff and Bank's management 
Flavian et al., 2005; 
Othman and Owen, 2002; 
Morgan and Hunt, 1994; 
Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002; 
Ellen et al., 2006; 
Osterhus, 1997 
Stakeholders  
loyalty  
1. I will say positive things about Islamic banks to other people  
2. I will recommend family and relatives to do business with Islamic bank  
3. I recommend Islamic banks to someone who seeks advice  
4. I continue to do more business with Islamic banks 
Zeithaml et al., 1996; 
Sirdeshmukh et al., 2002 
Disclosure  Sharia Disclosure  
1. I rely on SSBR to be sure about compliance with sharia for my bank 
2. The annual report as well as website provide sufficient and complete information 
about compliance with Islamic sharia 
3. To what extent are the SSBR sufficiently clear? 
4. For what extent Zakat and Sadakat statement is important for you (added 
value for you) and making differences in your decisions through dealing with 
Islamic banks  
5. For what extent SSBR is important for you (added value for you) and making 
differences in your decisions through dealing with Islamic banks  
6. For what extent Internal auditing sharia department report is important for you 
(added value for you) and making differences in your decisions through dealing 
with Islamic banks  
Social Disclosure  
1. I rely on CSR to be sure about serving my bank the society   
2. The annual report as well as website provide sufficient and complete information 
about serving society (charity and donations)  
3. To what extent are the CSRR sufficiently clear? 
4. For what extent Qard Hassan statement is important for you (added value for 
you) and making differences in your decisions through dealing with Islamic banks 
5. For what extent CSR report is important for you (added value for you) and 
making differences in your decisions through dealing with Islamic banks 
Financial Disclosure  
1. I rely on financial statements to be sure about financial performance for my bank  
2. The annual report as well as website provide sufficient and complete information 
about the financial performance and profitability   
3. To what extent are the FS sufficiently clear? 
4. For what extent Financial statements as profit and loss account and balance 
sheet  are important for you (added value for you) and making differences in your 
decisions through dealing with Islamic banks 
Beest and Braam, 2012; 
Chakroun and Hussainey, 
2014 approach and 
questions adopted from 
Brown and Dacin, 1997 
    The questionnaires distributed to bank stakeholders. Moreover, bank managers and brokerage 
firm managers asked to distribute the questionnaires to their clients; investors (individual or 
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institutional) and account holders. Furthermore, interviewers visited selected branches and 
distributed the questionnaires to customers outside the bank and used online and e-mail surveys 
to collect data50. The total sample of stakeholders who deal with IBs includes 250 customers; 200 
individual investors; 50 institutional investors and 100 accounts holders.  
Table 53: Descriptive statistics of respondent characteristics 
Variable Categories Frequency Percept Variable Categories Frequency Percept 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
420 
180 
70% 
30% 
Age 21>30                                                                                                                 
31>40                                                                                
41>50 
    >50 
252
270
60 
18 
42%
45 %
10 % 
3% 
Education  Bachelor degree 
Diploma 
Master  
Doctorate 
Other 
240 
90 
180 
60 
30 
40 % 
15 % 
30% 
10 % 
5% 
Key knowledge 
and 
background  
Sharia 
Business 
Other 
90 
300 
210 
15% 
50% 
35% 
Main sources of 
information 
about IBs  
Annual reports 
Websites 
Friends 
TV  
Others  
210 
180 
60 
30 
120 
35% 
30% 
10% 
5% 
20% 
Years of 
Experience in 
Dealing with 
IBs 
< 1 
1<3 
3<5 
   >5 
90 
150 
150 
210 
15 % 
25 % 
25 % 
35% 
Kind of services 
used by 
respondents  
Current account  
Murabaha 
Musharaka  
Mudaraba 
Other  
360 
90 
30 
30 
90 
60% 
15% 
5% 
5% 
15% 
Countries  UK 
Egypt 
KSA 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Qatar 
Bahrain 
Sudan 
Yemen 
Libya 
Algeria 
Tunisia 
Syria 
Malaysia 
Iraq 
120 
240 
60 
18 
30 
12 
12 
6 
18 
6 
24 
12 
6 
12 
24 
20% 
40% 
10% 
3% 
5% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
3% 
1% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
2% 
4% 
Kind of 
stakeholders  
Customers  
Accounts Holders  
Individual 
shareholders  
Institutional 
shareholders   
240 
100 
200 
 
50 
 
42% 
17% 
33% 
 
8% 
5.5.5 Data analysis and results  
5.5.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
    Table 53 displays the respondents’ profile. 600 respondents surveyed. Of these 600 
participants, male respondents accounted for 70% of the sample, while female respondents 
50 Online and e-mail surveys offer a more efficient and convenient form of data collection (Best and Krueger, 2002). 
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represented 30%. The majority of respondents were aged between 31 and 40 (45%) and 21 and 
30 (42 %). In terms of educational level, 40% of the respondents had bachelor degree and 30% 
of the respondents had a postgraduate degree (Master level). The majority of respondents have 
business knowledge in accounting and finance (50%); the main source of information on Islamic 
banks’ performance is the annual reports 35% then websites 30%. 35% of the respondents have 
experience of dealing with Islamic banks for more than 5 years. The main services used by the 
respondents are current accounts (60%). Finally, the majority of respondent stakeholders are 
customers representing 42% of the sample followed by individuals’ shareholders, representing 33% 
of the total sample. The majority of respondents come from Egypt, UK, and KSA representing 
40%, 20%, and 10%, respectively. 
5.5.5.2 Measurement model  
     To examine the validity and reliability of our measurement model, this study uses Structural 
Equation Modelling (SEM) for conﬁrmatory factor analysis along with the partial least squares 
(PLS) technique. This study assesses the measurement model through tests of convergent 
validity, discriminant validity, and reliability using commonly accepted guidelines. These results 
presented in tables 54 and 55. It also performs tests of multi-collinearity due to the relatively high 
correlations among some of the constructs. All constructs had variance inflation factors (VIF) 
values less than 4.75, which is within the cut off level of 5.0. As evidence of internal reliability 
and consistency of the construct, and following Sekaran and Bougie (2010), we use the Cronbach 
alpha coefficient and the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) (Hair et al., 2009). As shown in 
Table 54, the recommended threshold of 0.70 was met. Table 55 shows the discriminant validity 
of the construct, since the square root of the AVE between each pair of factors was higher than 
the correlation estimated between factors, thus ratifying its discriminant validity (Hair et al., 2009; 
Bagozzi and Yi, 1998). Finally, in order to confirm the discriminant validity we followed the 
procedure described by Fornell and Larcker (1981) who compare the correlations of the factors 
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with the square root of the average variance extracted for each of the factors. As Table 54 shows, 
the square root of the average variance extracted for each factor is greater than its correlations 
with other factors, providing evidence for discriminant validity 
Table 54: Loadings and cross-loadings of measurement items 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 55: Results of composite reliability and convergent/discriminant validity testing 
Construct Reliability Cronbach’s α AVE Collinearity VIFs Correlations and square roots of AVEs 
SATIS TRU LOYA DISC 
SATIS 0.799 0.763 0.513 4.058 0.716    
TRU 0.894 0.841 0.678 1.055 0.156 0.824   
LOYA 0.894 0.840 0.679 1.419 0.282 0.187 0.824  
DISC 0.898 0.820 0.751 4.751 0.655 0.134 0.470 0.867 
DISC: disclosure (sharia; social and financial); SATIS: satisfaction; TRU: trust and LOYA: loyalty. The bold diagonal elements are the square root of the 
variance shared between the constructs and their measures. Off diagonal elements are the correlations among constructs. Results suggesting that our measurement 
model provides a good fit to the data based on a number of fit statistics. As evidence of internal reliability or consistency of the construct, and following Anderson and 
Gerbing (1988), this study uses Cronbach’s alpha coefficient and the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) (Hair et al., 2010). The values of these statistics exceed 
the minimum recommended values of 0.7 and 0.5, respectively (Hair et al., 2010). 
5.5.5.3 Structural model assessment 
     The model explains 74% of variance for stakeholders’ satisfaction, 5% of variance for trust, 
and 43 % of variance for the loyalty towards Islamic banks. The overall fit measures suggest that 
the model is a plausible representation of the structures underlying the empirical data. APC= 
(0.428, p<0.001), ARS= (0.405, p<0.001), AARS= (0.403, p<0.001), AVIF= (2.821), and GOF= 
(0.515). As long as the Average Path Coefficient (APC), the Average R squared (ARS), and the 
Average adjusted R-squared (AARS) are significant under 1% level, and the average variance 
 SATIS TRUS LOYA DISC P value 
SATIS1 0.699 -0.009 0.274 -0.913 <0.001 
SATIS2 0.727 -0.018 0.198 -1.162 <0.001 
SATIS3 0.819 -0.003 -0.145 0.548 <0.001 
SATIS4 0.842 0.019 -0.187 0.514 <0.001 
TRUS1 0.062 0.798 0.027 -0.077 <0.001 
TRUS2 0.079 0.841 0.041 -0.073 <0.001 
TRUS3 -0.182 0.778 -0.065 0.180 <0.001 
TRUS4 0.029 0.874 -0.006 -0.019 <0.001 
LOYA1 0.041 0.086 0.847 -0.072 <0.001 
LOYA2 0.161 -0.014 0.859 -0.196 <0.001 
LOYA3 0.121 -0.033 0.867 -0.229 <0.001 
LOYA4 -0.389 -0.045 0.731 0.601 <0.001 
DISC1 (6) -0.541 -0.155 0.553 0.733 <0.001 
DISC2 (5) 0.180 0.064 -0.227 0.951 <0.001 
DISC3 (4) 0.176 0.038 -0.138 0.974 <0.001 
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Inflation Factor (AVIF) is lower than five. As well as the geometric mean of the average 
communality (GOF) suggests a large effect size, the overall fit indices indicate a good fit of the 
model (Kock, 2011). Disclosure has a positive and significant influence on loyalty (β=0.46, 
p<0.001) as suggested in H5.8. The results are in line with H5.2 that examines the effects of 
disclosure on stakeholders’ satisfaction. They show a significant association between disclosure 
and satisfaction (β=0.86, p<0.001). Results show that stakeholders’ satisfaction is significantly 
associated with loyalty (β=0.24, p<0.001. This outcome is support H5.3. Disclosure is 
significantly related to trust (β=0.22, p<0.001), giving support to H5.5. The result is in line with 
H5.6 that investigates the impacts of trust on the loyalty. It shows that, trust is significantly 
associated with loyalty (β=0.16, p<0.001. It seems that disclosure associations have greater 
influence on satisfaction than on trust. In summary, the significant direct effects in the model 
confirm that the influence of disclosure associations on loyalty mediated not only by 
stakeholders’ satisfaction, but also by trust. The structural model indicated that disclosure, 
through the mediating effect of trust and satisfaction, collectively explains 43% of the variation 
of the variable stakeholders’ loyalty for IBs. Figure 11 shows estimations for our model  
Figure 11: Structural model estimation 
 
 
                                                                                                       
          0.24***                         
       0.86***                     𝑅𝑅2= 0.74 
                        
                                         0.46***                            
 
                           0.22***                
                                0.16***                                 𝑅𝑅2= 0.43 
                                                                                    
   
                                                                𝑅𝑅2= 0.05  
SSF Discolour: Sharia; Social and Financial disclosure  
Note: The asterisks represent the significant level of the coefficient. *0.01; ** 0.05; ***0.001 
Figure (3) PLS results of research model of main test (n=600) 
APC= (0.428, p<0.001), ARS= (0.405, p<0.001), AARS= (0.403, p<0.001), AVIF= (2.821), and 
GOF= (0.515) 
Stakeholders 
Trust 
Stakeholders 
Loyalty 
 Stakeholders 
Satisfaction 
SSF 
Disclosure  
 
264 
 
5.5.5.4 Testing for mediation 
     This study investigates the partial mediating effect of trust and satisfaction in the association 
between the disclosure and stakeholders’ loyalty. This investigation tests H5.4; H5.7; H5.8. To 
do so, three alternative structural models in additional to the main model are estimated following 
the test procedures proposed by Baron and Kenney (1986). One includes disclosure only (base 
model), the second includes disclosure and satisfaction (Model 1), and the third includes 
disclosure and trust (Model 2) as well as the main model that contains disclosure; trust; 
satisfaction and loyalty (Full Model). Table 56 indicates that the path from disclosure to loyalty in 
the base model is significant (β=0.18, p<0.001) which is line with H5.1. However, the indirect 
effect of disclosure on loyalty via satisfaction is greater than its direct effect on it (β=0.36, 
p<0.001) and the indirect effect of disclosure on loyalty via trust is greater than its direct effect 
on it (β=0.27, p<0.001). This result supports H5.4 that, satisfaction mediates the effect between 
disclosure and loyalty. Moreover, this outcome supports H5.7 that, trust mediates the 
relationship between disclosure and loyalty. These results are in line with H5.8 that supports the 
mediating of trust and satisfaction of the relationship between disclosure and loyalty.    
      For further test the mediating effects, this study conducts a Sobel test. The results support 
the mediating effects of trust (p<0.001) and satisfaction (p<0.001). The fit indices values are as 
follows: APC= (0.428, p<0.001), ARS= (0.405, p<0.001), AARS= (0.403, p<0.001), AVIF= 
(2.821), and GOF= (0.515). The results suggest good model fit with the data (statistically 
significant APC, ARS, and AARS), and low overall collinearity (AVIF<5). The geometric mean 
of the average communality (GOF) suggests a large effect size. Furthermore, Cohen’s (1988) 
affect size f 2.51 The model suggests that satisfaction (f 2= 0.739) has a large effect size whereas 
loyalty (f 2 =0.321) has a medium effect size and trust (f 2 = 0.049) has a small effect size. In the 
51 F 2 defined as the degree to which the phenomenon is present in the population used to examine the substantive 
effect of the research model. Cohen (1988) suggested 0.02, 0.15, and 0.35 as operational definitions of small, 
medium, and large effect sizes, respectively. 
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main PLS model, Stone-Geisser Q2 is 0.740 for SATIS, 0.048 for LOYA and 0.278 for TRU that 
is positive and hence satisfies the predictive validity of the structural model52  
Table 56: Testing of mediating models  
Path Based Model Model 1 Model 2 Full Model 
Disclosure        Loyalty  0.18 0.36 0.27 0.46 
Disclosure     Satisfaction   0.86  0.86 
Satisfaction    Loyalty   0.22  0.24 
Disclosure      Trust    0.22 0.22 
Trust           Loyalty   0.15 0.16 
5.5.6 Discussion  
      This study is the first one that provides novel empirical evidence on the non-economic 
impact of the disclosure generally and for IBs particularly. The aim of this study is investigating 
the direct effects of disclosure on trust; satisfaction and loyalty for IBs. In order to gain a better 
understanding of how disclosure about compliance with SSF performance can enhance the 
loyalty of stakeholders who deal with IBs, this study examined the critical mediating role trust 
and satisfaction on the association between disclosure and loyalty.  Thus, this study develops a 
comprehensive model of stakeholders’ perception of disclosure based on accountability pillars of 
IBs. Disclosure is a multi-dimensional construct composed of three dimensions, which are Sharia, 
social, and financial. With a sample of 600 stakeholders who deal with Islamic banks cross 15 
counties, the structural equation modelling results, show a direct effect of disclosure on 
stakeholders’ loyalty. The results show that there are partial mediating effects of trust and 
satisfaction for the association between disclosure and loyalty. Furthermore, there is a strong 
positive linkage between trust, satisfaction, and loyalty. The result supports the previous studies 
that measuring the association between trust; satisfaction and loyalty (e.g., Shainesh, 2012; 
Nguyen and Leclerc, 2011; Hoq and Amin, 2010; Kassim and Abdullah, 2010). Furthermore; the 
result supports as well as expends scope the previous studies that measuring the impacts of 
52 The study tests the predictive validity of the structural model following the Stone–Geisser Q2. According to 
Roldán and Sánchez- Franco (2012), in order to examine the predictive validity of the research model, the cross-
validated construct redundancy Q2 is necessary. A Q2 is greater than 0 implies that the model has predictive validity. 
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disclosure or the performance on the trust; satisfaction and loyalty (Perez et al., 2012; Bigné et al., 
2011). The result support the debating about the benefits of disclosure (Wang et al., 2015; 
Moumen et al., 2015), but with expending to non-economic consequences rather than economic 
(impacts on cost of capital; firm value; analysts’ forecasts and financial performance).  
    The findings indicate that increasing SSF disclosure level through annual reports, websites, 
and other methods, has a significantly positive impact on external stakeholders’ trust; satisfaction 
and loyalty. The result of this study provides evidence about the impcts of increasing level of 
disclosure on the behaviour of stackholders. Also; it shows that non-financial or ethical 
information that contain sharia as well as social disclosure have a postiuve impccts on the loyalty 
of stacholders more than financial. This result differentiates IBs from other financial insituiotons 
and convetional banks and supported the main basics for these banks which construct on 
compliance with sharia and servicing the socity.  Based on these findings, this study contributes 
to the disclosure literature and the Islamic finance literature. First, it demonstrates that SSFD 
play a significant role in the development of IBs stakeholders’ loyalty. Second, it stresses the 
mediating effects of stakeholders’ trust and satisfaction on association between disclosure and 
stakeholders’ loyalty. Therefore, from a conceptual perspective, this research is the first that 
confirms the presence of significant direct effects of disclosure on stakeholders’ loyalty in IBs. 
Third, this study expands prior studies exploring the economic consequences of disclosure 
through measuring the non-economic consequences of disclosure related to stakeholders’ 
behaviour. To the best of my knowledge, prior empirical studies in the banking sector in general 
and in IBs in particular did not incorporate different facets of disclosure nor did they stress the 
mediating roles of trust and satisfaction towards loyalty. Additionally, while literature has shown 
that CSR associations are linked to consumer loyalty (Perez et al., 2012; Marin et al., 2009), this 
study contributes to this literature by examining the impact of CSR disclosure on stakeholders’ 
loyalty. The study extends the disclosure literature by adopting Best and Braam (2012) and 
Chakroun and Hussainey (2014)’s approach, which measures disclosure based on qualitative 
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characteristics of reporting information and applying it to IBs. Finally, this study contributes to 
theories on disclosure by linking accounting theories to those of marketing. As the literature 
have recently agreed to integrate the role of different constructs such as trust and satisfaction 
(He et al., 2012) to customer loyalty, this study seeks to introduce a model on the effect of 
disclosure on  IBs stakeholders’ loyalty  while including trust and satisfaction as mediators.         
      The key managerial implication of finding for this study is that Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs) may need to rethink increasing the level of disclosure to attract more customers based on 
their trust in the bank Sharia compliance. In the long run, however, IBs may focus on disclosing 
information in Sharia Supervisory Board report and CSR report to reflect the differences 
between these banks and conventional banks in additional to financial information. The results 
are applicable to all IFIs that seek to enhance their image and increase customers’ loyalty as well 
as attract potential customers by providing better disclosure of performance. Despite the novel 
contributions of this study, study contains some limitations that offer avenues for further 
research. First, the use of convenience sampling is one of the important shortcomings of this 
research. This study encourages future studies to use random sampling. Second, it limited data 
collection to Muslim respondents because one of the main disclosure dimensions in this study is 
Sharia compliance. As an interesting extension, future research may test this conceptual model 
for non-Muslim respondents who deal with IBs. Third, further research may provide separate 
results for different categories of stakeholders. Furthermore; the further research may add 
additional variable in this model as commitment and perceived value to see to what extent-
increased disclosure has an impacts on these variables. Mediating the effect of culture on the 
association between disclosure and loyalty could investigate in the future. Moreover, it is worth 
gaining insight on the perception of internal stakeholders, including managers and employees, 
towards the disclosure in IBs and its effect on the investors as well as all stakeholders’ behaviour 
as trust and loyalty. Finally; this study adopted quantitative method through using questionnaire 
which asking further research through using qualitative approach by using interviews with 
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internal as well as external stakeholders to see the consequences of disclosure on enhancing 
image and construct competitive advantage for IBs towards conventional banks.         
   Next chapter (6) aims to complete the holistic image about this study through measuring the 
consequences of SSF practices from different perception through surveying the stakeholders’ 
perceptions towards Islamic banks’ activities (who deal with IBs as well as non-customers who 
do not deal with IBs). Result of the following study may support this study to identify the gap 
between perspective of board (based on disclosure) and stakeholders.     
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Chapter Six: Perceptions towards Accountability practices 
6.0 Introduction   
   This chapter seeks to explore the perceptions and expectations of two different groups 
(stakeholders who deal with IBs and non-customers who do not deal with IBs) about the actual 
practices of accountabilities of IBs. The second aim for this chapter also is constructing a 
pyramid of IBs’ accountabilities based on perceptions of these groups. This study completes the 
picture of accountability practices and its consequences. Chapter 2 (parts 1, 2 and 3) explores the 
accountability from the perspective of Sharia. Chapter 4 (empirical studies 1, 2 and 3) explores 
the accountability concept from the view of disclosure conducted by BOD. The disclosure levels 
for Islamic banks reflected in the perceptions of managements about Sharia, social and financial 
accountabilities. Therefore, it explores this concept from the view of agent or management. 
Chapter five shows to what extent disclosure about these accountabilities have significant 
impacts on the agent or bank (empirical study 4) through measuring the consequences on the 
firm value as well as the impacts on the principle or stakeholders (empirical study 5) through 
investigate the consequences on the stakeholders’ loyalty. Then, chapter six explores 
accountability concept from perspective of stakeholders. Through the result of this chapter and 
comparing the same with the result of chapter, three related to disclosure level, the study 
constructs a comprehensive image about different viewpoint about these accountabilities from 
Islamic banks as an agent and from viewpoint of stakeholders as a principle that assists 
researcher to identify the gap between the two viewpoints. This chapter contains empirical study 
No. 6, which summarized as follows:  
Empirical study (6): Perceptions of stakeholders and non-customers towards 
accountability practices of Islamic banks: This study seeks to identify the perceptions and 
expectations of stakeholders and non-customers towards Sharia, social and financial practices of 
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Islamic banks (IBs). It aims to construct pyramid of Islamic banks’ accountabilities based on 
surveying opinions of two groups (stakeholders and non-customers), using survey questionnaire 
from large stakeholders samples from 15 cross countries, pertaining to two different segments 
(600 stakeholders who deal with IBs as well as 600 customers who do not deal with IBs). The 
pyramid of IBs’ accountabilities shows priorities of Sharia and then financial followed by social 
accountability for both of the two groups. It also shows that the main criterion of stakeholders’ 
selection of IBs was the Sharia, financial, and then social factors. Stakeholders who deal with IBs 
are satisfied with the practices of these banks. Both of the two groups believe that IBs may guide 
by Sharia, financial, and then social objectives. This research is one of the first empirical studies 
that test the IBs’ accountabilities practices for stakeholders as well as non-customers. The 
outcomes provide important theoretical and practical implications for IBs related to Sharia, social 
and financial practices. 
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Empirical study (6): Perceptions of stakeholders and non-customers 
towards accountability practices of Islamic banks 
6.6.1 Introduction  
   Researchers have proposed that the long-term survival of a firm improved when it responds to 
stakeholder interests. Therefore, less attention that given to the effects of SSF accountabilities 
actions has impacts on consumers and their perceptions of the firm. Fukukawa et al (2007) 
emphasize the importance of stakeholder perceptions to a firm’s pursuit of these accountabilities. 
In order to gain customers’ satisfaction and loyalty, it is important for the banks to know their 
customers' needs, interests, concerns, styles … etc. It is important for the firm to know those 
major factors that attract the customers to choose a given bank (Echchabi and Olaniyi, 2012). In 
the banking context, it recognized that customer satisfaction plays an important role in 
enhancing the long-term relationship between customers and the banks (Bontis et al., 2007). It is 
justified to argue that for IBs to remain competitive in additional to comply with Sharia  their 
expertise in Sharia  compliance services must be complemented by their ability to adopt modern 
technologies and practices into their business processes. This will allow IBs to create a 
differential advantage by simultaneously ensuring the religious, social activities and material 
wellbeing of their customers (Butt and Aftab, 2012).  
   This study is exploring the perceptions of stakeholders with IBs more than shareholders are.  
Stakeholder theory suggests that management decisions may not tailored just to the interest of 
shareholders, but also to stakeholders who similarly affected by the company’s actions (Clarkson, 
1995). This research aims to explore the accountabilities of IBs based on the perceptions of 
stakeholders who deal with IBs and non-customers who do not deal with IBs. For stakeholders 
who deal with IBs, this study aims to explore their opinions about the significant factors that 
affected their judgment through dealing with IBs. This study designed also to investigate 
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customer’s criteria for selecting IBs. This study seeks to explore also their viewpoints about the 
actual practices of their banks related to SSF performance and how these accountabilities 
develop and IBs objectives. It finally aims to identify the reactions of this category in case of 
their IBs stopping compliance with Sharia or stopping serving the society. For second group, we 
seek to measure the perceptions and expectations of non-customers towards the impacts of IBs’ 
practices related to their three accountabilities on their decision to not deal with these banks. 
This study aims also to exploring their opinions about the ideal objectives for IBs based on the 
framework of accountabilities for IBs and what may be practices of IBs to changes their 
background about these banks and switching to deal with IBs. This study finally seeks to test the 
expectations of this group about the ideal level of practices concerned with SSF performs. 
   This study motivated by several gaps in the previous studies. First, in the case of Islamic 
banking, the previous studies that attempted to study customer satisfaction with Islamic banking 
service quality are still scanty (e.g., Abduh, 2011; Golmohammadi and Jahandideh, 2010). The 
previous studies indicated that the role of social accountability in determining customer 
satisfaction has received little research attention (Fornell et al., 2006). Discussion concerning the 
relationship of these accountabilities initiatives and positive outcomes has increased in recent 
years (Argenti et al., 2005). This study furthermore motivated by debating about service quality 
that remains a topic of focal interest for both academicians and practitioners. In the service 
industry as banks, its definitions tend to focus on how well a service provider meets or exceed its 
customer expectations (Lewis and Booms, 1983). This study also motivated by outcomes of 
Dusuki and Abdullah (2007) who suggested that customer perception regarding a bank’s 
conformance with Islamic financial principles serves as one of the most important factors in 
patronizing IBs. Previous studies investigating the factors that could possibly contribute towards 
customer patronization of IBs found that relative price, efficient services, convenience, 
confidentiality, cost/benefit, bank’s reputation and image also contribute towards customer 
patronizing behaviour (Gait and Worthington, 2008). Thus, it appears quite clear that both the 
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religious and functional beliefs shape consumer global attitude towards IBs. However, the 
priorities of these factors from different issues as well as different groups not yet investigated. In 
contrast with the large number of works in bank selection criteria within the conventional 
framework (Hinson et al., 2009; Ardic and Yuzereroglu, 2009; Haron and Wan Azmi, 2008) 
relatively small numbers of studies have been done for IBs.  
   This study differs from other previous studies in many considerations. First, this study differs 
from Amin et al (2013), who just focused on sample from one country (Malaysia), whereas our 
sample is located in 15 countries. Secondly, Abdullah et al (2012) measure the perception of non-
Muslims customers, whereas our research investigates the perceptions of customers and non-
customers. Thirdly, this framework contains three accountabilities, whereas other works, such as 
Pérez and Bosque (2015); Martínez et al (2014), measure only one dimension (social 
accountability). Fourth, Awan and Bukhari (2011) investigate only the customer’s criteria for 
selecting IBs, while this study is exploring several themes such as factors behind dealing or not 
dealing with IBs, motivations behind switching to deal with IBs and objectives of IBs. Moreover, 
it differs from outcomes of Taap et al (2011) that adopt SERVQUAL model which represents 
just only one dimension of our model that contains the previous model as well as social and 
Sharia dimension. This work used data related to financial industry (banks), while other 
literatures focused on different sectors such as hospitality companies (Martínez et al., 2014). 
Finally, this study focused on stakeholders of IBs, whereas other works as Keisidou et al (2013) 
focused on conventional banks. The rest of this study organized as follows. First, a discussion of 
the relevant literature is presented, followed by exploring the accountabilities of IBs and how we 
measure, followed by the details of the methodology used and sample profile. Fourth, the 
findings presented and discussed, followed by the conclusion that explores our implications, 
limitations and venues for future research. 
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6.6.2 Literature Reviews  
   This study reviews the previous studies measuring the banking stakeholders’ selection criteria, 
perceptions of stakeholders about practices of IBs, and factors switching to deal with IBs and 
expectations of stakeholders towards practices of IBs. The assessment of customers’ awareness 
and usage of service has become more important as today IBs do not rely solely on religious 
factors as a strategy to secure customers’ allegiances but they may emphasize providing quality 
and efficient product and services (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). In the context of banking 
industry, the determinant factors of a customer’s bank selection have received significant 
attention in recent years. Kaufman (1967) found that the most influential factors in customer’s 
selection of a bank were convenient location and quality of services offered by the bank. 
Findings of various studies reveal that consumer choice of bank depends on a multiple set of 
criterions including bank location, availability of loans (Martenson, 1985). Hegazy (1995) found 
that the higher percentage of clients using Islamic modes of financing were Muslims. Metawa 
and Almossawi (1998) noted, “The bank-selection decisions by bank customers are 
predominantly religious-based decisions and ‘Adherence to Islamic principles’ was found to be 
the most important selection criterion” (p.305). Khan and Khanna (2010); Rashid and Hassan 
(2009) suggested that religious belief is the major motivation for selecting IBs. Contradictory to 
these findings, there is a point of view that religious beliefs are not the sole reason for selecting 
IBs (Zaher and Hassan, 2001)  
    The banking customers’ selection criteria largely studied in the previous literature. Ta and Har 
(2000) indicated that customers place high emphasis on the pricing and product dimensions of 
bank services. Their findings are similar to Abdjalil et al (2010); Erol et al. (2007). The other 
selection criteria include the bank’s reputation and image, convenience, interest rates, 
competence, size of bank, efficiency of personnel, location, and transaction fees and bank’s 
network (Khattak and Rehman, 2010; Hassan et al., 2009). In addition, the religious factor found 
in the literature to be one of the criteria of IBs’ selection (Ahmad et al., 2010; Osman et al., 2009; 
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Al-Ajmi et al., 2009). Ahmad and Haron (2002) reveal that the economic and religious factors 
were the most important factors for IBs’ selection. Social orientation is also important 
determinants of bank selection (Devlin and Ennew, 2005). 
   Related to the actual perceptions of stakeholders about actual IBs practices or customers 
satisfaction, Oliver (1997) defined customer satisfaction as the difference between an individual’s 
expectations before the consumption of service and the actual experience that results in the 
consumption. Service quality has been viewed as a factor that has a strong link to satisfaction 
(Culiberg and Rojsek, 2010; Arbore and Busacca, 2009). Akhtar et al (2011) tested the effect of 
service quality of IBs on customer satisfaction and concluded that their relationship is positive. 
Several studies explore customers satisfaction related to IBs’ services (e.g., Ijaz and Ali, 2013; 
Ebrahimi and Moghadam, 2012). Tahir and Bakar (2007) found that service quality provided by 
IBs was below customers’ expectations. According to Haque et al (2009), customer perception 
about IBs influenced significantly by quality of services, confidence in bank, social and religious 
perspective and availability of services. Chakrabarty (2006) identified 4 factors that determined 
overall customer satisfaction amongst banking customers which are in-branch satisfaction, 
economic satisfaction, remote satisfaction and Automated Teller Machine (ATM) satisfaction  
    Expectation disconfirmation theory of customer satisfaction proposes that customers are 
more likely to be satisfied when the actual company performance exceeds or confirms prior 
expectations (Oliver, 1997). When company performance’ expectations are confirmed (or 
exceed), the customers will be more satisfied (Aquino and Reed, 2002). The importance of 
identifying perceptions and expectations of customers mentioned frequently in the service 
quality literature (Avkiran, 1999). Paying attention to the customers’ perspective is an important 
approach that the banks must recognize in the face of stiffer competition. Measures of overall 
customer satisfaction typically capture consumer expectations towards the service provided, as 
well as how far the provided service is from their ideal (Soderlund, 2006). 
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Customers have many opportunities to switch service providers and many events within the 
established relationship are likely to cause service relationship deterioration and dissolution 
(Gustafsson et al., 2005). For Keaveney (1995), service switching may be due to critical incidents, 
such as attraction by competitors, pricing problems, core service failures, service encounter 
failures, lack of convenience and ethical problems. Varki and Colgate (2001) show that customer 
value impacts customer satisfaction and there is an inter-linkage between perceived service value, 
customer satisfaction evaluation and intention to switch to other service providers. In the case of 
Islamic banking services, Hashim and Latifah (2010) study the relationship between customer 
perceived value, relationship quality and switching intention among Islamic banking customers. 
Hashim and Latifah (2010) find evidence that customer perceived value significantly influences 
the level of customer satisfaction which then affects the intention to switch. Suryani and 
Chaniago (2011) indicate that there are five factors underlying customer-switching behaviour in 
Islamic banking services, namely, bank-customer relationship, Sharia compliance issues, service 
quality, switching cost and risk perceived by customers. Trust may also have a direct effect on 
consumer resistance to switch to another service provider when a critical incident occurs (Harris 
and Goode, 2004). 
   Previous researchers have identified various factors that determine customer satisfaction and 
criteria to deal with IBs. Othman and Owen (2002) find that between 65 and 78 % of Islamic 
banking customers are satisfied. It found that fast and efficient service, confidentiality and 
transaction speed are the key criteria that Malaysian customers have identified concerning their 
satisfaction with the services of their IBs (Amin and Isa, 2008). Therefore, in order to maintain 
and expand their customer base, it is important for IBs to understand the criteria consumers use 
to evaluate banking services and to have a system by which consumer satisfaction continuously 
measured and improved. 
      As it can inferred from the above studies, the Islamic aspect of IBs with the Sharia is the 
main factor that motivates customers to adopt the Islamic banking services, and it may be the 
278 
 
main reason for them to choose their banks. Hence, in order to provide a comprehensive 
framework of the attributes that are most important for the customers when selecting a given 
bank, all of the above-mentioned attributes will be included in the study.  Having gone through 
the previous studies, it is noteworthy that none of them has explored the perceptions of external 
stakeholders who deal with IBs and non-customers who do not deal with IBs. This study is an 
attempt to explore the perceptions of two groups based on holistic framework for SSF 
accountabilities of IBs. To the best of my knowledge, issues related to exploring the actual 
perceptions, expectations, opinions about how may be IBs’ objectives, reactions in case of non-
compliance with Sharia  as well as social role, constrains of dealing with IBs based on framework 
of accountabilities of IBs from different viewpoints have not been investigated before. 
6.6.3 Islamic banks’ accountabilities  
6.6.3.1 Sharia Accountability  
The concept of religion covers a wide range of items. Ali and Al Kazemi (2007) argue that 
Islamic work ethics and indicate that when Muslims are more religious, they are more likely to 
stick with the organization through good years and bad years and making sacrifices when 
necessary to keep the organization strong. Muslim customers tend to be more trusting that the 
operations of IBs are truly in accordance with Sharia. It has shown that religious approach 
proven to very effective among the Muslim community in their decision to deal with IBs 
(Tameme and Asutay, 2012). The principle difference between Islamic and conventional banks is 
that IBs follows Sharia in carrying out their business (Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). Haque et al 
(2009); Al-Ajmi et al (2009) concluded that, the religious is the main factor for stakeholders to 
patronize IBs. Lateh (2009) states that IBs systems are based on the Sharia in the sense that the 
IBs have to operate within the ethical and moral frameworks of the Sharia. Under this 
framework, IBs prohibited from dealing with activities that considered unlawful in Islam as 
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investing in alcoholic factories and casinos. Haron and Wan Azmi (2008) confirm the existence 
of Sharia/religious factor in decision process of bank selection. This study measures Sharia 
accountability for IBs based on several factors as compliance with Sharia, existing SSB, Islamic 
appearance for staff, Islamic image and others.           
6.6.3.2 Social Accountability (SA)  
   IBs predicted to embed ethics and social responsibility in their business model. From an 
Islamic approach, everyone is accountable in front of Allah for his responsibility towards society 
(Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). From an Islamic perspective, SA circles on the concept of ultimate 
accountability to Allah where human beings are stared as ‘khalifah’ (vicegerent on earth) and are 
expectable to relate with additional humans to take care of the natural environment entrusted to 
them (e.g., Farook et al., 2011; Aribi and Gao, 2010). CSR from an Islamic approach is a way to 
worship Allah through serving his society and satisfying him as Quran explains to us that all our 
activities as CSR towards the society may be for Allah as He says “Indeed, my prayer, my rites of 
sacrifice, my living and my dying are for Allah, Lord of the worlds” (Quran, 6:162).  
Social accountability has received increasing attention from scholars (Berens et al., 2007; Pirch 
et al., 2007). Actually, several literatures have identified a positive influence of SA practices on 
consumer identification with the company (He and Li, 2011). The literature has suggested that 
SA can influence customer satisfaction (Bigné et al., 2011). Luo and Bhattacharya (2006) 
articulate three reasons for what they name Social accountability activities-customer satisfaction 
effect. Firstly, as Maignan et al (2005) suggest company’s customers can be potential stakeholders 
who care about not only the economic performance of organizations but also the social 
performance of the company. Thus, customers are likely to be more satisfied if services 
providers develop CSR initiatives and present a socially responsible behaviour toward society 
(He and Li, 2011). Secondly, a strong record of SA creates a favourable image that positively 
enhances stakeholders’ evaluations of the firm and their attitude towards it (Bhattacharya and 
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Sen, 2003). Moreover, SA initiatives are a key element of corporate identity that can lead 
customers to identify the company and these customers are more likely to be satisfied with firm’s 
offerings (Bhattacharya and Sen, 2003). Third, Mithas et al (2005) empirically demonstrate that 
perceived value is a key antecedent to promote customer satisfaction. Customers are more likely 
to derive better-perceived value and, consequently, higher satisfaction from a service that is made 
by a socially responsible company (Luo and Bhattacharya, 2006). Moreover, Gundlach and 
Murphy (1993) argue that ethical and social principles help a firm to build long-term 
relationships with stakeholders. Roman (2003) demonstrates that stakeholders become more 
loyal to a company when behaviour perceived as ethical. The benefits of SA for firms include 
increased customer loyalty, trust, and positive brand attitude (Sen et al., 2006). This study 
measures SA based on several factors such as charity, donations, financing developed projects 
and Qard Hassan  
6.6.3.3 Commercial and Financial Accountability  
    Al-Ajmi et al (2009) argue that the satisfaction of religious responsibilities may or may not be 
an important element in bank selection, other motives are reported to have significant an effect 
of the consumers’ decisions in IBs. This accountability contains two dimensions, which are the 
financial accountability that comprises profitability and return and commercial accountability that 
comprises dimensions as services quality, convenience, tangibles, image and other variables. One 
of these significant bank selection criterions is the potential profits from investing in IBs. Erol 
and El-Bdour (1989) suggested, in considering motives responsible for selecting IBs as 
depository institutions, religious motives did not stand out as being the only significant ones, 
bank customers are profit motivated. Haron et al (1994) found that Muslim customers believe 
that investing in IBs can give higher returns.  
       Service quality remains a critical measure of organizational performance for banking 
institutions and continues to be at the forefront of services literature and practice (Yavas and 
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Yasin, 2001). The enthusiasm mostly kept high by the fact that a high service quality offered 
often leads to customer satisfaction, loyalty, and other positive behavioural outcomes (Razak et 
al., 2007). Service quality considered a key factor for a successful business, especially banks, and 
considered to contribute to increasing the competitive advantage (Akhtar et al., 2011). There is 
an agreement among several studies that service quality will remain a critical factor in 
determining customer satisfaction with financial services offered by banks and major 
determinants of customer’s choice of a bank (Al-Hawari and Ward, 2006). Convenience issues 
such as the location of a bank, the opening hours and ATM availability are the main factors 
behind dealing with banks (Manrai and Manrai, 2007). Kaynak and Whiteley (1999) observed 
that the convenience of a bank was a primary motivation for customers in selecting a specific 
institution. Tangibles factor includes physical layout, physical facilities, atmosphere, and 
environment inside the bank (Hossain and Leo, 2009). Jamal and Ananstasiadou (2009) support 
the fact that tangibles have an impact on customer satisfaction. 
   The image considered a valuable asset for companies (Pina et al., 2006). They suggest that the 
image of a company defined by the perceptions of all the external stakeholders and it represents 
their beliefs and attitudes towards it. Image used extensively to describe how customers perceive 
a company, regarding the products and services it offers and its reputation, and it considered able 
to generate value (Fathollahzadeh et al., 2011). This study measures the image of IBs based on 
their perceptions about Islamic image as Hijab for females, praying room and social face. Islamic 
branding means giving an Islamic name of the product or complying with the objectives of 
Sharia while offering any services (Jalil and Rahman, 2014). Brand credibility defined as the level 
to which the service position information considered believable. It entails the consistent delivery 
of what promised to the customers (Erdem et al., 2002). Haque et al (2009) state that bank’s 
name and reputation strongly affect customer selecting a bank and demonstrated as one of the 
important criteria in the banking selection decision.  
282 
 
      Financial performance as a factor not commonly measured in literature; however, the 
researchers that have included in their studies have measured it in a variety of ways. Anderson et 
al (1997) chose to measure the financial performance in terms of return on investment. In this 
research, we measure financial accountability by several measures as high return and profitability 
ratios. Moreover, it contains cost or price of services as one of the financial factors that may 
affect the perceptions of stakeholders. Levesque and McDougall (1996) considered competitive 
interest rates part of the service features that affect customer satisfaction. Kaynak and Harcar 
(2004) found that low service charges are vital for customer’s selection of a particular bank. 
When it comes to integrating modern technology in the business process, inarguably, 
information technology in general and internet in particular have greater dominance in the 
banking sector than any other service industry (Rod et al., 2008). Banks have provided innovative 
methods of satisfying customers as internet banking and online system.  
   According to the literature, the attributes of reliability are account accuracy (keeping records 
correctly, accuracy in billing), keeping promises, providing a timely service and accurate 
information to customers (Abdullrahim, 2010). Othman (2002) used assurance to politeness and 
friendly staff providing financial advice, interior comfort of the bank, eases of access to account 
information and knowledgeable and experienced management team. Kaynak and Harcar (2004) 
found that the managing service quality is very important because most depends on how well the 
bank’s staffs responds to the needs and expectations of the customers. Caring and responsible 
staff influences the consumer in making decision of selecting IBs. The staff may be able to 
communicate the public in proper and effective way about the operation of IBs, which would 
help develop banking customer relationship in future. Based on the previous debating about SSF 
accountabilities, figure 12 shows the framework of IBs’ accountabilities and expected impacts on 
stakeholders and non-customers as follows. 
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Figure 12: Framework of Islamic bank’ accountabilities 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
            
 
 
 
6.6.4 Research questions 
  This study aims to provide answers for the following questions. 
Panel 1: Stakeholders who deal with IBs 
RQ1. What are the determinants and criteria for stakeholders’ selection of IBs? 
RQ2. What are the main objectives of IBs based on IBs’ accountabilities model?  
RQ3. What are the perceptions of stakeholders about actual practices for IBs’ accountabilities?      
RQ4. What are the reactions of IBs’ stakeholders in case of stopping achieving social and Sharia 
practices?  
Panel 2: Customers who do not deal with IBs 
RQ5. What are the key constrains behind un-dealing with IBs based on IBs’ accountabilities? 
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RQ6. What are the main objectives of Islamic banks based on IBs’ accountabilities?  
RQ7. Which factors based on IBs’ accountabilities would motivate customers dealing with IBs? 
RQ8. What are the expectations of customers who do not deal with IBs’ about SSF performance? 
6.6.5 Research Design  
6.6.5.1 Methodology  
      There are several studies about bank selection criteria and perceptions about banks 
performance. The tools of analysis are varying from simple descriptive statistics up to advanced 
econometrics techniques. Gerrard and Cunningham (2001) used analysis of variance (ANOVA), 
whereas Al-Ajmi et al (2009); Mokhlis (2009) adopted factor analysis. Blankson et al (2007) 
adopted Structural Equation Modelling. In this current research, I follow the method of (e.g., Al-
Ajmi et al, 2009; Okumus, 2005; Naser et al, 1999; Metawa and Almossawi, 1998) that used 
simple descriptive statistics and Friedman test.   
6.6.5.2 Measurement of Constructs  
   A questionnaire survey used to collect data of IBs external stakeholders’ perceptions as well 
as non-customers towards IBs’ SSF accountabilities. Most of the instruments used to measure 
the constructs in this study are adapted from previous studies in order to ensure content validity. 
Existing well-established multiple-item 5-point Likert scales, ranging from strongly disagree (1) 
to strongly agree (5), adopted to measure the variables. Most of the factors and questions that 
used in questionnaire adapted from previous studies (e.g., Amin et al., 2013; Echchabi and 
Hassanuddeen, 2012; Awan and Bukhari, 2011; Abdullrahim, 2010; Poolthong and 
Mandhachitara, 2009; Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007; Saduman, 2005; Arasly et al, 2005a; Flavian et 
al, 2005;  Shafie et al., 2004; Ahmad and Haroon, 2002; Othman and Owen, 2002; Naser et al., 
1999; Gerard and Cunningham, 1997) with modifications to wording to be appropriate for our 
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study. In this research, I added some new questions based on discussions with academics and 
professionals who are working in IBs’ industry.   
6.6.5.3 Data Collection and Sample Description 
    Based on the general guidelines by prior researchers on the sample size required from a given 
population (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996; Hair et al., 1995), and in view of the number of items 
used in this study (50 statements) for each group, a minimum of 500 respondents for each 
category are required for this study. However, we set 600 as the targeted sample size. Of the 
2000 questionnaires sent for two kinds of categories (1200 questionnaires sent for 10 different 
kinds of stakeholders who deal with IBs) and (800 questionnaires sent for any customers who do 
not deal with IBs). 600 usable questionnaires were returned from group (A) (50% response rate) 
and 600 questionnaires were returned from group B (75% response rate) and were found as valid 
and complete, thus yielding an average response rate of 63% which was sufficient response rate 
to ensure statistical reliability and generalizability (Stevens, 2002).  
The study took place in 15 cross-countries, namely, UK, Egypt, KSA, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, 
Bahrain, Sudan, Yemen, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Syria, Malaysia and Iraq. UAE selected because 
it was the originator of the world’s full-fledged IBs (Mostaque and Hussein, 2014). The selection 
of a Middle Eastern was important for this study considering the fact that the religion Islam 
mainly originated from the Middle East and then extended to the rest of the world (Mostaque 
and Hussein, 2014). Malaysia chosen as it has become a key Islamic financial hub in the region 
(Echchabi and Olaniyi, 2012). Jordan, Sudan, Syria and Bahrain chosen as they adopt AAOIFI 
for all IBs, which support this research objective, related to survey of the accountabilities of 
these banks. Egypt chosen as the home country for the authors and it was the home for IBs 
originality, supporting us to access most of IBs’ customers and easy access for many stakeholders 
and non-customers. UK selected as a host country for the author who supports me to access for 
several researches and customers and easy access for multi-nationalities. 
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   The questions for the questionnaire were designed and developed in such a way that the 
respondents could properly examine in order to provide a clear insight into importance of SSF 
accountability practices. Face validity checked in this study in line with Hair et al (2009); Anastasi 
(1988) in order to see if the questionnaire looks valid for the respondents. For this purpose, 
several drafts were made and reviewed with the consultation of 5 academics in the same area 
prior to the finalization of the questionnaire as well as 4 professionals in the IBs industry. The 
questionnaire carefully validated by a pre-test on 30 respondents to ensure that the questionnaire 
items properly adopted to meet the research objectives. The pre-test results indicated that 
respondents have no difficulty understanding the questionnaire. The responses from the pilot 
study were not included in the main study. To ensure consistency and reliability, a standard 
definition of the three accountabilities of IBs and relevant terminologies provided on the cover 
page of the questionnaire. Any insignificant indicators removed and some modifications made to 
increase the clarity of the questionnaire in the final study. 
    This study has two different questionnaires. First, one targets the stakeholders who deal with 
IBs. This questionnaire contains questions related to impacts of banks SSF practices on their 
judgment, questions about what may be IBs’ objectives, questions related to reactions of 
stakeholders in case of stopping comply with Sharia  and serving the society and questions to 
testing the stakeholders’ perceptions about actual practices of IBs. The second questionnaire 
directed to customers who do not deal with IBs. This questionnaire contains questions related to 
key reasons that constrain them to deal with IBs, main objectives of IBs, factors that can 
motivate them to switch for IBs and their expectations about IBs practices of SSF accountability. 
The last section of the questionnaire explored information about respondent’s profile, i.e., 
gender, age and education … etc.  
   The questionnaires distributed by different ways. First, for stakeholders (Customers, Accounts 
holders, Individual Shareholders and Public shareholders), the questionnaires were given to bank 
managers who were asked to distribute the questionnaires to our target. Moreover, interviewers 
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visited selected branches and distributed the questionnaires to customers outside the bank. For 
non-customers as well as some customers’ in-group (1), this study used online survey and email 
to collect data. Online surveys offer a more efficient and convenient form of data collection 
(Best and Krueger, 2002). Data collected from all available external stakeholders in our selected 
countries, which contain 250 customers, 200 Accounts holders, 100 Individual Shareholders, and 
50 institutional shareholders. To ensure greater representation of the data, it is a necessary for 
subjects to participate in the study for group (1), respondents were stakeholders visiting the 
counters of banks and they must have an account with one of the full-fledged IBs and have 
conducted transaction with bank recently or they used one of the IBs’ services or investing in 
any IBs transactions. It obtained a usable sample of 600 respondents who already deal with IBs. 
For group (2), it was a necessary requirement for subjects to participate to have an account with 
any banks as well as having knowledge about IBs system. Consequently, it obtained a usable 
sample of 1200 interested parties. This study adopts a convenient sampling approach (Peterson 
and Merunka, 2014) to design the research sample. Convenience samples considered valid under 
two conditions: if the study is exploratory in nature and if the items on the questionnaire are 
pertinent to the respondents who answer them (Ferber, 1977). A convenience sampling 
technique was selected due to its cost and time efficiency. Moreover, we adopt this sampling as 
our sample frame is not limited (in-group A, we aim at most of stakeholders and in-group B we 
aim at any Muslim who do not deal with IBs). Demographic details of the sample profile 
provided in Table 56. 
6.6.6 Analysis  
6.6.6.1 Descriptive statistics 
      Table 57 displays the respondents’ profile. A total of 1200 respondents were surveyed online 
as well as direct interviews. Of these 1200 participants, 600 deals with IBs (Panel 1) and other 
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600 do not deal with IBs (Panel 2). For Panel 1, male respondents accounted for 70% of the 
sample, while Female respondents were 30%. The majority of respondents are aged between 31 
and 40 (45%) and between 21 and 30 (42%). 30% of sample had Bachelor degree and 25% of 
respondents had a postgraduate degree. 25% from our sample is Academician and Professional 
for each. 
Table 57: Sample profile 
Variable Categories N % Variable Categories N % 
Panel 1: Stakeholders who deal with IBs  Panel 2: Non-customers who do not deal with IBs 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
420 
180 
70% 
30% 
Gender 
 
Male 
Female 
480 
120 
80% 
20% 
Age 21>30                                                                                                                 
31>40                                                                                
41>50 
>50 
252 
270 
60 
18 
42% 
45 %
10 % 
3% 
Age 21>30                                                                                                  
31>40                                                                                
41>50 
>50 
210
240
60 
90 
35% 
40 %
10 % 
15% 
Education  No education 
Basic/elementary/secondary 
Bachelor degree 
Postgraduate  
120 
150 
180 
150 
20% 
25 % 
30%  
25 % 
Education  No education 
Basic/elementary/secondary 
Bachelor degree 
Postgraduate 
180 
120 
200 
100 
30% 
20 % 
33%  
17 % 
Key knowledge 
and 
background  
Sharia  
Business 
Other  
90 
300 
210 
15% 
50% 
35% 
Key 
knowledge 
and 
background 
Sharia  
Business 
Other  
60 
300 
240 
10% 
50% 
40% 
Sources about 
IBs  
Annual reports 
Websites 
Direct Interaction  
Friends 
Internet and Newspaper   
Others  
160 
140 
170 
60 
30 
40 
27% 
23% 
28% 
10% 
5% 
7% 
Sources about 
IBs  
Annual reports 
Websites 
Friends 
Internet and Newspaper   
Others  
60 
90 
300 
30 
120 
10% 
15% 
50% 
5% 
20% 
Countries  UK 
Egypt 
KSA 
Jordan  
Kuwait  
Qatar 
Bahrain  
Sudan  
Yemen  
Libya 
Algeria  
Tunisia  
Syria   
Malaysia  
Iraq    
120 
240 
60 
18 
30 
12 
12 
6 
18 
6 
24 
12 
6 
12 
24 
20% 
40% 
10% 
3% 
5% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
3% 
1% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
2% 
4% 
Countries  UK 
Egypt 
KSA 
Jordan  
Kuwait  
Qatar 
Bahrain  
Sudan  
Yemen  
Libya  
Algeria   
Tunisia  
Syria 
Malaysia    
Iraq  
60 
270 
72 
12 
66 
12 
12 
12 
24 
12 
6 
12 
12 
12 
6 
10% 
45% 
12% 
2% 
11% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
4% 
2% 
1% 
2% 
2% 
2% 
1% 
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Occupation 
 
Student                         
Unemployed 
Self-employed 
Housework 
Academician 
Retired              
Professional 
100 
50 
50 
60 
150 
40 
150 
17% 
8% 
8% 
10% 
25% 
7% 
25% 
Occupation 
 
Student                         
Unemployed 
Self-employed 
Housework 
Academician 
Retired              
Professional 
60 
100 
60 
30 
200 
50 
100 
10% 
17% 
10% 
5% 
33% 
8% 
17% 
Experience 
with IBs  
< 1 
1<3 
3<5 
  >5 
90 
150 
150 
210 
15 % 
25 % 
25 % 
35% 
 
Main services  Current account  
Murabaha 
Musharaka  
Mudaraba 
Other  
360 
90 
30 
30 
90 
60% 
15% 
5% 
5% 
15% 
Categories  of 
stakeholders  
Customers  
Accounts holders  
Individual Shareholders  
Public shareholders  
250 
200 
100 
50 
42% 
33% 
17% 
8% 
       The majority of respondents have business knowledge in accounting and finance (50%), the 
main sources used to construct perception about IBs are direct Interaction (28%), annual report 
(27%) and then websites (23%). The majority of our respondents mainly are from Egypt (40%), 
UK (20%) and KSA (10%). 35% of the respondents have experience to deal with IBs more than 
5 years. The main services used from our respondents are current account (60%). Finally, the 
main kind of stakeholders that our survey conducted with is customers (42%) and then Accounts 
holders (33%). For Panel 2, 480 were males (80 %) and 120 were females (20 %). The majority 
of respondents were aged between 31 and 40 (40%) and 21 and 30 (35%); Bachelor degree (33%) 
is the majority of respondents. The majority of respondents have business knowledge (50%), the 
main source used to construct perception about IBs is conversations with friends (50%). 33% 
from the panel 2 are academicians. The majority of our respondents primarily are from Egypt 
(45%), KSA (12%) and UK (10%). 
6.6.6.2 Panel 1: Stakeholders who are dealing with Islamic banks 
Table58: Priorities of factors that influencing the judgement about dealing with IBs 
 Not important 
at all 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Total 
important 
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Sharia accountability  2% 4% 4% 50% 41% 91% 
Avoiding the Interest (Riba)  2% 2% 8% 47% 41% 88% 
Islamic branding and image 1% 4% 2% 51% 42% 93% 
Confidence in the bank's Sharia Supervisory Board  3% 3% 3% 52% 39% 91% 
Its name contains an Islamic word  4% 4% 5% 49% 38% 87% 
Dealing with Zakat  1% 6% 5% 49% 39% 88% 
Bank Islamic reputation 2% 4% 3% 50% 41% 91% 
Employees’ appearance reflects Islamic values  2% 2% 4% 48% 44% 92% 
Closing for prayer time and has a prayer room 2% 3% 2% 51% 42% 93% 
Social accountability  5% 10% 15% 55% 15% 70% 
Involvement in the Community (e. g. giving donations) 4% 11% 15% 55% 15% 70% 
Environmental practice and impact  5% 10% 17% 54% 14% 68% 
Provides Qard Hassan 6% 9% 13% 56% 16% 72% 
Commercial/Financial accountability  4% 6% 10% 44% 36% 80% 
Price of the financial products (Low service charges) 4% 6% 10% 44% 36% 80% 
Competitive rate of return (Profitability) 2% 5% 9% 46% 38% 84% 
Number of branches available 3% 8% 12% 43% 34% 77% 
Customer service quality 5% 7% 10% 45% 33% 78% 
Location being near work or home 6% 5% 11% 41% 37% 78% 
Diversity of Islamic services  6% 6% 8% 45% 35% 80% 
Internet banking facilities 4% 5% 9% 45% 37% 82% 
  
 Not important at 
all 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Total 
important 
Important 
rank 
Sharia accountability  2% 4% 4% 50% 41% 91% 1 
Social accountability  5% 10% 15% 55% 15% 70% 2 
Financial accountability  4% 6% 10% 44% 36% 80% 3 
 
 
   Table 58 shows the importance of factors influencing stakeholders’ judgement through dealing 
with IBs. It shows that all the three accountabilities have a weight and importance for 
stakeholders. The stakeholders consider Sharia accountability to be a main factor, which affected 
their judgement and motivated them to deal with IBs (91%). This accountability contains, for 
example, avoiding the interest, confidence in the bank's SSB, bank reputation and employees’ 
appearance as Hijab for women. Secondly, stakeholders give financial accountability priority as a 
second factor that has impacts on their evaluation (80%). Financial accountability contains 
variables as price of the services, competitive rate of return and Internet banking facilities. Finally, 
stakeholders give importance for social accountability as the last factors that have impacts on 
judgments (70%). This factor contains items as giving donations and providing Qard Hassan. 
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Table 59:  The main objectives of IBs  
 Not important 
at all 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Total 
important  
Sharia Objectives  3% 8% 5% 36% 48% 84% 
Implement Islamic sharia  4% 7% 5% 36% 48% 84% 
Avoiding Riba in all services 2% 9% 7% 35% 47% 82% 
Helping Muslim to obey Allah   2% 8% 4% 36% 50% 86% 
Social Objectives  7% 5% 16% 51% 22% 73% 
Promoting sustainable development project 6% 5% 16% 50% 23% 73% 
Contributing to social welfare of the community  8% 4% 15% 52% 21% 73% 
Helping to solve social problems as poverty  7% 3% 17% 51% 22% 73% 
Giving Qard Hassan  6% 6% 16% 52% 20% 72% 
Commercial/ Financial Objectives  5% 11% 6% 38% 40% 78% 
Enhancing product and service quality 5% 10% 8% 35% 42% 77% 
Maximising profits  6% 12% 7% 39% 36% 75% 
 
 Not important at 
all 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Total 
important 
Important 
rank 
Sharia accountability  3% 8% 5% 36% 48% 84% 1 
Social accountability  7% 5% 16% 51% 22% 73% 3 
Financial accountability  5% 11% 6% 38% 40% 78% 2 
 
Table 59 displays the views of stakeholders about what IBs’ objectives may be. The 
respondents show that the main objectives for IBs from stakeholders’ attitudes may be Sharia 
accountability (84%) such as implementing Islamic Sharia and helping Muslim to obey Allah. The 
objective of financial accountability is located in the second level for stakeholders (78%) as 
enhancing service quality and maximizing profits. The social accountability (73%) that contains 
promoting sustainable development project and helping to solve social problems is located in the 
third level of objectives for IBs. Based on this result, IBs may guide by Sharia, financial and social 
objectives.   
Table 60: Actual Perceptions of stakeholders about actual IBs’ practices  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total agree 
Sharia accountability 5% 9% 7% 53% 25% 78% 
Provide banking services according to Islamic Sharia 3% 8% 6% 54% 29% 83% 
Have well known and trustworthy Sharia Advisory Board 5% 10% 8% 53% 24% 77% 
Neither pays nor takes interest on savings and loan accounts 1% 9% 8% 56% 26% 82% 
Provide profit-sharing investment account 5% 10% 7% 55% 23% 78% 
Activate the  Zakat system  7% 8% 8% 53% 24% 77% 
Islamic bank’ appearance reflect Islam 6% 11% 7% 51% 25% 76% 
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Employees’ appearance reflect Islam    8% 8% 9% 49% 26% 75% 
Separate department for ladies 6% 8% 7% 57% 22% 79% 
Bank has a prayer room 3% 10% 6% 53% 28% 81% 
Social accountability 11% 27% 11% 30% 22% 52% 
Socially responsible 9% 28% 11% 29% 23% 52% 
Finance small projects and social projects  10% 27% 11% 31% 21% 52% 
Charity for the Muslim and Non-Muslim society 11% 25% 10% 30% 24% 54% 
Provide Qard Hassan 12% 27% 12% 28% 21% 49% 
Financial accountability 10% 18% 5% 39% 29% 68% 
Modern-looking equipment (such as cash machines) 9% 21% 2% 38% 30% 68% 
Visually appealing interior design and facilities 11% 19% 3% 42% 25% 67% 
Applications are processed on time 10% 20% 4% 38% 28% 66% 
Brochures and forms are clear and easy to understand 8% 17% 5% 40% 30% 70% 
Business transactions are accurate 12% 17% 2% 38% 31% 69% 
Employees give customers prompt service 9% 18% 10% 36% 27% 63% 
Employees are never too busy to respond to customers’ requests 11% 21% 8% 35% 25% 60% 
Employees give customers personal attention 10% 17% 5% 39% 29% 68% 
Employees’ behaviour instils confidence in customers 9% 15% 3% 42% 31% 73% 
Have operating hours convenient to all its customer 8% 14% 7% 41% 30% 71% 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Uncertain Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
Total Agree  Important rank 
Sharia accountability  5% 9% 7% 53% 25% 77% 1 
Social accountability  11% 27% 11% 30% 22% 52% 3 
Financial accountability  10% 18% 5% 39% 29% 68% 2 
 
      Table 60 indicates the perceptions of stakeholders about actual IBs’ practices related to SSF 
accountabilities. The result indicates that stakeholders are satisfied with Sharia accountability 
performance (77%). The result also shows that stakeholders are satisfied with actual practices of 
IBs related to financial practices (68%). In the last level, stakeholders are less satisfied with social 
accountability (52%).  
Table 61: Reactions of stakeholders in case of stopping achieving social and Sharia accountability of IBs  
 Sharia accountability Social accountability 
Withdraw all deposits from IBs 80% 40% 
Send a letter of protest 10% 10% 
Agree with the decision 5% 20% 
Do not care 5% 30% 
Average strong reaction (withdraw and protest)  90% 50% 
Important rank 1 2 
 
   Table 61 shows the reactions of stakeholders towards IBs in case of shortage in compliance 
with Sharia and social activities. In case of stooping compliance with Sharia commitments or 
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compliance partially with concentrating on making profits, 80% will withdraw all deposits from 
the bank and 10% will send a letter of protest to the management. Therefore, 90% will take a 
strong reaction towards their IBs in case of incompliance with Sharia. Concerned with reactions 
of stakeholders towards the social accountability, 40% will withdraw all deposits from the bank 
and 10% will send a letter of protest for the management. Thus, 50% will take a strong reaction 
in case IBs stopped serving society in order to concentrate on making profits. This result reflects 
the importance of Sharia as well as social accountability for stakeholders who deal with IBs.   
Table 62: Summary of IBs accountabilities for stakeholders 
 Importance of factors Objectives of IBs Actual Perceptions Reactions of 
stakeholders 
Average  
Total 
important  
Important 
rank 
Total 
important  
Important 
rank 
Total 
agree  
Important 
rank 
Total 
agree  
Important 
rank 
Total 
important 
Important 
rank 
Sharia accountability  91% 1 84% 1 87% 1 90% 1 88% 1 
Social accountability  70% 2 73% 3 66% 3 50% 2 65% 3 
Financial accountability  80% 3 78% 2 80% 2 ---- ---- 79% 2 
     
Table 62 summarized the IBs’ accountabilities for stakeholders related to main factors that 
affected on their stakeholders, objectives of IBs, actual perceptions of stakeholders towards 
actual practices of IBs and reactions of stakeholders in case of stooping IBs’ social and Sharia 
practices. Sharia accountability has a priority for stakeholders (88%) and then financial 
accountability (79%) and social accountability (65%).  
6.6.6.3 Panel 2: Customers who do not deal with IBs 
Table 63:  The main reasons behind not dealing with IBs  
   The Table identifies the main factors that have a negative impact on customers to not deal 
with IBs. Sharia accountability (81%) is located as a first priority, then financial (76%), and social 
accountability (50%). Issues as Zakat and trusted SSB are the main items that affected on 
customers by negative consequences. Moreover, luck information, return and services quality 
represented as the main factors concerned with financial accountability. Issues concerned with 
Qard Hassan and serving society are the main social accountability affected by negative way. 
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These results reflect the shortage of IBs related to SSF issues and calling further enhancing in 
these factors.     
 Strongly  
Disagree  
Disagree  Uncertain Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
Total 
agree    
Sharia accountability  10% 6% 3% 50% 31% 81% 
I belief that interest is not Riba   9% 6% 3% 48% 34% 82% 
Islamic banks do not fully comply with sharia  8% 8% 2% 52% 30% 82% 
Islamic banks do not reflect the actual image of Islam  11% 5% 4% 49% 31% 80% 
Islamic banks has not a trusted SSB members 12% 6% 3% 48% 31% 79% 
Islamic banks do not deal with Zakat 10% 7% 3% 52% 28% 80% 
Social accountability  15% 20% 15% 35% 15% 50% 
Islamic banks do not provide Qard Hassan  16% 22% 13% 35% 14% 49% 
Islamic banks do not serving society  14% 18% 17% 35% 16% 51% 
Financial accountability  5% 15% 5% 40% 36% 76% 
Luck information about Islamic banking in the market 4% 16% 4% 39% 37% 76% 
Its services quality not like the other conventional banks   3% 15% 6% 38% 38% 76% 
Islamic bans does not provides diversity in services  4% 14% 5% 41% 36% 77% 
Insufficient branch network 7% 17% 7% 42% 27% 69% 
Islamic bank is similar with conventional bank 6% 13% 3% 40% 38% 78% 
Its return does not high like conventional bank   3% 15% 5% 40% 37% 77% 
   
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Uncertain Agree  Strongly Agree  Total 
Agree  
Important 
rank 
Sharia accountability  10% 6% 3% 50% 31% 81% 1 
Social accountability  15% 20% 15% 35% 15% 50% 3 
Financial accountability  5% 15% 5% 40% 36% 76% 2 
 
Table 64: The main objectives of IBs  
   Table 64 shows the perceptions of non-customers about the objectives of IBs. Issues related to 
Sharia accountability (85%) may be the main objectives for IBs from non-customers’ opinions. 
An objective related to the financial accountability is located in the second level (77%). This 
objective contains enhancing service quality and maximizing profits. The social accountability 
(64%) that contains promoting sustainable development project and contributing to social 
welfare of the community is located in the third level of objectives for IBs may be. Thus, IBs 
may guide by Sharia, financial and social objectives.  
 Not important at 
all 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Total  
important 
Sharia Objectives  2% 4% 9% 59% 26% 85% 
Implement Islamic sharia  1% 4% 10% 61% 24% 85% 
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Avoiding Riba in all services 3% 3% 8% 58% 28% 86% 
Helping Muslim to obey Allah   2% 5% 9% 59% 25% 84% 
Social Objectives  16% 10% 10% 43% 21% 64% 
Promoting sustainable development project 15% 11% 12% 43% 19% 62% 
Contributing to social welfare of the community  17% 9% 8% 43% 23% 66% 
Helping to solve social problems like poverty  16% 10% 9% 44% 21% 65% 
Commercial/ Financial Objectives  6% 14% 3% 40% 37% 77% 
Enhancing service quality 6% 14% 3% 40% 37% 77% 
Maximising profits  4% 16% 1% 46% 33% 79% 
 
 Not important 
at all 
Not 
important 
Neutral Important Most 
important 
Total  
important  
Important 
rank 
Sharia accountability  2% 4% 9% 59% 26% 85% 1 
Social accountability  16% 10% 10% 43% 21% 64% 3 
Financial accountability  6% 14% 3% 40% 37% 77% 2 
 
Table 65: The main factors would motivate non-customers to deal with IBs 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Uncertain Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
Total  
Agree 
Sharia Accountability  2% 4% 3% 55% 36% 91% 
Full implementation for sharia  3% 5% 6% 54% 32% 86% 
Activate Zakat  1% 3% 2% 55% 39% 94% 
Hiring trusted and famous SSB 2% 4% 1% 56% 37% 93% 
Social Accountability  5% 15% 9% 49% 22% 71% 
Full serving society  4% 15% 10% 51% 20% 71% 
Giving Qard Hassan 6% 16% 8% 48% 22% 70% 
Financing developed projects   5% 14% 9% 49% 23% 72% 
Commercial/Financial Accountability  5% 10% 5% 45% 35% 80% 
High return and profitability ratios 6% 11% 4% 44% 35% 79% 
Branches at different places  4% 10% 5% 43% 38% 81% 
High quality services 5% 9% 6% 47% 33% 80% 
 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Uncertain Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
Total Agree  Important rank 
Sharia accountability  2% 4% 3% 55% 36% 91% 1 
Social accountability  5% 15% 9% 49% 22% 71% 3 
Financial accountability  5% 10% 5% 45% 35% 80% 2 
 
 
   Table 65 identifies the key factors that can motivate non-customers to switch for IBs. Sharia 
accountability is the main determinants that can effected on non-customers to switch for IBs 
(91%). The financial accountability is the second factors that motivated non-customers to deal 
with IBs (80%). The social accountability is located in the third level (71%). Therefore, to 
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develop competitive advantage for IBs and attract new customers, they may guide by Sharia, 
financial and social factors.  
Table 66: The expectations about IBs’ practices  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly 
Agree 
Total 
agree 
Sharia accountability 2% 5% 1% 60% 32% 92% 
Provide banking services according to Islamic Sharia 2% 4% 1% 60% 33% 93% 
Have well known and trustworthy SSB 3% 6% 1% 62% 28% 90% 
Neither pays nor takes interest on savings and loan accounts 4% 5% 1% 58% 32% 90% 
Provide profit-sharing investment account 1% 3% 1% 59% 36% 95% 
Activate Zakat system  2% 7% 1% 61% 29% 90% 
Islamic bank’ appearance reflect Islam 1% 5% 1% 60% 33% 93% 
Employees’ appearance reflect Islam    3% 4% 1% 57% 35% 92% 
Separate department for ladies 1% 6% 1% 63% 29% 92% 
Bank has a prayer room 2% 5% 1% 60% 32% 92% 
Social accountability 10% 5% 7% 45% 34% 79% 
Socially responsible 9% 4% 6% 44% 37% 81% 
Finance small projects and social projects  11% 5% 5% 46% 33% 79% 
Charity for the Muslim and Non-Muslim society 12% 6% 7% 45% 30% 75% 
Provide Qard Hassan 8% 5% 10% 43% 34% 77% 
Financial accountability 1% 4% 10% 64% 21% 85% 
Modern-looking equipment. (such as cash machines) 1% 5% 9% 63% 22% 85% 
Visually appealing interior design and facilities 1% 3% 10% 65% 21% 86% 
Applications are processed on time 1% 4% 11% 62% 22% 84% 
Brochures and forms are clear and easy to understand 1% 2% 8% 64% 25% 89% 
Business transactions are accurate 1% 3% 7% 70% 19% 89% 
Employees give customers prompt service 1% 4% 12% 64% 20% 84% 
Employees are never too busy to respond to customers’ requests 1% 6% 9% 65% 19% 84% 
Employees give customers personal attention 1% 5% 10% 67% 17% 84% 
Employees’ behaviour instils confidence in customers 1% 4% 10% 62% 23% 85% 
Have operating hours convenient to all its customer 1% 3% 12% 61% 23% 84% 
 
 Strongly 
Disagree  
Disagree  Uncertain Agree  Strongly 
Agree  
Total 
Agree  
Important 
rank 
Sharia accountability  2% 5% 1% 60% 32% 92% 1 
Social accountability  10% 5% 7% 45% 34% 79% 3 
Financial accountability  1% 4% 10% 64% 21% 85% 2 
 
Table 66 indicates the perceptions of non-customers concerned with IBs’ practices of SSF 
accountabilities. The non-customers’ perceptions about Sharia practices of IBs are over-
estimated (92%), then financial (85%) and finally social accountability (79%). They have high 
expectations about Sharia accountability for IBs that contain items as compliance with Sharia, 
trustworthy SSB and activating Zakat system. They moreover have an over-estimation of 
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financial performance, which contains factors as modern-looking equipment, accuracy of 
transactions and culture of employees. Furthermore, non-customers have high expectations 
about social practices for IBs. It contains finance small projects and social projects, charity, and 
donations as providing Qard Hassan. 
Table 67: Summary of IBs’ accountabilities for customers who do not deal with IBs 
 Reasons of does not 
deal IBs  
Objectives of  
IBs 
Motivations behind 
dealing with IBs 
Expectation about 
practices of IBs 
Average  
Total 
agree  
Important 
rank 
Total 
important  
Important 
rank 
Total 
agree 
Important 
rank 
Total 
agree 
Important 
rank 
Total 
agree 
Important 
rank 
Sharia accountability  81% 1 85% 1 91% 1 92% 1 87% 1 
Social accountability  50% 3 64% 3 71% 3 79% 3 66% 3 
Financial accountability  76% 2 77% 2 80% 2 85% 2 80% 2 
   Table 67 summarized the IBs’ accountabilities for non-customers related to main factors that 
affected on their customers, objectives of IBs, constrains and their expectations about IBs 
practices. It shows that Sharia accountability has a priority for non-customers by average 87%, 
then financial accountability (80%) and finally social accountability (66%). This result reflects the 
importance and priorities of accountabilities particularly Sharia then financial and social practices 
based on perceptions of non-customers.        
 6.6.7 Empirical analysis  
      The data collected for the study was analysed by using SPSS in order to ascertain which of 
the banking choice criteria were preferred by the stakeholders of IBs, which objectives of IBs 
may be, what are the perceptions of stakeholders about actual IBs’ practices and what are the 
reactions of the stakeholders concerned with non-compliance with Sharia and social 
accountabilities. All factors ranked according to their importance by performing Friedman test, 
which is an alternative non-parametric to one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA). Friedman test 
used ANOVA when data scaled on ordinal scale and provided by the same respondent (Norrusis, 
2008). The results of the Friedman test are matching with the descriptive analysis that supports 
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the priorities of Sharia, then financial and finally social accountability for both groups. Thus, this 
study presents the result (tables 68:71) related to panel one as an example as follows.     
Friedman test results for Panel 1 
Table 68: Objectives of IBs based on Friedman test 
 Mean rank Important rank 
Sharia Objectives    
Implement Islamic sharia  4.69 1 
Avoiding Riba in all services 4.52 3 
Helping Muslim to obey Allah   3.41 7 
Social Objectives    
Promoting sustainable development project 2.51 9 
Contributing to social welfare of the community  3.54 6 
Helping to solve social problems as poverty  4.33 5 
Giving Qard Hassan  2.77 8 
Commercial/ Financial Objectives    
Enhancing product and service quality 4.43 4 
Maximising profits  4.57 2 
N  600 
Degrees of freedom  9 
Asym. Sig.  0.000 
 
Table 69: Selection criteria based on Friedman test 
 Mean rank Important rank 
Sharia accountability    
Avoiding the Interest (Riba)  4.89 1 
Islamic branding and image 4.12 5 
Confidence in the bank's Sharia Supervisory Board 4.55 4 
Its name contains an Islamic word  3.31 12 
Dealing with Zakat  3.65 9 
Employees’ appearance reflects Islamic values as  
Female staff wear Hijab 
3.88 7 
Closing for prayer time and has a prayer room 2.60 17 
Social accountability    
Involvement in the Community (e. g. giving donations) 3.55 10 
Environmental practice and impact  2.87 15 
Provides Qard Hassan 3.70 8 
Commercial/Financial accountability    
Low service charges 4.76 2 
Competitive rate of return (Profitability) 4.66 3 
Number of branches available 3.47 11 
Customer service quality 4.03 6 
Location being near work or home 3.09 14 
Bank offers a variety of financing options 3.14 13 
Internet banking facilities 2.75 16 
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N  600 
Degrees of freedom  9 
Asym. Sig.  0.000 
 
Table 70: Actual Perceptions based on Friedman test 
 Mean rank Important rank 
Sharia accountability   
Provide banking services according to Islamic Sharia 4.32 1 
Have well known and trustworthy Sharia Advisory Board 4.21 2 
Neither pays nor takes interest on savings and loan accounts 3.95 5 
Provide profit-sharing investment account 3.77 6 
Activate the  Zakat system  3.05 13 
Islamic bank’ appearance reflect Islam 3.50 7 
Employees’ appearance reflect Islam    3.45 8 
Separate department for ladies 2.67 14 
Bank has a prayer room 2.55 15 
Social accountability   
Finance small projects and social projects  3.11 12 
Charity for the Muslim and Non-Muslim society 3.20 11 
Provide Qard Hassan 1.91 22 
Financial accountability   
Modern-looking equipment (such as cash machines) 3.41 9 
Visually appealing interior design and facilities 2.34 16 
Applications are processed on time 2.31 17 
Brochures and forms are clear and easy to understand 2.15 18 
Business transactions are accurate 3.33 10 
Employees give customers prompt service 2.10 19 
Employees are never too busy to respond to customers’ requests 2.02 20 
Employees give customers personal attention 1.98 21 
Employees’ behaviour instils confidence in customers 4.02 4 
Have operating hours convenient to all its customer 4.10 3 
N  600 
Degrees of freedom  7 
Asym. Sig.  0.000 
 
Table 71: Reactions based on Friedman test 
 Mean rank Important rank 
Sharia accountability    
Withdraw all deposits from IBs 4.78 1 
Send a letter of protest 4.21 2 
Agree with the decision 2.55 4 
Do not care 3.33 3 
Social accountability    
Withdraw all deposits from IBs 1.50 4 
Send a letter of protest 2.55 3 
Agree with the decision 4.10 1 
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Do not care 3.50 2 
N  600 
Degrees of freedom  8 
Asym. Sig.  0.000 
6.6.8 The Pyramid of Islamic banks’ accountabilities 
Figure 13 shows the pyramid of IBs’ accountabilities that contains SSF dimensions. It shows 
priorities of IBs’ accountabilities based on the perceptions of our two groups (stakeholders and 
non-customers). In the basic level, we have Sharia accountability. This accountability can 
summarize in the following statement “Be obedient to Allah and comply with His Sharia”. This 
accountability can achieve for IBs through several practices such as compliance with Sharia, 
avoiding riba, hiring trusted SSB and activating Zakat. These items can gather in one statement 
“IBs may reflect the actual Sharia image fundamentally and outwardly”. In the second level and 
as any financial institution that aims to gain high financial performance and aims to provide high 
quality services, we find financial accountability in the intermediate level. This accountability can 
summarize in the following statement “IBs may be profitable and good services provider”. This 
accountability can accomplish for IBs through numerous practices such as providing modern-
looking equipment, visually appealing interior design and facilities, enhancing service quality and 
maximizing profits. These items can gather in one statement “IBs may reflect an actual financial 
and commercial face of IFIs”. In the third and last level, we find the social accountability. This 
accountability can summarize in the following statement “Be a social and ethical firm”. IBs can 
achieve this accountability through several activities as Qard Hassan, giving charity and finance 
social projects. These items can gather in one statement “IBs may reflect the actual social, ethical 
and environmental’ face of IFIs”. The social accountability is totally part of Sharia accountability 
through several verses in Quran asking all Muslim as well as IFIs to care about other people as 
well as society. Allah says, “They ask you, [O Muhammad], what they may spend, Say, "Whatever you 
spend of good is [to be] for parents and relatives and orphans and the needy and the traveller. And whatever you 
do of good - indeed, Allah knows of it" (Quran, 2:215). Moreover, Qard Hassan is represented one of 
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the main dimension for social accountability, Allah saying, “Who is it that would loan Allah a goodly 
loan so He may multiply it for him many times over? And it is Allah who withholds and grants abundance, and 
to Him you will be returned” (Quran, 2:245). Allah says in relation to customers who can pay their 
debts, “And if someone is in hardship, then [let there be] postponement until [a time of] ease. But if you give 
[from your right as] charity, then it is better for you, if you only knew” (Quran, 2:280).  
Through comparing the two groups, we find that both groups set Sharia accountability in the 
first level, then financial and social accountability. Both groups consider Sharia accountability the 
main objective for IBs, then financial and social objectives. In addition, the Sharia accountability 
is located in the first priorities for both groups concerned with the important factors that have 
positive impacts to deal with IBs as well as it represented the main constrains behind not dealing 
with IBs. Both of the two groups have overestimated IBs’ actual practices, then financial and 
social practices. Based on our results, we find that both of two groups have the same perceptions 
related to objectives of IBs as well as important factors and motivations to deal with IBs. Each 
of the two groups considers Sharia, then financial and social accountability the ideal sequences 
for IBs priorities. Furthermore, stakeholders who deal with IBs are satisfied with Sharia and 
financial practices and then social activities based on their actual practices with IBs. However, 
the main constraints, which affected non-customers, are Sharia factors, then financial and social 
factors. This result shows gap between the perceptions of stakeholders and non-customers. This 
gap can be justified based on luck of information about IBs’ in the market, luck of disclosure 
level in the annual report and websites particularly information concerned with Sharia  
compliance and social activities. This justification can approve based on the main sources that 
each group build their perceptions on. The sample profile shows that 78% are formal channels, 
which can reflect the actual image and practices of IBs. However, for other group, information 
from friends is the main source (50%) which is informal channels for information. This result 
shows that IBs’ management may give more attention towards disclosure and marketing their 
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true image for all stakeholders by several ways. Consequently, one of the main ways to reducing 
gap is enhancing disclosure level about SSF practices 
Figure 13: The Pyramid of Islamic banks’ accountabilities 
 
6.6.9 Discussion  
     Regarding Sharia accountability, this study finds that factors related to religion are located in 
the first level for IBs’ accountabilities pyramid for stakeholders and non-customers. This result 
supported by several literatures. For example, Othman and Owen (2001) concluded that religious 
factors identified as the most influential factors that affect IBs adoption in Kuwait. Wakhid and 
Efrita (2007) stated that religious factor is the key factor that would influence IBs adoption. 
Furthermore, these results complement findings of previous studies suggesting that stakeholders 
patronize and priorities dealing with IBs generally motivated by their religious beliefs (Gait and 
Worthington, 2008). Religious consideration or Sharia accountability can play a significant role in 
influencing the decision-making behaviour of Muslim customers’ as well as Muslim non-
customers and their established relationships with IBs because both of them believe that IBs are 
Sharia compliant (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). 
3. Social  
Accountability 
Be social  and ethical firm  
2. Financail Accountability 
Be profiTable and good services provider  
 
1. Sharia  Accountability 
Be obey to Allah and comply with Sharia   
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   The result shows the importance of social accountability towards the perceptions of 
stakeholders and attracts them to deal with IBs as well as motivate non-customers to switch to 
these banks. Studies suggest that in markets where the number of services available makes it 
difficult to differentiate one brand from another, with all other things being relatively equal, a 
company’s level of social responsibility can actually attract customers (McWilliams and Siegel, 
2001). Regarding the economics variable as price of the services, it found that it has a positive 
effect on stakeholders and non-customers. Levesque and McDougall (1996) have considered the 
economics factor to be part of satisfaction, which supports our result. The tangible factor proven 
to affect customer satisfaction that is in line with the studies carried out by several researchers 
(Jamal and Ananstasiadou, 2009, Hossain and Leo, 2009). 
   Brand credibility proven to have a substantial effect on customer satisfaction. This is possibly 
because people relate to a brand name, leading them to feel satisfied with their banks. As stated 
by Kotler (2003), brand is one of the most significant drivers to the selection of bank. The 
Islamic banking selection criteria appears to be a combination of quality of services offered and 
the convenience associated with it. These findings are similar to Dusuki and Abdullah (2007). 
These studies found quality of services, including competence of the personnel as well as the 
convenience, is from the main factors determining the selection of IBs. Customers are willing to 
deal with IBs with good image and reputation to achieve the prestige need. This is similar to the 
findings of Erol et al (2007). Furthermore, this study finds that Islamic reputation and image of 
IBs are important factors for stakeholders and have impacts on non-customers. This result is 
matching with Tyler and Stanley (1999) who found that reputation and reliability were the crucial 
factors to gain customers’ confidence. A favourable image will reinforce customer confidence in 
their bank and encourage customers to resist competitive offerings (Burmann et al., 2009). When 
this happens, IBs will be able to curb customer desire to switch to other banks. Erol and El-
Bdour (1989) got that religion is not the main factor for the selection of financial institution, but 
there are other factors too which are influencing the decision criteria of the customers and in this 
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regard the main factor is the level of profitability, that is, returns on their investment. Metawa 
and Almossawi (1998) point that; there were two main factors involved: “Adherence to the 
Islamic principle and return rate” (p.305). This result shows that most of the respondents are 
satisfied with the practices of IBs. These outcomes are complying with Othman and Owen 
(2002); Metawa and Almossawi (1998) 
6.6.10 Implications 
These findings have important managerial implications for IBs in building strong and lasting 
relationships with stakeholders and non-customers. These findings suggest that BOD of IBs may 
invest more in socially responsible initiatives since stakeholders tend to support and reward 
those banks that perceived as socially responsible by developing a greatest loyalty towards them. 
IBs may invest more on social accountability initiates since it demonstrated that one of the 
reasons making the consumer feel satisfied with the bank is the knowledge and perception of its 
CSR. Management needs to be aware of perceived Sharia and social accountability as a key 
variable in restoring stakeholders’ loyalty and satisfaction. Management of IBs may pay attention 
to financial performance and social commitment as well as Sharia compliance as essential 
antecedents of their accountabilities. Historically, managers have paid the most attention to 
financial impact of the firm. Managers may also closely monitor the firm’s reputation because it 
plays such a critical role in the overall assessment of any enterprise. Positive reputations are hard 
to build and easy to lose (Pérez and Bosque, 2015). The results show that based on non-
compliance with Sharia and non-fully serving the society for some; IBs builds a negative image 
and reputation for Muslims and non-customers as well as motivated them to deal with 
conventional banks. Furthermore, actual practices of IBs particularly concerned with Sharia and 
social accountability had a negative effect on Islam as a religion. Consequently, IFIs generally and 
IBs particularly may consider that they raise flag of Islam and they may be kept and considered 
the ideal model recommended by Sharia governed by Allah. Therefore, it is essential that 
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managers may consider reputation and image of bank to be substantive and long-standing than a 
short-term public relations issue. It is not only company financial performance factors that 
influence stakeholders’ and non-customers’ perceptions, but also Sharia and social accountability 
have more significant impacts. The managers of IBs must acknowledge that competition with 
conventional banking demonstrates a need to consider product features, service quality, and 
social activities as equally important to Sharia compliance in designing the positioning strategy of 
IBs services. Thus, IBs’ board needs to design their accountabilities’ pyramids in such a way that 
it reinforces religious, social, financial and commercial driven constructs for their corporate 
brand. Moreover, SSF accountabilities may reflect in vision and mission of IBs as well as their 
strategy. This study has implications on the regulators as well as accounting bodies as AAOIFI 
through determents minimum of disclosure level about Sharia and social information for IBs. 
They may be mandatory Islamic accounting standards as AAOIFI’ governance, accounting and 
Sharia standards which may affect the enhancing disclosure level for IBs, which may effected the 
satisfaction, trust, loyalty and perceptions of stakeholders as well as non-customers.  
6.6.11 Conclusion 
   The key objective of this study was to survey the selection criteria of IBs, as well as the priority 
and importance of SSF criteria for the stakeholders and non-customers. It aims also to explore 
the consequences of SSF practices on the perceptions and attitudes of stakeholders and non-
customers. Therefore, this study uses survey questionnaire from large stakeholders’ samples, 
pertaining to two different segments (600 stakeholders who deal with IBs as well as 600 
customers who do not deal with IBs). The pyramid of IBs’ accountabilities shows priorities of 
Sharia, then financial and followed by social accountability for both of the two groups. It found 
that the main criterion of stakeholders’ selection of IBs was Sharia, financial, and then social 
factors. This study found that stakeholders who deal with IBs are satisfied with the practices of 
IBs. Both of the two groups believe that IBs may be guide by Sharia, financial, and then social 
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objectives. Overall, religion is the main factor behind dealing with IBs. The findings confirm the 
findings of Al-Ajmi et al (2009) stating that the Sharia accountability is the main factor for the 
stakeholders as well as non-customers to patronize IBs. The findings propose that IBs may 
depend on the religiosity of the customers to market their IBs’ services, as the religious 
motivation is not the main factor of selection and patronization of these banks. Moreover, IBs 
may enhance the quality of their services. This passes through training and updating the 
personnel on the latest innovations in terms of IBs service. The findings of this study show that 
SSF issues influence corporate reputation, stakeholders’ motivations and switching of non-
customers to deal with IBs.  
Future research might investigate several areas that not covered in this study. A broader range 
of stakeholders may examine using a similar methodology undertaken in this study. Muslims 
external stakeholders and non-customers surveyed during the current project and other 
important stakeholders such as employees, managers and non-Muslims may be included to see 
for what extent they consider the multi accountabilities of IBs. Secondly, our research adopted 
quantitative approach through questionnaire asking further research that may use qualitative 
method through using interviews particularly with board of directors and SSB to explore their 
perceptions about IBs’ accountabilities. Future research can also look into the issue by 
comparing pure IBs with Islamic windows customers’ perceptions. This study adopts descriptive 
analysis, whereas future research may adopt Structural Equation Modelling as Blankson et al 
(2007) to explore the association between the several variables as satisfaction, loyalty, and 
switching based on SSF accountabilities. Finally, this study shows gap and limited information 
disclosed by IBs, and supplementary research may measure the impacts of increased disclosure 
concerned with SSF on enhancing the satisfaction, trust, loyalty and switching to IBs. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
7.1 Overview 
The main objective of this study was to identify the main determinants as well as 
consequences (both economic and non-economic) of SSF reporting across Islamic banks around 
the world. The first factor for stakeholders regarding compliance with Sharia is the accountability 
of Islamic banks towards Allah. Haque et al (2009) declare that Sharia accountability is the main 
factor for stakeholders who patronize Islamic banks. The second, from an Islamic perspective, is 
that social accountability centres on the concept of ultimate accountability to Allah where human 
beings as well as Islamic banks are stared as vicegerent on earth and are expected to take care of 
the natural environment entrusted to them (e.g., Hassan and Harahap, 2010; Aribi and Gao, 
2010). Islamic banks as any financial institution guide by maximising the profit for shareholders. 
Erol and El-Bdour (1989) suggested, “In considering motives responsible for selecting IBs as 
depository institutions, religious motives did not stand out as being the only significant ones; 
bank customers are profit motivated” (p.33). By investigating the determinants and 
consequences for SSF reporting within Islamic banks we may answer the calls of some prior 
researchers (e.g., Elzahar et al., 2015; Volkov and Smith, 2015) to deepen understanding of what 
motivates banks to disclose information about SSF. 
Islamic Sharia sets comprehensive rules for institutions such as IBs to be held accountable. 
Moreover, AAOIFI issued accounting and governance standards to organize and support IBs to 
disclose information concerned with SSF accountability. These regulations assist IBs by setting a 
benchmark that can follow to ensure accountability. Therefore, the present research has explored 
the practices of IBs with regard to SSF reporting. In addition, it has investigated the potential 
drivers of SSF reporting. Finally, the research extended to examine whether or not SSF reporting 
could have an impact on firm value as well as stakeholder’s loyalty.  This chapter provides the 
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concluding remarks of this thesis. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: section 
7.2 provides a summary of the research questions and approach. Section 7.3 presents a summary 
of the key findings of the research and discusses their implications. Section 7.4 shows the 
contributions and main theoretical and practical implications. Section 7.5 examines the 
limitations of the current study and provides suggestions for future research. 
7.2 Summary of research approach 
7.2.1 Research question 1 
To provide an answer to Q1, first, this study surveyed the Quran to find approvals for SSF 
accountabilities for IBs as well as existing research literature. Secondly; three indices has been 
developed to measure SSF reporting in the annual reports as well as through websites. Then, the 
research instrument constructed based upon the AAOIFI (2010) guidance for best practice as 
well as indices suggested by existing research. Manual content analysis used to code the text and 
to classify the indices disclosed into financial disclosure and non-financial disclosure that contain 
Sharia and social factors. After reviewing the different databases, central banks, websites and 
updated reports, as well as the criteria for the selected research sample, I applied the holistic 
index on 117 IBs across 23 countries. Concerned with compliance with AAOIFI; the sample 
returned 43 Islamic banks that had full adopted AAOIFI. The study sample of IBs based on the 
annual reports published at 2013 in addition to the websites of these banks. Descriptive statistics 
used to outline the disclosure levels for IBs, including its SSF categories and compliance with 
AAOIFI governance and accounting standards.       
7.2.2 Research question 2 
   To provide an answer to Q2, the study has reviewed the relevant theories that explain 
directors’ motivations to allow increased corporate disclosure. Consequently, the determinants of 
SSF reporting proposed, drawing on agency theory and signalling theory. Concerned with the 
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firm characteristics, the main variables tested were accounting standards; type of external audit 
firm; profitability; leverage; bank size; bank age; ownership; risk; and the existence of an in-house 
Sharia  auditing department. To CG mechanism variables that related to BOD, the main 
variables tested were the number of block holders; institutional ownership; foreign ownership; 
family ownership; listed share; duality in position; CEO founder; board size; board independence 
and investment account holders. To corporate governance mechanism variables that related to 
SSB, the main variables tested were SSB size; SSB reputation and SSB cross membership. In 
addition to these main variables, we accounted for variables that related to differences between 
countries, which are culture; legal system; full adoption of AAOIFI; the role of central bank in 
SSB; nature of the banking system; GDP; corruption index  and literacy rate. Some variables 
exist in the sample based on the objective and availability of data. Concerned with the firm 
characteristics, the research instrument employed to obtain SSF reporting for a sample of 117 
IBs across 23 countries. Concerned with corporate governance mechanism; the research 
instrument was employed for a sample of 95 IBs across 20 countries. Concerned with the level 
of compliance with AAOIFI; the research instrument was employed to obtain the compliance 
level with mandatory standards for a sample of 43 IBs across eight countries. In addition to the 
Pearson correlation matrix, OLS regressions models conducted to assess the significance of the 
association between determinants variables and SSF reporting scores.  
7.2.3 Research question 3 
   To provide an answer to Q3, the relevant literature reviewed. Signalling theory as well as 
economic theory used to explain how SSF reporting could affect firm value based on accounting 
and market-based measures, which are consistent with Sheu et al., 2010. Following the example 
of previous studies, this study has controlled for firm characteristics as well as corporate 
governance. Additionally, the following variables have been included in the analysis: size; risk; 
profitability; Leverage; existence of an in-house Sharia auditing department; accounting standard 
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and board size; board independence and block holders. Following previous studies (e.g. Garay et 
al., 2013; Karagiorgos, 2010), ROA ratio as an accounting-based measure has been used as a 
measure of firm value. Moreover, tests re-estimated using MC as a proxy for firm value based on 
market-based measure as Servaes and Tamayo (2013), in order to check the robustness of the 
results. OLS regressions models conducted to test the hypotheses of the study.   
7.2.4 Research question 4 
   To provide an answer to Q4, the relevant literature reviewed to shows limited studies that 
measure the non-economic consequences for disclosure, illustrated in terms of loyalty; 
satisfactions and trust of stakeholders. This study explains how SSF disclosure could directly 
influence the stakeholders’ loyalty and whether there a mediating affects that result from 
satisfaction and trust. To do so, three alternative structural models estimated. The base model 
includes disclosure only, the second model includes disclosure and satisfaction, and the third 
model includes disclosure and trust. This study uses data collected from 600 respondents to 
survey questionnaires disseminated to stakeholders from 15 countries dealing with IBs. This 
study adopted structural equation modelling with a partial least squares approach to test the 
hypotheses of the study.   
7.2.5 Research question 5 
To provide an answer to the Q5, a questionnaire survey used to collect data on Islamic banks 
external stakeholders’ as well as non-customers attitudes towards SSF practices. Convenience 
sample considered valid for this research. The samples gathered from 15 countries, pertaining to 
two different segments (600 stakeholders who deal with IBs as well as 600 customers who do 
not deal with IBs).  Descriptive statistics adopted to answer the research questions as well as 
using SPSS by performing the Friedman test to rank SSF dimensions according to their 
importance. Based on the descriptive statistics results, this study constructed a pyramid of 
Islamic banks’ accountabilities. To complete the picture, this study compared the results of 
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question 5 with results of question one related disclosure level to check the variances. This study 
also considered how the results of questions 3 and 4 related to economic and non-economic 
consequences of disclosure. The results of the first study measured SSF disclosure levels. Based 
on these results the pyramid illustrating the effects of disclosure on IBs’ accountabilities was 
constructed. It shows that Islamic banks consider financial issues, then Sharia issues and lastly 
social accountability. Regression results in the fourth study indicate the importance and effects of 
SSF disclosure on the firm value. Results of the fifth study show the significant impacts of 
disclosure on the stakeholders’ loyalty. Finally, the sixth study have been used to survey 
perceptions of stakeholders as well as non-customers about the practices of SSF and the 
consequences of this performance on their decisions. The result for this study shows that the 
two groups consider Sharia then financial and social issues may be the priorities of IBs.    
7.3 Research findings 
     This section includes a summary of the findings of the studies that conducted to achieve the 
research objectives. These findings will link with the key questions. 
7.3.1 The disclosure levels about IBs’ accountabilities (Q1) 
Related to Sharia accountability; as descriptive statistics have documented the average 
disclosure level is 53%. It indicates that the disclosure about names of SSBM is higher than any 
other item (74%) and the lowest item is the information about the independency of SSB (10%). 
The results also state that 58% of selected banks disclose information about SSBR and only 31% 
have SAD. These results are consistent with the findings of Hassan and Harahap (2010). 
Analysis shows that Syria has the highest score of 78% followed by Palestine and Jordan (70% 
and 68% respectively).  
Concerned with social accountability; descriptive statistics have documented the average 
disclosure level of CSR index is 28%. The highest disclosure score is Charitable activates (44%). 
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The lowest disclosure scores are Waqf management, late repayments and Qard Hassan (1%; 1% 
and 8% respectively). These results are consistent with studies that found low disclosure level 
concerned with CSR (e.g., Farook et al., 2011; Maali et al., 2006). The average index scores 
indicate that Jordan has the highest score of 47% followed by Bangladesh and Kuwait (43% and 
38% respectively). Iraq and Philippine (15% and 16% respectively) are the countries least 
concerned with social accountability. 
    Related to financial accountability; the descriptive statistics have documented full disclosure 
about Financial Position statement and profit and loss account (100%) and high disclosure about 
Statement of Cash Flows 98% and 88% related to Statement of Changes in the Owner's Equity. 
However, result shows low disclosure level about other statements which related to Islamic 
identification that include statement of Zakat; Qard Hassan and changes in Restricted 
Investments (11%; 8% and 4% respectively). Disclosure levels about the SSF accountabilities 
focused on 5 sections (vision, mission and objectives; CEO’ statement; directs’ report; strategy 
report and corporate governance report); 75% of the selected banks disclose information about 
Sharia  accountability in their vision and mission; 45% about social accountability and 100% 
related to financial issues. The other sections such as CEO statement and CG report indicate 
high disclosure levels about financial accountability and low levels related to Sharia and social 
accountabilities. The result also shows that, vision and mission is the highest section in the 
disclosure level (73%) then CG report followed by CEO statement (62% and 56% respectively). 
Related to compliance with AAOIFI; the result indicates that Jordan disclosed 65%, which is 
more than Bahrain (56%). Sudan is the lowest country for compliance with AAOIFI (46%). 
Bahrain has the highest number of banks that have adopted AAOIFI (15 banks). Related to 
compliance with AAOIFI Governance Standards No 1, 2 and 5; the result shows compliance by 
68%. The disclosure level concerning SSB members is 70% whereas the disclosure level 
concerned with SSB reports is 66%. Concerned with compliance with AAOIFI Governance 
Standard No 7; the average compliance level is 27%. The disclosure level related to universal-
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oriented CSR items is 30% while the disclosure level related to Islamic-oriented CSR items is 
23%. To compliance with AAOIFI accounting Standard No 1, the average compliance level is 
73%. The disclosure level for universal-oriented financial disclosure is 86% whereas, the 
disclosure level related to Sharia -oriented financial disclosure is 36%. The result shows high 
compliance with universal financial statements that recommended by AAOIFI as well as IFRS 
(e.g., Financial Position Statement). However, it shows low compliance with Sharia -oriented 
financial statements (e.g., Statement of Zakat, Statement of Qard Hassan).  
7.3.2 Determinants behind SSF disclosure levels (Q2) 
The determinants of holistic disclosure levels related to firm characteristics have revealed that 
adopting AAOIFI standards is marginally significant with financial disclosure rather than other 
kinds of disclosure. Furthermore, the analysis displays the importance of size as one of the 
determinants related to disclosure. The analysis shows that IBs that have SAD have higher 
disclosure levels about Sharia compliance as well as social than other banks that set only SSB. 
This result is consistent with Farook et al (2011), who asserted that the existence of SSB in an 
Islamic bank leads to enhanced levels of disclosure for stakeholders. The analysis shows 
insignificant association between disclosure and auditor, or profitability and age. These outcomes 
are matching with Barako et al (2006). 
Concerned with CG mechanism; the analysis have revealed that block holders; foreign 
ownership; institutional ownership; listed share; CEO founder; board size and IAH have 
significant and positive relationships with SSF reporting. In contrast, family ownership, duality in 
position and board independence has a negative influence. However, it has been observed that 
CG variables have different effects on the four models in terms of disclosure (i.e. Sharia; social; 
financial and aggregate). Whereas, board size and listed share have a positive influence on the 
four models for disclosures. The results show that association between disclosure and CG 
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variables differ based on the nature of disclosure. Moreover, the outcomes show that CG 
mechanism has equal consequences on the financial as well as non-financial disclosure.   
These findings are important for many reasons. There are limited previous studies that 
examined CG variables effect on multi corporate disclosures for Islamic banks (e.g. Samaha et al., 
2012; Farook et al., 2011). The findings of this study add to the literature by providing strong 
evidence that highly CG frameworks tend to publish more information. Accordingly, it can argue 
that CG frameworks are keen to improve SSF reporting. These results can interpret in terms of 
the propositions of agency theory. The results illustrate that an effective board-monitoring role 
as well as ownership structure leads to the disclosure of more SSF and improved reporting level. 
These findings are in line with the previous literature that examines the relationship between 
disclosure and board size (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013), listed share (e.g. Robb et al., 2001), 
foreign ownership (e.g. Nekhili et al., 2012); institutional ownership (e.g. Barako et al., 2006); 
block holders (e.g. Tsamenyi et al., 2007).  
   To determinants of compliance with AAOIFI, the analysis identifies a significant association 
between compliance level and existing SAD, age and size. This finding is consistent with Carcello 
et al (2005); Hossain and Hammami (2009). The analyses have revealed a positive association 
between compliance level and CG mechanism concerned with SSB (SSB size; SSB reputation 
and cross membership) particularly for Sharia compliance level. This association is consistent 
with Rahman and Bukair (2013); Farook et al (2011). Results do not support argument about the 
impacts of CG of BOD on the compliance level. Analysis shows insignificant link between 
corporate compliance level and CG that contain duality in position; institutional ownership; 
board independence; block holders and foreign ownership. This result is consist with Samaha 
and Dahawy (2011); Vandemele et al (2009); Ghazali and Weetman (2006). Thus, mechanism of 
CG of BOD has not effects on compliance levels for Islamic banks that are full adopting of 
AAOIFI because these standards are mandatory  
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7.3.3 Impacts of SSF reporting on VF (Q3) 
   To market based measure; the Sharia and overall disclosure models support the significant 
association between corporate disclosure and firm value. This result corroborates the results of 
Anam et al (2011). The social and financial disclosure models indicate insignificant association 
between disclosure and firm value, which supported by work of Murray et al (2006). While, 
concerned with accounting-based measure; the Sharia, social and overall disclosure models 
support the significant correlation between disclosure and firm value. This finding validates the 
consequences of Margolis and Walsh (2003). On the other hand, it concluded that financial 
disclosure model indicates insignificant link with FV. These findings provide evidence that, 
economic consequences for disclosure are sensitive to the category of disclosure being made in 
terms of financial and non-financial information (Hassan et al., 2009).  
   Concerned with the association between social disclosure and FV, the result is supported 
outcomes of Dhaliwal et al (2011), that suggests proactive social accountability activities enhance 
firm value. This result is consistent with findings of studies that adopt signalling theory (Curado 
et al., 2011). The result particularly related to the impacts of Sharia and social disclosure on FV 
supported views of managers that have to disclose adequate information to convey specific 
signals to potential users that gain value for the firms. Furthermore, the result concurs with 
previous studies that adopted economic theory (Easley and O’Hara, 2004) which suggest a 
positive impact on FV based on disclosure.  
    The results support the importance of compliance with Sharia and serving the society for 
Islamic banks, which reflect the role of disclosure on enhancing the performance. The result of 
financial disclosure is matching with Wang et al (2008) that find no evidence about the benefit 
from extensive financial disclosure on firm value. This finding might be explained based on the 
ethical identification for Islamic banks and ethical behaviour and attitude of investors who gives 
greater weight to Sharia  and social disclosure as well as or more than financial factors. 
Disclosure about Sharia compliance has an impact on profitability through increasing the number 
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of customers and investing in these banks as well as enhancing the image and reputation, which 
generally have positive consequences for firm value. The economic consequences for social 
disclosure is based on intangible benefits such as improving a firm’s reputation (Schwaiger, 2004) 
and improved brand image (Epstein and Roy, 2001) which influence on financial performance.   
7.3.4 Impacts of SSF disclosure on stakeholders’ loyalty (Q4) 
   The empirical analysis has revealed that SSF disclosure has a direct effect on stakeholders’ 
loyalty. The results indicate the path from disclosure to loyalty in the base model is significant 
but the indirect effect of disclosure on loyalty via satisfaction is equal to its direct effect on it and 
the indirect effect of disclosure on loyalty via trust is greater than its direct effect on it. 
Furthermore, there is a strong positive linkage between trust, satisfaction, and loyalty. Regarding 
the disclosure about financial performance of banks as one of the disclosure dimensions, it has 
been found that neither customer satisfaction nor customer loyalty have an effect on the 
profitability of the bank contrary to the findings of many studies (e.g., Fathollahzadeh et al., 2011; 
Chi and Gursoy, 2009). 
7.3.5 Perceptions of stakeholders and non-customers towards accountabilities of IBs (Q5) 
   The results related to stakeholders who are dealing with Islamic banks indicate that SSF 
accountabilities have equal weight and importance for stakeholders. The stakeholders consider 
Sharia accountability as a main factor that affected their decision and motivated them to deal 
with Islamic banks (91%). Secondly, stakeholders give financial accountability priority (80%) and 
social accountability as the last factors that impact judgments (70%). The respondents’ result 
shows that the main objectives for IBs from stakeholders’ attitudes may be Sharia accountability 
(84%) followed by financial accountability (78%) then social accountability (73%). Based on the 
results IBs may guide by Sharia as well as financial and social objectives.    
   The result related to actual perceptions of stakeholders about Islamic banks’ practices indicates 
that stakeholders are satisfied about Sharia accountability performance (77%). They are satisfied 
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that they provided banking services according to Sharia and from a trustworthy SSB.  The result 
also shows that stakeholders are satisfied about actual practices financial practices (68%). 
Stakeholders are less satisfied about social accountability (52%). Finally, the analysis has revealed 
that when IBs stopped complying with Sharia commitments or only comply partially, 80% will 
withdraw all deposits from the bank. In comparison, 40% will withdraw all deposits from the 
bank because of issues of social accountability. The study has shown that Sharia accountability 
has a priority for stakeholders by an average 88% then financial accountability by 79% and social 
accountability by 65%.  
   The findings concerned with non-customers; the results identify the main factors that have a 
negative impact on customers who are not dealing with Islamic banks. Sharia accountability (81%) 
is located as a first priority then financial (76%) and social accountability (50%). Issues related to 
Zakat; trusted SSB; lack of information about services; diversity in services, return and services 
quality; lack of Qard Hassan and serving society reflect the shortage of Islamic banks and calling 
further enhancing in these factors. The analysis shows the perceptions of non-customers about 
the objectives of Islamic banks. Sharia accountability (85%) may be the main objectives whereas 
financial accountability is located in the second level (77%) and social accountability (64%) is 
located in the third level of objectives IBs may meet.  
   The analysis identifies the key factors that may motivate non-customers to switch for Islamic 
banks. Sharia accountability is the main determinants (91%) then financial accountability (80%) 
and followed by social accountability (71%). Therefore, to develop competitive advantage for 
Islamic banks and attract new customers, they may guide by Sharia as well as financial and social 
factors. The result indicates that; the non-customers’ perceptions about Sharia practices of 
Islamic banks is over estimated (92%) then financial (85%) and finally social accountability (79%). 
Based on the previous result; Sharia  accountability has a priority for non-customers by average 
87% then financial accountability by 80% and finally social accountability by 66%. 
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The following tables (72; 73 and 74) and based on the previous section summarized the results 
of the whole thesis. Table72 summarized results based on the link between questions; studies 
and Priority of accountabilities from IBs’ board as well as stakeholders. Table73 shows the 
comparison between the expected sign for the research’ hypotheses with what this research find. 
Table74 presented the answers for the main questions related to disclosure levels about SSF; 
Compliance levels with AAOIFI and perceptions of who deal as well as who do not deal about 
IBs’ practices concerned with SSF.  
Table 72: Summary of results for Priority of accountabilities 
Research’ 
questions  
Empirical 
study  
Orientation   View of  Results 
(Priority of accountabilities)  
Question 1 
and2 
Study 1; 2 
and3 
For what extent IBs consider SSF 
accountabilities through disclosure level and 
main determinants   
IBs’ board  1. Financial 
2. Sharia  
3. Social   
Question 3 
and4 
Study 4 and 
5 
Economic and non-economic consequences of 
SSF disclosure  
IBs’ board  
IBs’ stakeholders 
(who deal)   
SSF has a positive impacts on firm 
value and stakeholders’ loyalty   
Question 5 Study 6 Perceptions of who deal and who do not deal 
about SSF practices    
IBs’ stakeholders  
Non-customers  
1. Sharia  
2. Financial 
3. Social   
 
Table73: Results of the research’ hypotheses53  
Hypotheses Expected 
sign 
Research’ 
result 
Empirical study 1 
H1.1. The degree of disclosure is predicted to be higher in IBs audited by the big 4 auditors than in 
banks which are audited by non-Big 4 auditors  
+ 0 
H1.2. Older IBs are expected to disclose more information than younger IBs. + + 
H1.3. Large IBs are more likely to disclose more information than small IBs. + + 
H1.4. Disclosure practices are expected are expected to be higher for highly profitable IBs than low 
profit. 
+ 0 
H1.5. The level of disclosure is positively associated with SAD inside the IBs  + + 
H1.6. IBs with high percentages of block holder ownership have low levels of disclosures - 0 
H1.7. There is a negative relationship between disclosure for IBs and institutional ownership. - 0 
H1.8. There is appositive relationship between disclosure levels and foreign ownership + 0 
H1.9. IBs with duality in position have a lower level of disclosures - 0 
H1.10. IBs with higher proportions of independent non-executive directive directors on the board have 
higher levels of disclosures  
+ 0 
H1.11. There is a positive relationship between the size of SSB and disclosure level. + + 
H1.12. There is a positive relationship between SSB cross-membership and disclosure levels + + 
53 Where (+) is a positive association; (-) is a negative association and (0) is an insignificant association  
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H1.13. There is a positive relationship between SSB reputation and disclosure level. + + 
H1.14 There is a negative association between uncertainty avoidance and disclosure levels - - 
Empirical study 2 
H2.1. There is no association between profitability and levels of disclosure. 0 + 
H2.2. There is a positive association between frim size and levels of disclosure  + + 
H2.3. Highly gearing IBs are more likely to disclose more information compared with low leverage IBs + 0 
H2.4. The extent of levels of disclosure in IBs is large for Banks that audited by one of the Big 4 
Audit firms  
+ 0 
H2.5. There is a positive association between levels of disclosure and adopting AAOIFI + + 
H2.6. The extent of levels of disclosure is positive associate with existing IASD inside IBs + + 
Empirical study 3 
H3.1. IBS with higher percentages of foreign ownership have higher levels of disclosure + + 
H3.2. There is a positive association between institutional ownership and level of disclosure   + + 
H3.3. There is a negative association between family ownership and level of disclosure - - 
H3.4. IBs with higher percentages of block holder ownership have lower levels of disclosure - + 
H3.5. There is a positive association between the proportion of IAH to shareholder funds and levels of 
disclosure 
+ + 
H3.6. Islamic banks with duality in position have a lower level of disclosure  - - 
H3.7. Islamic banks with large board size have a higher level of disclosure  + + 
H3.8. There is a positive association between board independence and level of disclosure  + - 
H3.9. There a positive association between CEO founder and of disclosure + + 
Empirical study 4 
H4.1. The level of sharia; social and financial disclosure of IBs is positively associated with firm value 
based on ROA and MC 
+ + 
Empirical study 5 
H5.1 There is a significant direct association between disclosure and stakeholders’ loyalty + + 
H5.2 There is a significant direct link between disclosure and stakeholders’ satisfaction + + 
H5.3 There is a significant direct link between stakeholders’ satisfaction and loyalty  + + 
H5.4 Stakeholders’ satisfaction mediates the effect between disclosure and loyalty  + + 
H5.5 Disclosure has a significant direct effect on stakeholders’ trust   + + 
H5.6 Stakeholders’ trust has a significant direct effect on stakeholders’ loyalty   + + 
H5.7 Stakeholders’ trust mediates effect between disclosure and loyalty + + 
H5.8 Stakeholders’ trust and satisfaction mediates effect between disclosure and loyalty + + 
 
Table74: Answers of the research’ questions  
Question Highlight of the answers 
What are the SSF disclosure 
levels for IBs?  
Results shows relatively high disclosure level for financial and sharia disclosure (62% & 52% 
respectively) and relatively low for social disclosure (28%) concerned with holistic disclosure 
level that measuring accountability' pillars for all sections in the annual report, disclosure level 
about sharia, social and financial are 40% ; 28% and 81% respectively 
What are the compliance levels 
for IBs with AAOIFI 
standards? 
 
The study shows that the average  compliance   level  with AADIFI  standards  related  to  
sharia  supervisory  Board Report is 68%; corporate social responsibility report is 27% and 
presentation of financial statements (FS) is 73% the aggregate disclosure based on the 3 
indices is 56%. 
What are the main 
determinants of SSF disclosure 
level?  
The main variables are Size, SAD, age, corporate governance of SSB; size of auditor; 
profitability; riskiness; number of Block holders; institutional ownership; foreign Ownership; 
family ownership; Listed share; CEO power; Board size; Board independence and IAH. 
What is the economic Results shows after controlling firms' characteristics and corporate governance' variables that 
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consequences foe SSF 
disclosure?  
sharia; social and overall disclosure have a positive impact on FV based on ROA. It also 
finds that sharia and overall disclosure has a positive significant impact on the FV based on 
market capitalization  
What are the Non-economic 
consequences for SSF 
disclosure? 
The results indicate that there is a significant association of disclosure on stakeholders' trust, 
satisfaction and loyalty. It also indicates that is a partial mediating of trust and satisfaction in 
relationship between disclosure and loyalty 
What are the determinants and 
criteria for stakeholders' 
selection of IBs'? 
The stakeholders consider sharia accountability is the main factor which affected their 
judgement and motivated to deal with IBs (91%) then financial accountability (80%) and 
finally, stakeholders give importance (78%) and finally social accountability (70%)  
What are the main objectives of 
IBs?  
The main objectives for IBs from stakeholder's attitudes should be sharia accountability 
(84%) then financial performance (78%) and finally social accountability  
What are the actual perceptions 
of stakeholders about actual 
IBs' practices for IBs' practices?  
The result indicates that stakeholders are satisfied with sharia accountability performance 
(77%); financial performances (68%) then stakeholders are less satisfied with social 
accountability (52%)  
What are the reactions of IBs' 
stakeholders in case of stopping 
achieving social and sharia 
practices?  
In case stooping compliance with sharia commitments or compliance partially, 80% will 
withdraw all deposits from bank and 10% will send a letter of protest to management. 
Concerned with towards social accountability, 40% will withdraw deposits from bank and 
10% will send a letter of protest  
Overall results for stakeholders who deal with IBs: Sharia accountability has a priority for stakeholders (88%) and then 
financial accountability (79%) and social accountability (65%) 
What are the key constrains 
behind un-dealing with IBs?  
Sharia accountability (81%) is located as a first constrains then financial (76%) and finally 
social accountability (50%)  
What are the main objectives of 
Islamic banks? 
Issues elated to sharia accountability (85%) should be the main objective for IBs then 
financial accountability (77%) and finally social accountability (64%) is located in the third 
level of objectives for IBs should be.  
Which factors would motivate 
customers dealing with IBs?  
Sharia accountability is the main determinants that can effected on non-customers to switch for 
IBs (91%). The financial accountability is the second factors (80%). The social accountability 
is located in the third level (71%)  
What are the expectations of 
non-customers w about SSF 
performance? 
The non-customers' perceptions about sharia practices of IBs are over-estimated (92%), then 
financial accountability (85%) and finally social accountability (79%)  
 
7.4 Contributions and implications 
   This section indicates how this thesis contributes to the extant literature. Then, the 
implications of the present study provided. 
7.4.1 Contributions 
    This thesis contributes to the literature by answering the five research questions. Furthermore, 
the thesis could add to the methodologies applied in the literature. 
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7.4.1.1 Contributions to the literature 
 The answer to Q1 extends the limited literature that explores SSF reporting in practice: 
Moumen et al (2015); Aribi and Gao (2012); Haniffa and Hudaib (2007); Maali et al (2006). 
However, the present study distinguished by investigating the level and quantity of SSF reporting 
for a relatively large sample of Islamic banks around the world and from the multifaceted scope 
of disclosure. The answer to Q2 contributes to the academic studies testing the role of CG 
mechanisms concerned with BOD and SSB as well as firm characteristics as determinants of 
multi corporate disclosure (e.g. Farag et al., 2014; Gisbert and Navallas, 2013; Samaha et al., 2012; 
Farook et al., 2011;). The outcomes contribute to the literature suggesting that the quantity of 
SSF disclosure not derived from the same factors. The findings provide strong support for the 
proposition of agency and signalling theory, when testing the effect of different factors on SSF 
reporting. The answer to Q3 contributes to the previous literature examining the impact of 
disclosure on FV (e.g., Elzahar et al., 2015; Dhaliwal et al., 2011). The outcomes show that non-
financial disclosure (Sharia and social) has more positive impacts than financial disclosure. The 
answer to Q4 contributes to the previous literature examining the consequences of disclosure on 
stakeholders through exploring non-economic consequences (e.g., He et al., 2012; Bigné et al., 
2011). Finally, the answer to Q5 contributes to the previous literature examining the perceptions 
of different groups about Islamic accountabilities of IBs (e.g., Hashim and Latifah, 2010; Haque 
et al., 2009; Dusuki and Abdullah, 2007). However, the present study distinguished by 
investigating the beliefs of two different groups about several issues such as motivations for 
dealing with IBs, the constraints and ideal objectives of IBs.   
     Based on the findings of the holistic disclosure for SSF accountabilities, it applies an objective, 
holistic and context-specific measure of the accountabilities reporting for any IFI based on 
Islamic approaches (AAOIFI and related literature). The approach that this study follow focused 
on surveying all sections in the annual report for IBs, which could be beneficial for future studies 
dealing with disclosures. Second, this study added empirical evidence about the significant 
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impact of the firm characteristics (accounting standards; SAD; size) on disclosures. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first empirical study that investigates the determinants of disclosure 
in IBs using more comprehensive disclosure indices that distinguishes between Sharia, social and 
financial disclosures and applied on most of the IBs around the world. 
Concerned with exploring Sharia accountability, it makes several incremental contributions to 
the literature on Sharia compliance in IBs. First, although there have been few empirical studies 
investigating the association between Sharia disclosures and firm as well as national 
characteristics in the Islamic banking sector, as far as I know, this is the first study that 
empirically investigates this association using a comprehensive Sharia disclosure index. Few prior 
studies investigate disclosure of SSB reports to explore corporate social responsibility of Islamic 
banks (e.g., Farook et al., 2011), while limited research explores AAOIFI governance standards 
that focus on compliance with Sharia. Second, this study determine the disclosure level for each 
bank and each country related to SSB report separately not as a dimension in a corporate social 
responsibility model as prior studies (e.g., Haniffa and Hudaib, 2007; Maali et al., 2006). Third, 
the study provides novel evidence of the effects of cultural, legal and economic variables on the 
level of disclosure of Sharia compliance. Fourth, this study introduces an SSB disclosure index, 
which focuses on two categories. The first relates to elements of SSBR and the second focuses 
on the SSB members and their responsibilities. In relation to exploring social accountability, it 
was the first to study CSRD in IBs around the world. It is also the first to consider a 
comprehensive number of bank-specific and country-specific characteristics in the analysis.  
    Concerned with investigating the determinants of disclosure concerned with CG of BOD, this 
study first ascertained the determinants of Islamic banks’ SSF disclosures, which will 
subsequently be, tested utilising the disclosure measures obtained. Departing from previous 
research, this study also tests the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
SSF disclosure. The results imply that banks with high foreign ownership report disclosures that 
are more corporate as a proactive legitimacy strategy to satisfy ethical foreign investors and to 
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attract more foreign capital.  This study moreover extended the corporate disclosure literature by 
providing empirical evidence of determinants of SSBD, CSRD and FD in Islamic banking 
system context. This contributes to the current debate by regulators on the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms by testing how effective the governance recommendations are at 
improving firm disclosure strategy. This study provides evidence that factors related to CG may 
explain the variability of results found in this research field. In this sense, the results show that 
variables related to the IBs’ board has been positively associated with multi disclosure, which has 
important implications for the regulatory definition of board independence, and leads to the 
recommendation of the use of more stringent and specific criteria to define this CG mechanism. 
The study adds to the growing literature on global disclosure practices and their determinants. 
The study also benefits stakeholders with IFIs generally and IBs particularly because knowing 
disclosure characteristics will help stakeholders find desired information about IBs. 
    Concerned with compliance with AAOIFI; the study of AAOFII standards has grown in 
recent years with substantial contributions from scholars such as Ahmed and Khatun (2013); 
Hassan and Harahap (2010). It is notable that the focus of most of these studies is descriptive or 
analytical in nature, emphasising in particular the compliance level with AAOIFI without 
extending their study to explore the main factors behind the disclosure level. This study further 
contribute to the literature by examining the interactions of national culture with company level 
factors such as profitability and size in addition to CG for BOD and SSB, in order to understand 
more completely how these factors jointly impact compliance. The present research adds a large-
scale academic study-examining compliance with AAOIFI mandatory disclosures after 2010 
(based on the updated version of AAOIFI financial and governance standards). It provides 
evidence regarding the explanatory factors of compliance levels with AAOIFI that contain firm 
characteristics and CG mechanisms. 
The study makes several incremental contributions to the literature of economic consequences. 
There have been few empirical studies investigating the link between disclosure and financial 
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performance in the banking sector, and as far as I know, this is the first study to investigate this 
relationship in IBs using a more holistic definition of disclosure. The study offers a unique 
contribution to existing literature by looking at the economic consequences of disclosure in IBs. 
This study contribute to the literature by extending the traditional research on corporate 
disclosure beyond the narrow focus on financial disclosure towards a more comprehensive, 
multi-layered form of disclosure (Sharia  and social). The study also contributes to the extant 
literature by indicating the positive FV arising from voluntary disclosure of comprehensive 
information. However, despite several studies having gone on to investigate this relationship, the 
positive impacts of multi-categories of disclosure on the FV of IBs seldom explored. The 
evidence that financial as well as non-financial disclosure affects FV contributes to prior 
disclosure literature by proposing an extended boundary where the different forms of disclosures 
can have different effects on FV.  
  Concerned with non-economic consequences for disclosure; this research is the first that 
confirms the presence of significant direct effects of disclosure on stakeholders’ loyalty in IBs. 
This research expands prior studies exploring the economic consequences of disclosure through 
measuring the non-economic consequences of disclosure related to stakeholders’ behaviour. To 
the best of our knowledge, prior empirical studies in the banking sector in general and in IBs in 
particular did not incorporate different facets of disclosure nor did they stress the mediating 
roles of trust and satisfaction towards loyalty. This study extends the disclosure literature by 
adopting the approach of Beest and Braam (2012), which measures disclosure based on 
qualitative characteristics of reporting information and applying it to IBs.  
     Overall, this thesis constructed the pyramid of accountabilities to illustrate how factors such 
as disclosure levels, determinants, and perceptions about SSF practices of IBs, make incremental 
contributions for Islamic banks from different and integrated perspectives.  First, this study 
constructed the pyramid of Islamic banks based on the survey of Quran as well as literature 
reviews. Secondly, this study constructs the pyramid of IBs’ accountabilities based on disclosure 
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levels outlined in corporate reporting. Thirdly, this study constructs two pyramids from the 
perceptions of stakeholders who deal with these banks, and non-customers who do not deal with 
IBs. Based on the previous investigations; this study measures the gap between the different 
views which added value and contribute to IBs.          
7.4.1.2 Methodological contributions 
   The study introduces a valid and reliable measure of multi disclosure as well as a model for 
measuring the non-economic consequences of disclosure. This thesis has provided evidence that 
non-economic consequences for multi disclosure by IBs can be assessed based upon the 
qualitative characteristics that are provided conceptual framework of IFRS as well as used by 
Beest and Braam (2012), with modification to comply with SSF Islamic banks’ accountabilities. 
The previous studies that measured the consequences of disclosure always adopted content 
analysis for annual report based on OLS (e.g., Elzahar et al., 2015; Kothari et al., 2009; Hussainey 
and Walker, 2009). However, the current study adopt PLS warp as a new methodology to 
measuring the impacts of multi disclosure. 
7.4.2 Implications 
7.4.2.1 Theoretical implications   
   The results summarised in the previous section have some distinctive theoretical implications 
either in support of existing theories; or in extending the scope of previous works and creating 
additional linkages within the existing literature. First, the analysis provides strong support for 
the agency theory arguments, which suggests that corporations with reliable CG mechanism are 
more likely to disclose supplementary information to stakeholders (Taylor et al., 2010). However, 
the result shows that CG of SSB has equal consequences on the disclosure comparing with CG 
of BOD (Farook et al., 2011).  In addition, this research agrees with the theoretical basis for 
Signalling and Economic theories, which argues that increased discourse has a positive impact on 
a firm’s value (Gordon et al., 2010; Easley and O’Hara, 2004). It also illustrates that non-financial 
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disclosure has superior impact when compared with only financial disclosure, particularly for 
ethical institutions such as Islamic banks. The result supported the theoretical argument about 
sensitivity of economic consequences’ analysis in the category of disclosure (Hassan et al., 2009). 
Fourthly, the outcomes support the theoretical root of accountability for Islamic banks; that 
accountability to Allah may come before stakeholders. This study constructs a comprehensive 
model for accountability that is applicable for Islamic banks, and shows the link between primary 
accountee (Allah) as well as secondary accountee (stakeholders) with the primary accountor 
(BOD) and role of disclosure (SSF) to satisfy this accountability. Moreover, this research 
adopted marketing theories such as information processing, as well as social identification theory 
and linked with accounting theories, including Signalling theory, to construct an integrated model 
that interpreted the impacts of disclosure on the stakeholders’ behaviour (loyalty; trust and 
satisfaction) (He et al., 2012). This integration expands the theoretical arguments about the 
benefits of increased disclosure to contain economic as well as non-economic consequences.       
7.4.2.2 Practical implications  
    These previous results have some distinctive implications for regulators, policy makers, 
managers, IBs, investors, FASB and AAOIFI. The present study has revealed that disclosure of 
SSFs - especially non-financial ones - was limited in many annual reports as well as websites. 
Therefore, regulatory bodies such as central banks particularly in countries that have IBs or even 
Islamic windows may identify a minimum level of SSFs to issue by each IB. The definition and 
the assumptions used to drive each of these SSFs may unify and generalised for each IBs to 
enhance comparability. It also confirms the concerns regarding the role of enforcement 
mechanisms. This suggests that IBs might need clear guidance that indicates best practice for 
SSF framework as AAOIFI. More specifically, this guidance may show IBs how to indicate the 
link between firms’ SSF and their strategies, quantify their SSF targets.  
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   This thesis provides strong evidence that particular firm characteristics and CG mechanisms 
affect the quantity of SSF reporting. More specifically, it informs regulatory bodies and 
information users, when IBs have adopted AAOIFI standards, as well as auditor, SAD, size, 
profitability, age, and corporate governance of SSB and BOD as SSB size, block holders, foreign 
ownership, institutional ownership, listed share, CEO founder, board size, investment account 
holders are more likely to report larger levels of SSF. Moreover, investors and stakeholders who 
intend to deal with IBs may consider SSF attributes (disclosure levels) before taking any 
decisions. This may be of interest to regulators as they may encourage IBs to improve these 
dominant mechanisms, in order to enhance SSF reporting as well as its image. Moreover, the 
findings have potential managerial implications with regard to the positive effects of the quantity 
of SSF reported upon FV. In particular, the results suggest that market participants may pay 
more attention to non-financial disclosure levels (Sharia and social) rather than financial ones.  
   The study has crucial implications to how Islamic banks may improve its Sharia compliance 
disclosures to create a competitive advantage and capitalize on a niche clientele that is growing 
rapidly. The results show that adopting AAOIFI standards and hiring SAD is positive and 
marginally significant with financial as well as non-financial disclosure. Islamic banks may 
consider Sharia and social issues where they promote and market their services. Furthermore, 
AAOIFI may take measures to make their standards mandatory for all their members as a first 
step to making it compulsory for all IFIs around the world. Thus, the AAOIFI may consider 
even partial adoption as a one of the main requirements for getting membership of AAOIFI. 
This study may help investors with their decision-making processes when looking at Islamic 
banks. The study suggests that investors may concentrate on firms’ Sharia and social disclosure, 
which has a significant impact on the firm value. This study shows that high SSF disclosure is 
associated with economic as well as non-economic consequences. In the light of these findings, 
regulators may focus more on how to improve firms’ disclosure. More explicit rules on 
disclosure may enhance the MC and ROA, and may impact positively on the behaviour of 
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stakeholders who deal with Islamic banks and changes the perceptions of non-customers. 
Regulators may encourage Islamic banks to provide higher disclosure, related to compliance with 
Sharia as well as social information. This study also indicates that corporate governance practices 
concerned with BOD and SSB are able to solve corporate disclosure and accountability practices 
problems in IBs; hence, it suggests that regulators need to review their reliance on CG codes and 
AAOIFI standards in the light of their costs and benefits. 
Researchers may benefit from this study since there is very little research in this area. The 
study provides empirical evidence on the potential of SSF disclosure to enhance the firm value 
and effect on the perception of non-customers. The study provides opportunities for further 
research about SSF disclosure and its economic as well as non-economic impacts. The findings 
from this research may use to educate accounting students about the importance of disclosure 
and its benefits, and promote accountability towards Allah as a primary accountee as well as 
highlighting the importance of ethical reporting and full transparency to satisfy Allah and then 
seeking to satisfy all stakeholders as the main objectives for accounting.     
  The results of economic and non-economic consequences of disclosure tell investors that 
Sharia and social disclosures have a positive effect on market value of their banks. Managers who 
engage in good practices such as information disclosure recommended continuing doing so. For 
those who refrain from providing information to the stakeholders, the results call for more 
transparency if they want their bank’s value to become more attractive. Furthermore, the result 
has an implication on international standard setters such as the FASB. It needs to take into 
account Sharia and social information for IBs that adopt IFRS to enhance their value through 
issuing a comprehensive accounting standard for IBs to covers these categories of disclosure    
The findings indicate that increasing SSF disclosure level has a significantly positive impact on 
external stakeholders’ loyalty. The key implication of this finding is that IFIs may need to rethink 
increasing the level of disclosure to support the trust of stakeholders who deal with IBs as well as 
attract more customers in addition to effects on non-customers to switch for IBs. In the long 
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run, IBs may focus on disclosing Sharia and social information to reflect the variances between 
these banks and conventional banks and support its position in the market. The results are 
applicable to IFIs that seek to enhance their image, increase customers’ loyalty and attract 
potential customers by providing better SSF disclosure. 
    The outcomes concerned with surveying the perceptions of stakeholders suggest that boards 
at Islamic bank’s may invest more in socially responsible initiatives since stakeholders tend to 
support and reward those banks that are perceived as socially responsible by developing a greater 
loyalty toward them. The Board may need to be aware of perceived Sharia accountability as a key 
variable in restoring stakeholders’ loyalty and trust. IFIs generally and IBs particularly may 
consider that they carry the flag of Islam and they may be consider the ideal model 
recommended by Sharia which is governed by Allah. Therefore, it is essential that managers may 
consider the reputation and image of the bank as more substantive and long-standing than a 
short-term public relations issue. Hence, IBs’ board needs to design their accountability pyramids 
in such a way that it reinforces religious, social, financial, and commercial driven constructs for 
their corporate brand.   
7.5 Limitations and suggestions for future research 
   The present study is one of the first to investigate the determinants and consequences for SSF 
disclosure for IBs based on a holistic model. Moreover, the current study is one of the first to 
investigate the non-economic consequences for corporate disclosure. The current study, 
therefore, extends the empirical knowledge and contributes to SSF disclosure literature. The 
current study has some limitations, in either sample or data; disclosure indices; approach; or in its 
research methodology, which have to consider as potential avenues for future research. 
In terms of sample and data, the study is limited through focusing on one year (2013). The 
number of observations has restricted the opportunity to obtain reliable results that could be 
generalised. Thus, further research can uses panel data. A second potential limitation is the 
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relatively small sample size concerning with IFIs that contain both Islamic and non-Islamic 
institutions. Future research could explore the above issues in other settings, which comprise 
other kinds of IFIs such as insurance firms (Takaful) and Islamic investing firms. In terms of 
methodology, the current study relied on annual reports, websites and manual content analysis as 
research material. Annual reports and websites are two ways for banks to convey information. 
However, there are other sources, such as financial releases, interim reports and financial news 
reports (e.g., Kothari et al., 2009), which could be utilised to measure a bank’s SSF reporting 
levels. Automated content analysis could be utilised to capture SSF reporting levels. Further 
research could usefully implement this technique (e.g., Elshandidy et al., 2013).  
Research could also explore other consequences of disclosure levels, such as the effect on cost 
of debt and equity capital, or analysts’ forecast errors and forecast dispersion. Qualitative 
behavioural research exploring preparers’ incentives for (non-) disclosure or regulators’ 
perceptions would add depth to analysis regarding management’s decision-making. In terms of 
disclosure indices, the results are only valid to the extent that the disclosure indices used are 
applicable. Despite following all usual procedures to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
research instrument, the use of a disclosure index constantly involves a degree of subjectivity. 
This may hinder consistent replication of the research. However, the reliability test is satisfactory. 
The further research related to non-economic consequences for disclosure asking use random 
sampling. Regarding the questionnaire, it must note that it limited data collection to Muslim 
respondents. As an interesting extension, future research may test this conceptual model for 
non-Muslim respondents. This study just measuring quantity disclosure. Further research may 
use quality disclosure. The current study emphasised quantitative approach, whereas adopting 
qualitative approach represents another direction for research. For example, undertaking 
interviews with investors and BOD might reveal great insights into their perceptions. Finally, by 
measuring the quantity of SSF reporting this research also raises the possibility of also measuring 
the quality of SSF reporting. 
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Appendix  
  
A Survey 
Of  
Stakeholders and Non-Customers’ 
Expectations; Motivations; Consequences and Perceptions about 
Accountabilities of Islamic banks 
 
By 
Sherif Ismail El-Halaby   
School of Business  
Plymouth University, United Kingdom 
E-mail: Sherif.Ismail@Plymouth.ac.uk                        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This research survey seeks to measure the expectations and opinion of customers’ on the issue of service quality 
of Islamic banks and its accountability towards Allah; society and stockholders. Therefore, being a customer of a 
bank, we would like to seek your cooperation to give your valuable opinion which is contributing towards the 
success of this research. 
Most of the questions merely require you to tick the appropriate box. All the information given will be treated in 
the strictest confidence. 
Your participation in this research is greatly appreciated. 
General Instructions and Information 
1. All individual responses to this questionnaire will be kept STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL and for academic 
research purpose only. 
 2. Please do not worry about questions that seemingly look alike. If you do not have the exact answer to a question, 
please provide your best judgement by ticking the appropriate boxes in the questions. Your answers are very 
important to the accuracy of the study. 
3. If you wish to make any comment, please feel free to use the space at the end of the questionnaire. 
Islamic accountability’s pillars are: 
1. Sharia /Religion accountability: It reflects Islamic banks’ responsibility towards Allah through implement his 
Sharia and complies with his rules in all bank’s activities  
2. Social/Ethical accountability: It reflects Islamic banks’ responsibility towards the Muslim and Non-Muslim 
communities by social; ethical and environmental roles as charity and finance developed and non-profitable 
projects and giving Qard Hassan     
3. Commercial/Financial accountability: It reflects Islamic banks’ responsibility towards their stockholders as 
maximizing the profitability; enhancing services quality and present annual report that include all information about 
bank’s activities  
369 
 
Part One 
For stakeholders who deal with Islamic banks 
Q1. How important are the following factors influencing your judgement when opening an 
account with Islamic bank? (Priorities of factors that influencing the judgement about dealing 
with IBs) 
 Not 
important at 
all (1) 
Not 
important 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
 (3) 
Important 
  
(4) 
Most 
important 
(5) 
Sharia  accountability       
Avoiding the Interest (Riba)       
Islamic branding and image      
Confidence in the bank's Sharia  Supervisory Board      
Its name contains an Islamic word      
Dealing with Zakat       
Bank Islamic reputation      
Employees’ appearance reflects the Islamic values as  Female staff 
wear Hijab 
     
Closing for prayer time and Bank has a prayer room      
Social accountability       
Involvement in the Community (e. g. giving donations)      
Environmental practice and impact       
Providing Qard Hassan        
Commercial/Financial accountability       
Price of the financial products (Low service charges)      
Competitive rate of return (Profitability)       
Number of branches available      
Customer service quality      
Location being near work or home      
Diversity of Islamic services (variety of financing options)        
Internet banking facilities      
 
Q2. What may be the objectives of Islamic banking operation? (The main objectives for IBs) 
 Not 
important at 
all  (1) 
Not 
important 
(2) 
Neutral 
  
(3) 
Important 
 
 (4) 
Most 
important 
(5) 
Sharia  Objectives       
Implement Islamic Sharia        
Avoiding Riba in all services      
Helping Muslim to obey Allah        
Social Objectives       
Promoting sustainable development project      
Contributing to social welfare of the community       
Helping to solve social problems like poverty and social 
exclusion 
     
Giving Qard Hassan       
Commercial/Financial Accountability      
Enhancing product and service quality      
Maximising profits       
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Q3. Actual perceptions of stakeholders about actual IBs’ practices  
 Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
  
(2) 
Neutral 
  
(3) 
Agree 
 
 (4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
Sharia  accountability      
Provide banking services according to Islamic Sharia       
Have well known, confidence and trustworthy Sharia  Advisory Board      
Neither pays nor takes interest on savings and loan accounts      
Provide profit-sharing investment account      
Activate Zakat system       
Islamic bank’ appearance reflect Islam      
Employees’ appearance reflect Islam (as Female staffs wear hijab)         
Separate department for ladies (Separate window for ladies)       
Bank has a prayer room      
Social accountability      
Finance small projects and social projects       
Charity for the Muslim and Non-Muslim society      
Providing Qard Hassan       
Commercial/Financial Accountability      
Modern-looking equipment (such as cash machines)      
Visually appealing interior design and facilities      
Applications are processed on time      
Brochures and forms are clear and easy to understand      
Business transactions are accurate      
Employees give customers prompt service      
Have  good websites and good online services       
Employees give customers personal attention      
Employees’ behaviour instils confidence in customers      
Have operating hours convenient to all its customer      
 
Q4.1 If an Islamic bank stopped giving charity, donations and other social responsibility commitments in order to 
concentrate on making profits and maintaining its competitiveness in the market, would you: 
• Withdraw all deposits from the Islamic bank and switch to another bank that was highly regarded 
as socially responsible. 
• Send a letter of protest 
• Agree with the decision since the Islamic bank must be able to compete with other banks and 
remain sustainable and viable. 
• Do not care since it does not directly affect you 
Q4.2 If an Islamic bank stopped compliance with Sharia commitments or comply partially in order to concentrate 
on making profits and maintaining its competitiveness in the market would you: 
• Withdraw all deposits from the Islamic bank and switch to another bank that was highly regarded 
as religion responsible and more compliance with Islamic Sharia. 
• Send a letter of protest 
• Agree with the decision since the Islamic bank must be able to compete with other banks and 
remain sustainable and viable. 
• Do not care since it does not directly affect you 
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Q5. Stakeholders’ satisfaction; Trust; Loyalty and Disclosure of about Sharia ; social and financial practices   
  
  
Strongly 
Disagree 
(1) 
Disagree 
  
(2) 
Neutral 
  
(3) 
Agree 
 
 (4) 
Strongly 
Agree 
(5) 
Stakeholders’ Satisfaction      
I am satisfied with my bank's financial performance      
I am satisfied with services provided by my bank      
I am satisfied with the bank’ compliance with Islamic Sharia          
I am satisfied with the bank’s accountability towards society       
Stakeholders’ Trust      
I trust that the Islamic bank is truly concerned with Islamic principles      
I am confidence and trust in Bank's Sharia  advisors      
I believe that Islamic bank serving society well        
I have a confidence and trust in Bank's staff and Bank's management      
Stakeholders’ loyalty      
I will say positive things about Islamic banks to other people       
I will recommend family and relatives to do business with Islamic bank       
I recommend Islamic banks to someone who seeks advice       
I continue to do more business with Islamic banks      
Disclosure       
Sharia  Disclosure       
I rely on SSBR to be sure about compliance with Sharia  for my bank      
The annual report as well as website provide sufficient and complete 
information about compliance with Islamic Sharia  
     
To what extent are the SSBR sufficiently clear?      
For what extent Zakat and Sadakat statement is important for you (added 
value for you) and making differences in your decisions through dealing 
with Islamic banks  
     
For what extent SSB report is important for you (added value for you) 
and making differences in your decisions through dealing with Islamic 
banks 
     
For what extent Internal auditing Sharia  department report is important 
for you (added value for you) and making differences in your decisions 
through dealing with Islamic banks 
     
Social Disclosure       
I rely on CSR to be sure about serving my bank the society        
The annual report as well as website provide sufficient and complete 
information about serving society (charity and donations)  
     
To what extent are the CSRR sufficiently clear?      
For what extent Qard Hassan statement is important for you (added value 
for you) and making differences in your decisions through dealing with 
Islamic banks 
     
For what extent CSR report is important for you (added value for you) 
and making differences in your decisions through dealing with Islamic 
banks 
     
Financial Disclosure       
I rely on financial statements to be sure about financial performance for 
my bank  
     
The annual report as well as website provide sufficient and complete 
information about the financial performance and profitability   
     
To what extent are the FS sufficiently clear?      
For what extent the Financial statements as a statement of profit or loss 
and balance sheet  are important for you (added value for you) and 
making differences in your decisions through dealing with Islamic banks 
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Part Two 
For Non-Customers who do not deal with Islamic banks 
Q1. I do not deal with Islamic banks because the following reasons (The main reasons behind does not dealing 
with IBs) 
 Strongly 
Disagree(1) 
Disagree 
 (2) 
Neutral 
 (3) 
Agree 
 (4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
Sharia  Accountability       
I belief that interest is not Riba        
Islamic banks do not fully comply with Islamic Sharia        
Islamic banks do not reflect the actual image of Islam        
Islamic banks have not s trusted SSB members       
Islamic banks do not deal with Zakat       
Social accountability       
Islamic banks do not provide Qard Hassan       
Islamic banks do not serving society       
Commercial/Financial Accountability      
Luck information about Islamic banking in the market       
Services quality is not like the conventional banks        
Islamic banks does not provides diversity in services       
Insufficient branch network       
Islamic banks is similar with conventional bank       
Return is not like the conventional bank       
 
Q2. What may be the objectives of Islamic banking operation? (The main objectives for IBs) 
 Not 
important at 
all  (1) 
Not 
important 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Important 
(4) 
Most 
important 
(5) 
Sharia  Objectives       
Implement Islamic Sharia        
Avoiding Riba in all services      
Helping Muslim to obey Allah        
Social Objectives       
Promoting sustainable development project      
Contributing to social welfare of the community       
Helping to solve social problems like poverty and social exclusion      
Commercial/Financial Accountability      
Enhancing product and service quality      
Maximising profits       
 
 
Q3. Which factors would motivate you to deal with an Islamic bank? (The main factors would motivate non-
customers to deal with IBs) 
 Strongly 
Disagree (1) 
Disagree 
(2) 
Neutral 
(3) 
Agree 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree (5) 
Sharia  Accountability       
Full implementation for Sharia        
Activate Zakat       
Hiring trusted and famous SSB      
Social Accountability       
Full serving society       
Giving Qard Hassan      
Financing developed projects        
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Commercial/Financial Accountability       
High return and profitability ratios      
Branches at different places       
High services quality       
 
Q4. What are your expectations/Attitudes about practices of Islamic banks? 
 Strongly 
Disagree 
 (1) 
Disagree 
 
(2) 
Neutral 
 
(3) 
Agree 
 
(4) 
Strongly 
Agree  
(5) 
Sharia  accountability      
Provide banking services according to Islamic Sharia       
Have well known, confidence and trustworthy Sharia  Advisory Board      
Neither pays nor takes interest on savings and loan accounts      
Provide profit-sharing investment account      
Activate Zakat system       
Islamic bank’ appearance reflect Islam      
Employees’ appearance reflect Islam (as Female staffs wear hijab)         
Separate department for ladies (Separate window for ladies)       
Bank has a prayer room      
Social accountability      
Finance small projects and social projects       
Charity for the Muslim and Non-Muslim society      
Providing Qard Hassan       
Commercial/Financial Accountability      
Modern-looking equipment (such as cash machines)      
Visually appealing interior design and facilities      
Applications are processed on time      
Brochures and forms are clear and easy to understand      
Business transactions are accurate      
Employees give customers prompt service      
Have  good websites and good online services       
Employees give customers personal attention      
Employees’ behaviour instils confidence in customers      
Have operating hours convenient to all its customer      
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Personal Information 
For two groups: 
(Please tick (√) in an appropriate box) 
1. Gender:       •Male                        •Female 
2. Age:           •21 – 30                    •31 – 40                 •41 – 50                    •Above 50       
3. Country Residence……………………………………………………………………… 
4. Highest Education Level:           •No education                   •Basic/Elementary/Secondary                 
•Bachelor degree                            •Postgraduate  
5. Occupation:               •Self-employed             •Professional (lawyer, engineer, Accountant, 
doctor)                       •Unemployed               •Academician / Education              •Retired             
•Housewife                •Student                        •others – (Please specify)………………         
6. Which aspect of training or knowledge have you attained? 
• Sharia                            •Business                         •others please specify......................... 
7. What is your main source of information about Islamic Banks?  
•Annual Reports            •Islamic banks’ Website          •Direct interaction     •Friend             
•Internet and Websites                   • others (Please specify)……… 
 
For only stakeholders who deal with an Islamic banks: 
8. How long have you been a customer of this Islamic bank? 
•Less than 1 year        •1 - 3 years              •3 - 5 years              •More than 5 years 
9. What kind of banking facilities have you used with Islamic bank? (You may select more than one)    
•Current account       •Murabaha             •Musharaka         •Mudaraba      
•others (Please specify)….. 
10. From which category you belong?  
•Customers                   •Account holder                 •Individual shareholders      
•Institutional shareholders  
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire. Your assistance in providing this information is very 
much appreciated. If there is anything else you would like to tell us about this survey or other comments you wish 
to make that you think may help us to understand the Service Quality of Islamic Banks and issues arising thereof, 
please do so in the space (box) provided below 
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 Cover letter   
 
Assalam Alaikcum Wa Rahmat Allah, 
 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
 
I am a postgraduate researcher at the School of Business, University of Plymouth at the United 
Kingdom, currently undertaking a PhD research project on the topic “Accountability Practices 
of Islamic Banks: A Stakeholders' Perspective” under the supervision of Professor Khaled 
Hussainey 
 
As part of the research, I have prepared the enclosed questionnaire. It seeks your opinions about 
some issues associated with “Islamic accountability framework” that contain three main pillars: 
Sharia accountability; social accountability and commercial/financial accountability within the 
context of Islamic Banks. The questionnaire has been designed so that you can complete it easily. 
In most cases, you need to tick the appropriate box which describes your opinion. It takes about 
15 minutes. 
 
It would be highly appreciated if the questionnaire were completed as soon as possible and 
returned or deliver it to the same person who gave you or just through by email. You can 
absolutely sure that all information you provide is strictly confidential and is used for research 
purposes only. 
 
Thank you in advance for your help. 
 
Sincerely yours, 
 
Sherif Ismail El-Halaby 
PhD Student at Plymouth Business School 
University of Plymouth 
Cook worthy Building 
Plymouth 
PL4 8AA 
United Kingdom 
Tel:  +44 7440074935 
Sherif.ismail@plymouth.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
376 
 
 
 اﺳﺘﻘﺼﺎء
 ﻋﻦ
  ﺗﻮﻗﻌﺎت ودواﻓﻊ واراء واﺛﺎر ﻣﺴﺆﻟﯿﺎت اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﻋﻠﻰ 
  اﻟﻤﮭﺘﻤﮫ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﮫ واﻟﻐﯿﺮ اﻟﻤﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﮫ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫاﻻطﺮاف 
 ﺑﻮاﺳﻄﺔ
 ﻛﻠﯿﮫ اﻻداره   ﺷﺮﯾﻒ اﻟﺤﻠﺒﻰ
  ﺑﺮﯾﻄﺎﻧﯿﺎ -اﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﮫ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪه -ﺟﺎﻣﻌﮫ ﺑﻼﯾﻤﻮث 
  ku.ca.htuomylP@liamsI.firehS :liam-E
                      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ﻏﯾر ﻣواﻓق ﺗﻣﺎﻣﺎ ﻏﯾر ﻣواﻓق ﻣﺣﺎﯾد ﻣواﻓق ﻣواﻓق ﺑﺷده
 ﻏﯾر ﻣﮭم إطﻼﻗﺂ ﻏﯾر ﻣﮭم ﻻ أﻋرف ﻣﮭم ﻣﮭم ﺟدا
 ﻏﯾر راﺿﻲ ﺗﻣﺎﻣﺎ ﻏﯾر راﺿﻲ ﻻ أﻋرف راﺿﻲ راﺿﻲ ﺟدا
 1 2 3 4 5
 
واﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ ﺗﺠﺎه  اراء وﺗﻮﻗﻌﺎت اﻟﻌﻤﻼء ﺑﺸﺄن ﺟﻮدة اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﮫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺼﺎرف اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔھﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ اﻟﺒﺤﺜﯿﺔ ﺗﮭﺪف ﻟﻘﯿﺎس 
ﻟﺬا، ﻟﻜﻮﻧﻚ اﺣﺪ ﻋﻤﻼء اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ، ﻧﺮﺟﻮا ﺗﻌﺎوﻧﻚ ﻹﺑﺪاء راﯾﻚ واﻟﺬى ﺳﯿﻜﻮن ﻟﮫ   ﷲ واﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ وﻛﺎﻓﮫ اﻻطﺮاف اﻟﻤﮭﺘﻤﮫ
 .اﻛﺒﺮ اﻻﺛﺮ واﻟﻤﺴﺎھﻤﮫ ﻓﻲ ﻧﺠﺎح ھﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ
ﻣﺸﺎرﻛﺘﻚ .  ﺐ ﻣﻨﻚ وﺿﻊ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮﺑﻊ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺐ. ﺳﯿﺘﻢ اﻟﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ ﻛﺎﻓﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﻮاردة ﻓﻲ ﺳﺮﯾﺔ ﺗﺎﻣﺔﻣﻌﻈﻢ اﻷﺳﺌﻠﺔ ﺗﺘﻄﻠ
 .ﻓﻰ ھﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻟﮭﺎ ﻛﻞ اﻟﺘﻘﺪﯾﺮ
 
       ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻤﺎت ﻋﺎﻣﺔ
اﻟﺒﺤﺚ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﻰ  ﻛﻞ اﻻﺟﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﻔﺮدﯾﮫ ﻓﻰ ھﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﺳﻮف ﯾﺤﺘﻔﻆ ﺑﮭﺎ ﺑﺼﻮره ﺳﺮﯾﮫ واﻣﻨﮫ وﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻓﻘﻂ ﻻﻏﺮاض .1
 واﻻﻛﺎدﯾﻤﻰ
ﻣﻦ ﻓﻀﻠﻚ ﻻ ﺗﻘﻠﻖ ﺑﺸﺄن اﻷﺳﺌﻠﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺒﺪو ﻣﺘﺸﺎﺑﮭﮫ. إذا ﻟﻢ ﯾﻜﻦ ﻟﺪﯾﻚ اﻟﺠﻮاب ﺑﺎﻟﻀﺒﻂ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺳﺆال، ﯾﺮﺟﻰ ﺗﻘﺪﯾﻢ  .2
 أﻓﻀﻞ راى وذﻟﻚ ﺑﻮﺿﻊ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮﺑﻌﺎت اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺒﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻷﺳﺌﻠﺔ. إﺟﺎﺑﺎﺗﻚ ﻣﮭﻤﺔ ﺟﺪا ﻟﺪﻗﺔ اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ.
 ﻓﻲ ﻧﮭﺎﯾﺔ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﯿﺎن اﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺨﺎﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﺘﺮوك إذا ﻛﻨﺖ ﺗﺮﻏﺐ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﮫ أي ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻖ، ﻻ ﺗﺘﺮدد ﻓﻲ .3
 اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﮫ اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ ﻧﻤﻮذج رﻛﺎﺋﺰ
 ﻓﻲ اﻻﺳﻼم ﻗﻮاﻋﺪ ﻣﻊ واﻟﺘﻮاﻓﻖ اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﺔ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻖ ﺧﻼل ﻣﻦ ﷲ ﻧﺤﻮ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك ﻣﺴﺆوﻟﯿﺔ ﯾﻌﻜﺲ: اﻟﺸﺮﻋﯿﮫ اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ .1
 اﻟﺒﻨﻚ أﻧﺸﻄﺔ ﺟﻤﯿﻊ
 اﻷﺧﻼﻗﯿﺔ ﺧﻼل اﻷدوار ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﺔ وﻏﯿﺮ اﻟﻤﺴﻠﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻌﺎت ﺗﺠﺎه اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك ﻣﺴﺆوﻟﯿﺔ ﯾﻌﻜﺲ :اﻷﺧﻼﻗﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ .2
 اﻟﺤﺴﻦ اﻟﻘﺮض وإﻋﻄﺎء ﻣﺮﺑﺤﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﺗﻤﻮﯾﻞ ﻣﺸﺎرﯾﻊ و واﻟﺨﯿﺮﯾﺔ واﻟﺒﯿﺌﯿﺔ
 اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت ﺟﻮدة ﺗﻌﺰﯾﺰ. اﻟﺮﺑﺤﯿﺔ وﺗﻌﻈﯿﻢ اﻻﺳﮭﻢ اﺻﺤﺎب ﻧﺤﻮ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك ﻣﺴﺆوﻟﯿﺔ ﯾﻌﻜﺲ :اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﺔ و اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ .3
 اﻟﺒﻨﻚ أﻧﺸﻄﺔ ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺟﻤﯿﻊ ﺗﺸﻤﻞ واﻟﺘﻲ اﻟﺴﻨﻮي واﻟﺘﻘﺮﯾﺮ
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 اﻟﺠﺰء اﻻول
  ﯾﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮا ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫﻟﻠﻤﮭﺘﻤﯿﻦ اﻟﺬﯾﻦ 
 :ﻣﺎھﻲ أھﻣﯾﺔ اﻟﻌواﻣل اﻟﺗﺎﻟﯾﮫ واﻟﺗﻲ ﺗؤﺛر ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﻛﻣك ﻓﻲ اﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ؟ 1اﻟﺳؤال
 5 4 3 2 1 
 اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ 
      ﺗﺟﻧب اﻟﻔﺎﺋده / اﻟرﺑﺎ 
      ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ﺗﺟﺎرﯾﺔ إﺳﻼﻣﯾﺔ 
      اﻟﺛﻘﮫ ﻓﻲ ھﯾﺋﺔ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﺔ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ 
      أن ﯾﺣﻣل اﻟﺑﻧك إﺳم إﺳﻼﻣﻲ 
      ﯾﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﺑﺎﻟزﻛﺎة 
      ﺳﻣﻌﺔ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ 
      ﻣﻈﮭﺮ اﻟﻤﻮظﻔﯿﻦ ﯾﻌﻜﺲ اﻟﻘﯿﻢ ﻣﺜﻞ ارﺗﺪاء ﻟﻠﻤﻮظﻔﺎت ﻟﻠﺤﺠﺎب
      ﯾﻐﻠﻖ وﻗﺖ اﻟﺼﻼة و اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﻟﺪﯾﮫ ﻏﺮﻓﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻼة
 اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﮫ اﻹﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ 
      ﺧدﻣﺔ اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﻣﺛل )إﻋطﺎء اﻟﺗﺑرﻋﺎت( 
      اﻟﺗﺄﺛﯾرات واﻟﻣﻣﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﺑﯾﺋﯾﮫ )ﺧدﻣﺔ اﻟﺑﯾﺋﮫ(
      ﯾﻘدم اﻟﻘروض اﻟﺣﺳﻧﮫ
 اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ اﻟﺗﺟﺎرﯾﮫ واﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ  
      ﺳﻌر اﻟﻣﻧﺗﺟﺎت اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ )ﺗﻛﻠﻔﺔ اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت رﺧﯾﺻﮫ(
      ﻣﻌدل ﻋﺎﺋد ﺗﻧﺎﻓﺳﻲ 
      ﻋدد اﻟﻔروع اﻟﻣﺗﺎﺣﮫ 
      ﺟودة ﺧدﻣﺔ اﻟﻌﻣﻼء 
      ﻣوﻗﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك ﻗرﯾب ﻣن اﻟﻌﻣل واﻟﺳﻛن 
      ﺗﻧوع ﻓﻲ اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ 
      ﺗﺳﮭﯾﻼت ﺧدﻣﺎت ﺑﻧﻛﯾﮫ ﻋﻠﻲ اﻷﻧﺗرﻧت 
 
  ؟ﻣﺎذا ﯾﺟب أن ﺗﻛون أھداف اﻟﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ : 2اﻟﺳؤال
 5 4 3 2 1 
 أھداف ﺷرﻋﯾﮫ 
       اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫﺗطﺑﯾق 
      ﺗﺟﻧب اﻟرﺑﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺎﻓﮫ اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﻘدﻣﮫ
      ﻣﺳﺎﻋدة اﻟﻣﺳﻠﻣﯾن ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘوي ﷲ
 أھداف إﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ 
      ﻧﺷر وﺗﻣوﯾل ﻣﺷروﻋﺎت اﻟﺗﻧﻣﯾﮫ اﻟﻣﺳﺗداﻣﮫ 
      اﻟﻣﺳﺎھﻣﮫ ﻓﻲ رﻓﻊ ﻣﺳﺗوي ﻣﻌﯾﺷﺔ اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ 
      اﻟﻣﺳﺎﻋده ﻓﻲ ﺣل اﻟﻣﺷﻛﻼت اﻹﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ ﻣﺛل اﻟﻔﻘر 
      ﻣﻧﺢ اﻟﻘروض اﻟﺣﺳﻧﮫ
 أھداف ﺗﺟﺎرﯾﮫ و ﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ
      ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ 
      ﺗﻌظﯾم اﻟرﺑﺣﯾﮫ 
 
  : آراء ﻋﻣﻼء اﻟﺑﻧوك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ ﻋن اﻻءاء اﻟﻔﻌﻠﻰ ﻟﺗﻠك اﻟﺑﻧوك 3اﻟﺳؤال
 5 4 3 2 1 
  اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ  
       ﺗﻘدﯾم ﺧدﻣﺎت ﺑﻧﻛﯾﮫ ﺗﺗﻔق ﻣﻊ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ 
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اﻟﺳؤال 4 )1(:اذا ﺗوﻗف ﺑﻧﻛك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﻋن ﻣﻧﺢ اﻟﺻدﻗﺎت واﻟﺗﺑرﻋﺎت واﻟﻘﯾﺎم ﺑدوره وﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﺗﮫ 
اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﺔ ﻧﺣو اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ ﻣن أﺟل اﻟﺗرﻛﯾز ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺣﻘﯾق اﻷرﺑﺎح واﻟﺣﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗدرﺗﮫ اﻟﺗﻧﺎﻓﺳﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ 
 اﻟﺳوق، ھل:
 ﺳوف ﺗﻘوم ﺑﺳﺣب ﺟﻣﯾﻊ وداﺋﻌك ﻣن اﻟﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ واﻟﺗﺣول إﻟﻰ ﺑﻧك آﺧر ﻟﮫ دور وﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﮫ اﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ  (1
 ﺳوف ﺗﻘوم ﺑﺎرﺳﺎل رﺳﺎﻟﺔ اﺣﺗﺟﺎج واﻋﺗراض (2
 ﺳﻮف اﺗﻔﻖ ﻣﻊ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﺣﯿﺚ ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﻜﻮن اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﻗﺎدرة ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻷﺧﺮى  (3
 ﻻ اھﺘﻢ ﻷﻧﮫ ﻻ ﯾﺆﺛﺮ ﻣﺒﺎﺷﺮة ﻓﻰ (4
 
اﻟﺳؤال 4 )2(: اذا ﺗﻮﻗﻒ ﺑﻨﻜﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﻋﻦ اﻟﺘﻄﺒﯿﻖ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ ﻟﻼﻟﺘﺰاﻣﺎت ااﻟﺸﺮﻋﯿﮫ أوﯾﺘﻮاﻓﻖ  ﺟﺰﺋﯿﺎ ﻣﻊ 
  ، ھل:اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﮫ ﻣﻦ أﺟﻞ اﻟﺘﺮﻛﯿﺰ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﺤﻘﯿﻖ اﻷرﺑﺎح واﻟﺤﻔﺎظ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘﺪره اﻟﺘﻨﺎﻓﺴﯿﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮق 
 ﺳوف ﺗﻘوم ﺑﺳﺣب ﺟﻣﯾﻊ وداﺋﻌك ﻣن اﻟﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ واﻟﺗﺣول إﻟﻰ ﺑﻧك آﺧر ﻟﮫ دور وﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﮫ اﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ  (1
 ف ﺗﻘوم ﺑﺎرﺳﺎل رﺳﺎﻟﺔ اﺣﺗﺟﺎج واﻋﺗراضﺳو (2
 ﺳﻮف اﺗﻔﻖ ﻣﻊ ﻗﺮار اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﺣﯿﺚ ﯾﺠﺐ أن ﯾﻜﻮن اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﻗﺎدرة ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﻓﺴﺔ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻷﺧﺮى  (3
 ﻻ اھﺘﻢ ﻷﻧﮫ ﻻ ﯾﺆﺛﺮ ﻣﺒﺎﺷﺮة ﻓﻰ (4
 
واﻻﻓﺻﺎح ﻋن اﻟﻣﻌﺎﻣﻼت اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ  وﻻء اﻟﻌﻣﻼء  –ﺻورة اﻟﺑﻧك  –اﻟﺛﻘﮫ  –إرﺿﺎء اﻟﻌﻣﻼء :5اﻟﺳؤال 
  واﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫواﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ 
 5 4 3 2 1 
  )ﻛﺎﻓﮫ اﻻطراف اﻟﻣﮭﺗﻣﮫ( إرﺿﺎء اﻟﻌﻣﻼء
      اﻧﺎ راﺿﻰ ﺑﺎﻻداء اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻰ ﻟﻠﺑﻧك
      أﻧﺎ راﺿﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﻣﻧﺗﺟﺎت / اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﻘدﻣﮫ ﻣن اﻟﺑﻧك
       اﻻﺳﻼمأﻧﺎ راﺿﻲ ﺑﺗواﻓق اﻟﺑﻧك ﻣﻊ ﺷرﯾﻌﺔ 
      أﻧﺎ راﺿﻲ ﺑدور وﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﺔ اﻟﺑﻧك ﺗﺟﺎه اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ
  اﻟﻣﮭﺗﻣﮫﺛﻘﮫ اﻻطراف 
       ﻟدﯾﮫ رﻗﺎﺑﮫ ﺷرﻋﯾﮫ ﻣوﺛوق ﻓﯾﮭﺎ ﻣﻌروﻓﮫ وﺟدﯾره ﺑﺎﻟﺛﻘﮫ 
       ﻻ ﯾدﻓﻊ وﻻ ﯾﺄﺧذ اﻟﻔﺎﺋده ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺗوﻓﯾر  
       ﯾوﻓر/ ﯾﻘدم ﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت اﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎر ﻣﺷﺎرﻛﮫ ﻓﻲ اﻟرﺑﺣﯾﮫ  
       ﯾﻔﻌل ﻧظﺎم اﻟزﻛﺎه 
       اﻟﻣظﮭر اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﺑﻧك ﯾﻌﻛس اﻹﺳﻼم 
       اﻟﻣظﮭر اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﯾﻌﻛس اﻹﺳﻼم 
       ﺷﺒﺎك وطﺎﺑﻮر ﺧﺎص ﺑﺎﻟﺴﯿﺪات إدارة ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﯿﺪات 
       اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﻟﺪﯾﮫ ﻏﺮﻓﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻼة  
 اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ اﻹﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ
       ﺗﻨﻤﻮﯾﮫ ﺗﻣوﯾل ﻣﺷروﻋﺎت ﺻﻐﯾره وﻣﺷروﻋﺎت إﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ
       اﻟﺗﺑرﻋﺎت ﻟﻠﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﺎت اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ وﻏﯾراﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ 
      ﻣﻧﺢ اﻟﻘروض اﻟﺣﺳﻧﮫ
 اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ اﻟﺗﺟﺎرﯾﮫ واﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ 
      ﻣﻌﺪات ﺣﺪﯾﺜﮫ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻻت ﻻﯾﺪاع اﻟﺸﯿﻜﺎت واﻟﻨﻘﺪﯾﮫ
      اﻟﺪﯾﻜﻮر )  ﺟﺬاب(  اﻟﺘﺼﻤﯿﻢ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻲ
       اﻻﻧﺘﮭﺎء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﻠﺒﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﮫ ﺗﺘﻢ ﻓﻰ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻤﺤﺪد 
       اﻟﻜﺘﯿﺒﺎت واﻻﺳﺘﻤﺎرات واﺿﺤﺔ وﺳﮭﻠﺔ اﻟﻔﮭﻢ 
       اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻣﻼت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﺔ دﻗﯿﻘﺔ 
       ﯾﻘﻮم اﻟﻤﻮظﻔﯿﻦ ﺑﺎﻋﻄﺎء اﻟﻌﻤﻼء ﺧﺪﻣﺎت ﺳﺮﯾﻌﮫ 
      اﻟﺑﻧك ﻟدﯾﮫ ﻣوﻗﻊ اﻟﯾﻛﺗروﻧﻰ ﻣﺗﻣﯾز وﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻛﺗروﻧﯾﮫ ﻣﺗﻣﯾزه
      اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﯾﻌطوا اﻟﻌﻣﻼء اھﺗﻣﺎم ﺷﺧﺻﻰ ﻛﺎﻓﻰ
      ﺳﻠوك اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﯾرﺳﺦ اﻟﺛﻘﮫ ﻓﻰ ﻧﻔوس اﻟﻌﻣﻼء
       ﻋﻣل ﻣﻧﺎﺳﺑﮫ ﻟﻛل اﻟﻌﻣﻼءاﻟﺑﻧك ﻟدﯾﮫ ﺳﺎﻋﺎت 
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      اﺛق ان ﺑﻧﻛﻰ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﯾﺗﻔق ﻣﻊ ﻣﺑﺎدئ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ 
      ﻟﺪى اﻟﺜﻘﮫ ﻓﻰ ھﯿﺌﮫ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﮫ اﻟﺸﺮﻋﯿﮫ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﻚ
      اؤﻣﻦ ان اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻاﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﯾﺨﺪم اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ ﺑﺼﻮره ﺟﯿﺪه
      ﻟﺪي اﻟﺜﻘﺔ ﻓﻲ ﻣﻮظﻔﻲ اﻟﺒﻨﻚ وإدارﺗﮫ
  وﻻء اﻻطراف اﻟﻣﮭﺗﻣﮫ
       اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ ﻟﻸﻓراد اﻷﺧرﯾنﺳوف أﻗول أﺷﯾﺎء إﯾﺟﺎﺑﯾﮫ ﻋن اﻟﺑﻧوك 
      ﺳوف أوﺻﻲ أﺳرﺗﻲ وأﻗﺎرﺑﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧوك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ
      أوﺻﯾت ﺷﺧص ﻣﺎ ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧوك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ ﻋﻧدﻣﺎ ﺳﺄﻟﻧﻲ اﻟﻧﺻﯾﺣﮫ 
       اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ ﺳوف أﺳﺗﻣر ﻓﻲ اﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ ﺗﻠك اﻟﺑﻧوك
 اﻻﻓﺻﺎح
 اﻻﻓﺻﺎح اﻟﺷرﻋﻰ
       ﻣن ﺗواﻓق ﺑﻧﻛﻰ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ ﻟﻠﺗﺄﻛداﻧﺎ اﻋﺗﻣد ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘرﯾر ھﯾﺋﮫ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﮫ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ 
      اﻟﺗﻘرﯾر اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻰ وﻣوﻗﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻰ ﯾوﻓروا ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻛﺎﻓﯾﮫ ﻋن ﺗواﻓق اﻟﺑﻧك ﻣﻊ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ
      ﺗﻘرﯾر ھﯾﺋﮫ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ ﻛﺎﻓﻰ وواﺿﺢ
       ﻗﯾﻣﮫ ﺑﺣﯾث ﺗؤﺛر ﻓﻰ اﺗﺧﺎذ ﻗرارى ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰﻣﮭﻣﮫ وذات ﻗﺎﺋﻣﮫ اﻟزﻛﺎه واﻟﺻدﻗﺎت 
       وذات ﻗﯾﻣﮫ ﺑﺣﯾث ﺗؤﺛر ﻓﻰ اﺗﺧﺎذ ﻗرارى ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ  ﻣﮭمﺗﻘرﯾر ھﯾﺋﮫ اﻟرﻗﺎﺑﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ 
ﺗﻘرﯾر ھﯾﺋﮫ ﻗﺳم اﻟﻣرﺟﻌﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ اﻟداﺧﻠﯾﮫ ﻣﮭم وذات ﻗﯾﻣﮫ ﺑﺣﯾث ﺗؤﺛر ﻓﻰ اﺗﺧﺎذ ﻗرارى ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ 
 اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ 
     
 اﻻﻓﺻﺎح اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﻰ
      اﻋﺗﻣد ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻘرﯾر اﻻداء اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﻰ ﻟﻠﺗﺄﻛد ﻣن اداء اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﺗﺟﺎه اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ
       ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻛﺎﻓﯾﮫ ﻋن اداء اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﺗﺟﺎه اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ اﻟﺗﻘرﯾر اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻰ وﻣوﻗﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻰ ﯾوﻓروا
      ﺗﻘرﯾر اﻻداء اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﻰ ﻛﺎﻓﻰ وواﺿﺢ
      ﻗﺎﺋﻣﮫ اﻟﻘرض اﻟﺣﺳن ﻣﮭﻣﮫ وذات ﻗﯾﻣﮫ ﺑﺣﯾث ﺗؤﺛر ﻓﻰ اﺗﺧﺎذ ﻗرارى ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ
       ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰﺗﻘرﯾر اﻻداء اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﻰ ﻣﮭم وذات ﻗﯾﻣﮫ ﺑﺣﯾث ﺗؤﺛر ﻓﻰ اﺗﺧﺎذ ﻗرارى ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل 
 اﻻﻓﺻﺎح اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻰ 
      اﻋﺗﻣد ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻘواﺋم اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ ﻟﻠﺗﺄﻛد ﻣن اﻟوﺿﻊ اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻰ ﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ 
      اﻟﺗﻘرﯾر اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻰ وﻣوﻗﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻰ ﯾوﻓروا ﺑﯾﺎﻧﺎت ﻛﺎﻓﯾﮫ ﻋن اداء اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ اﻟﻣﺎﻟﻰ واﻟرﺑﺣﯾﮫ 
      اﻟﻘواﺋم اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ ﻛﺎﻓﯩﮫ وواﺿﺣﮫ
ﻣﮭﻣﮫ وذات ﻗﯾﻣﮫ ﺑﺣﯾث ﺗؤﺛر ﻓﻰ اﺗﺧﺎذ ﻗرارى ﺑﺎﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل ﻣﻊ  اﻟﻘواﺋم اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ ﻣﺛل اﻟﻣﯾزاﻧﯾﮫ وﻗﺎﺋﻣﮫ اﻟدﺧل
 اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ
     
 
 اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻰ
 ﻻ ﯾﺘﻌﺎﻣﻠﻮا ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ ﻟﻠﻤﮭﺘﻤﯿﻦ ﻟﻜﻦ 
  أﻧﺎ ﻻ اﺗﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ ﻟﻼﺳﺒﺎب اﻟﺘﺎﻟﯿﺔ: 1اﻟﺳؤال
 5 4 3 2 1 
  / اﻟﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫاﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ 
      اﻋﺘﻘﺪ واؤﻣﻦ ﺑﺎن اﻟﻔﺎﺋﺪه اﻟﺒﻨﻜﯿﮫ ﻟﯿﺴﺖ رﺑﺎ
      اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﻻ ﯾﻄﺒﻖ اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﮫ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ ﻛﺎﻣﻠﮫ
      ﻟﻺﺳﻼم اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ ﻻ ﺗﻌﻜﺲ اﻟﺼﻮرة اﻟﺤﻘﯿﻘﯿﮫ
      ﻟﯿﺲ ﻟﺪى اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ اﻋﻀﺎء ھﯿﺌﮫ ﻟﻠﺮﻗﺎﺑﮫ اﻟﺸﺮﻋﯿﮫ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺪر ﻣﻦ اﻟﺜﻘﮫ  
      اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﻻ ﯾﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺰﻛﺎه 
 اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺋوﻟﯾﮫ اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ
      اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﻻ ﯾﻘﺪم اﻟﻘﺮوض اﻟﺤﺴﻨﮫ
      اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺨﺪم اﻟﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ 
 اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ اﻟﺗﺟﺎرﯾﮫ واﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ  
       ﻏﯿﺮﻣﺘﺎﺣﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺴﻮقاﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻋﻦ اﻟﻤﻨﺘﺠﺎت اﻟﻤﺼﺮﻓﯿﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ أو اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت 
      ﺟﻮدة ﺧﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ ﻟﯿﺴﺖ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻟﺘﻘﻠﯿﺪﯾﺔ
      ﻻ ﯾﻘﺪم اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﺗﻨﻮع ﻓﻰ اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﮫ
      ﺷﺒﻜﮫ ﻓﺮوع اﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻛﺎﻓﯿﮫ
      اﻟﺒﻨﻚ إﺳﻼﻣﻲ ﻣﻤﺎﺛﻞ ﻟﻠﺒﻨﻚ اﻟﺘﻘﻠﯿﺪى
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      اﻟﻌﺎﺋد اﻟذى ﯾوﻓره اﻟﺑﻧك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ ﻏﯾر ﻣﻣﺎﺛل ﻟﻠﺑﻧك ﻟﻠﺗﻘﻠﯾدى 
 
  ؟ﻣﺎذا ﯾﻨﺒﻐﻲ أن ﺗﻜﻮن أھﺪاف اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ :2اﻟﺳؤال 
 5 4 3 2 1 
 أھداف ﺷرﻋﯾﮫ
      ﺗطﺑﯾق اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ
      ﺗﺟﻧب اﻟرﺑﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻛﺎﻓﮫ اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﻘدﻣﮫ
      ﻣﺳﺎﻋدة اﻟﻣﺳﻠﻣﯾن ﻓﻲ ﺗﻘوي ﷲ
  إﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫأھداف 
      ﻧﺷر وﺗﻣوﯾل ﻣﺷروﻋﺎت اﻟﺗﻧﻣﯾﮫ اﻟﻣﺳﺗداﻣﮫ 
      اﻟﻣﺳﺎھﻣﮫ ﻓﻲ رﻓﻊ ﻣﺳﺗوي ﻣﻌﯾﺷﺔ اﻟﻣﺟﺗﻣﻊ 
      اﻟﻣﺳﺎھﻣﮫ ﻓﻲ ﺣل اﻟﻣﺷﻛﻼت اﻹﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ ﻣﺛل اﻟﻔﻘر 
 أھداف ﺗﺟﺎرﯾﮫ
      ﺗﺣﺳﯾن ﺟودة اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ 
      ﺗﻌظﯾم اﻟرﺑﺣﯾﮫ 
 
  ؟ﻟﻠﺘﻌﺎﻣﻞ ﻣﻊ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ اى ﻣﻦ اﻟﻌﻮاﻣﻞ اﻟﺘﺎﻟﯿﮫ ﺗﺪﻓﻌﻚ: 3اﻟﺳؤال
 5 4 3 2 1 
 اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ
      اﻟﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ ﻷﺣﻜﺎم اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﺔ
      ﺗﻔﻌﯿﻞ ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺰﻛﺎه 
      ﺗﻌﯿﯿﻦ اﻋﻀﺎء ھﯿﺌﮫ اﻟﺮﻗﺎﺑﮫ اﻟﺸﺮﻋﯿﮫ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻗﺪر ﻣﻦ اﻟﺜﻘﮫ واﻟﺸﮭﺮه
 اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ / اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﮫ اﻹﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯿﮫ
      اﻟﺨﺪﻣﮫ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻠﮫ ﻟﻠﻤﺠﺘﻤﻊ
      ﻣﻨﺢ اﻟﻘﺮوض اﻟﺤﺴﻨﮫ
      ﺗﻤﻮﯾﻞ ﻣﺸﺮوﻋﺎت ﺗﻨﻤﻮﯾﮫ
 اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ / اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﮫ اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﮫ واﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﮫ 
      ارﺗﻔﺎع اﻟﻌﺎﺋﺪ واﻟﺮﺑﺤﯿﺔ  ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﻮداﺋﻊ 
      ﻓﺮوع ﻓﻲ أﻣﺎﻛﻦ ﻣﺨﺘﻠﻔﺔ 
      ﺟﻮدة ﺧﺪﻣﺎت ﻋﺎﻟﯿﺔ
 
 ? ﻣﺎ ھﻰ ﺗﻮﻗﻌﺎﺗﻚ / اﻧﻄﺒﺎﻋﺎﺗﻚ ﺣﻮل اﻟﻤﺼﺎرف اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ : 4اﻟﺳؤال
 5 4 3 2 1 
  اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ اﻟﺷرﻋﯾﮫ  
       ﺗﻘدﯾم ﺧدﻣﺎت ﺑﻧﻛﯾﮫ ﺗﺗﻔق ﻣﻊ اﻟﺷرﯾﻌﮫ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ 
       ﻟدﯾﮫ رﻗﺎﺑﮫ ﺷرﻋﯾﮫ ﻣوﺛوق ﻓﯾﮭﺎ ﻣﻌروﻓﮫ وﺟدﯾره ﺑﺎﻟﺛﻘﮫ 
       ﻻ ﯾدﻓﻊ وﻻ ﯾﺄﺧذ اﻟﻔﺎﺋده ﻋﻠﻲ ﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت اﻟﺗوﻓﯾر  
       ﯾوﻓر/ ﯾﻘدم ﺣﺳﺎﺑﺎت اﺳﺗﺛﻣﺎر ﻣﺷﺎرﻛﮫ ﻓﻲ اﻟرﺑﺣﯾﮫ  
       ﯾﻔﻌل ﻧظﺎم اﻟزﻛﺎه 
       اﻟﻣظﮭر اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﺑﻧك ﯾﻌﻛس اﻹﺳﻼم 
       اﻟﻣظﮭر اﻟﻌﺎم ﻟﻠﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﯾﻌﻛس اﻹﺳﻼم 
      ﺷﺒﺎك وطﺎﺑﻮر ﺧﺎص ﺑﺎﻟﺴﯿﺪات ) (إدارة ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﺴﯿﺪات 
       اﻟﺒﻨﻚ ﻟﺪﯾﮫ ﻏﺮﻓﺔ ﻟﻠﺼﻼة  
 اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ اﻹﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫ
       ﺗﻨﻤﻮﯾﮫ إﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﯾﮫﺗﻣوﯾل ﻣﺷروﻋﺎت ﺻﻐﯾره وﻣﺷروﻋﺎت 
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 ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎت ﺷﺧﺻﯾﮫ
 اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن وﻏﯾر اﻟﻣﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧوك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ
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 ....................................... ﺑﻠد اﻹﻗﺎﻣﮫ .3
  ﺑﻛﺎﻟورﯾوس -----ﺛﺎﻧوﯾﮫ / دﺑﻠوم      -----ﻏﯾر ﻣﺗﻌﻠم         ------ أﻋﻠﻲ ﻣﺳﺗوي ﺗﻌﻠﯾﻣﻲ ﺗم اﻟوﺻول إﻟﯾﮫ : .4
 و دﻛﺗوراه( دراﺳﺎت ﻋﻠﯾﺎ )ﻣﺎﺟﺳﺗﯾر ا        -----
      ﻣﮭﻧﻲ ) ﻣﺣﺎﻣﻲ /  ﻣﺣﺎﺳب / طﺑﯾب / ﻣﮭﻧدس                -------- ﺗﺎﺟر / رﺟل أﻋﻣﺎل    ------        اﻟﻣﮭﻧﮫ .5
 رﺑﺔﻣﻧزل --------           ﻣدرس / دﻛﺗور أﻛﺎ -------        ﻣﺗﻘﺎﻋد   --------------ﻻ ﯾﻌﻣل     ------------    
 ----------طﺎﻟب        أﺧري                  ------- 
 --------ﺷرﯾﻌﮫ     اداره اﻋﻣﺎل  -------      أي ﻧوع ﻣن اﻟﺧﻠﻔﯾﮫ / اﻟﺗدرﯾب ﺣﺻﻠت ﻋﻠﯾﮭﺎ ؟ .6
 أﺧري ....................
 اﻟﻣوﻗﻊ اﻻﻟﻛﺗروﻧﻰ ﻟﻠﺑﻧك------اﻟﺗﻘﺎرﯾر اﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ     -------  ﻣﺎ ھو ﻣﺻدر ﻣﻌﻠوﻣﺎﺗك ﻋن اﻟﺑﻧوك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ؟ .7
  اﻻﻧﺗرﻧت وﻣواﻗﻊ اﻟﺗواﺻل اﻻﺟﺗﻣﺎﻋﻰ   ------اﻻﺻدﻗﺎء   ------ﻣﺑﺎﺷر ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك    اﻟﺗﻌﺎﻣل اﻟ-------
 اﺧرى )ﺣدد ﻣن ﻓﺿﻠك( ------
 
 ﻟﻠﻣﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﻓﻘط ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧوك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ
 ﻣﺎھﻲ ﻣدة ﺗﻌﺎﻣﻠك ﻣﻊ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ ؟   .1
 ﺳﻧوات 5أﻛﺛر ﻣن  ----ﺳﻧوات           5: 3 ------        ﺳﻧوات 3: 1 -------أﻗل ﻣن ﺳﻧﮫ             ------         
 أي ﻧوع ﻣن اﻟﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﺑﻧﻛﯾﮫ اﺳﺗﺧدﻣﺗﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺑﻧك اﻹﺳﻼﻣﻲ ؟ )ﯾﻣﻛﻧك إﺧﺗﯾﺎر أﻛﺛر ﻣن ﺧدﻣﮫ( .2
  ﻣﺿﺎرﺑﮫ  -------------- ﻣﺷﺎرﻛﮫ     ----------ﻣراﺑﺣﮫ         ------- ﺣﺳﺎب ﺟﺎري                -----              
  اﺧرى )ﺣدد ﻣن ﻓﺿﻠك( ------              
 ﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣر ﻣؤﺳﺳﻰ ------ﻣﺳﺗﺛﻣر ﻓردى   ------ﻟدﯾك ﺣﺳﺎب ﺑﺎﻟﺑﻧك   ------ﻋﻣﯾل    ----- ﻣن اى ﻓﺋﮫ ﺗﻧﺗﻣﻰ؟ .3
 
أﺷﻜﺮك ﻋﻠﻰ وﻗﺘﻚ ﻻﺳﺘﻜﻤﺎل ھﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﺒﯿﺎن. ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪﺗﻚ ﻣﺤﻞ ﺗﻘﺪﯾﺮ ﻛﺒﯿﺮ ﺟﺪا ﻓﻲ ﺗﻮﻓﯿﺮ ھﺬه اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت. إذا ﻛﺎن  •
ﺗﻮد أن ﺗﺨﺒﺮﻧﺎ ﺑﮫ ﻋﻦ ھﺬا اﻻﺳﺘﺒﯿﺎن أو ﺗﻌﻠﯿﻘﺎت أﺧﺮى ﺗﻌﺘﻘﺪ أﻧﮭﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺗﺴﺎﻋﺪﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻓﮭﻢ ھﻨﺎك أي ﺷﻲء آﺧﺮ ﻛﻨﺖ 
 ﺟﻮدة اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﮫ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﻨﻮك اﻻﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ واﻟﻘﻀﺎﯾﺎ اﻟﻨﺎﺷﺌﺔ ﻣﻨﮭﺎ ، اﻟﺮﺟﺎء اﻟﻘﯿﺎم ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺠﺰء اﻟﻤﻘﺪم أدﻧﺎه
 
 
 
 
       اﻟﺗﺑرﻋﺎت ﻟﻠﻣﺟﺗﻣﻌﺎت اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ وﻏﯾراﻹﺳﻼﻣﯾﮫ 
      ﻣﻧﺢ اﻟﻘروض اﻟﺣﺳﻧﮫ
 اﻟﻣﺳؤﻟﯾﮫ / اﻟﻣﺳﺎءﻟﮫ اﻟﺗﺟﺎرﯾﮫ واﻟﻣﺎﻟﯾﮫ 
      ﻣﻌﺪات ﺣﺪﯾﺜﮫ ﻣﺜﻞ اﻻت ﻻﯾﺪاع اﻟﺸﯿﻜﺎت واﻟﻨﻘﺪﯾﮫ
       ﺟﺬاب  (اﻟﺪﯾﻜﻮر) اﻟﺘﺼﻤﯿﻢ اﻟﺪاﺧﻠﻲ
       ﻓﻰ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﻤﺤﺪد اﻻﻧﺘﮭﺎء ﻣﻦ اﻟﻄﻠﺒﺎت اﻟﻤﻘﺪﻣﮫ ﺗﺘﻢ 
       اﻟﻜﺘﯿﺒﺎت واﻻﺳﺘﻤﺎرات واﺿﺤﺔ وﺳﮭﻠﺔ اﻟﻔﮭﻢ 
       اﻟﻤﻌﺎﻣﻼت اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﺔ دﻗﯿﻘﺔ 
       ﯾﻘﻮم اﻟﻤﻮظﻔﯿﻦ ﺑﺎﻋﻄﺎء اﻟﻌﻤﻼء ﺧﺪﻣﺎت ﺳﺮﯾﻌﮫ 
      اﻟﺑﻧك ﻟدﯾﮫ ﻣوﻗﻊ اﻟﯾﻛﺗروﻧﻰ ﻣﺗﻣﯾز وﺧدﻣﺎت اﻟﻛﺗروﻧﯾﮫ ﻣﺗﻣﯾزه
      اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﯾﻌطوا اﻟﻌﻣﻼء اھﺗﻣﺎم ﺷﺧﺻﻰ ﻛﺎﻓﻰ
      ﺳﻠوك اﻟﻌﺎﻣﻠﯾن ﯾرﺳﺦ اﻟﺛﻘﮫ ﻓﻰ ﻧﻔوس اﻟﻌﻣﻼء
      اﻟﺑﻧك ﻟدﯾﮫ ﺳﺎﻋﺎت ﻋﻣل ﻣﻧﺎﺳﺑﮫ ﻟﻛل اﻟﻌﻣﻼء
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 ﻋزﯾزﺗﻰ اﻟﻣﺷﺎرك ﻓﻰ اﻻﺳﺗﺑﯾﺎن /ﻋزﯾزى
 ..……………طﯿﺒﮫ  وﺑﻌﺪﺗﺤﯿﮫ 
 
أﻧﺎ ﺑﺎﺣﺚ ﻟﻠﺪراﺳﺎت اﻟﻌﻠﯿﺎ ﻓﻲ ﻛﻠﯿﺔ إدارة اﻷﻋﻤﺎل، ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔ ﺑﻠﯿﻤﻮث ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻤﻠﻜﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﺤﺪة، اﻗﻮم ﺣﺎﻟﯿﺎ ﺑﻤﺸﺮوع ﺑﺤﺚ اﻟﺪﻛﺘﻮراه 
 ﺗﺤﺖ إﺷﺮاف اﻟﺒﺮوﻓﯿﺴﻮر ﺧﺎﻟﺪ اﻟﺤﺴﯿﻨﻰ  ”ﺣﻮل ﻣﻮﺿﻮع "ﻣﻤﺎرﺳﺎت اﻟﻤﺴﺆﻟﯿﮫ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﻨﻚ اﻻﺳﻼﻣﻰ: ﻣﻨﻈﻮر ﺷﺎﻣﻞ
 
ﺗﺴﻌﻰ ﻟﻠﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ آراﺋﻜﻢ ﺣﻮل ﺑﻌﺾ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﯾﺎ اﻟﻤﺮﺗﺒﻄﺔ ﺑﺈطﺎر اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﮫ  ﺎرة.ﻛﺠﺰء ﻣﻦ اﻟﺒﺤﺚ، ﻟﻘﺪ أﻋﺪدت اﻻﺳﺘﻤ
اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ اﻻﺟﺘﻤﺎﻋﯿﺔ واﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ اﻟﻤﺎﻟﯿﺔ / اﻟﺘﺠﺎرﯾﺔ اﻟﺨﺎﺻﮫ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﻨﻮك  ,اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺤﺘﻮي ﻋﻠﻰ ﺛﻼث رﻛﺎﺋﺰ أﺳﺎﺳﯿﺔ: اﻟﻤﺴﺎءﻟﺔ اﻟﺸﺮﯾﻌﺔ
ﻌﻈﻢ اﻟﺤﺎﻻت واﻻﺳﺌﻠﮫ، ﺗﺤﺘﺎج إﻟﻰ وﺿﻊ ﻋﻼﻣﺔ ﻓﻲ وﻗﺪ ﺗﻢ ﺗﺼﻤﯿﻢ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﯿﺎن ﺑﺤﯿﺚ ﯾﻤﻜﻨﻚ إﻧﺠﺎزه ﺑﺴﮭﻮﻟﺔ. ﻓﻲ ﻣ اﻹﺳﻼﻣﯿﺔ.
 دﻗﯿﻘﺔ 51اﻟﺨﺎﻧﺔ اﻟﻤﻨﺎﺳﺒﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺼﻒ رأﯾﻚ. اﻻﺳﺘﺒﯿﺎن ﺳﻮف ﯾﺴﺘﻐﺮق ﺣﻮاﻟﻲ 
 
ﻛﻣﺎ  وﺳﯿﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺿﻊ ﺗﻘﺪﯾﺮ ﻛﺒﯿﺮ إذا ﺗﻢ اﻻﻧﺘﮭﺎء ﻣﻦ اﻻﺳﺘﺒﯿﺎن ﻓﻰ اﻗﺮب وﻗﺖ ﻣﻤﻜﻦ وﺗﺴﻠﯿﻤﮫ ﻟﻨﻔﺲ اﻟﺸﺨﺺ اﻟﺬى اﻋﻄﺎه ﻟﻚ
  اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻘﺪﻣﮭﺎ ﺳﻮف ﺗﻜﻮن ﺳﺮﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﻐﺎﯾﺔ، وﺗﺴﺘﺨﺪم ﻷﻏﺮاض ﺑﺤﺜﯿﺔ ﻓﻘﻂﯾﻤﻜﻨﻚ اﻟﺘﺎﻛﺪ ﺗﻤﺎﻣﺎ ﻣﻦ أن ﺟﻤﯿﻊ 
 
 ﺷﻜﺮا ﻟﻜﻢ ﻣﻘﺪﻣﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪﺗﻜﻢ.
 
 ﺗﻔﻀﻠﻮا ﺑﻘﺒﻮل ﻓﺎﺋﻖ اﻻﺣﺘﺮام
 
  ﺷﺮﯾﻒ اﺳﻤﺎﻋﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﻠﺒﻰ
 طﺎﻟﺐ دﻛﺘﻮراه ﻓﻲ ﻛﻠﯿﺔ اﻻداره ﺑﺒﻠﯿﻤﻮث
  اﻧﺠﻠﺘﺮا-ﺟﺎﻣﻌﮫ ﺑﻼﯾﻤﻮث
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